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
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IN TWO VOLUMES

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INTRODUCTION.

MORE and more as man advances in knowledge and capacity does he feel an inward aspiration after an intelligible theory of himself, of the universe in which he lives, and of life, duty, and destiny in it. Some theory, however vague, he must and will have. It is, indeed, quite certain that his semi-human progenitors took little more thought about the matter than the other animals around them. The still surviving savage races, though completely human in form, and at least approximately human in intellectual and moral capacity, are yet in much the same merely animal condition as their predecessors were, in respect of rational thought, knowledge, or moral sense. We cannot deny that they possess some degree of feeling, imagination, and reason; yet we know that they have little more compunction in killing and eating their missionary benefactors than in feeding upon other animals. As the races of men have acquired social organization, coöperation, arts, industries, and a knowledge of their own powers, relations, and faculties, they have begun to look further into the nature of things around them and into themselves: some spirit of inquiry, some thought about the world, however feeble or fantastic at first, has arisen in their minds. A scientific study of the races which still continue in the state of savagery, barbarism, or semi-civilization is sufficient to reveal to us some adequate conception in what manner, by what successive stages "in the dark backward and abysm of time," and by what painfully slow degrees, the progress has been made, in the course of the

evolution of the bodily structure and the new creation of mental power and moral capacity, even from those ape-like creatures of the Miocene period, or from the earliest articulate-speaking men of some later period, up to the highest knowledge and culture among the races of men now existing upon the earth.

§ 1. — INTUITIONAL SYSTEMS.

A due consideration of the earlier phases of the human development, as indeed of all science, may bear profoundly upon the question of a true theory of human nature ; but it is chiefly in an antiquarian and merely historical point of view that the early hypotheses of mankind about Nature and themselves, and more especially about spiritual and demoniac powers, gods, demigods, angels, spirits, and devils, or even the philosophies of the more ancient peoples of whom some record has come down to us, can have much interest or value upon our question of a philosophy of the universe, as it is now presented for the consideration of enlightened minds, otherwise than as the study of the past history of the race may aid in the investigation, not so much by anything they have to teach, by way of throwing new light upon the problem for us, as by assisting in the elimination of errors and misconceptions which still stand in the way.

Every person actually has some theory of his own, whether he knows it or not, however acquired, however crude or simple, upon which he acts and lives, consciously or (as it may be) unconsciously. Even the animal may be presumed to act upon some unconsciously assumed theory that the world around him (so far as he is made aware of its presence) exists for him to live in, and that he exists to live in it as best he may, — an instinctive rather than a rational theory. Not much better or other is that of the lowest savages. The small advance that any stage of barbarism makes upon this theory need not be dwelt upon here. When

we come to the historical peoples of antiquity, in whatever degrees of semi-civilization they were (and this is the best that can be said of any of them), — Chinese, Egyptians, Peruvians, Mexicans, Aryans, Hindus, Iranians, Persians, Chaldeans, Assyrians, Phenicians, Hebrews, Greeks, Romans, — we find that there had taken place among them all (with or without intercommunication) certain extremely varied and fanciful transformations of natural facts, forces, and appearances, or of animal and human qualities, into invisible powers, spirits, demons, deities, and hierarchies of gods and demi-gods, which were personified and figured to the imagination in the most visionary and fantastic ways. For the primitive Chinese, looking out upon visible Nature in a childlike and somewhat sober manner, but without much faculty of speculation or imagination, there was simply the world of things which they saw, and as they saw them, in the heavens above and on the earth beneath. The Confucian practical wisdom of life and conduct, relatively great as it was, still bore this stamp of simplicity. Later Chinese literature is not destitute of some glimpses of deeper thought and more philosophical conceptions. By the more impressible and imaginative Aryans, the glorious morning dawn is magnified into a god (Dyaus), the sun's heat into a fire-god (Agni), the thunder into a sky-god (Indra), and more of like nature, whence came the later developments of the Vedic, Iranian, and Greek Pantheons, representing the powers and aspects of Nature and the faculties and qualities of the human mind, which their own awe-struck and reverential imaginations transferred to visionary deities. In later periods, these childlike beginnings culminated, among the Aryans, in a prodigiously extravagant cosmology, or a kind of theological vision of the whole creation.¹ There was, at the same time, some crude philosophical speculation among them. Some vague outline of methods that might be termed idealistic, materialistic, sensational, and spiritual, or positive and speculative, may be

¹ See *Laws of Menu*, by Sir Wm. Jones.

said to have anticipated the later systems of the Greek philosophy ; but they were, for the most part, theological and visionary, and always crude and vague. Out of these primitive fancies many abstruse metaphysical discussions, and some very profound conceptions, were at length developed in India, in Iran, in China, and in Egypt also. Some of them, indeed, were of such depth and acuteness that they may amaze (if they do not quite confound) the modern philosophic mind ; but they always proceed upon a spontaneously intuitive and purely subjective method. If we may credit the interpretations of Professor Max Müller, these more speculative Aryans, even before the close of the Vedic period proper, had arrived at some vague notion of a universal Self as the creator of the universe.¹ But all this speculation was conducted under the controlling influence of what might be called the Vedic orthodoxy of that olden time, as that of Thomas Aquinas was, under the guiding star of Catholic divinity, or that of Jonathan Edwards, under the dominion of Calvinism. They had (it seems) a development theory of matter arranging itself, a supernatural theory of matter arranged by a spiritual deity, and an idealistic theory of emanation from a Supreme Being, which only had a real existence, the created world of things being all illusion.² But, in respect of philosophical theory or method, all these speculations partake of the vagueness, imaginative intuition, and want of precision that belong to all primitive thought ; and they have little value for modern philosophy, which has advanced far beyond them ; or if not so very far in depth of insight, certainly in method and precision of statement.

In like manner, in Chaldæa, Assyria, and Egypt, the

¹ *Lectures on the Origin and Growth of Religion in India*, by F. Max Müller, New York, 1879 ; *The Sacred Books of the East*, vol. i., the Upanishads, Transl. by F. Max Müller, Oxford, 1879.

² *History of Indian Literature*, by Albrecht Weber, Transl. by John Munn, M. A., and Theodore Zachariæ, Ph. D., Boston, 1878, pp. 232-246.

sun, moon, and stars, the aspects of Nature, mental qualities, and human passions were raised into imaginary hierarchies of gods and demons, which worked upon man and Nature in some vague, cloudy, and incomprehensible manner. The gods were contemplated as a part of the cosmologic world. There are remarkable resemblances or analogies between the theogonies of Egypt and India, as well as great differences. In both, the sun and his motions, the constellations of stars, and the signs and divisions of the Zodiac, played a large part. There was at an early period a near approximation to the conception of One Supreme God, creator of all things, of whom the other gods were only subordinate phases or manifestations, somewhat as the same was true of the Zeus of the Greek Pantheon; and (if we may trust the interpretations of M. Le Page Renouf¹) he was spoken of as the "self-existent," or "self-becoming" One. The sun-god (Osiris) made the circuit of the heavens by day, and passed through a cavernous hole under the earth by night; and the Judgment Hall of the Dead was situated athwart this subterranean passage. There was an amazing faith in some sort of a resurrection and immortality in a reunion with Osiris; but all their ideas were vague, childish, and visionary. In Chaldæa and Assyria, as in Egypt, the reigning king took some particular god of the hierarchy as his guiding patron. These deities were not as yet raised completely above Nature into a spiritual kingdom apart from the material world. In the Zoroastrian scheme of the *Avesta* (an offshoot, it seems, of the earlier Vedic system), a more pronounced dualism appears: the chief gods, Ormuzd and Ahriman, represent more distinctly light and darkness, good and evil; and the conception of them becomes more spiritualized, much as in some of the Hindu speculations. They seem to have been conceived as ruling over Nature in some vague way, or as having (in some unexplained and unintelligible manner) created Nature; but,

¹ *Religion of Ancient Egypt*, New York, 1880, p. 263.

as in all the other systems, while they adhered very closely to natural facts and appearances as they were perceptible to the senses, they made little or no attempt to investigate the actual order and processes of Nature ; nor does it seem to have occurred to them to inquire in what manner Nature proceeded from these imaginary personalities, or from a One Supreme Creator, nor how they were connected with the world of Nature.

A similar personification of natural forces into supernatural deities pervaded the Scandinavian mythology of Odin, Thor, Skrymir, and the Jotuns, showing much vigor of conception in the old Norse imagination. But it is still the forces of Nature raised into supernatural Titans and demoniac powers, identified in some vague way with Nature, and set forth in an extravagantly poetical style ; and the world as they saw and knew it was figured to the imagination under the image of the Tree *Igdrasil*, symbolizing a deep intuition into the constitution of the universe : at least, a modern philosopher may so interpret it.

The Semitic peoples were a primitive offshoot of the white Aryan stem of Central Asia ; and whether they descended into the valley of the Euphrates from the Armenian mountains, or through Southern Persia (as would seem to be more certain), or whether they were indigenous to Western Asia and spread into Mesopotamia from Arabia (as some have imagined), and whatever mythological conceptions they may have brought with them from their original home, or however much they may have borrowed from the surrounding nations, or to whatever extent they became mixed with the older brown race of Accadia, which extended from India to Egypt, or with the Turanian migrations from Northern Asia, they appear to have built up for themselves, out of all existing elements, a peculiar religion and mythology of their own in this very ancient seat of the family known as *Casdim*¹. And whether the Hebrews,

¹ See *Oriental Religions : Persia*, by Samuel Johnson, Boston, 1885,

when they marched out of Chaldæa, took with them but one god of the Chaldæan Pantheon, or whether, when they escaped out of Egypt from Zoan (*Tanis*) towards Mount Sinai, they took with them the chief Egyptian god of that place (*Ankh*, the living one), as Brugsch¹ supposes, it seems to be certain that, after their separation from both Mesopotamia and Egypt, they purged their faith of all but the one Jehovah, and raised him above Nature into a purely spiritual kingdom of absolute will and power, placed above the visible heavens; and they conceived him in a vague and indefinite way as a spiritual power, moving over the waste and void chaos of matter, and moulding it into the forms of the heavens and the earth as they saw them then existing. This monotheistic conception, though still partaking of the character of a powerful Lord that belonged to the Chaldæan and Egyptian protecting deities, became the especial protector of the Jews, his chosen people, and the supreme moral governor of the world; and he was clothed with human attributes and qualities, such as they could conceive him to possess. He was a jealous and fearful God.²

The Heaven-Father (*Dyauspitar*) of the Vedic Hindus became transformed into the *Zeus-pater* of the Greeks and the *Jupiter* of the Romans. Apollo, like Osiris, became another name for the sun-god. The Greek mythology was even more strictly a representation and personification of the powers and aspects of Nature, and of human

pp. 161-278; *Ancient Hist. of the East*, by Lenormant and Chevalier, London, 1869; *Trans. of the Acad. of Sci.*, St. Louis, vol. iv. pp. 1-35; and *Assyria: its Princes, Priests, and People*, by A. H. Sayce, M. A., London, 1885.

¹ *Memoir on the Exodus* (Hist. of Egypt), by Henry Brugsch-Bey, vol. ii. p. 348, London, 1879.

² For a summary of late researches on Accadian, Babylonian, Chaldæan, Assyrian, and Semitic origins and religions, see *Assyria: its Princes, Priests, and Peoples*, by A. H. Sayce, M. A., etc., etc., London, 1885.

faculties, qualities, and passions raised into imaginary personalities; and they were invested by the poets with the attributes of divine intelligences, conceived after such human exemplars as were then possible. The Roman Pantheon, mainly the outcome of the Greek (or of similar origin), was of like nature.

The ruder sun-worship and grosser superstitions of the ancient Peruvians and Mexicans grew up in like manner out of the simplicity of those semi-civilized peoples. They were the product of a childlike outlook upon Nature and themselves, and a merely spontaneous intuition; and they were somewhat similar in character to the oldest myths and superstitions of Egypt and India.

All these systems of thought were the product of such natural perception, spontaneous insight, and untutored imagination as these ancient peoples were capable of, in the childhood of the races. They had little more knowledge of Nature than the unassisted senses could reach. They had no sciences, properly speaking, or next to none, no disciplined thought, and nothing deserving the name of scientific or philosophical method. Not that there was no truth at all in these primitive ideas and beliefs, no religion, no aspiration after a true knowledge of God, Man, and Nature, but that they were vague, uncritical, childish, and in a large measure visionary, superstitious, inadequate, and erroneous.

This hierarchical system of gods did not die with Greece and Rome. The Jews did not put an end to it. It was continued in idea, though under much change of form and name, into the spiritual hierarchy of the Christian Church. It still survives in the worship of the Mother of God, the supernatural Messiah and Redeemer, the Holy Ghost, the saints, angels, archangels, and heavenly powers of the Catholic mythology. Indeed, the whole system of Christian beliefs, strictly as such, was of like nature in respect of its mode of origin in the human mind. It was not directly

the product of philosophical thinking, nor of any scientific study, nor of any critical method, but rather the natural outcome of the spontaneous intuition, the illusions of sense, the purely subjective imagination, emotional feeling, and superstitious fears, and, not least, of the sufferings, sorrows, and despondencies of simple, unlettered, and oppressed peoples in semi-barbarous times ; for they were all as yet in the youthful stage of the evolution of intellectual and moral capacity, not less than of the growth of knowledge, of science, of philosophy, and religious culture in the human race.

Christianity may be said to have had its origin partly in the Jewish conceptions, and partly in those of the primitive Zoroastrianism, or of the later Eastern Buddhism, which had reached Palestine through the Essenic, Therapeutic, and perhaps other kindred sects ; but to these teachings were added at a later day, and in a certain confused manner, the ideas and doctrines of the later Greek philosophy. Metaphysical conceptions were borrowed from Plato and Aristotle. The ethics of the Stoics were transfused into it, and became, in a large measure, the basis of its morals. Its higher conception of God as creative Spirit, its doctrine of the trinity, of a resurrection and a judgment day, of future rewards and punishments, and of the immortality of the soul, were all to be found in the writings of Plato, and were largely introduced into the Christian theology from Plato and Aristotle through the earlier Fathers of the Church, rather than from the Zoroastrians, the Buddhists, the Egyptians, or the Jews. Those learned divines quoted Plato, book and page, even more freely than did Hooker himself in his day. Christianity received discipline in thought from Aristotle, and borrowed mystical conceptions of the supreme Spirit and of ecstatic piety from Jamblichus, Porphyry, Plotinus, and Proclus.

Jesus himself did not claim to be a supernatural Angel-Messiah, nor did the Twelve claim this character for him

before (or immediately after) his crucifixion. His pretension seems rather to have been that of the Son of Man, or of a Son of God according to the Jewish conception of a God-fearing man. The learned research of these later times has clearly demonstrated that the whole conception of a supernatural spirit (or even of God himself), descending to the earth in a human form, came into Palestine with the Buddhistic Essenes and Therapeutæ, and was introduced into primitive Christianity chiefly through the apostles Stephen, Barnabas, and Thomas, the Gospel of John, and the teaching of Paul. These were all imbued with the religious doctrines of the Essenic brotherhood.¹ The Gospel of John also shows traces of some acquaintance with the Platonic philosophy then prevalent in Western Asia. The baptism of John, and of Jesus coming after him, indicates the Essenic custom of bathing in the Jordan, as the Indian Buddhists bathed in the Ganges; and it became an emblem of cleanliness and purity. Thomas is distinctly proved to have lived first with the Essenes of the Jordan, and afterwards with the kindred sect of the Therapeutæ of Alexandria, before he became an immediate follower of Jesus.² Philo Judæus, a contemporary (if not also one of them, as stated by Bunsen), describes them as a benevolent and worthy spiritual brotherhood, a pious, communistic, industrious, pure, and holy fraternity of celibates, who dwelt in villages but not in cities, and were given to studies and good works, to "the love of God, the love of virtue, and the love of mankind."³ Their doctrine and practice are distinctly traceable to the Indian Gautama-Buddha, and even still further back to Zoroaster in Eastern Iran. Pythagoras (nearly contemporary with Gautama) appears to

¹ *The Angel-Messiah of Buddhists, Essenes, and Christians*, by Ernest de Bunsen, London, 1880.

² *The Legend of Thomas Didymus, the Jewish Sceptic*, by James Freeman Clarke, Boston, 1881.

³ *Works of Philo Judæus*, by C. A. Yonge, B. A., London, 1855, vol. iii. p. 523; iv. p. 219.

have been a teacher of *Boddhi* (wisdom), as his name *Pat-guru* (or *Putha-goras*) signifies.¹ The Pythagorean doctrine of the transmigration of souls, and the *Gnosis* of the Gnostics, centring in the idea of an Angel-Messiah, appears to have had the same origin and ground; though the Christian doctrine of vicarious suffering, or the atonement, was contrary to Buddhism. The Semitic peoples and language² alike are shown to have been a primitive offshoot of the oldest Aryan stem in Central Asia, though, as the Semites of history, they may be regarded as a mixture of the brown race of the Accadian cities of the lower Euphrates, of Turanian intrusions from Northern Asia, and of other white Iranians (old Persians or Medes), who founded the Chaldean dynasty of Babylon, and were called *Casdim*. This was the birth of Shem in Hebrew tradition, as it is also in scientific ethnology. The Jewish Elohim and Jehovah seem to have been borrowed out of the Chaldean hierarchies of gods, as the custom was, with the reigning king, to select one only as his special guardian and protector; and so *Jehovah* finally became the one peculiar protecting deity of the Abrahamic Hebrews. The Jewish conception of a Messiah was simply that of an anointed son of God, a human person and a king; it was not at all that of a supernatural angel or spirit descended into a human body. *Mashiach* (Messiah), says Rabbi Schindler,³ meant simply *anointed*; and Jesus never was anointed as a Jewish Messiah. But, as the Buddhistic Angel-Messiah

¹ Bunsen's *Angel-Messiah*; also *India in Greece*; or, *Truth in Mythology*, by E. Pococke, Esq., London, 1852, pp. 359-364.

² See *The Science of Language*, etc., by Abel Hovelacque, trans. by A. H. Keane, B. A. (London, 1877), who cites a later work of Andreas Raube (*Gemeinschaftliche Grammatik der Arischen und der Semitischen Sprachen*, Leipzig, 1874) against the opinions of Hovelacque and Sayce (*Introd. to the Science of Language*, by A. H. Sayce, Professor of Comparative Philology at Oxford, London, 1880). It would seem to be most probable that the primitive origin of their language was the same as that of the race.

³ *Index* of 26 November, 1885, p. 259, Boston.

of his Essenic followers, he was believed, in the popular myth, to have had a supernatural birth in the same manner as Pythagoras, and even Buddha himself, and also Sosyosh, the last and greatest descendant of Zoroaster,¹ was; and a similar mythical belief prevailed among the Greeks with regard to Empedocles and also Plato, whose mothers were imagined to have received a miraculous visit from Apollo, even with the husband's consent,² he having been previously warned by the god in person of the intended honor, as an angel was sent to tell Mary of her wonderful destiny. The Judaizing Apostles held to an *anointed man*; Paul and his Buddhistic followers, to an *anointed angel*, or a supernatural man.

It would seem to be clear from all authentic accounts that Jesus of Nazareth (his name *Jeshua*, or *Joshua*, written Ἰησοῦς in Greek, and Jesus in English)³ was born a peasant, the son of Joseph, the carpenter, and Mary (or *Maria*) his wife; that he received instruction in the ordinary Jewish schools of his time, and diligently studied the Jewish Scriptures, whatever may have been his later connection with the Essenic sect, or however he may have had some acquaintance with the higher Platonic philosophy then prevalent in Palestine as well as in Alexandria; or by whatever originality, clear intelligence, and fine spiritual nature he worked out his own simple theory of the universe, or rather his religious conception of God and Man and of human life and destiny. Whether or not he claimed to be himself the Messiah, either according to the Jewish or the Buddhistic conception, it would seem to be evident that he endeavored to carry out the spirit of Hebrew prophecy in his own higher, more spiritual, more charitable, and hu-

¹ *Oriental Religions: Persia*, by Samuel Johnson, Boston, 1885, p. 128; and *Buddhism in Christendom; or, Jesus the Essene*, by Arthur Lillie, London, 1887, p. 14.

² Proclus' *Theology of Plato*, translated by Thomas Taylor, London, 4to, 1816, ii. 278.

³ *Rabbi Jeshua: an Eastern Story*, New York, 1881.

mane conception of that high office. Everywhere (according to the gospels, at least) he is represented as giving (somewhat naively indeed) as a reason for his acts, doings, and sayings, *that it might be fulfilled, what was spoken by the Prophets*. He seems not to have aimed at any revolution in the political state as it then was (though he was charged with that, and was doubtless condemned on that ground by the Roman judge), but rather to have hoped that the Jews would accept him, if not as the expected Messiah, at least as a reformer of their religion. His teaching (so far as any authentic record remains of what it really was) appears to have been in many respects profound and acute, his character pure, simple, lofty, spiritual, and his doctrine sometimes really great and deep; and his moral heroism appears to have been that of an innocent, inexperienced youth and an earnest spiritual prophet, all-absorbed in his new idealism, and in his sympathy with suffering humanity. His reputed miracles, supernatural birth and resurrection, and the whole Christian scheme of atonement, salvation, and a future life, as grounded on them, were evidently the misconceptions, illusions, and delusions of an ignorant and superstitious age, abounding in all manner of miracles, wonders, and fantastic spiritual dreams.

The amount of all this is, that early Christianity as such was essentially Buddhism in a new form, as Catholicism especially is to this day, but with a new scheme of theological or metaphysical doctrines, elaborated chiefly out of the Greek philosophy. Eastern Buddhism survives in India, China, and Japan, and in the Grand Lamaism of Thibet. It is all of like origin and nature in a philosophical point of view, — a confused delirium of Angel-Messiahs, transmigrations of souls, renunciations, Saviours, Sons and Words of God, Spirits and Holy Ghosts, revelations, resurrections, atonement and salvation, Heaven and Hell, Orthodoxy and Heterodoxy, and, in the sum total, as a mere external form and manner of religious worship, a visionary dream of the

enchanted imagination. And yet what little of philosophy, learning, humanity, morality, or religion there was in those benighted ages, was confusedly wrapped up in these fantastic vestments, and for the most part blended with them, and so preserved, almost inseparably, down to this day. The Christianity of these first centuries of our era has since received, century after century, further additions and modifications, interpretations and expansion, depth and breadth of doctrine, refinement of morals, culture, and general enlightenment from the continually advancing knowledge, science, criticism, and philosophy of all the succeeding ages.

Christianity is not now, nor is it possible or desirable that it should be, what it was in the days of the crucifixion, or of the massacres of Nero, or in the middle ages, or even one hundred years ago. The mythical stories which gathered around the life of Jesus, and were worked up in the superstitious imaginations of ignorant peoples into extraordinary miracles, in an age of ignorance and ready belief in frivolous supernatural agencies, were the life and soul of its earlier days; and they have been chiefly instrumental in keeping the biblical system founded on them alive down to our time. All that immense foliage, flowering, and fruit of thought, wisdom, culture, morality, purity of life, and hopes for eternity, which have grown up over the mythical tale — this fertile root of truth and error, of good and evil — are now able to live and thrive without its aid, by their own roots thrown down deeper into the thought and knowledge of this more enlightened age, and into the heart of all humanity; and these beneficial fruits, in so far as they have been founded upon truth and reality, may survive, and continue to nourish the soul, though that old root should be left to perish in ease on "Lethe Wharf." Not that there is no supernatural in any proper sense; but that the popular biblical or anti-biblical notions about the supernatural are full of error, extravagance, superstition, and absurdity.

In Eastern Buddhism there has been no element of life

and action, of progress in knowledge, science, arts, or philosophy. Its whole tendency has been towards inaction, retreat, renunciation, visionary contemplation, idle monasticism, rest, futility, inanity, and finally death. All on earth is evanescent, useless, and a transient illusion (*Maya*); Brahm is some unconscious entity scarcely distinguishable from nonentity; and *Nirvana*, the end of all for the finite soul, is a state of privation scarcely distinct from utter nothingness.¹ Christianity has at least some conception of a conscious Intelligence, and of a Heaven where some kind of life for the soul is conceivably possible. In Buddhism there is no critically philosophical thought. From Gautama (the enlightened *Buddha*) and his forest Hermits to the latest Fakirs of India; from Jesus to Simon Stylites on his pillar, or to Loyola in his iron shirt, or to the latest Lamaic dreamer in a monastery of Thibet, sitting his life out in a mystical contemplation of the tip end of his nose, and sighing "Om! Om!" (as Hegel said) till death come,—all is vague, undefined, obtuse, illogical (or wanting in any science of logic), and for the most part a crude ratiocination, or a fantastic dreaming. If the whole vast literature of Buddhism or Brahminism, however interesting in the point of view of antiquarian, philological, or historical research, were swept out of existence as with a besom of destruction, if some Caliph Omar could heap it all into one pile and burn it, the advancement of knowledge and of sound philosophy in these later times would scarcely miss it, and it might be a blessing to the future ages of mankind. It would seem that the chief interest in Sanscrit and Hindu literature, from the days of Sir William Jones to those of

¹ Says Professor Max Müller: "If we derive our ideas of Nirvana from the Abhidharma, *i. e.* the metaphysical portion of the Buddhistic Canon, we cannot escape the conclusion that it meant perfect annihilation." (*The Science of Religion*, by Max Müller, M. A., New York, 1872, p. 165.) Or, again, it was that state of the mere *isity* of emptiness whereof it could still be said that *it is*. (*Chips from a German Workshop*, by Max Müller, M. A., 2d ed. London, 1868, vol. i. pp. 280-291.)

Max Müller, has consisted in its bearing on the origin of Christianity, as of most other Eastern religions, and in the direct tendency of learned research into it to undermine dogmatic creeds, and dispel all mythical and superstitious belief in their miraculous origin and supernatural character. Something like the same thing may be said of the Greek and Roman literature and philosophy; for it is, after all, likewise true of that also, that, however valuable, instructive, or delightful the best of it may be, in an antiquarian, historical, or merely literary and educational aspect, it is nevertheless hopeless for the advanced knowledge or philosophy of this nineteenth century to expect to gain from the ancients any new or important light on the great problems of modern science, modern philosophy, or modern life.

The stream of thought and light which poured along the vast ages of antiquity, gathering strength and clearness from Vedic, Zoroastrian, Buddhistic, Chaldæan, Egyptian, Hebrew, or Grecian sources, was transmuted, with whatever refractions or reflections, obscurations or illuminations, into the learning and wisdom of the Christian era, such as they have been. Exactly how much the knowledge or culture of the present time has been indebted to either, or how much to the religion, literature, sciences, or philosophy of the Christian centuries alone, it would be as difficult as perhaps unimportant (if any one were able) to specify. The one most certain thing of all is, that the knowledge of Nature, the insight into any true theory of this universe, or into any true wisdom in the conduct of life in this world, or into any assurance of life hereafter, that has been gained within the last five hundred years, is of more worth and value to mankind than all the rest put together.

Whether the Buddhistic transmigration was properly a transmigration of the soul, or was only a kind of hereditary transmission of the accumulated effects of life called *Karma*, or of both together, after the manner of the Darwinian "heredity," or of the positivist conception of immortality;

Too strong a statement.

or whether *Nirvana* were an annihilation of the soul at death, or only an extinction of all desire for further life under the passions and evils that afflict men, as Professor Rhys Davids interprets;¹ or were something comparable with the spiritual union with God of the Neoplatonists and the Christian Mystics, as Mr. Arthur Lillie is rather inclined to think;² or however otherwise these doctrines may be defined out of any extant Buddhistic writings, — the absence of any intelligible theory of the universe, and of any logical precision, either of thought or expression, in all their confused and visionary lucubrations, is everywhere plainly manifest. Sometimes there is an uncertain implication of something like the universal Self of the old Vedic *Upanishads*; but even this is only a vague conception of the imagination: it is not grounded on any scientific knowledge of Nature, nor upon any rational science of logic or metaphysics. Others interpret them as allowing no conscious thought or intelligence whatever to Brahm, or the first principle of Being. Either way, the state of utter privation of all special and positive existence (as presupposed by all definitions of *Nirvana*) must be equivalent to annihilation; for identity with unconscious being, whether conceived as entity or nonentity, and identity with a conscious universal Self (however that were conceived), must alike be the extinction of the finite personality as such. There are no doubt a great variety of interpretations of *Nirvana* among the Buddhists, as there is also among Christians concerning immortality. The ordinary Christian conceptions are sufficiently vague, visionary, and unphilosophical: the Buddhists have no well-reasoned thought, no strictly logical criticism, among them. Vagueness of thought, or a hazy mysticism, is more palpable and extreme in their writings than in the later Greek philoso-

¹ *Lectures on the Origin and Growth of Religions, as illustrated by some Points in Indian Buddhism*, by T. W. Rhys Davids, New York, 1882.

² *Buddhism in Christendom, etc.*, London, 1887, pp. 41-63.

phy. If they express no such dread of extinction as nearly all Christian peoples have, it would seem to be still more profoundly implied and felt as exhibited in the general inanity, listlessness, thorough disgust of this world and its affairs, and indifference to everything practical, desirable, or useful in life. On any theory of a universal Self or intelligible Soul of the universe, in whatever way the finite soul might be conceived as specialized in it or created by it, it would not necessarily follow that at death it must relapse into identity with it, since that must necessarily depend on the plan, power, and purpose of such a Creator. Without some special continuation of the creative action—if all finiteness were allowed to cease—such extreme privation of actual existence must, upon any sound metaphysical theory, logically and necessarily involve the utter extinction of the finite person as such. If we were to take the most critically philosophical statement (even that of Hegel), grounded on a thoroughly metaphysical and physical logic of universal soul, in place of the uncritical thinking and visionary poetical mysticism of the Buddhists, as essentially what Gautama's philosophy vaguely and darkly aimed at, but utterly failed to reach, and at the same time omitted all consideration of what might be the plan and purpose of the creative thought in the whole universe (as Gautama, of course, did), then Mr. Arnold's¹ poetical interpretation of *Nirvana* as the falling of the finite soul into identity with the universal, as

“The dew-drop slips into the shining sea,”

might be true to the innermost secret of Buddhism.

Professor Max Müller endeavors to make it appear that the *Nirvana* of Buddha himself did not mean a state of annihilation: no religion (he thinks) could ever have been founded on such a doctrine. He gives a specimen of a genuine Buddhistic parable, ending thus: “All living beings

¹ *The Light of Asia; or the Great Renunciation*, etc., by Edwin Arnold, M. A., Boston, 1880.

resemble the flame of these lamps, one moment lighted, the next extinguished; those only who have arrived at Nirvana are at rest. Kisâgotami, on hearing this, reached the stage of a saint possessed of intuitive knowledge."¹ It is a fair specimen also of the ambiguous vagueness and worthlessness of all Buddhistic thought, or rather want of thought. To any clearness of intellect, the "rest" at which those lamp-flames arrived when extinguished was utter annihilation for them, and the "intuitive knowledge" which Kisâgotami reached when she came to know that the same thing must be true of all living beings, could be nothing else but a knowledge (if it were any knowledge at all) that death for them must be utter and inevitable extinction; and it would matter little whether she called it Knowledge, Rest, Nirvana, or Annihilation. Nevertheless Kisâgotami, whether she knew it so or not, might very well be a saint while she did live; but, on all Buddhistic enlightenment, her saintship must have been sadly "sicklied o'er with the pale cast of thought."

"*Arahatship*," says Davids, "is insight into what is impermanent, and all impermanent things are dissolved. *Nirvana* is renunciation of all passion and desire even of a further life, a state of immortal, unchangeable, eternal Peace to be attained here, — a state of perfect Rest and Peace." Such a state must be identical with nothingness, here or elsewhere. Putting the two main tenets of Buddhism together, — first, the illusory nature of life and things in this world, and, second, this Nirvana of Rest and Peace (whatever that may mean to any believer in it), it should be no great wonder that Buddhism everywhere, East or West, inculcates inaction, retreat, renunciation, rest, death. Directly the contrary is the teaching of that truer philosophy of Christianity that would inculcate action, active life, heroic struggle, resolute battle, until death is swallowed up

¹ *Lectures on the Science of Religion, and Buddhist Nihilism*, by Max Müller, M. A., New York, 1872, p. 147.

in victory. Much better, at least, is that last outcome of the culture of Christendom as interpreted by Goethe and Carlyle : —

“ Life ’s no resting, but a doing,
Let thy life be Deed on Deed ; ”

or by Shakespeare, who says : —

“ The flighty purpose never is o’ertook,
Unless the Deed go with it.” ¹

Whether the purpose be good or evil, the nature of duty is not altered, but remains in one sense infinite ; and, pursue it as we may,

“ I to the world am like a drop of water
That in the ocean seeks another drop ;
Who, failing there to find his fellow forth,
Unseen, inquisitive, confounds himself.” ²

With Hamlet, we have to leave the rest to silence and the “ Immortal Providence.”

For Bacon, the end of human culture (or “ Humanity ”) was to be “ a complete power of action ; ” and for Shakespeare, life was not, in the “ dread of something after death,” to be “ sicklied o’er with the pale cast of thought,” until “ conscience does make cowards of us all,”

“ And lose the name of action.”

In this manner, then, have the ethnic and popular religions and their conceptions about God, or the creation and government of the world, arisen and grown into the beliefs of mankind. They have been the outcome mainly of the spontaneous and intuitive method, and never of any strictly inductive and interpretative method. Nor was it by any sound dialectic method of exact metaphysical thinking. A truly philosophical method has had by far too little to do with it hitherto. As was natural and inevitable, the conceptions thus arrived at have been full of extravagant error, baleful superstitions, vagueness, uncertainty, unintelligible

¹ *Macbeth*, Act IV., Sc. 1.

² *Comedy of Errors*, Act I., Sc. 2.

mysticism, fanciful dreaming, and the absurdest inconceivabilities of the blindest faith. But does it follow, therefore, that no rational conception of God is possible? or that nothing exists which may properly be called by that name? Can no philosophy, no science, furnish an intelligent and credible conception? Is it altogether beyond the power of human thought? Is the existence of a creative power and providence in the universe beyond the reach of demonstration by all the evidence and all the logic that can be in any way addressed to human reason in any present or future state of knowledge? We may certainly reject the conceptions of all savages and barbarians, and of all ancient peoples, the Egyptians, the Hindus, the Chaldeans, Assyrians, Hebrews, Greeks, and Romans inclusive. The Chinese as such never had any conceptions of their own that can be worthy of much notice, whatever spiritual dreams may have been included under their Earth and Sky. The Buddhistic notions are not much better. The old Vedic conception of a universal Self, and the old Egyptian notions of a self-existent One, were as original as remarkable. The Christian conception seems to have been a mixture of the Jewish ideas of Jehovah with those of the Buddhistic Angel-Messiah, and with those of the Greek philosophy from Plato and Aristotle to Plotinus and Proclus. To these sources, and to later Christian speculations grounded upon them, or to the speculations of philosophers since the middle ages, we owe the prevailing conceptions concerning God. Biblical revelation, by itself alone, furnishes no clear and distinct conception, — at least none that can bear the test of philosophical criticism. Not that there is no truth contained in it, but that it is vague, cloudy, mystical, visionary, and unsatisfactory to the critical mind. In this respect the Christian, Mahometan, Jewish, Vedic, and Zoroastrian conceptions are of like character. The general notion (more or less common to them all) is that of some immaterial, mystical spirit outside and above material nature, but in some undefined

and unintelligible way acting through it, or operating upon it. Their thought had never gone deep enough, was never sufficiently critical and exact, to discover any difficulty here. In reality, any such conception of immaterial and merely empty spirit (if this were ever what was really meant) could be nothing more than an idle dream of the fancy. It would be something beyond the pale of reason, of all rationality, of all philosophical thinking, and of all science. This notion may safely be rejected in the outset of any critical inquiry upon the subject. At this day of the world's history, it is not worth while to waste time or argument upon such empty spiritual visions of the subjective fancy. Plutarch's conclusion was not so very absurd for his day, that "men's souls, encompassed here with bodies and passions, have no communication with God, except what they can reach to in conception by means of philosophy as by a kind of an obscure dream."

The modern speculations of philosophical theists have been for the most part so biased by preconceived notions, or foregone conclusions respecting the biblical revelation, or by influences growing out of some reverence for Christian beliefs and popular opinion, or some subjection to an established church, that they seem to have been incapable of investigating the subject, or not at liberty to discuss it in a thoroughly critical and philosophical manner. Like Thomas Aquinas, they are bent upon bringing philosophy to their aid in establishing the God of biblical revelation and the church. So of Descartes and Berkeley. Locke takes his conception of God and his theory of the universe from his biblical theology, and only examines into sensation and "Human Understanding:" that is the whole of philosophy for Locke. The rest is Divinity. With Jonathan Edwards, the scope and end of philosophy was, to establish the truth of Calvinistic orthodoxy. Reid and Stewart keep pretty close to the plan of Locke. Sir William Hamilton philosophizes from a similar stand-point. Kant held to

nearly the same position as Locke in reference to theology, and further sought to demonstrate the impossibility of a philosophical (or an *à priori*) demonstration of the existence of God. For that, like Locke and the rest, he took the practical reason and Revelation; at least, such is the scope of the "Critique of Pure Reason." But it is stated by his recent biographer,¹ that Kant himself did not regard this work as a theory or philosophy of the Universe, but only (after the manner of Locke) as a sort of psychology of the Human Understanding; and this is in fact all that it really is, though it certainly made a beginning of a scientific Logic of Pure Reason. Fichte and Schelling, with whatever breadth and freedom of discussion, still sought to bring their philosophies into some keeping with the Christian conceptions of the biblical revelation; and Hegel, while founding little or nothing thereon, in respect of his philosophical method, still endeavored to vindicate the Christian conception of the God-man in the person of Jesus of Nazareth. Much the same is true of Cousin, who nevertheless discusses the categories of impersonal reason, discourses of method, and expounds fundamental principles as grounded on necessity and universality, with a freedom and eloquence worthy of Plato; but he completes no theory of the Universe (or of God, Nature, and Man), endeavoring to keep within the pale of the received Christian religion. Like the others named, he seeks to reconcile philosophy with Christianity, as if that were a foregone necessity of all philosophy. At the same time, he lays more stress on scientific knowledge than his predecessors. He would bring all science within the scope of his method; and he developed intellectual conceptions that are more in keeping with the results of science. He has much of the breadth and depth of Plato and the Neoplatonists. He places the True, the Good, and the Beautiful, and also the Moral, upon their

¹ *Life of Immanuel Kant*, by J. H. W. Stuckenberg, D. D., London, 1882.

philosophical foundations in eternal principles, independent of the artificial Christian theories based upon biblical revelation, scriptural dogma, and the traditions of the Church.

Voltaire may be taken as a representative of the Deists of the Eighteenth Century, none of whom ever presented a statement of universal philosophy, or a conception of Deity, which need much detain the critical thinker of this century. Their writings are mainly literary and iconoclastic. Strauss was one of those heroes of literary research and criticism whose labors went back to the life and times of Jesus, cleared away the clouds of myth and mystical halo that had enveloped his name for centuries, and effectually undermined the miraculous supernaturalism of the Christian beliefs concerning him; but Strauss himself built up no rational theory of God or Nature. Nothing better can be said of Renan. Hume reasoned upon an atheistic or agnostic view of man and nature. Schopenhauer was a sort of German Hume. His mind had received much discipline from Kant and Hegel (whom he systematically abuses), but he rejected the theological and theistic phases of their philosophies. He scornfully swept the Christian religion out of view, and, together with it, all sound metaphysical thinking. Mere blind Force, unconscious "*blinder Drang*," produced the universe as it is, the best and the worst possible. Von Hartmann, his successor, better disciplined in the physical sciences, would simply raise Nature into an unconscious God-machine, a blind evolutionary process. One large sect of scientific specialists, without stopping to look further, adopt a purely mechanical theory of the evolution of matter into a universe; and, so far as they profess to know anything, they teach a materialistic machine-philosophy, or what Carlyle called "a philosophy of Dirt." Not that the doctrine of evolution is, in the judgment of all scientists, necessarily materialistic in philosophy, or atheistic in religion; but rather the contrary, as many eminent names of the foremost men of science in all countries may bear witness.

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All science is undoubtedly infidel, or even atheistic, in the narrow sense of ignoring or rejecting the popular biblical myths and superstitions and various theological notions about God and Nature. Precisely what the conceptions of scientific theists about God are, it would probably be difficult even for themselves to state in a strictly philosophical manner. Scientific methods deal with Nature and fact as they are found in experimental observation. As to a theory of God, or of the universe, they are not directly concerned about that: it is rather held up before the scientific mind as an ideal attainment that may be possible in the future progress of knowledge, or in some higher stage of human development. Many of the first living men of science are also very profound metaphysicians, though not always professing to be such. Nothing can be more metaphysical, fundamentally, than the science of mathematics. Zoölogy, properly understood, is as much a metaphysical as a physical science. Man by nature is both physical and metaphysical in constitution. Nearly all the sciences inevitably run into metaphysics when carried far enough. Even physics, as such, is rapidly becoming purely metaphysical; for the great problems in physics now concern matters that are not perceptible to the senses, but are cognizable only by the intellect. Science itself is arriving at the realm of reason, of exact logical thinking, where metaphysics must reign; that is, a scientific metaphysics, not a mere theological biblical dreaming, nor a mystical visionary speculation. This is the proper sphere of philosophy itself. For the most part, hitherto, it has been a misnomer to call science *philosophy*; and in the main what has hitherto been called philosophy has been nearly as wide of any true designation; for it has been quite as much either theological or anti-theological as philosophical. Not that everything that can be said about God is necessarily theological in any censurable sense; it should rather perhaps be called theistical. If science has not yet been able to construct an intelligible theory of

Let me
give them
a fair trial

1.13.

God, Man, and Nature, or if, going upon its present methods, it should never be able to conceive such theory, it would by no means follow that philosophy cannot, nor that science will not, when it shall have become philosophy itself. Indeed, this is the very business of both. If philosophy has failed hitherto to furnish a satisfactory theory, then the greater is the need that it should still endeavor to accomplish it. One thing is certain, and that is, that any philosophy that shall attempt the work, with any hope of success, must be able to take up all science, all nature, all humanity, into clear solution, leaving nothing out, or nothing but nothing. Least of all can it leave out mind and soul, either special or universal. Neither God nor Man can be wholly ignored and omitted. Erroneous, inadequate, visionary, and untrue conceptions may be discarded ; but some true theory must necessarily exist, whether man can attain to it or not. We find Nature, even matter itself, dissolving into illusion before our eyes ; that is, it turns out, under closer inspection, not to be exactly what we had taken it for, but something quite other and different from what we had imagined it to be ; and we are continually arriving at that old Hindu dialectic that ended in teaching that the created world of things was all illusory, and that nothing was real but the one absolute and supreme creative Spirit or Self. We still pursue that other and the Real. When all illusions have vanished, we may find that Nature, Soul, God, are but names for one and the same whole truth. The thing is, to conceive and know the truth aright : when we have attained to a true notion or knowledge of it, we may be perfectly satisfied to call it God. It will matter little what we call it.

But how can man reach such knowledge, or be capable of knowing so much ? Can a finite mind get much beyond itself ? What does the fish know beyond the water in which it swims ? What can man know beyond the environment of air and æther in which he breathes ? As if a man were no more than a fish, or some larger species of ape (and a mis-

chievous one at that, as Harvey suggested), or as if the human mind in its highest estate were not "as a mirror or glass capable of the image of the universal world," as Bacon said. What hinders the human mind from knowing that a principle, a law, a truth, is absolute, is both universal and necessary? — is just as true and real outside of himself, or outside of the planet, as within? An intelligent person may understand the principle or theory of the steam-engine, without being able to construct it with his own hands, and without knowing also the entire molecular structure of steel and water. He might understand it more perfectly by knowing that, too; and still better if he knew also the nature and origin of the molecules, of the laws, forces, and everything else concerned in it. It is not necessary to examine every particle of sand on the seashore to know what sand is, nor every molecule to know what air is. Must there be a new "Principia" for every solar system that the telescope or the spectroscope can discover in the realms of space? What difference if it be large or small? If the human thought could be so expanded or deepened as to become commensurate with all thought, or even identical with the universal mind itself, comprehending all Nature from the central point of view of the whole, would there need to be any new or different theory of the one or the other? Theories are not necessarily mere visions or mystical dreams. There have been foolish theories enough, no doubt; but it does not therefore follow that no sound, rational, and true theory exists, or is possibly knowable, or is attainable by any philosophy.

§ 2. — SYSTEMATIC PHILOSOPHY.

The first philosophy that commands attention here as a critical endeavor to expound a theory of the universe was that of Plato and Aristotle. This Platonic philosophy received its fullest development in their Alexandrian successors. Its maturest statement is to be found in Proclus, who

was nearly the last teacher in a school of philosophy at Athens,¹ when the Roman emperor Justinian laid the ban of Christian power on all freedom of thought. In the briefest possible outline of its essential scope, it may be said to propound a kind of threefold unity or *hypostasis* of the Good, the Intelligence, and Soul in Nature, in a continuous and concrete whole as the One and All of Being. The True, the Beautiful, and the Good appear to have been conceived, not as ideas in our sense of the term, nor exactly in the sense of Plato's own doctrine of Ideas, but rather as ideal qualities of the One in the aspect of the final cause (in the sense of the *reason why*) of all creation. The Intelligence seems to have been conceived as universal Reason, not exactly as having a material existence, but as having a real, unchangeable, and eternal essence or truth as the necessary principles of all rationality, and as having within it also an active principle of movement, moving itself, or (in other words, perhaps) being in an eternal state of movement as a last fact and an absolute truth. There was this movement, this life, in the standing All. As Reason in unity with the self-active (or eternally active) power or essence, it may be said, perhaps, that this "Intelligence" was understood to be the universal mind or the Divine Soul. This Intelligence was capable of establishing within itself an intelligible world of lesser intelligences in a subordinate architectonic of archetypes and types, or less general forms, at once ideal and real, downward through the spheres of the higher intelligences into the souls of men and animals, which were let down or suspended into what we call material nature, and so became embodied souls, and even into material things (bodies or atoms), giving to them their ideal forms and a substantial existence. It would be difficult to say precisely in what manner it was conceived that souls in nature received their life, — whether it were by virtue of an inherent activity of their own as distinctly constituted intelligences, by them-

¹ *Procli Opera*, ed. V. Cousin, I., p. xviii., Parisiis, 1820.

selves considered, or by having life and power imparted to them, partially and continuously, from the activity of the universal Soul itself; or precisely in what manner it was conceived that essence was so constituted as to fill these ideal forms and give them a content; or whether the intelligible form itself alone, or the active essence of the universal Soul itself thrown into the form in the process of creating things in nature, constituted the only substance, essence, or matter (as we call it) which they have as bodies or things: for there is in this philosophy, as in all other ancient systems, a certain vagueness of both thought and expression. For this reason, it is inadequate to the subject, and fails to answer the demands of modern thought. In respect of physical science, in the absence of any scientific knowledge about Nature, their notions were wild, imaginary, superficial, extravagant, and nearly useless for our times. There is no precise statement of the nature and constitution of this universal Intelligence, and of the manner of its movement as "a proceeding intellect." There is no attempt to answer the question how it could be self-active and move itself, nor how there could be an eternal movement in a standing All. There is only the simple assertion of the fact; as if that were all and enough. Nevertheless there are reasonings and conceptions in this philosophy which, however they may need modification in thought, or precision and completeness in statement, may challenge consideration in any philosophical theory of the universe.

Historically, this Neoplatonic philosophy culminated in spiritualistic conceptions concerning God that passed over into a sort of mystical ecstatic piety, much akin to Christianity; and the philosophy itself sunk out of view. Indeed, nearly all philosophy perished in the biblical supernaturalism that enveloped the Christian world, or it resumed its function only under the yoke of the church and under the fogs of biblical orthodoxy. Here and there, some little examination into physical nature, and some philosophical specu-

lation, was continued through the middle ages in a suppressed and rather clandestine manner, as was then alone possible.

The next most notable attempts at anything which might be called a universal theory were those of Bacon, Spinoza, and Descartes. These were rather efforts to introduce some philosophic method, in place of the reigning theological supernaturalism, than any exact or complete statement of such theory; but they were methods to be taken universally. Especially Bacon would include God, Nature, and Man within the scope of his philosophy: both Physics and Metaphysics, both mind and matter, the soul with all its powers, faculties, capabilities, practical uses, and employment in the spheres of the Useful, the Civil, and the Moral or Religious, as well as the body and all the rest of material Nature, were to be embraced alike within its comprehensive grasp. They all had to defer somewhat to the biblical theology of their day. Perhaps neither of them could have ventured, in that age, to propound a theory which did not profess to take in biblical supernaturalism as a part of it. Any such scheme would have been denounced as an attack upon religion. As it was, Descartes had to hide his book until he could publish it in Holland: otherwise, like Bruno, he might have been burnt at a stake.¹ There was a beginning of method, but no completely developed theory of the universe: there was scarcely more than a philosophy of Nature, supplemented by a theology of the spiritual Kingdom of Heaven.

From the close of the fifteenth century onward, the general course of philosophy may be said to have branched, much in the same way as in Vedic India, or as in the later Grecian period, into two main divisions or directions; the one tending towards a materialistic atheism or machine-philosophy, like that of Epicurus and Lucretius, the other

¹ Hobbes said that if Descartes had kept himself to geometry, he would have been the best geometer in the world, but he could never pardon him for writing a defence of Transubstantiation, merely to flatter the Jesuits, which he knew was absolutely against his conscience. — Aubrey's *Letters and Lives*, ii. 626.

towards some phase of biblical idealism. In general, these opposing tendencies have represented a false issue: the main battle has been between scientific materialism on the one part and biblical supernaturalism on the other. Which of these two was a true philosophy of this universe? as if it must necessarily be either the one or the other. Still, in spite of this persistent fallacy of an Excluded Middle, there has been some tendency towards a middle and common ground in a truer theory, which, through a deeper analysis and a wider synthesis, rejecting both extremes and repudiating the false issue, has sought to arrive at a completely rational theory, which should be capable of taking up all systems and all sciences into solution in some harmonious unity and completeness, that might deserve to be called philosophy itself. There is as yet no complete and final statement of such a philosophy.

True

N. 15.

The general character of the philosophical discussion hitherto has been that of the more ancient vagueness, obtuseness, and inadequacy, or that of some partial one-sidedness, and in the main upshot it has been for the most part a battling between windmills and chimeras on a false issue. Of this vagueness and inadequacy Spinoza may be taken as an example on one side, and Hume on the other. Hume was a materialistic atheist: Spinoza was neither an atheist nor a materialist, though often so denounced by one or another orthodox. The scope of his method was at least universal. In his style, there is more of mathematical formula than of exact scientific thinking. His statement is rather vague and insufficient than radically wrong; his thought rather stops short of completeness than misses the road altogether. Hume never so much as entered upon the philosophical highway. His thought was a sort of blind groping among the sensible facts of physical nature, and his criticism was mainly directed against the great bugbear of biblical supernaturalism. As to a theory of the universe, he simply had none to offer. In brief summary, it may be said that the

immaterial Spirit of the Bible, the absolute atomic Matter of the materialists, the absolute Substance of Spinoza, the thinking Substance of Berkeley, the one supreme Monad of Leibnitz, the sensational Understanding of Locke, Reid, Kant, and Hamilton, the Mud-Logic of Mill, the subjective Idealism and mystic Theology of Fichte, the theological Identity-Philosophy of Schelling, the absolute Idea and theological God-man of Hegel, the absolute Substance and Cause of Cousin, the anti-theological Unconscious Force of Schopenhauer and Von Hartmann, — the scientific physics on the one hand, and the biblical metaphysics on the other, — all together exhibit the shifting phases and Protean shapes which the long and varied contest has assumed. The one thing that most constantly impresses the mind throughout the entire discussion is this same false issue, nearly everywhere made, tacitly or expressly, between atheistic Materialism and biblical Supernaturalism, as a foregone assumption that *one of these two must be the true theory of this universe*. Wherever a theory was even proposed, it was essentially either an anti-theological materialistic theory, or one compounded of materialism and theology, or one mixed of idealism and revelation. The atheists have endeavored to explain the universe without the help of any God, biblical or other. The theological idealists have sought to draw all Nature, and philosophy too, into the service of the supernatural God-man of the Bible. If there has been anywhere any notable teaching of philosophy itself, it has taken the covert form of literature and poetry.

§ 3.—FOUR THEORIES.

What, then, are the Theories of the Universe that now stand before the world for consideration? They may be summed up into these four : —

- I. The Biblical-Supernatural Theory.
- II. The Materialistic-Machine Theory.
- III. The Mystical-Idealistic Theory.
- IV. The Realistic-Ideal Theory.

Add. . .
*V. The Scientific Realism of
 Creative Evolutionary*

I. THE BIBLICAL-SUPERNATURAL THEORY.

This is founded on the myths and miracles of the Bible and on religious feeling and imagination. It creates for itself a supernatural world, and places it in a purely Spiritual Heaven above and beyond material Nature. God is pure immaterial Spirit apart from matter. Matter is coeternal with Him, or was made of nothing. It takes philosophy to be a science of Matter; and for a theory of the universe (so far as it has or needs any) it looks to the biblical revelation. All else belongs to the unknowable and incomprehensible; and faith in Christ and the Word of God must be accepted in place of all Truth; whereby philosophy becomes impossible and impertinent.

II. THE MATERIALISTIC-MACHINE THEORY.

This is founded on Matter and Gravity: these always were and always will be. Atoms, energy, laws, properties, and mechanical forces fall into the best or the worst possible order, and evolve themselves into the world of things which we see or can observe. Atoms make up molecules and æthers. They are solid and impenetrable, and yet so elastic as to rebound in all possible directions: this is the *kinetic* theory of motion. Gravity is an *ultimatum*, a last fact. Facts and necessities are laws of Nature. Laws do not merely operate, but act; so also conditions. Outside of atoms is the Void, what Epicurus called "The Empty." The æther and the stars fill infinite space; there is no end to them; the farther you go, the more there is of them. The stars are agglomerations of æthereal atoms into masses at definite centres. Heat is a mode of motion: it scatters masses into æther, and cold lets them down again into dead masses. Work is done both ways. All movement is merely mechanical. When bodies and gravity fall into an exact mathematical balance of centripetal and centrifugal forces, you have a solar system that will run eternally, unless some

wandering planet, or a burnt-out sun, should happen to dash it out of equilibrium: then it would all fall to smash, and vanish into æther again. The whole business is thus carried on as well without a God as with one. A Laplace needs no God to make his Solar System go, and there is no proof of the existence of any. Lalande swept the heavens with his telescope, and found none. Tyndall traced a snowflake from the Ocean to the Alps, and saw no God, no mind, in the process. Dumas finds that the vegetal (with the help of the Sun) raises the mineral to organic life, and the animal lets it down again to mineral; one produces, the other destroys; and this (mankind will please to take notice) is a philosophy of creation. Matter has in it the potency of all forms of life. Mind has a physical basis and no other. Thinking is a physiological process, and the work done is measured by the consumption of brain tissue. Feeling is a state of the nerves. Volition is reflex action, the turning of a balance on its hinge, or the motion of the drop in a spirit-level. Memory is residual impression on brain-structure, as if imprinted on wax, or is a well-hammered habit of the cell-tissues. Consciousness is phosphorescent illumination, as when light glows from an electric candle. Judgment is an overweighing of conflicting brain-states, or of "relational perceptions." Reason is only the formal outlines of sense-impressions on the brain-tissue. There is no need of Will or Soul, and no proof of the existence of any: neither microscope nor spectroscope has ever discovered any. Art is a play of brain-tissues into imitations of sense-forms. The ideal is a dream of the fancy. Imagination is a vision-making play of neural states. Emotion is an excited state of the nerves. Morality is the utilitarian result of the mechanical working of the brain: vice and crime are the useless result. Religion is mere superstition: death ends all. Money is the *summum bonum*; but pure devotion to science, that leaves all the profits to patentees and speculators, is highly honorable. Physical science is all the knowledge

worth knowing, and is the only redemption from biblical supernaturalism. All beyond is unknowable and incomprehensible. Positive science is philosophy : all else is either theological vision or metaphysical moonshine.

III. THE MYSTICAL-IDEALISTIC THEORY.

This theory is founded partly on psychology, and partly on supernatural revelation. It is mainly speculative in method, but its speculation is enlisted from the outset in the service of the Scriptural God-man. We can have no certain knowledge of external Nature, but only of the ideas or images which are formed in our minds on sensation and sense-perception. We do not see, feel, hear, smell, or taste the things themselves, but only perceive the ideas of them that are awakened in our thought. These ideal perceptions or images may be, and in fact are, all illusory : they furnish no certain knowledge about Nature. We may in this manner infer the existence of a *Not-me*, but we can know nothing about what it is in itself, nor how it came to be such, nor indeed whether there is in fact any *Not-me* at all. The sooner we get rid of the illusion that there is any reality in it, the better for us. We only know the *Me* : I am myself, I am an Ego. This Ego is capable only of having faith in an infinite Being, pure being, the infinite and absolute, pure activity (*actus purus*), infinite wisdom, infinite love, supreme ideal perfection, perfect personality, absolute and infinite will. The best a man can do is to ignore the *Not-me* altogether, and will to live in the *Me* eternally. This infinite Ego is God : he is a supernatural, immaterial Spirit, which created me and all things else in his own way, but why, or in what manner, it is impossible for man to know, or conceive ; it is past finding out, and he can only believe in the *Me*, and have faith in Revelation. It is a divine mystery, and incomprehensible to the finite mind. A continual approximation to God, however, is the highest wisdom, life, and happiness, and our chief business, in this

world or the next, is ecstatic piety. This world is an illusory scene of trial and tribulation, of discipline and preparation for a higher state of existence. The soul came from God and returns to God, and may have an immortality coeternal with Him, according to the promise of Jesus Christ, the God-man, Mediator, and Saviour. Every soul is divine, or (as it may be) wicked. For salvation it must depend on Grace. There is a Heavenly hierarchy of angels, spirits, and departed souls, ranging through many spheres from the throne of Heaven above to the bottom of Hell beneath, and every individual finds his own place at last. The only source of true knowledge and wisdom is in the biblical Word of God, in subjective ideal contemplation, emotional piety, and will to live an immortal life. The business of philosophy is, to make this theory as intelligible, credible, and acceptable as possible: pure Idealism is the only philosophy worth having.

IV. THE REALISTIC-IDEAL THEORY.

Realistic Idealism holds that the Real and the Ideal are not two distinct worlds, but only the two sides or aspects of one and the same whole Actuality of real Essence and Power. The theory is founded, as the universe itself eternally is, upon absolute and relative necessities, movable and immovable grounds, essential and changeable relations, the logical categories of reason, of freedom and necessity, universal and necessary truths, and absolute Fact. Its method is both analytical and synthetical, is neither exclusively dialectical and deductive, nor wholly experimental and inductive, but is both at once: it is, in short, the universal method of the Metaphysical Logic which takes up all science into intelligible and clear solution. It begins with Psychology and ends only in Ontology, or the Science of all real Being. The analysis finds its completion and absolute synthesis in the identity of the Real and the Ideal. Its Logic is grounded on these eternal necessities, absolute

truths, essential and necessary relations, universal categories of necessity and freedom, and the universal and necessary fact of eternal movement on the basis of the immovable or the unmoved, and the instrumental mediation and reflection therein necessarily involved; and that are, all together and in the complex unity of the synthetic and absolute Whole, necessarily constitutive of pure universal Reason or absolute Intelligence, and of all Reality. Its summary category is that of Universality, Specialty, Particularity, and Totality or One-Wholeness. Freedom is mere possibility, and as such is an absolute fact; a truth that is as eternal and necessary as any other necessity of Reason. Universal Movement is the same thing as Self-movement, and is an absolute fact and a necessary truth as such. The universal and essential Whole, as absolute Content and Form in eternal movement, is eternally and necessarily differenced, distinguished, and distributed into parts, aspects, and special relations within the Whole; and the eternally active and absolute Causality therein involved is eternally and necessarily mediated through these special determinations of essence, form, and relation, as media, means, or instrumentalities, and further differentiated into other specialties of essence and form, and into the particular substances, shapes, qualities, and properties of things in Nature; returning again through them and out of them into its own ever-continuous identity, whereby they vanish as such in a perpetual round or cycle of creation of new in the destruction of old. Such movement in Freedom and under all the categories of Necessity and Reason is thereby necessarily a rational process of change in the movable on the ground of the immovable, and is, in short, an eternal process of absolute Knowing and Creating. Knowing, or Thinking, is nothing else but that. Consciousness is the simple fact of knowing, and is nothing else but that. Such knowing, conscious movement is Will, and Will is nothing else but that; and Will is only partially (not absolutely) free, and is only par-

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tially (not absolutely) necessary. Some limited degree and measure of purposive self-determination to a definite end and aim is both possible and actual therein. Fully defined and correctly conceived, the universal and absolute Intelligence is found to be identical with the absolute logical Notion, Concept, or Idea of all Reality and all Ideality. Nature is the external aspect and manifestation of the continuous evolution of the universal, eternal, absolute, and ever-identical Whole into special and particular parts, aspects, and things, which are as permanent as they are permanent, and as evanescent as they are evanescent, existing as real only in the ever-flowing Ideality of the eternal Reality. Finite souls, in whatever degree, from the lowest self-conscious animal up to the highest human intelligence, are such specialties of essence and form, of soul and body compounded, in the sphere of external Nature; the internal soul being so specially constituted within the external body as to be in itself a special whole by itself considered, and a *quasi* logical Notion (however incomplete), and, as such, a partial and dependent (not an absolute) unity or syllogism of synthetic Apperception and Judgment in a finite personality, sharing as such in the universal reason and life by a certain limited participation therein, and so being itself a special knowing, thinking, and creating power, under a special consciousness of its own, endowed with a certain limited free agency as knowing will or conscience, and capable of imposing law, guidance, and control on its own action and conduct, and of a certain measure of moral responsibility. This may be taken as a brief summary outline of the theory which it will be the main drift of this work to unfold and explain, and (if possible) to establish on impregnable grounds.

*This is, as far as I know, never
 before stated, and perhaps, giving neither
 true identity nor true individuality.*

REALISTIC IDEALISM IN PHILOSOPHY ITSELF.

CHAPTER I.

METHOD.

§ 1. METHOD IN GENERAL.

AT the foundation of all philosophy lies the question of method. It may be said that nothing appeared in philosophy anterior to Greece that properly deserves the name of method. In earlier times, mankind were in such a state of primitive ignorance concerning Nature and themselves, that the best thinkers could only form such conceptions, or invent such theories, as were possible in the childhood of the race. The result was the introduction of all manner of childish vagaries, visionary dreaming, and superstitious beliefs about visible Nature and invisible spirits, demons, gods, and deified men. Leaders and people were enveloped in clouds of superstition and absurdity; yet they were not wholly destitute of common sense, of morality, of religious feeling or thought. There are traces of very early speculations in India, Egypt, and Chaldæa, growing out of their respective religions, reaching to some breadth and depth of thought, and even ascending to the height of some vague conception of a self-existent and eternal Self or Soul of the universe; but it was not until late in the history of Greece that the best intellects began to see clearly through the mythological mists, and that some rational inquiry into

the nature and powers of the human mind, and into natural phenomena, were commenced in a systematic manner. These early investigations were necessarily superficial, heterogeneous, inadequate, and incomplete. There was a beginning of earnest search after truth, and a lover of wisdom was called a philosopher. Some turned their attention to the visible elements, fire, water, earth, air, and speculated about atoms and the stars, the heavens and the earth; others turned their thoughts inwardly upon man himself, his capacities and powers. *Know thyself* became a maxim. The Socratic method aimed at a right use of the intellect in the search for principles and ideas which might be found to lie at the foundation of all thought; but, in the state of knowledge then existing, a method looking to a philosophical theory of the universe was scarcely conceivable or possible otherwise than as a speculative dream. Plato, indeed, did attempt, by the exercise of thought in a scientific method of dialectic reasoning, to ascend up to the highest intelligence, cause, power, and Soul of the universe. He sought to define a rational conception of God as the creator and governor of the world, but his doctrines were still vague, initiatory, and inadequate. However deep and wonderful they were as compared with all that had gone before him, and however they surpass much that came after him, still they fall far short of satisfying the more exact knowledge and more critical insight of the modern mind. There was then no accurate knowledge of Nature, no natural science worth mentioning. The motions of the heavenly bodies were but imperfectly understood: the mechanical theory of those motions was utterly unknown. On such topics the notions of Plato and Aristotle partook of the vagaries and imaginary theories of the age. They had to frame some theory for themselves, though necessarily insufficient or erroneous. Yet Plato laid the foundation of sound metaphysical investigation. Aristotle united the dialectic method of his master with an inductive method of experimental

observation, and laid the foundation of natural science. The Greek philosophy, on its metaphysical side, may be said to have culminated in Plotinus and Proclus; on its experimental side, it found its latest expression in the atheistic materialism of Epicurus and Lucretius. In its ethical aspect, it led to the moral philosophy of the Stoics. In the shape of both the Stoic morality and the Neoplatonic spiritualism, it was absorbed into the later Christianity. In its experimental aspect, it has been continued into the methods of modern physical science. Between these two opposite poles of materialism and idealism, philosophy has, on the whole, librated like a pendulum ever since. All the speculations of the ancients, as compared with those of modern philosophy, are characterized by the vagueness, want of precision, inconclusiveness of reasoning, loose indulgence of the fancy, and a certain participation in the visionary mythologies and popular superstitions, that belonged to those ages. They are now to be regarded only as the initiatory processes of the human mind, however vigorous or surprising, or as a beginning in philosophy. In these modern times, man has reached a far higher stage in knowledge, in capacity, in critical discipline, and in precision and certainty of method. Philosophy now stands on a higher plane: it cannot now be learned from the ancients, though a study of its historical progress may be useful. Their methods do not now answer the purpose of philosophical inquiry. Science ignores them, and metaphysics rejects them, not as entirely worthless, but as inadequate and insufficient. Indeed, the history of philosophy measures the progress of the human mind in knowledge, wisdom, and power of comprehension.

The problem of philosophy really embraces a true theory of the universe and all it contains. Such, indeed, was the aim of the later Greek philosophy; but it almost necessarily failed of a correct solution. In the rise of Christianity, this universal scope was submerged and sunk out of view. Miracles and supernatural revelation were substituted in place

Yes

of all philosophy. The Scriptures and the Church were taken as furnishing a sufficient solution of the whole problem. It has been nearly so down to this day: it has been only within the nineteenth century that this superstitious biblical supernaturalism has been effectually swept out of the minds of the learned, and of nearly all intelligent persons; but it has not yet ceased to disturb the progress of sound philosophy. Through all the Christian centuries, it has swayed more or less the minds of the greatest philosophical writers. It has hung over them like a slowly vanishing cloud, darkening all the sky. The clearing up has been a slow and tedious process. Nevertheless there were always some minds that rejected this overshadowing mysticism. The studies of such men have been directed mostly to physical science and critical researches. But few of them have made any great figure in the history of philosophy itself. Bacon, though perhaps not entirely clear of the Christian supernaturalism, did not allow it to interfere with his philosophical studies, nor with his inductive and interpretative method. This method has been for the most part understood, since his day, as having a drift toward sheer materialism; but such was not his own understanding of it, nor is it the proper tendency of the method as expounded by him. He knew the time had not come, and he did not attempt, to propound a theory of the universe in any systematic manner, though clearly enough he had a general theory of his own, and that theory was to include God, Man, and Nature: it was not an atheistic material theory, but rather a realistic idealism, not fundamentally different from that of Berkeley at a later day. Berkeley, properly understood, was not a mystical idealist, but an idealistic realist. His method was too exclusively dialectic and theological: in this he stood at the opposite pole from Bacon, but their methods looked to the same end. Bacon did not divorce, but sought to unite, the empirical and the rational methods in one.¹

¹ *Works* (Boston, 1866), viii. p. 34; Cousin's *Hist. of Mod. Phil.*, ed. Wight, ii. p. 81.

Descartes wrote more systematically upon an idealistic view of philosophy, but his mind was swayed by theological bias. Nevertheless he laid the corner-stone of sound method, and made a beginning for modern philosophy. Spinoza is perhaps a still more illustrious example of that breadth and independence of thought that are absolutely necessary to universal method in philosophy. But for want of thorough scientific knowledge of Nature, and in the stage in which philosophic thinking was in his time, though his scope was comprehensive and profound, yet his method was too vague and too exclusively subjective and theological in character. His thought lacked critical precision, notwithstanding the mathematical formalism of his style. His method was rather inadequate than radically unsound. The method of Locke did not contemplate a theory of the universe: he sought only a psychology of the Human Understanding, based on sense-perception. His biblical theology would answer for the rest. Following Locke and Hume, there has been a large class of atheistic materialists, down to Auguste Comte and John Stuart Mill, who were all more or less materialistic and positive in method; and many of them were rather literary critics than philosophers. They contemplated Nature merely in its physical and actual presentation to observation and study upon the outside (as it were), and made little or no attempt at obtaining an inside view; and so far as their writings were philosophical they partook of the one-sided sensational and materialistic character that belonged to the method of Locke or Hume, and were rather, on the whole, a kind of protest against biblical theology, making false issues with the reigning Supernaturalism, than any serious endeavor to establish a sound and comprehensive philosophical method. Their teachings have had great practical value and importance; for, beyond question, the actual world of Nature (in which our lot on earth is cast), and the practical affairs of human life in it, the faculties, capacities, and powers of the race to cope with

it, and use or control it, and build up within it the best conditions and mode of individual, social, and political life, — arts, sciences, industries, and institutions, — are most real, actual, and immediate, and demand the first attention, and indeed furnish an all-absorbing, practically necessary, clearly useful, and almost exclusive occupation for the mass of mankind. While they have greatly advanced the state of civilization, and aided in the progress of knowledge, they have propounded no theory of the universe at all, or none that deserves any mention here. Pursuing the same narrow method of sense-perception and experience, there has arisen in these modern times an immense body of scientific specialists who limit their methods, their inquiries, and, for the most part, their knowledge and their thought, to material Nature and natural sciences. These deny the possibility of any knowledge beyond the sphere of experimental research. They ignore, or rather profess to ignore, metaphysics altogether (for the thing in itself would be impossible), and, in like manner as the former class of thinkers, they rather place themselves in antagonism with biblical supernaturalism than make any question of philosophy itself. They begin by denying the possibility of any. They have no philosophical method whatever, but only certain special methods of scientific research into the facts of physical and natural phenomena. For them the world is merely a cosmic aggregation of facts and necessities, commonly called laws. These narrow methods are doubtless effectual for the purposes proposed by those who adopt them ; but they are manifestly inadequate to the purposes of philosophy. They do not, and cannot, even pretend to propound a theory of the universe ; at best there can be for them only a material, atomic cosmos. If these methods were exhausted, they would still be as far as ever from such a theory. In fact they are becoming more and more metaphysical as they penetrate deeper into Nature, and approach the metaphysical sphere. In the end they may arrive at some rationally philosophical

method. There is another class of scientific men, however, who recognize the fundamental truth that there is really a *beyond-physics*, a scientific metaphysics, and make it a light and a guide in their special researches. But in reference to philosophy itself, they hold themselves in reserve, not venturing to anticipate too far the future results of all science. After the example of Bacon, they await the completion of both natural and metaphysical knowledge, before undertaking to reconstruct the fabric of philosophy. In truth it belongs, not to physical science, but to speculative philosophy, or the science of Logic and Metaphysic, to establish a universal method, and to propound a philosophical theory of the universe.

There is another class of thinkers, not belonging especially to science, to theology, or to philosophy, who write rather as literary critics and moralists than as philosophers. They have made themselves acquainted with the existing state of knowledge in nearly every department, and with all past states of knowledge and culture among men. They do not expound any systematic philosophy or theory of the universe, but it is evident from their writings that they have some general theory of their own, which underlies all their thought and criticism. They freely accept the results of science and of historical and critical research. They have, in most instances, come from the side of theology or a Christian education, but they reject the authority of miracles, dogma, and supernatural revelation. They are idealists, or rather idealistic realists, in philosophy. If they have not mastered all philosophical systems, their studies have taken a wide range through ancient and modern philosophy, through the divinity of the Christian Church, and through the literature of all nations and ages as well as through all modern science; for they have been men of all knowledge. Their wisdom does not consist merely in learning from books: they have observed and studied nature, men, and things for themselves. They were not only knowers,

but original thinkers. With them, intellectual, moral, and spiritual truth, and practical wisdom were even more important than merely physical and natural science, or theoretical philosophy. What was their theory of this universe? They have nowhere distinctly told us: they do not think it their business, perhaps, to set forth a philosophy in terms as such. It may be gathered, however, for one thing, that they regarded this universe as intellectual and spiritual in its essential and innermost nature, as throughout, and from top to bottom, both "natural and supernatural," or rather as both essential and superessential, not as two, as it appears, but as really one and the same, in whatever differences of law and form in the different spheres of the whole reality. For them it was, and is eternally, the work of intelligent and artistically creative thought or Soul, and of that essential power which is necessarily both Providence and Fate in all that is created. What was their method? They have not distinctly expounded any. It may be gathered, perhaps, that they had no other method than that of rational, intelligent thinking, and the right use of their own reason upon all their knowledge, however acquired. Evidently they have deemed it less important to set forth a philosophy, or to expound a method, than to instruct mankind upon the great laws of reason, of wisdom, of moral and spiritual beauty, of life and action, of duty and heroism, love and charity, by which the lives and conduct, the fortunes and the fates of men and women should be governed, and are in fact governed, whether they know and believe it or not, as parts of all humanity, as members of families, communities, and states, and as children of the Supreme Creator of all. As representatives of this class of thinkers, I may venture to name Herder, Richter, Goethe, Carlyle, Emerson, not to extend the list further. All this seems very fine. Still we would like to know the ground of such sweeping conclusions, in what manner they have been reached, and by what means we may convince ourselves of their truth. Is it not

very much as if some richly endowed person had discovered or invented a ladder to all knowledge and all high designs, by means of which he had himself climbed to the top of the Temple of Wisdom, and had drawn up the ladder after him, and hidden it away out of sight, and then stood there upon the lofty summit, calling on all below to come up also, as it were in mockery? or as seeming, like Pallas Athene, —

. . . “to shake a lance,
As brandisht at the eyes of ignorance”?

But if the ladder were put down to us, have we considered the length of it, the life labor of climbing it, and the ability, patience, industry, skill, and genius requisite for the work? Or shall we rather accept the teaching upon their authority, and upon the approval of such judgment as we possess, without further question or labor?

These writers have certainly derived much help from the philosophers, from Plato and Aristotle to Plotinus and Proclus, from Bacon, Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibnitz to Hegel and Cousin. The later German philosophy has made a grand figure in the more recent development of philosophical study and critical thinking, no less than the amazing progress of the physical and natural sciences. If philosophy in France, since the days of Descartes and Pascal, has given origin to the modern scientific Positivism of Auguste Comte and Herbert Spencer, it has also, in such names as Cousin, Jouffroy, Janet, Bouillier, Vacherot, and Ravaisson, made illustrious contributions to realistic idealism. One system after another has, indeed, sought to expose the errors of preceding systems; but, in the elimination of error and in supplying defects, some advance has constantly been made towards stable truth. This is the very process of philosophy itself: a truly eclectic and critical research clears away the errors of ignorance or mistake, that the real truth may become established, or (to state the same thing in another way) it establishes truth that error and superstition may disappear.

In philosophy, several distinct methods have been defined: we have, for instance, the deductive, the inductive, and the speculative methods; the analytical and the synthetical, the externally experimental and the internally dialectic, the empirical and the rational methods. Each regards, or especially is, either a special mode of logical reasoning, or a peculiar mode of investigation. We have the deductive logic from given premises, and the inductive logic from ascertained facts; and we have the experimental, inductive, and interpretative method of establishing facts and laws by observation and experience in the field of physical Nature; and, in the dialectic logic of pure reason, grounded on necessity, we have the speculative method of establishing principles, laws, and truths in metaphysics, or in the world of thought. No doubt each and all are valid and good within proper limits, and when rightly employed for the particular uses and purposes to which they are adapted. But the subject now under consideration is no special, one-sided, partial, or particular matter, but nothing less or other than a theory of the universe, or philosophy itself; and what is wanted, in such an undertaking, is a philosophical method of procedure that may be adequate to such an inquiry and commensurate with such a purpose.

In this larger sense, neither of these special methods alone can be regarded as a sound and complete philosophical method. The Deductive method of Mathematics proceeds upon given data, — upon axioms and facts assumed to be true. As such, it becomes a powerful instrument for the more certain investigation of natural phenomena, and the clearer demonstration of truth in the field of external Nature. Practically, mathematics belongs to physical science, though in its farthest reaches it enters upon the realm of purely metaphysical conceptions. As a method, either of thought or of investigation, mathematical science cannot even propose to itself the problem of a philosophy of the universe. The inductive method is, in like manner, by the

very definition of its scope, limited to facts ascertained, or to the work of determining facts; and it can never reach with logical certainty beyond its facts. If it had all the facts of Nature but one, that one might be an only exception, falling beyond the legitimate conclusion of its inferential induction. As practically employed in the field of external Nature, it is a mere mode of observation and discovery, a kind of uncertain groping after facts, laws, and necessities in Nature, rather than any true science of logic, though all sorts of logical reasoning may come into use in its operations. It can never propose to itself the problem of a universal philosophy. Even with the interpretative phase (which Bacon claimed for it) added, it must fall far short of this end. Not until the entire universe of facts should have been examined, determined, and interpreted, could this empirical or merely inductive method venture to undertake the construction or instauration of a theory of the universe, or Philosophy itself. The severer methods of exact science are strictly limited to the field of external Nature, — to the material world as seen from the outside. At any stage of progress upon these methods, Science can only be in a condition to propound an approximate Cosmos of such phenomenal facts and necessities (generally called laws) of Nature, and such physical and metaphysical truths, as it has thus far discovered and established. For such Sciences, therefore, the universe is, and always must be, what is thus far and in this way known about it: the rest remains to them unknown, and perhaps unknowable. Such a method as this of treating of the problem of the universe is not only defective and inadequate, but can have little pretension to be considered a philosophical method, in the proper sense of Philosophy itself.

Another mode of viewing the universe is the theological: it can scarcely be called a method of any kind, and certainly not a philosophical method. It is rather a teaching of traditions and common beliefs about the world, or rather about

God and Man. It is for the most part a dogmatic teaching founded upon assumed miracles and special supernatural revelations. It is rather a moral and religious culture than a philosophy. So far as it has any theory of the universe at all, it is a theory founded upon the authority of miracles and biblical revelations, or upon its own deductions from the written Word, or from traditional beliefs concerning it, aided by such spontaneous thought, superficial knowledge, childish imagination, innate reverence, pious emotion, and such mystical ideal dreaming as the human mind is capable of in all ages, without much help from scientific experience or critical research, or much logical discipline, or any comprehensive universal philosophy. Such a mode of contemplating the world, whatever may be its uses or its merits otherwise, can have no claim to be considered a philosophical method.

Still another method may deserve to be mentioned: it consists of a certain combination of both the scientific and the theological modes of proceeding. The Sciences are accepted as a philosophy of material Nature, and theology as a philosophy of the spiritual world above Nature, and indeed of Nature itself, when the question is of its first creation, or of the providential government of it since it was created. But two defective methods cannot, by mere superaddition, make one good one: the inevitable result is none at all, or confusion worse confounded.

Theology as such may be said to belong to the speculative method: but it is in truth rather that spontaneous use or misuse, or even abuse of it, that has characterized all strictly theological speculations as far back as the childhood of the race. It has been much the same with the use that has been made of it in pure idealism, as in that of Plato, the Neoplatonists, and all the mystical idealists (their disciples) of the Christian Church, — Ficino, Nicolas de Cusa, Dionysius (Denis) the Areopagite, Scotus Erigena, Richard of St. Victor, Reuchlin, Agrippa, Tauler, and Jacob Böhme,¹

¹ Cousin's *Hist. of Mod. Phil.*, by O. W. Wight, vol. ii. pp. 19-

and even down to Bishop Berkeley, Swedenborg, Jean Paul Richter, Coleridge, Frederic Schlegel, and Fichte, the coryphæus of German Idealism of the mystical stamp. In the earlier periods of philosophical speculation, when there was as yet no true science of Nature, when the logic of thought was as yet undeveloped, and all cosmogonies or theories of the universe could be scarcely more than the ideal dreams that they were, it is not surprising that all philosophy should have verged to the opposite extremes of an exclusive study of material Nature (as in Democritus and Epicurus), on the one hand, and a too exclusively idealistic speculation on the other (as in Plato and the Neoplatonists). With some justice, Bacon objected to Plato that "he extolleth too much the understanding in the inward light thereof;" that he relied too much on "discourse and doctrine," and "subjected the world to his contemplations;" and that even Aristotle "subjected his contemplations to terms;" and in his view "the one approached as near to the province of the poet as the other to that of the sophist:" both had left, or rather neither had pursued, "the way of the severer investigation of truth." What Bacon insisted on was a more sure and solid method, both physical and metaphysical, — a married union of the empirical and the rational methods.¹ Not that a sound speculation that should seek for "the eternal and immutable in nature," and proceed upon an exact logic of metaphysical reason and necessity, could be dispensed with, but that a right use should be made of it; and it might properly be employed "universally (with Plato), and aim at a knowledge of principles and forms" (not "abstract forms," but rather "form and cause conjoined," as it is found in reality), and "not for principles only, but for

72, New York, 1854; *Hours with the Mystics*, by R. A. Vaughan, B. A., 3d ed., London, 1879.

¹ *Instauratio Magna*, Præf., p. 10, ed: 1620: *Works*, by Spedding, i. p. 208, Boston, 1861; Cousin's *Hist. Mod. Phil.*, by Wight, ii. p. 81, New York, 1854.

middle propositions" as well ; and, indeed, it should pursue the continuity of that "chain" of causation that "must needs be tied to the foot of Jupiter's throne," and reach from the absolute Causality in the universal Whole to all particulars and to the end of Nature itself ;¹ but not in the way of theological mysticism, merely to uphold popular superstitions, fantastical miracles, and biblical revelations. Bacon's own labors were chiefly directed to the instauration of better methods in natural science and in matters moral and civil : he gave no systematic exposition of this speculative method. For that we must come down to Kant, Hegel, and Cousin. Descartes and Spinoza made vast but somewhat crude attempts toward it. Leibnitz's endeavor was not much better. Even Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason," vigorous and admirable as it was, was yet a failure in respect of the fundamental matter of a universal philosophy : nor is Cousin, however superior to Kant in many respects, or even to Hegel in some, complete or final in respect of universal method. It is nevertheless in Hegel and Cousin and their followers, among all the moderns, notwithstanding all defects, that we are to look for the most solidly grounded and most majestic exposition of universal method in philosophy that has ever yet been made in a systematic manner. Not that even Hegel's use of it must be accepted as perfect and complete, nor that his method, on the whole, is to be adopted as final for a philosophical method in the sense required by Philosophy itself for a full and perfect theory of the universe ; but that whoever will undertake to do more or better towards that end must work from the standpoint of his advance, or begin by overthrowing his groundwork, the metaphysical Logic of the speculative method.

What then is the difference here ? One difference is, that the whole theological use, simply as theological, grounds

¹ *Nov. Org.* I. cv. ; II. c. xxv ; *De Aug. Sci.*, II. c. xiii. ; *Int. Nat. : Works*, by Montagu, II. 543, Philad. ; *Authorship of Shakes.*, pp. 379-393, New York, 1875, 3d ed.

N. B.

itself, not upon metaphysical logic, but upon the authority of miracles and the biblical Word. Another is, that the purely idealistic misuse of it consists in not making distinction between the ideal play of the imagination and feeling of the personal human Ego and those fundamental and eternal principles, relations, laws, truths, and necessities of reason, intelligence, essence, knowing, consciousness, thought itself, as they are and must be universally in all thought, and in all Nature as a creation of thought, though they may also be exhibited in a special way in finite and particular minds or things. These are, in brief, the main differences between the theological and the idealistic, as distinguished from the strictly logical and realistic use of the speculative method. It is this misuse that has led to that imaginative and emotional spiritual dreaming which has been characteristic of all philosophical and religious mysticism hitherto. This Mysticism is not grounded upon the internal and universal Logic, nor upon any knowledge of external Nature: its whole basis lies in the dreamer himself, — in his imaginary assumptions of a Supreme Spirit and a spiritual world, not only above Nature and Man, but infinitely severed from both, for the reality of which there is no possible proof, and no evidence, beyond the mythical revelations, or their own emotional fancies, on which the whole superstructure is mainly founded.

What is wanted is a truly philosophical method that shall be grounded indeed upon a universal Logic of metaphysical reason and necessity, upon the truth and fact of thought, but also upon a thorough knowledge and experience of Nature itself; and such a method may invoke the aid of all special methods of investigation, in their fit and proper use and place, speculative, deductive, inductive, and interpretative, both physical and metaphysical, both empirical and rational.

cf. Vol. II, 197.

4.1.17, 177, 202, 204, 239, 254, 338, 454, 483, 494. 1

§ 2. BEGINNING OF METHOD.

For a beginning of philosophical method, modern philosophy affords no more solid foundation than the position of Descartes, *I think and I am*; for this is the real purport of his *cogito ergo sum*. With him, dismissing for the moment all preconceived notions, I find that I know that I am and that I think. This is a fact for me. One man may doubt it as to another, but no sane man can doubt the fact as to himself. If this be not a fact, or cannot be taken as a fact, then no method, no philosophy, can begin: knowledge would be impossible. This immediate truth is the very fact of being and knowing.* It is not yet a question of the origin, cause, manner, necessity, or law of that fact. When these questions come up, then doubt, inquiry, investigation, may begin. Here uncertainty enters. All philosophy for me must be concerned with these questions; for when I shall come to know, not only the fact of my own being and knowing, but the whole nature, cause, manner, necessity, and law of that fact, I shall then know myself and all that is, concerning me. This involves a knowledge, not only of my immediate self, physically and mentally, but also a knowledge of things external to myself, of my whole environment, of all Nature; and that, again, involves at least a complete theory or philosophy of the universe (God, Nature, and Man inclusive), if not indeed all possible knowledge. In respect of theory merely, it may not be necessary for me to know all the facts of the universe, nor the manner thereof in particular detail; but a universal theory must pervade, comprehend, and explain the whole in an intelligible way as theory. It follows that a theory which will give a full, complete, and satisfactory account of my being and knowing, must be capable also of explaining all being and knowing and all that is of God, Nature, and Man. When the whole fact of being and knowing, and the whole manner, necessity, and law of that fact, shall be

* No, — only the fact of my being and knowing, which is the only way to a complete knowledge of the universe.

intelligible to me, though in theory only, I shall then know all that is directly and immediately knowable or foreknowable concerning it; and if, in addition to this knowledge, I were possessed of a thorough knowledge and experience of all Nature as it now is, or as it has been at any given moment of its existence, I should be possessed of all knowledge. Whoever knows, even theoretically only, all that absolutely and eternally is, may patiently wait for that which shall be, and entertain himself with the search for such traces as may remain of that which was, or has been; that is, for what is, in its own nature, contingent, temporary, and evanescent.

§ 3. INWARD AND OUTWARD.

Starting from the beginning, plainly a philosophical method must needs look inward for what is within and outward for what is without. It must turn inwardly to study the facts of consciousness and the operations of mind in ourselves: it must examine the truth of personal being, knowing, and thinking, and search into the cause, principles, grounds, necessities, relations, laws, and manner thereof. And in logical order, this study must come first; for this alone can be a ground of knowledge, a standard of judgment, a light in the path, and a sure guidance in all further investigation. With this metaphysical lamp surely held in front, a truly philosophical method will then turn its look outwardly and examine into sensation and sense-perception, and, through their aid, into all the facts and phenomena, laws or necessities, of external Nature. In the end, the external analysis may be seen to be the simple reverse of the internal synthesis.

It is not my purpose to undertake to do over again all the work that has heretofore been done in either of these directions. I do not really propose (with Descartes) to wipe out all the knowledge I have acquired, and begin anew, nor (with Locke) to commence with a blank *senso-*

rium. Nor do I propose to go back with the physiologist to the origin of my own existence, nor with Darwin to the earliest progenitors of mankind, nor with Huxley and Haeckel to the first protoplasmic origin of the animal or the vegetable kingdom; nor even to Plato or to Lucretius, nor to Hume or to Hegel: but rather (if it were possible) I should prefer to begin where the latest philosopher left off, and with the best revelations that science, or critical research, or any philosophy, has made hitherto. For in an undertaking so vast and deep, so complicated and difficult (one might almost say presumptuous), there is certainly need of all the knowledge and wisdom that mankind have gained thus far, together with as much more as the philosopher himself may be able to command in any way. To put out all lights and begin in the dark, would surely be the height of folly. To begin where the first human creature began to reason or to philosophize, and undertake to trace the whole progress of thought and knowledge to the present time, would exhaust the lifetime (if not the powers) of the philosopher himself, and still leave his work scarcely begun.

§ 4. INWARD VIEW.

Looking within, I begin with the fact of my own being and knowing. I see it by the light of consciousness; but it has been thoroughly demonstrated long ago that consciousness is the mere fact of knowing. A distinction may be made between knowing and thinking. Both are active; but knowing may be regarded as a continuous state, thinking as a continuous process. The fundamental necessities and relations that are constitutive of pure reason or simple intelligence may be considered as in themselves (properly speaking) not active, but rather as passively operative, or only obstructive: in their own nature they must be something necessary, eternal, and unchangeable, since they are the ground and necessary condition of all possible activity of knowing, doing, and thinking. I perceive that I am

* N.B.
 has already being (or knowing) his beginning (or consciousness) "beginning" here the beginning of a new, not with the "beginning" of the world.

knowing, thinking, and doing by virtue of all the organization, conditions, energies, powers, faculties, relations, laws, and necessities within me. At the bottom of all, and most notable of all, I discover life, the active power, self-movement. What is this that is active within me and keeps the knowing awake, the thinking process alive, enables me to act, and is the first mover in all my conscious doing? I find and directly know that it is I myself; and I may call it Will. I find and know the fact to be, then, that I am alive and move myself; that I can act and do, and can proceed at will to observation, perception, reflection, thought, and action, at least in some measure and in some manner. It is not yet a question of the cause, nature, necessity, law, or manner of this self-moving, self-determining will, but only of the fact of it. As a matter of fact and immediate knowledge, then, I know that I am a self-moving essence and power or will of some kind. Power, potency, energy, force, motion, movement, apart from matter or essence of any kind, would seem to be utterly inconceivable and impossible. Movement, motion, properly means only the fact that something moves or is moving. Power, potency (*δύναμις*), in the proper sense of the word, would seem to mean potentiality, or the mere fact and possibility of something moving, acting, or being in motion. *Energy, action*, signifies the mere fact that something energizes, acts, or is in action, whether producing motion, or merely an equilibrium or stationary balance of action and reaction. *Force* would seem merely to express the amount or degree of energy or action that in fact exists, without also signifying or characterizing the nature of the moving activity, essence, or cause itself. Plato, Descartes, Spinoza, and Cousin speak of a thinking Substance of substances; Berkeley, of a thinking Essence; and others of a thinking Being. Hegel employs these terms, *Being, Essence, Substance*, with a distinction of sense, use, or application. He sometimes speaks of "universal Essence," and of "the power of Substance,"

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but not of a "thinking substance," nor of a "thinking essence," nor indeed of a thinking activity: with him, there is only a thinking "Notion," or "the absolute Idea," an eternal Ideality on the basis of Cognition as the universal Spirit. For the present, whether we call it the universal *Essence*, the logical *Notion*, the absolute *Idea*, or *Soul*, it matters little. Certainly it is a Something, and not a Nothing; but, since (as Plato said) the "*that which itself moves itself*," or (what might be better still) that which is eternally in action, self-moving or eternally moving, is the very best definition of *Soul*, such being "the very essence and nature of soul," I will even call it *Soul*. And since I find myself, in the first fact of being and knowing, to be a self-moving essence or entity of some kind, I will, to begin with, call myself a Soul. The question is not yet of the origin, the how, the why, or of the what this soul is in itself, but merely of the fact that it is, and is so. I have to begin with the fact: no other beginning is really possible for any philosopher. The further inquiry may be of the mode, manner, origin, cause, necessities, relations, or laws of that fact. So far, then, the manner of it is manifestly that of a self-moving essence or soul. This fact is just as certain for me, in the outset, as the first fact of being and knowing: the knowledge of it is immediate and direct. It requires no other proof: it does not lie in proof, but in knowledge. The actual constitution and true nature of soul, universal or finite, will remain for further consideration.

The *torpedo* carries a curiously organized electric battery in immediate connection with his nervous system and brain. When the fish wills to discharge the battery, it goes off and gives a shock; not otherwise. When I will to put my hand up, it goes up, and when I will to put it down, it goes down; not otherwise. Therein I know that I am a self-moving cause, and wield the bodily instruments of the corporeal structure from the brain to the hand; and this knowledge makes it very easy for me to believe that the torpedo is a

With some fact, I have to begin with the fact, no other beginning is really possible for any philosopher. The further inquiry may be of the mode, manner, origin, cause, necessities, relations, or laws of that fact. So far, then, the manner of it is manifestly that of a self-moving essence or soul. This fact is just as certain for me, in the outset, as the first fact of being and knowing: the knowledge of it is immediate and direct. It requires no other proof: it does not lie in proof, but in knowledge. The actual constitution and true nature of soul, universal or finite, will remain for further consideration.

self-mover also in his way. It is nothing to the purpose to say that the body, with its muscles, nerves, and brain-tissues, is a physiological machine, moved by external impressions, or wound up like a clock, and set (as it were) upon a hair-trigger, which the slightest sensation from without, or the least possible movement of the will from within, may let off. But for that movement, however delicate, it might never go off at all. Nor will it do to say that some slight overweighing of sensational impressions and nervous currents, or some tremor in the mechanical structure itself, may do the business; for, while it may be true that in some instances such instinctive, unconscious, and merely physiological action appears to be the fact, we know that in many instances this conscious self-moving will has the power of resisting and controlling such merely physiological and mechanical motions, and of acting quite contrary to such motions. It is, indeed, very certain that without some causative movement from within the soul, or from within or without the organization as such, it is inconceivable — nay, impossible — that it should ever go off, or move at all.

§ 5. OUTWARD VIEW.

Again, looking without, I find all manner of impressions falling upon my senses, and coming from the external world of things, and through the nerves and brain impressing me, the self-moving essence that I am. In consequence thereof, sensations are felt and perceptions arise in me, whereby I learn that there are things external to me and other than myself, and in this I know that I am a perceiver as well as a self-mover; and, considering the matter, it becomes plain to me that no perception is possible without a perceiver, any more than knowing is possible without a knower, doing without a doer, motion without moving essence (or a mover), or effect without a cause.

§ 6. SOUL AND MECHANISM IN NATURE.

It is all illusion, says the physiological psychologist. You think you know, and perceive, and will, and do ; but there is in fact no self-mover, no self-moving (or eternally moving) essence, no knower, no perceiver, no will, no soul there at all: there is only a congeries of muscles, nerves, nerve-cells and brain-tissues, built up by the evolution of matter into a gossamer mechanism of structure, and kept in motion by the little engine, the heart; and all your self-moving, willing, knowing, perceiving, and doing are the mere work of the physiological machine. Consciousness is the result of the flow, as light glows from burning phosphorus; or as the convolution of Sight refers back the light-wave impressions (coming to it from the sensitive rods of the bacillary layer of the retina¹) to the last objects from which they rebounded, and projects upon them their apparent colors, and fills the whole optical range of the eye with seeing, and the brain with consciousness perhaps. Well, the machine does indeed run, and wonderful enough is the structure and operation thereof. By the help of all the sciences, I perceive and know that, too; but if there were no perceiving and knowing I, no soul, there at all, how should I be any the wiser for it if the machine ran till doomsday?

In truth, no machine is self-motive: every known machine is manifestly moved by something other than itself. It may have ever so complex a structure, and contain any amount of temporarily fixed or "stored" force, or energy (as it is sometimes called), that will suffice to keep it running for a certain time, like a watch that is wound up, or like a nebula that is cooled to the stage of a habitable earth; but the immediate cause of the special energies or movements lies in the spring, or in the reservoirs of stored force;

¹ *Sight: an Exposition of Monocular and Binocular Vision*, by Joseph Le Conte, LL. D., New York, 1881.

and the cause of these lies in the maker who constructs the machine and winds it up, and the cause that moves the maker and winder, in either case, lies in his own self-moving I, or Soul. If the universe were nothing but a machine wound up, and the winder were extinct, it would inevitably run down in due time (as some suppose), and never have any power whereby it might be again wound up: it might, indeed, ~~lay~~ as eternally dead as some imagine a solar system would when completely burnt out, unless another dead body should happen to strike it into life again. Nothing conceivable but Soul is, or can be, self-moving. The self-moving power of my soul may be only temporary: it is not now a question of its eternal duration. It may finally turn out that the absolute universal Soul is the only perpetual motion extant, itself (alone of all things else) dwelling in eternity, without beginning, end, or middle, inexhaustible, imperishable: it is not now a question of that. We are just now considering the nature of a machine; and plainly, according to all that is known of pure mechanics, if a machine be entirely cut off from any external force, or source of motion, it will soon come to a stand-still. No one has ever invented a perpetual motion, and scientific engineers confidently predict that none will ever be invented on this earth. Even if one could somehow belt his invention to a planet, he could not be certain of it, though it would doubtless in that case run much longer than he would need a patent right. No doubt a machine will run (while it runs) to a definite end, according to the structure and motive-power that are given to it. We might call this the reason, the intelligence, the knowing, of the machine, if we chose to speak in such terms; and, since consciousness is only the fact of knowing, we might say that the machine is so far conscious. The same thing may be said of a tree, or of other organisms in nature. Indeed, some seemingly wise men have said that a magnetic needle might suppose (if it could think) that it turned to the north of its own free will; and of a spinning-

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top, that it might itself imagine that it whirled of its own accord. Such gymnastic exercises may do for intellectual child's-play; but when the question is of a self-moving power or essence, we find none in a machine, a magnet, or a tree, nor in any natural organism short of an animal brain; nor, indeed, in all animals, but only in those in which a self-moving soul, however diminutive, is discoverable. It is this fact which distinguishes all other natural organisms, not from man only, but from all such animals as do really and appreciably possess a self-moving soul. What should it signify that no well-marked dividing line between organization and instinct, or between instinct and self-conscious soul, can be established by physical observation?—since any rational doctrine of evolution, no less than of creation, must require and presuppose the continuity of Nature's chain, whether denominated of sequence, or of causation. All scientific discovery hitherto finds that life, or soul, whenever either appears in any organic body, is always exhibited from within the most central point, or most interior phase, of the organization. What can it matter, then, that physical experience thus far fails to designate the precise stage in the evolution or creation of the animal kingdom where what may be clearly defined as a special, self-moving soul first appears in the order of Nature? If the physiological psychologist, in his unwearied search for the distinction, will trace backward the growth of the individual, or the evolution of the species, the class, or the kingdom, even to the primitive protoplasm, let him do so and welcome. It will matter little at what precise stage in the process he may discover it; but, wherever and whenever he shall find it, he will have to recognize the fact, and will then know it in his own way. The necessity, relations, manner, law, principle, and cause of that fact will still remain for him to investigate.

Darwin discovers that a leaf of *Drosera* can catch flies and digest them for nutrition. It certainly appears to be

* It is repeated by the psychic action of micro-organisms. See *Science*.

an ingenious trap, constructed by Nature and perfected in the way of Natural Selection, and seems to set itself on purpose to catch flies. Darwin unfolds the structure, and shows the physiological character of its operation and the mechanical nature of its action, and explains how it is moved by interior and external forces, and how it is sprung by the fly: he does not say that it has any conscious intention, but, for all he has to say to the contrary, a simple-minded person might conclude that the mechanical trap had as much soul as the fly that is so foolish as to rush into it. Huxley finds that there is life in protoplasm; Bastian fails to find the beginning ("archebiosis") of it, or himself to create it anew; and Tyndall concludes that there is in matter the potency of all life on the earth. In these first physiological and protoplasmic appearances of it in physical organization, it appears to be accompanied with little more self-conscious intelligence or knowing than a machine exhibits. Yet the structureless mass (called an *Amœba*) will throw out arms or portions of its own substance, and envelop particles of food, and draw them into its interior for digestion, and take other and questionable shapes, wonderfully as if it knew what it was about.¹ It may remind one of Hegel's dialectic of the evolution of the absolute Idea, or the Ideality of the Notion, representing itself here on this small scale. But if we must infer that there is some small degree of self-conscious soul there, we should consider also that this primitive exhibition of it is quite limited, special, and simple.

It is found that there is contractility in muscle, reflex action in ganglions, and a circuit of nervous force through the brain centres; that there is life in the flow of arterial blood; and that the body of man or animal, and especially the brain, is a wonderfully complex structure of infinitesimal cells, fibres, and tissues that surpass in subtlety all the powers and instruments of observation. If the physiologist be a thorough physicist as well, he may resolve all tissues into

¹ See Leidy's *Fresh-Water Rhizopods*, Washington, 4to, 1880.

their chemical elements, into molecules, or even into atoms of some kind, if he will venture to indulge his metaphysical faculty so far as to conclude and believe that they exist, on purely metaphysical proofs: at any rate, no other evidence of their actuality exists for him. He may find also that, in the flow of the physical stream throughout the known sidereal spaces, whether in the whole or in the parts, there is always movement and motion, an activity which may be called life; and that over and above the structural composition of bodies, mineral, vegetable, or animal, and their molecules or atoms, with whatever mechanisms, attractions, and repulsions, elasticities, contractilities, or electricities, oscillations, vibrations, waves, or kinetic mean paths, eddying vortices, or whirling rings, compressions and expansions, they may be attended, there still remains to be accounted for the interstellar æther which fills all the sidereal spaces as far as yet known, and pervades all bodies, even if it do not in some way form out of itself and constitute the supposed atoms or molecules themselves. Now, whether atoms and electricities are not mere modes of motion of the æther in the æther; whether all movement or life does not consist in such motion; whether motion, action, or energy, apart from matter or essence of some kind, is at all possible or conceivable; or whether the æther itself is made up of solid particles, or of whirling globules, moving in a void, or is a one continuous substance; or whether such substance is an elastic solid, or an elastic fluid, or simply another form or mode of that one whole of essence and power which is in fact, or in necessity, self-moving or eternally moving, and which may be identified, in the metaphysical logic of the speculative method, with what we may properly call universal Soul, — I will here leave him to his work of further investigation; for I do not propose to confine myself to the strictly physical methods, but intend to pursue that more philosophical method which is both physical and metaphysical. It may turn out that such is the nature of man, and indeed of the universe itself.

§ 7. THE WAY OF TRUE METHOD.

Returning, then, to the starting-point, I turn my search inwardly again ; for it is evident, from this preliminary outlook upon Nature with all the eyes that physical and natural sciences afford, there is as yet no seeing completely through the universe in that direction and in that way. Science itself does not profess to be able to see through it, but prudently stops short with what it can see thus far : it pronounces the rest unknown, if not unknowable. Surely, then, philosophy is warranted in endeavoring to ascertain the farthest limit of the inward view. Finding it to be an indubitable fact that I am, that I know and think, and that I am a conscious self-moving essence (whatever that may prove to be on deeper examination), the next inquiry, in logical order, should be into the whole manner, necessity, law, principle, relation, condition, and cause of that fact. Until this inquiry be exhausted, — indeed, until it be successful, — it is certain that I can be in no fit condition to look without and inquire into external things, or into sensation and the nature of sense-perception, with any prospect of success. I must first know, if possible, how it is that I have perceptions or conceptions of internal things. Men knew that they could see with the eye long before they discovered in what manner the eye enabled them to see at all ; and it is but quite recently that it has been made known that seeing is not in the eye, but in the brain, or in some convolution of the brain, where the perceiving soul is also present. How should we expect to learn how the soul perceives and feels, or how the mind knows, without looking into its interior constitution, its own nature, operations, laws, relations, principles, conditions, and necessities ? A critical consideration of these matters must needs take us over the entire field of philosophical inquiry, through all the dialectics of thought, all forms of logic, and all the categories of reason or of the understanding, since philosophy had a history ; for the whole of philosophical think-

ing may help us to know ourselves, and to comprehend the laws and truths of our own being and knowing. Having gained in this way all possible knowledge of the facts, laws, relations, necessities, and conditions of thought, both finite and universal, we shall then be the more able to examine successfully into sense-perception and into all external Nature. In this outward direction lies the whole field of natural science, in which the experimental, inductive, and interpretative method, and all other means of practical observation, may come into effective use. In this external outlook, we see Nature on the outside : in the internal direction, we get an inside view, sufficient at least for the beginning of some rational theory of the whole, which, even if it be not entirely true and correct in every particular, may yet serve for a provisional hypothesis upon which to work, until it be completely verified and perfected by the scientifically demonstrated facts and truths of actual observation and experience ; for in the constitution of the universe it is reasonably certain, in the outset, that metaphysical principles, necessities, laws, relations, and truths must stand first in logical order, and must necessarily precede all material Nature, bound up as it manifestly is in the claims of causation and in the limits of time and space ; and just as surely as eternity must embrace all times, and immensity all spaces, and as certainly as the boundless abyss of Nothingness must envelop and contain the whole really existent Actuality, internal metaphysics must reign over external physics. Theory exists before practice, though it be true that our practice may sometimes go before any knowledge of theory. But since, in the present state of knowledge, no theory of the universe which can yet be propounded can safely be accepted, merely as theory and without reference to actual Nature, as absolutely true and certain, but must at best be regarded as in some large measure as provisional only, any theory which even Philosophy itself may presume to expound can claim to be taken, in the science

of Nature, rather only as "handmaid and guide" than as absolute master; for it remains true, in one sense at least, for man, that

"... the art and practice part of life
Must be mistress to this theoretic."

Man finds himself protruded (as it were) into the midst of the universal fact and reality: plainly his practice must begin at once, and in a very small way. He finds himself endowed with both physical and metaphysical powers and capacities of seeing into and through his whole environment and himself, and of intellectually comprehending all that is; for, as Bacon said, his soul is "as a mirror or glass capable of the image of the universal world." But clearly he must allow the intellectual and spiritual mirror to receive the impression of the whole, which he may then find truly reflected in himself. For him, Nature must ever be the one true and perfect revelation of the essential powers, relations, truths, laws, necessities, and facts of the world external to himself. For a true and perfect knowledge or comprehension of that revelation, it is manifest that the whole book must be read. A perfect theory must take it all up into clear solution. As long as theory falls short of this, it can only be approximate and provisional: it must need verification, confirmation, and completion from a scientific and thorough observation of all Nature and a critical and complete study of all knowledge.

A truly philosophical method of proceeding, aiming at such theory, may properly include all special methods. If induction falls short, then why not call in the aid of dialectic and deduction? If these alone prove insufficient, then surely the aid of induction and experiment should not be rejected. If the inside view alone, or the outside view alone, still terminates in darkness, or leaves the subject still opaque, both together may finally render it translucent and thoroughly intelligible. The scientific engineer begins his tunnel at both ends: if his theory, his thought, be exact and true, his cuts

are certain to meet, and let the light of heaven shine through.

§ 8. A SCIENCE OF LOGIC INDISPENSABLE.

N.B. | A sound method must be centred in absolute Logic. The Logic of Hegel may be said to have sprung from the ground of the categories and antinomies of Kant. Hegel brings them up to the point of view of Aristotle, of Plotinus and Proclus, of Plato, Anaxagoras, Heraclitus, Parmenides, and the best of all the ancients. Kant left them in a state of unreconciled and irreconcilable contradiction. Hegel and Cousin summed them up into reconciliation in the Unity of Thought, at the point of beginning (as it were) of all possible thinking or creating, as the old Aryan Upanishad,¹ long before Aristotle, had endeavored to do, though imperfectly. This central point of the "Synthetic Apperception" (as Kant called it, when speaking of the human mind alone), which is shown by them to be just as necessary and true for the universal as for the finite Soul, is that point of unity of the one Whole in which the contradictions are cancelled in the Ideality of Thought itself (the "Notion" or "Absolute Idea," as Hegel called it); but whether it is to be conceived as a mathematical point or mere zero, or as simply the last dividing-line (as it were), where the universal Essence distinguishes itself from the gulf of zero or absolute Nothingness, the Logic of Hegel may leave his reader in some doubt, perhaps; but on the whole it would seem that he intended that the universal Essence, the One and All of Real Being, should be conceived as existing in the manner only of the Notion, the Absolute Idea, or Thought itself, in the unity of which as a One Whole all antinomies and contradictions are resolved into reconciliation and intelligible comprehension in the one universal Essence, whence all finite essences must proceed. Cousin

¹ Khandogya Upanishad (*Sacred Books of the East*), ed. by F. Max Müller, vol. i. pt. i. pp. 107-125, Oxford, 1879.

objected to Aristotle's Being, that "it is only a possibility of Being; form realizes that possibility, gives it actuality, and is therefore the active element." "This Being," says M. Ravaisson again, "is a mere abstraction; it cannot go out of itself, for it is all entirely in its manifestation: it remains concentrated in a mathematical point."¹ The same objection may very plausibly be taken to that part of Hegel's Logic where he seems to begin with simple Being as the purely abstract *isity* of a Becoming to be; but, says Hegel, "the Infinite, conceived aright, can and does go out into the Finite; the Finite by itself has no truth, is in itself mere nothingness, and goes back into its ground, the Infinite; and the unity of the Finite and the Infinite is the Ideal, and is inseparable: this is the only Truth."² This "Ideal" is, with Hegel, the Ideality of the Notion. It is not a point, nor mere zero: it is the whole essential reality, real Being or Essence; but it is an Essence which exists only in the nature, form, and manner of the logical Notion. "The One," says Hegel, "in and for itself goes over into attraction, into its Ideality, and hence the continuity is not external to itself, but belongs to itself and is grounded in its Essence (*Wesen*)."³ It is a one organic Whole and All: the Ideality is inseparable from the essential Reality.

Newton begins his Calculus of the Infinite Series at the mathematical point where the line begins to be described out of nothing into its finite limitations, and the curve into its difference from a straight line. He assumes that a point moves in describing a line or curve; but he does not stop to inquire what moves it, nor what it essentially is that moves or is moved. That was not his immediate business: he was only inventing a Calculus for the practical use of the mathematician. These philosophers were all alike dealing, each in his own way and for his special purpose, with the matter

¹ *Œuvres de V. Cousin*, i. pp. 475-485, Bruxelles.

² *Wiss. der Logik* (Werke, iii. pp. 160-163), Berlin, 1841.

³ *Wissenschaft der Logik*, iii. p. 206, Berlin, 1841.

of how a finite somewhat comes to be projected into a finite form, and necessarily, at the same time, into those categories of contradiction, those necessary principles or laws of Thought, by means of which only was it ever possible or conceivable that any finite thing could exist in Nature, or that any finite image or conception could exist in the human mind, or in any other.

Hegel's "Infinite" here, like Aristotle's "First Mover," is a vague and obscure term. If we ask Aristotle what or how this first mover is, his answer sometimes is, with Plato, that it is the "*that which itself moves itself*," and sometimes that it is God. If we consult Hegel for what he means by "the Infinite," we find no very explicit or distinct answer, otherwise than as the whole of his philosophy may furnish an answer; and that may leave us in some doubt. The proper sense of the word *infinite* would seem to be the boundless, the illimitable, the unbounded, the eternal, the inexhaustible. Mere absolute Nothingness (if such a thing were in fact possible) might be called infinite, boundless. But the term is more properly used (as Hegel seems to use it) to express the eternity of existence and the inexhaustibility of that activity which belongs to the actually existent one and universal Essence, conceived as the Notion or absolute Idea, that is, as God. It may as well express the eternity of the truth of these same categories or principles of all thought; for in this sense they, too, are infinite. As to these truths in themselves considered, space-limit and time-limit (or boundary in the ordinary sense) can have no pertinency: all finite objects or things receive boundary, determination of limits, only under and through them. Yet there is a sense in which the whole actually existent One may be conceived as bounded over (as it were) against (or out of) the otherwise boundless infinity of Nothingness beyond or other than it, or as standing in a necessary relation of opposition to it, as one may distinguish Thought from Oblivion. In this respect, the One must be conceived as

determinate, bounded, limited, finite, and not as infinite in the sense of the absolutely unbounded : such Infinite would necessarily be identical with absolute Nothingness. It is this one determinate Essence that throws itself out, or goes out, into specially determined states, or into particular things, under the categories of Quantity, Quality, and Modality. The Logic of Hegel endeavors to pursue, dialectically, the eternal existence, the essential and necessary relations, course, manner, and law (or the logical necessity), of this evolution. In the first logical aspect, this one Essence, as the Notion, may be regarded (rather in our thought than as it ever was in fact) somewhat as it was considered also by the Neoplatonists, as being as yet in its simplest and least differentiated state, where the one real whole would be barely distinguishable in thought from wholly indeterminate Nothingness, or the sheer emptiness of Negation, the absolute Void ; or, in other words, as being in the simplest state of the Notion itself as such, before any further proceeding into special creation, or further distinction and determination of its own inner and eternal identity into difference and variety. Or it may be contemplated, with Plato, as the standing All of Whole and Parts in one, in which the self-movement into more specifically determinate states, or into finite bodies or things, begins in the process of creating them ; for such things have a beginning, and may have an end as such ; very much as if we should conceive that the homogeneous, structureless mass of protoplasm, called an *Amæba*, carried an independent power of self-movement within itself, and protruded out of its own standing All some small portion of its own substance in the special direction and form of an extended arm or feeler, under these same categories (as is alone possible), and withdrew again the finite arm into the infinite all of itself (if we might for the moment take it for an absolute and eternal All by itself alone) ; whereby the arm indeed vanishes, though no particle of substance has been lost. If this evolution and draw-

ing in of arms were conceived as going on in an eternal circuit of evolution and return from centre to circumference of the whole mass, we might get some true notion of an infinite Ideality. Circular movement, that perpetually returns into itself, is properly infinite, as Aristotle said : to that there is neither beginning, end, nor middle. In this *Amœba* there is certainly some appearance of life and motion in a standing whole, or movement in the unmoved, as if it were a small copy of the universal Notion itself.

Considering the animal as it is in Nature, it is perhaps possible to imagine its molecules to be in such an unstable equilibrium that the slightest change initiated in a single one, or a slight impression from without, might set the whole or some part into movement ; and that such sensible impressions from another body, coming in a particular direction, might institute a tendency of some part in that same direction, until it should meet some substance that would serve for food. This would go upon the supposition that there was nothing there but molecules ; but the fact is, that an æther pervades the mass, and light-waves, heat-waves, magnetisms, and electricities envelop the molecules ; and the moving cause may as well lie in this æther as in the molecules, or in both together. We may reason in the same way with the æther itself, and just as well imagine a still more subtile state of essence beyond the æther, in which a disturbance of equilibrium may be conceived as initiating movement in a mechanical way. That would be a sheer hypothesis, without any ground in reason. Rationally, a universal mass of atoms, as well as a continuous essence, once at a stand-still, must continue so eternally ; for, by the very hypothesis itself, there could be no power extant by which it could possibly be started into movement. From the fact that all molecules as found in Nature are in motion, and that any known equilibrium or stationary balance of action and reaction among them is temporary only, it is necessarily to be inferred, and may with equal justice be in-

ferred, whether we go upon a theory of atoms, or upon the assumption of a continuous Essence, that the movement is eternal, is perpetually returning into itself, and is therefore infinite. But the presupposition of a One whole Essence, existing in the manner of the logical Notion, and as an eternal Ideality in an eternal Reality, would seem to be more philosophical, in the first instance, and far more satisfactory, than the like assumption of an eternal mechanism of atoms and gravity as a source of life and motion ; for such a mechanism must, in like manner, be either self-moving or eternally in motion.

This life, this innermost activity of essence, in our *Amæba*, may very well be eternal in itself, though temporary only as exhibited in that particular animal ; and as eternal (in the sense of perpetually flowing from an inexhaustible fountain), it may be said to be truly infinite. Conceived in this manner of the logical Notion, it may rationally be said that essential life can go out, and does in fact go out, into more finite states or things, and return again into its own universal identity ; but always under these same categories, antinomies, or necessary laws of thought, and never by any conceivable possibility otherwise. And it is not a going out of nothing, nor out of a mere possibility, nor out of an empty abstraction, nor out of a mathematical point, though the work of finite creation, in reference only to the thing created, may always be conceived as beginning at such point. The Logic of Hegel, like that of Aristotle, may have some appearance of assuming a movement flowing out of nothing, or out of a mere possibility ; but when the All of Essence is once conceived as eternally existent in the nature, form, and manner of the absolute Ideality of the real Notion, and as a movement flowing in an eternal cycle in such standing All of essential Reality, and as a last fact and a necessary truth, the eternity of the motion, the inexhaustibility of the flow, its infinity or mere endlessness as such, becomes conceivable and in-

telligible. Mere Gravity, or Atoms, as a *Causa sui*, would seem to be as mystical and mysterious as the immaterial Spirit of the biblical revelation, and as incomprehensible as the world-machine of atheistic Materialism.

These Categories were first (though but partly) expounded in a systematic manner by Aristotle, not as categories of the Understanding only, as was mainly done by Kant, and is still done by the psychological followers of Kant and Locke, but as universal, necessary, and absolute truths, and as principles, of all thought, human or divine, as Bacon obscurely hinted, and as Hegel, Cousin, Rosenkranz, and others, their successors, have more elaborately demonstrated. The Logic of Aristotle was, in its real scope, essentially a philosophy or theory of the universe, and not a mere school logic of formal ratiocination, though he also expounded that; nor a mere play of the understanding, as the Christian world believed and taught, in the middle ages, and until better conceptions of it were derived from the Arabian commentators,¹ or were discovered in a more profound study of the philosopher himself in later times, or were borrowed from the Neoplatonists by the more learned doctors of the Church itself.² A sound philosophy must be grounded on the necessary, the universal, and the eternal. No thought, no science, no philosophy, is possible otherwise. If these categories, principles, truths, laws, necessities, necessary relations, facts (or whatever else they may be called), need further demonstration or elucidation, then let that work be done, or at least undertaken. It is of no use merely to deny their existence or truth, or simply to ignore them, or to relegate the whole subject to the class of persons known or treated as metaphysical and theological dreamers. There may be some of that sort also, but neither science nor philosophy need waste its strength on false issues with them.

¹ *Geschichte der Logik im Aberlande*, von Dr. Carl Prantl, Leipzig, 1853.

² *Hours with the Mystics*, by B. A. Vaughan, B. A., London, 1879.

§ 9. METAPHYSICALLY ONTOLOGICAL.

The method of a sound Metaphysic, or a scientific Logic, begins with the study of the human mind. It investigates the facts and phenomena of conscious knowing and thinking in ourselves, and endeavors to ascertain and establish the fundamental principles, truths, necessary laws, relations, and conditions of the mental activity and process in our minds, on which alone a sound and reliable psychology can be grounded. At first, these matters have to be examined and considered in reference to the finite mind as such, which is the immediate subject of inquiry. A further analysis and a deeper insight may finally discover and demonstrate that these principles and truths are true and real, not alone for the finite mind, but that they are also absolutely, necessarily, and universally true and real in themselves considered, and so must be true for all mind and all possible knowing and thinking; and that therefore, to the extent, degree, or mode of operation, effect, or participation that properly belongs to their nature, truth, and reality, they must be equally true, real, and necessary in God and in Nature as in Man. In this way a sound metaphysical Logic may arrive at an ontological demonstration of an absolute theory of all Being and Knowing, of Thought and Oblivion; and it is thus made manifest that the One and All that really is must be grasped and conceived in its unity, totality, and universality as absolute Mind or Soul, and that any true definition or description of it must be expressed in terms of mind and soul rather than in terms of matter and physics. In this, the differences between the finite and the universal soul should no more be overlooked or neglected than their identities, in so far as identical; and of course it must be understood that the word *soul* here is used in a quite different sense from the ordinary acceptance, but that the term *matter* is used quite in the common acceptance; for philosophy speaks in terms of

mind and soul and metaphysical noumena, while physical and natural science generally insists upon speaking in terms of matter and natural phenomena. Theory concerns only necessary, universal, and eternal truth : it does not profess to reach to all contingent details of phenomenal fact, either in the noumenal sphere of mind thinking and creating, or in the natural or material sphere of the phenomena created ; for both the necessary, universal, and immutable and the contingent, finite, temporary, and changeable are equally true and actual in both spheres. In either case, there is a continual movement and change on the basis of the immovable and unchangeable, or of the unmoved and unchanged. There is eternity invariable and times variable ; there is immensity invariable and variable spaces ; and there is the invariable activity of Essence and the variable finiteness of essences. There is invariable relativity, and there are variable relations. The invariable infinity of Nothingness is, indeed, a conceivable hypothesis as a pure abstraction of thought ; but it is neither a fact nor a possible truth, if conceived as excluding the absolutely existent essence and reality, whereof it is the mere empty possibility. There is unity and variety, the one and the many, the whole and the particulars ; and there is a continuous, never-ending process of creation and destruction, of appearance and disappearance, or (in terms of mind) of thought and oblivion. Philosophical theory must end in showing the identity as well as the difference of the natural (or physical) and the metaphysical (or supersensual), or also of the Real and the Ideal. The two, so far as different, stand in the relation to one another of the internal and the external, or of the essential and the superessential, differing as they differ : they are but two aspects of one and the same identical Whole.

§ 10. SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY.

When science is confronted with philosophy, and a comparison is made between the actual methods, conclusions,

conceptions, and theories of the natural sciences and those of philosophy itself, the discrepancies are so many and vast, the contradictions so apparently irreconcilable, that it is no wonder that science and philosophy should stand in such an attitude of antagonism and estrangement as they now do. That both science and philosophy should find themselves placed in irreconcilable contradiction and antipathy to the traditional theories of both the physical and the metaphysical, and to the whole world of unphilosophical, uncritical, unscientific, erroneous, and superstitious opinions and beliefs, is no wonder at all; since it was always so, and always must be so, as long as any given nation or people exhibits within itself nearly all degrees of intelligence and knowledge, from the very borders of ignorance and incapacity up to the largest faculties and the highest culture, or as long as the differences of race range almost from the savage level of the higher apes up to the most intelligent and cultivated peoples on earth. But that the devotees of scientific research should neglect, or fail to appreciate, metaphysical studies, and should ignore their value and importance, to the extent that they appear to do, at this day, and should so often dogmatically identify metaphysics with theology and sweep both overboard together, and should pronounce a philosophical theory of the universe to be an impossibility, or wholly beyond the comprehension of human intelligence, though not so very wonderful in the present state of both, is yet a thing to be regretted, and as speedily as possible to be remedied. Nor is it wholly neglected in our time: the complaint is but half true. At least in the higher grades of scientific ability and knowledge, the metaphysical logic and the results of speculative thinking are more or less understood and recognized as furnishing a guiding light in physical research, though speculative conclusions alone are not accepted as absolutely valid, or as sufficient evidence for establishing laws and facts in the field of physical Nature, without the verification of experimental demonstration.

In this way the proof is made so complete, the fact so undeniable, and the demonstration so clear even to the commonest apprehension, that it is at once and generally accepted as a basis of action and belief by all possessing intellect, knowledge, or common sense.

§ 11. EMPIRICAL AND RATIONAL.

If a complete philosophy of the universe were already known and established, the true and real method of it might also be known and declared for absolute truth. A speculative philosophy that assumes to have exhausted the problem may also venture to conclude that the mode, manner, law, necessity, and fact of the actual proceeding of universal Essence and Power (as absolute Concept, Notion, or Idea) into an evolution or creation of all Nature, as the ultimate system of the universe, is the absolutely true philosophical Method. This would be a consideration of method from the rational point of view of a metaphysically logical science of the universe. The empirical methods of physical science approach the problem on the side of the external facts, and they are conceived from the external standpoint. They profess only to be in search of a universal philosophy: they do not assume to have arrived at it already. Properly speaking, philosophy is only a search after truth. If all truth were known, we might have an absolutely true and complete theory. In the present state of knowledge, a philosophical method that would proceed with certainty and safety, or make any valid claim to soundness or wisdom, must combine the rational with the empirical method. Science, said Bacon, must "take Metaphysic for handmaid and guide." Reason is the light by which only the true path can be discovered. Provisional theory is the surest guide of experiment. Theory verified by fact is science, is knowledge, is sound philosophy. Facts need interpretation: until we have some theory of them, they mean nothing intelligible. Faraday's facts were clouded in darkness until Maxwell's

mathematical theory began to throw some light upon them. It is plain that, if we are to have a theory or philosophy of the universe that can be accepted as completely and absolutely true and real, the provisional Metaphysic must become as wide and deep as the universe itself. It must be as profound as Thought itself, and the verification must be commensurate with the theory. In short, we must have a Metaphysic, or a Logic, that will take up all science into clear solution, and make Nature itself translucently intelligible.

When Newton had worked out his mathematical theory, he had before him the result of exact logical thinking upon the assumed premises. According to the theory, the moon and planets should be found at certain places at certain times. The next thing to be done was, to ascertain by actual observation whether these bodies were veritably there where theory would place them, or not. The observed facts did not accord exactly with the theory: there had been some mistake in the premises; and it was not until long afterwards, when the length of a meridian arc had been more exactly measured, or certain perturbations not taken into his calculations were discovered, that finally the theory and the fact were seen to agree and confirm each other. Mathematics, in its essential principles, may be said to be a science of the laws or necessities of thought so far; and the science is grounded upon those same absolute and universal necessities, relations, and principles of reason which lie at the foundation of the dialectic Logic as well. In Hegel's Science of Logic there may be found a thorough discussion and criticism of the mathematical use (or rather misuse) of the principles of the logical dialectic in the Calculus, proceeding as it does upon a purely empirical assumption of a movement by successive steps, or short leaps. For the purposes of an instrument of calculation as applicable to an external investigation of Nature, there was in this a certain approximation to the truth that might be deemed sufficient

for such purposes ; but it tacitly overlooked and completely ignored the continuous operation of the internal activity of the logical dialectic of the creative power that is actually producing Nature as it is found presented to external observation, not proceeding altogether by sudden leaps and stoppages, but rather by both a continuous and a fitful process ; and this is really the absolute truth. Hegel's masterly criticism of the empirically mathematical method furnishes, at the same time, a happy exemplification of the logical dialectic of Negativity and new creation. It would seem to be unanswerable.

The error of Newton was not in his theory or in his logic, but in the assumption of premises, or rather in the neglect of facts and data that should have been taken into consideration. He had only undertaken the discussion of a Solar System assumed to be composed of a certain number of bodies. Had he proposed to himself to consider a mathematical theory of the universe, plainly it would have been necessary for him to take into view all the bodies and all the facts of the universe. What would be true of one solar system might, indeed, be equally true of another. It may very well be true that matter, gravity, the æther, electricity, light, heat, and all physical processes are exactly the same, under like circumstances and conditions, for all the solar systems, stars, and nebulae within the realms of space ; but when the question is of the entire universe, in the whole and in its parts, it is reasonable to expect that a still more abstruse, subtle, and comprehensive theory would be required for its explanation. Still more profound and exact logical processes of thought must be necessary to enable the human mind to attain to a comprehension of it. For this purpose we may need a dialectic that shall far surpass anything yet achieved by the mathematical sciences, — a mathematics (or rather a mathesis) of the universe itself. It is generally assumed that these sciences require the highest intellectual endowment ; and it is certainly true that some of the great-

est mathematicians have been also the greatest metaphysicians of their time, as witness Pythagoras, Descartes, Leibnitz; and even Newton may be included, for, though not strictly a metaphysician, many of his discussions involved the deepest problems in metaphysical science, in the handling of which he exhibited a profound metaphysical insight. The same thing may be said of the more eminent mathematicians of recent times, as the names of Thomson, Maxwell, and Peirce may sufficiently attest. Not that it is probable that a philosophical theory of the universe can ever be brought within the range of mathematical equations and formulas. Ordinarily, mathematics is employed upon magnitudes, quantities, lines, curves, surfaces, solids, forms, numbers, measures, and proportions, in practical application to the physical side of Nature: there is also a mathematics of potentials, dynamics, and statics, of energy, force, motion, inertia, and momentum; and some more recent mathematicians, like Peirce and Chase, seem to need a *Vis Viva* also, not merely as seen externally in Nature, but rather, perhaps, as seen from the point of view of the internal, original, and eternally active cause. Indeed, what is any mathematics but exact logical thinking about the matters in hand? What is metaphysics but exact logical thinking about the laws, powers, necessities, necessary relations, and facts of the universe, in a systematic search for the absolute truth? Mathematics deals with conceptions, principles, necessities, relations, proportions, laws, and truths that are neither perceptible to the senses nor cognizable by sense-perception merely, though its intellectual conclusions are sometimes capable of sensible demonstration also. It is the same with purely metaphysical truth.

§ 12. A TRUE METHOD AIMS AT THEORY ONLY.

The fundamental necessities, essential and necessary relations, categories, and universal truths of reason are something different from the ideal images, representations, or

conceptions of the imaginative faculty : they have a real existence and truth of their own. The actual thinking of any given person, the ideas and conceptions he will form, though necessarily involving all these truths, are nevertheless the work of his own thought or imagination ; and they may have little or no correspondence with the realities of external Nature. They are often merely subjective and visionary, but they are not always or necessarily so. We are not now dealing with these purely ideal creations of the inventive imagination, but with those more inward necessities, relations, laws, and categories by means whereof only any and all thinking, knowing, and creative processes must and do actually take place, whether the special thinker himself be immediately aware of it or not ; for we are in search of those truths and realities which must be universally and necessarily true, and therefore in a measure common to all intelligences. All the while, it must be remembered that the absolute Intelligence and its thought or creation, with whatever necessary contingencies and merely fatal consequences, constitute the whole actual universe of which we ourselves are a part, as permanent as it is or as changeable as it is, and as full of fate and providence as it is ; and it dwells both in eternity and in time, in immensity and in space ; while the thought and creation of the finite thinker are as limited, temporary, and evanescent as himself, and are in a measure phenomenal, like any other part or phase of the universal Whole. But, since these principles and truths are the only possible ground and means whereby intelligence, or thinking soul, can exist, or knowing and creating be possible at all, whether for the universal or the finite mind, it is in a knowledge and comprehension of them only that we can expect to find a bridge or passage over from a knowledge of the nature of finite mind in ourselves to a knowledge or intelligible comprehension of the necessary being and true nature of the universal mind, and so be able to transcend the physical and reach the metaphysical side. And it is only by means

of a critical study, an exact logical discussion, and a clear insight into these metaphysical truths and realities that it now is or ever was possible for the human reason to discover this bridge, or make the passage over; though a thorough study of all Nature that should penetrate to the fundamental depths of things, and extend to all superficial particulars, in a complete and exact experience, might verify and confirm the theory. Thus our knowledge of theory might be firmly established both on the ground of reason and on the fact of Nature. But it is the theory only that can be known in this metaphysical way. That only is the proper subject of direct and immediate knowledge. Knowledge of that is foreknowledge as well; for it is in itself eternal, necessary, and immutable truth. As to what sort of a universe of created things, what sort of a Nature in detail, the creative mind, working upon this theory, will actually bring forth at any future period as a present existent creation, the theory alone can give no complete and certain information; for that matter must lie in the field of the contingent, finite, temporary, and changeable. It is ever in a state of flux: all flows, *πάντα ῥεῖ*, says Heraclitus. Unless, indeed, it were possible for the finite soul so completely to make the passage over this metaphysical bridge as to be able to place itself at the point of view of the creative power itself, or, bursting its own finite limitations, to become expanded (as it were) or enlarged into identity with the universal soul itself, and so become one with God, there certainly could be no conceivable possibility for the finite soul to see completely through all Nature, and be knowing and conscious thereof from the height of the absolute Thought itself. From the very nature of the case, it would seem to be plain that, for any exact knowledge of things in detail in the natural field of this ever-flowing variety of merely phenomenal existence, the finite mind, while it continues in this natural and finite state, must cease to look in the inward direction, and must turn about and confront Nature face to face, and, bearing aloft

the blazing torch of metaphysical theory, snatched from the supreme source of light, begin to look earnestly without, and examine into actual Nature as it stands presented to our observation and study. In this work, surely, all powers and methods of observation may fairly come into use; and we shall need, not only our general theory of the universe, but all the experiments, instruments, and scopes that human ingenuity can invent, all the insight the intuitive intelligence can afford, and all the aid the natural sciences can give.

As to our theory, it will still have to be remembered that the final test of its truth and correctness, as in the case of the mathematical theory of the heavens, must be found in its application, and in its sufficiency to explain the facts observed, or, in other words, in its capability of taking up all Nature and all Science into clear solution. A method that will effectually lead to such a result may be entitled to be called a philosophical method. A theory that will enable us to accomplish it may be entitled to be called a philosophical theory. It would be a natural theory, but not necessarily an atheistic-machine theory. It would be an idealistic, but not a mystical-ideal theory. It would be a realistic Idealism, but not necessarily a theologico-biblical Supernaturalism.

CHAPTER II.

DEFINITION OF TERMS.

§ 1. UNIVERSE — BEING.

SOME further definition of terms may fitly find a place here. Terms are employed to express conceptions. The term *Universe* expresses the conception of the All that is: it is, at the same time, that Conception itself as it really is, in its own nature and being. The Science of Logic calls it the absolute Concept, Notion, or Idea, as an intelligible theory of the whole universe, which is also that Whole itself. It is its own theory. It is of little or no importance what the original meaning of the word *Universe* was: the real question now is, What is its proper signification in present philosophical use and in its actual truth?

The term *Being* has an equivocal meaning and use: it is employed sometimes in an active sense, sometimes in a passive sense, and sometimes in both. In the active sense of the present participle *being*, it conveys the idea of a *coming to be*, or becoming. While a seed is growing into a tree, it is in a state of *being* (coming to be, or becoming) a tree. While a nebula is proceeding into some stage of a solar system, it may be said to be *being* (coming to be) a solar system. This would seem to be the only intelligible (if not the proper) sense of Hegel's doctrine of Becoming (*Werden*), *i. e.* a something coming to be something other than exactly what it was before. In another sense, it is employed to express what is, was, has been, and ever will be, — the eternal and universal All in its phase of ever-identical

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reality, as when we speak of a Supreme Being. Here the element of time, or tense, is dropped out of the conception, as it should be; for this is a real something, an Essence and Power, which has the character of eternal reality, universality, and ideality, at once and in one, unchangeable in respect of its own internal identity. In this sense, *Being* is rather a something *been* than a something *being*, or it is really both *being* and *been*. The term *Essence* may better express the true concept or notion; but this term is also somewhat ambiguous, as it carries with it, in common use, the sense of something which was once in a state of coming to be, or *being*, but which has become fixed and is now *been*. For this reason (apparently) Hegel employs the term *Essence* rather to express the posited or determined essences of things than the universal Essence itself. For this he prefers the term *Notion* or *Concept*; and he treats this determined state of permanency or persistence of essence and form in things as their essences, and he sometimes also uses the word to express the one Essence of all essences, Substance of all substances, and Power of all powers. Usually, however, to designate the true conception of this real Being, Essence, Essentiality, or Substantiality, he prefers the logical term *Notion*, or (in its fullness) the "Absolute Idea" of all Reality. Correctly understood, this term may be less subject to ambiguity and uncertainty than any other; but it must be conceived as expressing the whole truth and reality of the One and All of real Essence and Power, as it in fact is in its own true, logical constitution, and not merely as *being*, nor merely as *been*, but as eternally both at once and in One.

The word *Being* may be used also in the sense of the abstract predicate *to be* or *is*, as that empty *isity* of predication which may be as truly affirmed of Nothing as of Something. But the *isity* of Nothingness is quite a different thing from the *isity* of Something. The truth asserted is the same only in respect of this abstract *isity*: in respect of the real nature and truth of the subject of the predica-

tion, the truths asserted are the widest possible contraries of each other. For a true conception of the actual Something, we may accept the term Notion (*Begriff*) as expressing the one standing All of real Essence and Power, in which movement is eternal, as it really is in its own true nature, absoluteness, continuity, ideality, and wholeness, and in its universality, specialities, and particularities, at once and in one, eternally.

§ 2. UNIVERSALITY — SPECIALITY — PARTICULARITY.

The term *Universality* expresses, not only this absolute Wholeness and Oneness of the Notion, but also the Ideality of eternal movement in it as such, and as distinguished from the terms *Speciality* and *Particularity*, as meaning the parts, particulars, or several aspects into which the Whole may be considered as eternally differenced, distinguished, and distributed in the course of the ideal movement, while still retaining all the essential relations of Identity and Difference in the Totality of the Whole (the parts, aspects, and particulars inclusive). It is that continuous unity of the One and the many, the Whole and the parts, the All and some, special and particular, which continues ever the same in respect of its own identity, whatever may be the movement, the differentiation, division, or distribution, within the whole unity. This is the proper conception of Universality: it necessarily implies and involves movement in the standing All, a proceeding or process of the one Whole into parts and particulars, or into several aspects, as an eternal and necessary Fact. This movement is the *Ideality* of the Notion.

Speciality, and *Particularity*, expresses merely the aspect of opposition in the whole of the parts and particulars to the whole and to each other, — that of distinction, division into parts, and further differentiation into particulars; into which the one Whole may actually be distributed or limited into the bounds of time and space within the All-comprehending universality, both metaphysically and physically.

§ 3. INFINITY.

Infinity is another very ambiguous, much abused, and perplexing term. No term has been more vaguely and loosely employed in mathematics, in philosophy, or in divinity, than this of *Infinity* or *the Infinite*. Etymologically, it signifies simply boundlessness. In this sense, it means absolute Nothingness. Hegel argues that there can be no absolute Nothing, because the Nothing is necessarily bounded by the Something, which exists as necessarily and as absolutely as the Nothing; and this is true enough in so far as the one is necessarily bounded over against the other, or is related to the other, or as impliedly involved in our conception of the other; but this truth amounts to nothing, or is nothing to the purpose, because it remains forever true, notwithstanding, that beyond the whole Something that has actuality of subsistence as a real Something, or other than it, there is in fact, and can by no possibility be anything else or other than sheer Nothingness, "the Empty" of Epicurus, the Void of the scientists, the Infinity of the mathematicians, the blank Possibility or Freedom of the metaphysicians, the Oblivion of Thought. It signifies and expresses merely the possibility of the actual existence of the whole real Something, whether that is conceived as a sum total of atomic matter, or as the One and All that really is, as the Notion. So far as that whole Something really is, it is only in the otherwise unbounded and absolute infinity of Nothingness. In this sense the *infinity* of the real Notion is, first, the mere fact and possibility of its eternal existence as such. In respect of Time, the Notion may be said to be infinite in so far as its duration is without beginning, end, or middle, and so is unbounded: it dwells in Eternity. In respect of Space proper (*i.e.* limited or filled space), the Notion may be said to be infinite in the sense that it freely gives spacial and temporal boundaries or limitation to some special exhibition of its own essence in the

evolution of itself into spacial dimensions, and freely cancels that limitation in a perpetual round of creation, sustension, and destruction of particulars, for this circuit has neither beginning, end, nor middle, and is therefore properly infinite, *i. e.* unbounded as such; but it is not infinite in the sense of being itself absolutely boundless in respect of Immensity (or the possibility of Space or Spaces); for in reference to that it must necessarily remain forever determinate and limited as bounded (or rather as bounding itself) over against that empty Possibility, whatever conceivable extension it might have in determined Space, or whatever extension might be given to the evolution of itself into spaces or spacial dimensions. Infinity, in this sense of spacial indeterminateness, or boundlessness in respect of Immensity, would make the whole real Notion of Essence and Power identical with absolute Nothingness: it would necessarily presuppose the possibility of total extinction, annihilation, or non-existence of the absolutely existent Something, *viz.*, the real Notion itself. This supposition might not be inconceivable or absurd in itself; but it would be an absolute contradiction to the actual and known fact of the existent Reality. In respect of this limitation, which consists in the distinction of the whole Something from the Nothingness beyond or other than it, the Notion (that is, the whole real Universe) is necessarily determinate, limited, bounded, conditioned, and, in a word, finite, though as such it is also the absolute One and All of real existence; and it is not infinite in this sense. The predication of infinity (in this use and application of the term) of this one real Whole would be merely an irrational use of words; for it must be forever logically true and necessary that a Something, or any real Essence whatever, that is spacially infinite, must be identical with absolute Nothingness. True and real extension in this definition means simply the absolute Modality of the one Whole Reality, or the unity of absolute Quantity and absolute Quality in the absolute Whole, — an infinitely changeable boundary of limitation.

What is truly infinite is the Ideality of the One and All of real Essence and Power conceived after the manner of the logical Notion as really existing *in and for itself* absolutely. "In *Being-for-itself*," says Hegel, "the determination of ideality is produced. Existence, seen from the point of view of its affirmative being, has a reality, and consequently the finite has a reality. But the truth of the finite is rather its ideality. For the same reason, the Infinite of the Understanding, where the finite is allowed to subsist alongside of the infinite, which is thus made itself to be finite, has its truth only in its ideal existence. This ideality of the finite is the fundamental principle of philosophy, and there is no true philosophy but *idealism* [*i. e.* realistic idealism]. What it is important to avoid in this regard is the taking of the infinite for what by its determination constitutes only particular and finite existence." And he insists that "upon this difference the fundamental notion of philosophy and of the true infinite depends."¹

A.B. { The whole reality is necessarily finite in respect of its own actual constitution, form, and nature, and in the sense of having all that determinateness of limitation within itself, whereby only it can be distinguishable from *absolute infinity*, the mere empty possibility of the actuality, or sheer Nothingness. As such really finite Whole, the truth of its finiteness consists as much in its ideality as in its reality. Its ideality is truly infinite as being without beginning, end, or middle. In this sense, it may truly be said that there is no true philosophy but Idealism, — not a mystical "pure idealism" of our subjective imagination, but that realistic idealism of the universe itself which is the unity and identity of the Real and the Ideal in the one absolute Whole. This will be found to be the true meaning of *idealism* with Hegel.

¹ *Logique de Hegel*, traduite par A. Véra, ii. p. 35, Paris, 1859.

§ 4. SPACE — IMMENSITY — TIME — ETERNITY.

In a true science of Logic, there is a difference in the signification of the terms *Space* and *Immensity*, *Time* and *Eternity*. Properly speaking, Immensity is the possibility of Space, or Spaces in serial order, and Eternity is the possibility of Time, or Times in succession, — the possibilities of limitation : as such possibilities they are also absolute and unalterable necessities. *Space* and *Time* are, in their own proper definition, merely necessary conditions or laws of thought, giving boundary and form, or whereby boundary and form are given, to particular things within the universality of the Notion. The Notion itself dwells in Eternity and in Immensity, and also in those limitations in respect of Eternity and Immensity which are also absolute and unalterable necessities : whereas the limitations of Time and Space within the Notion are of the nature of temporary and changeable, or movable necessities, which are imposed by the Notion itself on its own action, under all the necessities and necessary relations of its own absolute constitution ; and they are therefore properly called *laws* of thought. Time and Eternity, Space and Immensity, may be regarded as expressing a necessary relation. The necessity which underlies this relation is simply one of those absolute and unalterable necessities whereon the universe is built : they lie at the foundation of the Notion itself, and of all it contains or creates. To talk about “*infinite space*,” or “*infinite time*,” is to use words irrationally and absurdly : it necessarily confounds conceptions that are different and distinct. So common and inveterate is this use of the words *time*, *space*, and *infinity* in a double sense that it is extremely difficult to make the proper distinctions clearly intelligible and comprehensible.¹

¹ “Absolute, true, and mathematical time,” says Newton, “of itself and from its own nature, flows equably, without regard to anything external, and by another name is called *duration* ; relative, ap-

There is a clear distinction between the conception of Infinity proper as such and that infinity which consists merely in an endless series of finites, or a mere *progressus ad infinitum*; for here the infinity is predicated of the series, which is always necessarily finite, and not (as it should be) of the empty possibility into which the series is supposed to be projected, step by step, indefinitely. This was Locke's notion of infinity, though it appears by his letters¹ that he was not himself satisfied with it. It is the infinite of the endless succession of causes and effects, or sequences of facts (as some prefer to call it), in the sphere of external Nature. By infinity (properly such) may be understood that boundlessness which belongs to sheer empty possibility as it is in itself considered. In this sense, it may mean that empty possibility into which a series of finites may be supposed to be continued, endlessly or infinitely, and which is that same absolute Nothingness that lies beyond the All of the real Universe; for this, as mere possibility, has neither beginning, end, nor middle, is unbounded, and properly infinite, otherwise than as the whole existent actuality of real Essence and Power is bounded over against it, in it, and out of it. For another instance, it may mean that eternal duration in respect of Time which belongs to the One and All of real Being, or that Eternity which is the possibility of time or times in succession; for this possibility is without beginning, end, or middle, as such, and is therefore in this sense boundless, infinite: or, for another instance, it may mean that boundlessness in respect of Space which belongs to Immensity, and is the mere possibility of space or spaces

parent, and common time is some sensible and external (whether accurate or unequable) measure of duration by the means of motion, which is commonly used instead of true time." . . . "Absolute space, in its own nature, without regard to anything external, remains always similar and immovable; relative space is some movable dimension or measure of the absolute space, . . . and which is commonly taken for immovable space." — *Principia*.

¹ *Life of John Locke*, by H. R. Fox Bourne, New York, 1876.

in serial order ; for this possibility is truly infinite, boundless, endless, as such. For another instance, it may mean that boundlessness which belongs to eternal and continuous movement in the circuit of the standing All (the Notion itself) ; for this movement is truly infinite in respect of its eternal continuity and its possibility, while it is also the absolute Fact. This is Aristotle's *infinity* of circular motion, perpetually returning into itself, without beginning, end, or middle, in respect of Time and continuity. The Notion, therefore, may properly be said to be infinite in respect of its own eternal duration, in respect of the eternal continuity of action or movement in it, and in respect of the perpetual and continuous extension or evolution of itself into the limitations of forms in times and spaces, and cancellation of the same again, in a perpetual circuit of return into itself again ; and finally, in respect of the absolute Fact of the existence and truth of the Notion itself as such, its actuality, its reality, its substantiality or Essence (its Matter, if any one chooses to call it by that name) ; for this, again, in a true sense, is without beginning, end, or middle, and is therefore properly infinite (or rather absolute as the All). As to this essence (the *Ding an sich*) of the Notion, that consists in the logical, necessary, and actual constitution of the Notion itself as the whole existent Reality, the Absolute One and All ; for the Notion is itself the absolute Essence. Motion is the mere fact that Essence moves. There is, indeed, no motion apart from Essence (as science declares) ; but eternally moving, or (what is the same thing) self-moving, Essence is the Notion, and nothing else but the Notion ; and, in this sense of the boundlessness or eternity of the movement in the ideality of the Notion, Essence may properly be said to be infinite. But, as the standing All and whole Actuality of real existence, it is bounded over against the Nothingness or Oblivion, is limited in it, or is limited out of it, in determinate distinction from it, and is therefore not infinite in the spacial sense of a boundless infinity

of Nothingness, or an absolute identity with Nothingness. It is this false conception of infinity which many insist upon giving to some irrational and absurd notion of infinite, immaterial Spirit, which could be no other than sheer empty Nothingness; but in this sense it is an irrational and absurd use of the word.¹ Neither does the standing All as the Notion proceed out of Nothing: it eternally is. Neither does the movement of it react upon Nothing, or spring from Nothing, as a stream flowing from no fountain: the reaction is upon the eternal necessities, the logical essentiaes and absolute truths, which are the foundation of the Notion, and are subsumed into its universality as the eternally standing whole and one of real existence. Nor is it conceivable or possible that this movement could ever have had a beginning; for if the Notion, if the universe (however constituted), had ever been once at an equilibrium of stationary balance within itself, there would have been no conceivable power whereby it could ever have been set in motion. Its movement must therefore be an eternal Fact. But movement in an Essence of this nature must (if there be movement at all) be a movement of change into things produced or created by it, or out of things destroyed by it. These things must therefore have a beginning, and may have an end, and are finite in the ordinary sense of the term.

§ 5. FINITE.

The term *Finite* is often used ambiguously. *Finite*, properly speaking, means bounded, limited to an end (*finis*) or termination. It stands in the antithesis of absolute relation to the Infinite as boundlessness, or the unbounded. In this category, the absolute One and All has necessarily to be regarded as finite or limited, as bounded over against the

¹ See an interesting (though not an entirely satisfactory) discussion on this topic by M. Paul Janet in the "Introduction" to his *Études sur la Dialectique dans Platon et dans Hegel*, Paris, 1861, pp. xli.-xlvi.

Nothingness beyond it, which is Infinity in the sense of what it really is in itself considered, viz., its Nothingness as empty possibility. In the materialistic philosophies, the atoms are conceived as finite; the whole aggregate of the atoms is also conceived as finite; matter (and the whole material universe) is conceived as finite; and beyond that is only the empty Void. But this Void is not always conceived in the true sense of Infinity; but the term *infinity* is generally applied in some vague way to a never-ending series of finites, which is said to be infinite because it has not yet come to the last possible end, and may never come to such end. This is the *bastard infinite*, or a mere *progressus ad infinitum*. Still it is in general vaguely conceived as infinity, as if the series of finites were absolutely without end. Words are used without thought, and are made to express impossible and absurd conceptions. In the purely idealistic and spiritual philosophies, an equally absurd use is generally made of the terms *infinite* and *finite*, as if pure Spirit were absolutely infinite, and only the things created by it were finite. By reason of the manifest impossibility of such an Infinite passing into the Finite, or of the Finite ascending to the Infinite, absolute Spirit becomes an incomprehensible object of blind faith.

Starting with the assumption of a whole One and All, and omitting the question whether that be finite or infinite, the finite may be intelligibly understood in the sense that the whole One and All may give bound, limit, or termination to some part of itself within the comprehension of its Universality. In this restricted sense, the finite always stands in the relation of the particular to the Whole and Universal. The term may have an intelligible meaning as applied to Time in contradistinction to Eternity, to Space in contradistinction to Immensity, and to Essences and forms in contradistinction to the absolute Essence and universal Form. But, as before shown, the absolute One and All, the Universe (whether considered as the Notion, or in any other way), is

itself also necessarily finite even in its universality and as such. All attempt to regard it as infinite in spacial extension, or in respect of Immensity, must end in an irrational and absurd use of words, or in impossible conceptions. The unknowable incomprehensibilities of spiritual mysticism and of unspiritual materialism alike are such conceptions.

§ 6. NECESSITY — FREEDOM — WILL — FREEWILL.

Necessity (as we have seen) is in its own nature of two kinds: *First*, it is absolute, unalterable, and eternal necessity; and, *second*, it is temporary, changeable, and limited necessity. Necessity in the first sense pervades the universe of mind and matter. It reigns in blind force and mechanical power. It is distinguishable from Law in the proper sense of Law as a temporary and alterable necessity, imposed as a rule prescribed by a knowing, conscious person or a sovereign power; which rule may be altered or repealed and have an end as it had a beginning.

Freedom is in itself mere liberty, mere empty possibility, the Nothingness, the Void, identical with Oblivion. It is simply the Open.

Will is in itself the Whole Power of the One and All (the Notion) in its absolute totality: it is the eternal movement (or self-movement, if you prefer to call it so) as the absolute and eternal Fact. The truth of the fact is (to our logical reason) an absolute and unalterable Necessity. As such, it is not entirely free, but is an absolute fact. Absolute freedom for it, would mean its absolute non-existence.

Freewill, or the Freedom of Will, expresses merely the fact of freedom or liberty as above defined. This liberty necessarily accompanies the Will-movement as its possibility, and as a necessary condition of its possible existence as such Will. In this proper sense of the term, Freedom may be predicated of the Notion (the universal Soul) as truly as of any finite soul, or specialized image and exemplar of it. But there is a difference in the amount of Power, and in the

amount or degree of liberty, or rather in the extent and degree of limiting necessities, laws, and conditions, but no essential difference in the nature of that power, or of those necessities and laws as such, though the laws imposed on its own action by the finite soul may be quite different from those imposed on itself by the universal, self-conscious Power.

§ 7. REST.

Rest (in the proper signification of the term) should mean absolute and total rest, or the entire cessation or non-existence of essence, action, movement, or life: all real Essence must then be utterly extinct and powerless. Still further, if it be a logical truth and a necessary fact that Essence itself consists merely in the actual constitution of the Notion as a Whole of logical necessities and necessary relations, or intellectually cognizable entities ("*essentia*," as Hegel calls them), which Whole is, by its very nature and constitution, eternally and necessarily in action or movement, then the state of absolute Rest must be the utter extinction, annihilation, or non-existence of all real Essence and Power: only absolute Nothingness could remain. This is not, perhaps, an unimaginable hypothesis, but it would be a contradiction of both the necessary truth and the observed fact of an actual universe of real Essence in a state of continuous and eternal action, or movement, without rest,—a contradiction to the existence and reality, as well as to the life and Ideality, of the Notion.

What is ordinarily understood by Rest (or rather a temporary state of rest) is really and truly no more than a supposed equilibrium of stationary balance between existing entities, opposing forces, or bodies, producing therein a temporary stationariness or state of permanency in the whole or in some part thereof. If such a state of perfect equilibrium were to be imagined as ever existent in the whole, One and All (whether conceived as the Notion itself or otherwise), then it would have to be conceived as utterly

lifeless and eternally dead ; and there could never be any power whereby it could be started into action, movement, or life again. This would not be an inconceivable hypothesis, perhaps, but it would be, in like manner as before, a contradiction to both the necessary and the observed fact of a state of eternal and continuous movement in the One Standing All, without Rest. While, therefore, such temporary stationariness, or state of permanency, is not only possible, but the general fact as to all particular things within the comprehension of the universal Whole, it is, in reference to the One Whole itself, a logical absurdity and an impossible conception, as well as a contradiction to the actually known Fact.

§ 8. ABSTRACTION.

The term *Abstraction* is often employed ambiguously, erroneously, or confusedly. Metaphysics, even Logic, or Thought itself, is sometimes denounced as mere abstraction, and an abstraction is deemed to be something of the nature of illusion, emptiness, moonshine. It is sometimes confounded with *generalization*, as generalization is, also, with *universality*. In this popular sense, an abstraction is regarded, properly enough, as a visionary fancy of the mind thinking it, or as some idea or image formed in the imagination on sense-perception of external objects, and of a something supposed to be abstracted from them, and taken as a real something separate from the whole thing. Of course the something abstracted is never the whole thing itself, but only some part, quality, accident, or phase of it, taken separately. What is so separated may be an actual fact, if critically observed and accurately perceived ; but the careless image-forming faculty does not exactly discriminate what is truly perceived from what is not, but fallaciously assumes more than is actually perceived. For instance, the common notion of matter as an underlying substrate of bodies is a something apparently abstracted from the objects of sense-perception, and is an image or representation

formed in the imagination, and erroneously assumed to be grounded on sensation, and especially on the resistance of the object to the touch, or its apparent persistency of form and position: whereupon the image-forming imagination proceeds further to imagine what is not actually perceived and has no basis in sense-perception, namely, that the object has a solid substrate of dead material within it, and that such substrate, or the object itself, has an independent subsistence by itself as such from all eternity, and this, too, whether the thing observed be a molecule or a large mass. The exterior qualities, accidents, or phases which affect the senses and are truly perceived have a certain truth and actuality as such, and may be correctly apprehended so far as truly perceived, but no farther. As to the supposed substrate, that is not perceptible to the senses at all, or not otherwise than as a certain resistance to the touch and a certain persistency of form and position, and it is not actually perceived in its truth as it really is in fact; but its existence as a dead substrate is a mere inference from what is perceived, without an adequate ground for such inference. The inference, therefore, and in just so far as groundless, is a vision of the fancy, an empty *abstraction*, and a sheer illusion, as Berkeley truly said; and this is precisely what he meant to say, and no more, however much he may have been abused and misrepresented in respect of it, not by common people only, but by those pretending to be philosophers. This sort of illusion was the *Maya* of the Hindu philosophy. Matter so conceived is an empty abstraction. But this is no denial of the real and substantial presence of the object, nor of the real truth of such qualities, accidents, and properties as do actually affect the senses, and furnish a ground for sense-perception, and for a just abstraction of them from the whole thing for an accurate consideration separately. Not, however, that an inference of a substrate of some kind may not be entirely just; for the resistance to touch and the persistence of form and position do affect

the senses and give rise to a sense-perception thereof, and this fact may be abstracted from the rest, and, being grounded on an actual sensation, it is an abstraction, indeed, but not an empty or unreal abstraction; and it may legitimately be inferred that there is certainly there a more or less permanent persistence of form and substance of some kind, which is capable of resistance to the touch, and is the ground of the appearances, qualities, accidents, and properties which are perceived (if accurately observed), while the object remains what it is. So much may be real truth: the conceit of a dead matter is a visionary and unreal *abstraction*. If Newton's hypothetical hard, impenetrable atoms, though of the least possible size this side of zero or absolute nonentity, were to be conceived in this manner as a dead substrate of material, they would be empty abstractions of this kind; but he does not tell us in what manner he supposed the atoms in themselves to be constituted: the simple conception of atoms was all he required for his mathematical uses and methods. Bacon's conception of an "active matter" was general and vague, according to the state of knowledge in his day; but it pointed in the right direction, and in the same direction which modern science is pursuing in its analysis of bodies, and in its searching investigation into their actual nature and constitution, and into the true nature of what is called *matter and force*, having nearly reached already the demonstration that the terms *matter* and *force* are but two words expressing two phases merely of one and the same real truth, namely, a one whole and absolute All of Essence in an eternal state of action, or (as Hegel defined it) Intensive and Extensive Magnitude, or Quantity, the universal Quantity of all quantities, or (as Plato and Spinoza expressed it) the Substance of substances; the intension and extension together establishing, for the time being, the actual substance and form of the particular things in time and space as a definite and more or less persistent determination of the absolute Thought

which is constituting them in the manner of a knowing and creating intelligence.

Bacon required, in his day, a more thorough study of Nature, and insisted upon an active matter, having a principle of motion within it, form and cause conjoined, and to be taken as it is found in Nature, not syllogistically upon uncertain or false premises, and he rejected every sort of "abstract matter." He recommended observation and induction from particulars as a method of arriving at generalizations and ultimately at "universals;" and, in the study, Interpretation was to go along with observation, taking "Metaphysique as handmaid and guide." Here was a method, not of empty abstraction, but of well-grounded generalizations until the Universal was reached. But soon afterward, Newton came in with his hypothetical assumption of hard, impenetrable atoms of matter, as if taking for granted the old notions of Democritus, Epicurus, and Lucretius, and physical science has for the most part ever since left Bacon and followed Newton and his hard mathematical *abstraction*. Not that mathematics is altogether an abstract or illusory science: on the contrary, in its own proper nature, it is a purely logical, metaphysical, positive, and concrete science, either of the actual or of the potential; but, in its way and methods of dealing with Nature, it has necessarily to take it in the external presentation, and to abstract its data and its units of measure and number from the concrete Whole. These data are of the nature of abstractions, not always or necessarily (but sometimes) illusory abstractions: whence it comes that, in the application of its methods to Nature, though not a science of abstractions, but rather of necessary truths, it has to deal largely with data drawn from observation, which, as abstractions from the Whole, are for the most part real, but in some large measure empty and unreal, that is, mere groundless fancies of the observer's imagination, or purely arbitrary assumptions, having oftentimes only some superficial, one-sided, or only approximate

conformity with the actual realities. With Bacon, "the principles and axioms" which were common to the several sciences, and "likewise the inquiry touching the operation of the relative and adventitious characters of essences, as Quantity, Similitude, Diversity, Possibility, and the rest," which (he said) might be called "Transcendental," belonged to "Summary Philosophy," as being "the common ancestor to all knowledge;" and Metaphysic was to be "an inquiry of the formal and final causes," as being "the descendant of natural science." They were to be "handled as they have efficacy in Nature," and not "logically" merely, that is, not "syllogistically" in the manner of an abstract logic. Plato (he said) had perceived "that Forms were the true object of knowledge, but lost the fruit of his opinion by considering of forms as absolutely abstracted from matter and not confined and determined by matter, and so turning his opinion upon theology, wherewith all his natural philosophy is infected." It is very plain, in short, that Bacon everywhere considers Essence and Form as one inseparable identity, the Essence itself determining the Form. Super-essential abstractions could have no place in philosophy: they were to be remitted to the visionary realm of theological incomprehensibilities as empty illusions. Here was some true but vague outline of a rational philosophy and a sound method.¹

If we gently press grapes and draw off the freest juice, we get a clear wine of a certain quality; if pressed hard, we get perhaps a red wine of another quality, having now abstracted something from the seeds and skins. What we draw off may be said to be an abstraction from the whole mass; the rest remains. What is thus actually separated is not an empty abstraction, but a very important reality. But if we should infer from the abstract that grapes were wine, either red or white, leaving the remains out of all considera-

¹ See Holmes' *Authorship of Shakespeare*, p. 383 *et seq*, Boston, 1886, 1875, and 1886.

tion, our inference would be simply erroneous, and illusory in just so far as erroneous; and if we went still further and inferred, either that the grapes, or that the remains of them, were dead matter, or had a more material substrate than the liquid wine, or that the invisible constituents of the wine had any the less or the more a material substrate than the wine itself had, our inference would be still more illusory and a still emptier *abstraction*, because an utterly groundless inference, and a sheer vision of the fancy. Neither could we any better infer that there was no substantial reality in either the one or the other of these things; for the question is not, whether grapes are matter or nothing, but what is the true conception of real substance or Essence in them all.

Principles of law enter into every contract and constitute a part of it, not all at once into every contract, but some only. Besides the rules of law, the facts of the transaction also enter into the contract and make an essential part of it. Laws are general in their nature, and in themselves remain the same, preserving their generality, while entering partially into each one of a great variety of contracts. Wholly apart from any given state of facts, they have to be considered abstractly as general principles only, and may be regarded, in a certain way and in reference to such particular contracts as might possibly be made under them, as *abstractions*. But, in themselves considered, they remain all the same as ever, whether entering into any particular contracts or not, and have a real existence as such, as much as the air we breathe, and whether we know it or not. If we go contrary to either the law or the air, or undertake to violate or ignore the actual existence, essential nature, and power of either the one or the other, we are certain to find out our mistake very soon, and to learn (perhaps too late) that neither of them was an empty abstraction. The laws are certainly the creation of the legislative mind. They are none the less real that they are also purely ideal creations,

having only a metaphysical or logical existence in thought or intelligence, though they may also be written down and printed in statute-books. The air is invisible to the naked eye, though not wholly imperceptible to the senses; but some forms of substance (the supposed atoms, and the æther of interstellar spaces, for instance) are insensible to sense-perception, are cognizable only by the intellect, in whatever experimental, instrumental, mathematical, or logical way we arrive at a knowledge of their real existence and true nature. They are not necessarily for that reason empty abstractions, but may very well be, if not exactly as now conceived, yet in some actual mode and form, very real things.

Locke spoke of generalization as a kind of *abstraction*. "The mind," he said, "makes particular ideas, received from particular objects, to become general; which is done by considering them as they are in the mind such appearances, separated from all other existences and the circumstances of real existence, as time, place, or any other concomitant ideas. This is called *abstraction*, whereby ideas, taken from particular beings, become general representatives of all of the same kind; and their names general names, applicable to whatever exists conformable to such abstract ideas."¹ There is here a certain want of depth and precision of both thought and expression. In this vague way, a generalization is an *abstraction*; but only as a general truth drawn (and it may, by a careful induction, be truly drawn) from particular objects, and not an untrue, empty, and illusory abstraction. It may very well be, by a true separation of an actual fact, or by a sound induction, a real truth of a general or universal nature, existing as well apart from those objects as in them; as Plato drew a universal principle or idea of beauty from the particular beauties seen in a great variety of objects. If the particulars (qualities, accidents, appearances) thus abstracted

¹ *Hum. Underst.*, b. ii. ch. 11, § 9.

from an object were mistakes of observation, or mere misconceptions of what was observed, then the abstraction (generalization) would inevitably be itself untrue and illusory; and if the induction of a general law were made from too limited a number of facts, the truth of its generality would be in the same degree uncertain; and unless, indeed, the induction were made from all the facts of the universe involved in the subject of inquiry, — if a single fact were overlooked or left out, — the law induced might not be absolutely general or universal, for that omitted fact might very well be the single exception to such general law. This vice is inherent in the very nature and method of the inductive logic; as, for instance, observation might find that all particular objects whatever in the entire material universe were temporary, evanescent, perishable things, while it might still be true that the one and all of real Being or Essence was the single thing that is, in its own nature and truth, eternal, imperishable, immortal; and an induction, generalization, or abstraction, to the effect that all things are perishable or evanescent would be an empty abstraction and an illusion. In short, either the one or the other may be empty and illusory in just so far as erroneous or groundless.

Berkeley thought he could abstract some qualities from objects which might possibly exist without those objects, or as separated from them; but he denied that he could abstract, or could conceive as separated, “those qualities which it is impossible should exist so separated,” or “that he could form a general notion by such an *abstracting* from particulars;” and “these two last were the proper acceptations of *abstraction* ;”¹ that is to say, empty abstraction. Here, too, is a vague use of the term *qualities*; but upon this distinction of Berkeley (clearly at bottom a sound one) an abstraction of a part, fact, or truth from the whole object, which should be in its own nature general or universal, or such that it had a true and real existence, not only in the

¹ *Prin. Hum. Knowl.*, Introd. § 10.

object as sharing or participating in it, or entering into its essential constitution, but also beyond it and independent of it, generally or universally, would not be illusory; but an abstraction of the other kind, whether conceived as a generalization, an induction, or an abstraction, would be utterly groundless and empty. In short, the real question is, not whether either is an empty illusion or a reality, but what induction, generalization, or abstraction, is well-grounded and true, and what not, or how far so, and how far not so, — what are in truth real and what are illusory abstractions; that is, again, what are true logical conceptions of the necessary and the real, and not merely the empty visions of our own imagination which have no logical truth or reality beyond themselves. Sir Benjamin Brodie makes a more proper use of the term than Locke, or Dugald Stewart, when he questions their denial that “brute animals have the power of abstraction,” and insists that, in this use of the word, it must imply “the power of comparing our conceptions,” and is “a necessary part of the process of reasoning,” and that “a stupid carp, or an intelligent dog, reasons,” though not so well as a man.¹

§ 9. POTENCE — POTENTIALITY — POWER — ENERGY.

Potence (δύναμις, *potentia*), *Potentiality*, “*Potential*” *Power*, are terms which really mean, or only express, though often loosely and vaguely employed, the mere empty possibility of the actual and absolute subsistence, or real being and truth, of the logical Notion of the One and All of real Essence and Power, in an eternal state of action (whether of static strain or of actual movement), unfolding, infolding, and limiting itself into the special essences and forms, or the particular substances, of things, throughout the world of Nature; and it is only in that same possibility or freedom, and under all the necessities of such Notion, that the spe-

¹ *Mind and Matter; or, Physiological Inquiries*, by Sir Benjamin Brodie, Bart., D. C. L., V.-Prest. R. S., New York, 1857, p. 176.

cials and particulars receive their peculiar essences and forms, or their substances, as such things as they are and while they are such. What so eternally is, as matter of fact, is the absolute one and whole of Essence and Power, thus evolved and limited, or evolving and limiting itself, into a world of things. What remains for investigation is simply the fundamental necessities, the necessary relations, the essential mediations, and the whole mode, manner, and law of that fact and reality; that is, of Essence and Power in one as it eternally is in itself, and in the evolution of itself into such special and particular existences within the comprehension of the universal whole in the eternal process of their creation, sustentation, and dissolution, as such, in the entire order of necessity, freedom, and providence. Its potency or potentiality may mean or express the entire compass of the possible evolution of the whole reality into such special or particular actualities, however persistent or evanescent they may be as such, whereof it is capable. This Potentiality, at once eternal, inexhaustible, absolute, and necessary, is without beginning, end, or middle, and is therefore, in this proper sense, infinite, that is, it dwells in Eternity and Immensity.

This absolute Whole of Essence and Power in one is *Energy*. In the last analysis, energy is nothing else but that. This Aristotelian term has grown much into favor with modern science. "What is in potency," said Aristotle, "is indeed energy;" and again he says, "Essence and form is energy."¹ Matter in action, or in potential strain, is energy, says positive science: it might better be said that essence in action, or in potentiality, is energy. There is no action, no strain, no motion, apart from essence, or without essence of some kind. There can be no action without reaction. Aristotle grounded action, all motion, on the immovable whole; Plato, on the standing All. Science

¹ *Arist. Met. E. 1*, Redarg. W. Christ., Lipsiae, 1886, p. 127; § 8, p. 193.

knows of no action, strain, motion, or energy, but in some matter, essence, or vehicle. There is energy in momentum, in mechanical power, in a suspended weight, in a clock wound up, in a working steam-engine, in the turning of the earth on its axis or in its orbital revolution, in the nebular theory of a solar system, in the æther, in gravity, in heat, electricity, and electro-magnetism. Wherever there is energy, there is a necessary presupposition of matter, essence, or a real something, in action or in static stress, — in actual or in potential movement. Essence, Form, and Power in the one absolute Whole is eternal Energy.

Materialistic science sometimes tries to conceive this whole Essence and Power as Matter and Force, or as an aggregation of atoms with a force, either in them or (as it may be) outside of them, called *Gravity*, which somehow fall into the order or disorder of the material world which it discovers, under the necessities or laws that are inherent in them; but exactly how, or why, or what matter is, or what gravity is, or what the necessities or the laws are, or what is the mode and manner of it, the materialists do not much concern themselves to inquire, have not as yet found out, and do not pretend to know; but they see no providential order or direction in it, or only sheer necessity, mechanical force, and blind fatality. Their philosophy of the universe (so far as they have any) is that of an absolute perpetual-motion machine. It is all that, perhaps, and much more.

§ 10. UNDERSTANDING — REASON — INTELLIGENCE.

The terms *Understanding*, *Reason*, *Intelligence*, are employed in science and philosophy, scarcely less than in common use, in partial ways, or in ambiguous senses. The use of the word *Understanding* has pretty much settled down into the meaning and scope which the term has received, since Locke and Hume, in the sensational and positive philosophies. As such, it may be briefly defined as the practical use of the human faculties of sensation, perception,

imagination, association of ideas, memory, and reflection, — the apprehension, generalization, and practical use of knowledge derived from experience through the senses in making inductions and inferences, and in reasoning about Nature, God, and Man. In a philosophical aspect, the whole business merely concerns Human Understanding as a part of the phenomena of Nature, refers to the external sphere of material Nature, and contemplates the mental operations as a part of the working of the world-machine. In the theological aspect, Understanding (where there is any at all) looks to the biblical revelations for such knowledge of a purely intellectual and spiritual world as man is capable of acquiring or possessing; or it denies or ignores the existence of spiritual intelligence altogether. This is nearly the whole scope of the powers and capabilities usually assigned to Human Understanding. Professor Max Müller has recently adopted Hobbes' definition of it as "the faculty of addition and subtraction;"¹ but he rejects the use of the word *Understanding*, and calls it the Human "Monon."

Reason (sometimes called "pure reason") generally, or as ordinarily understood, means those innate or intuitive principles of mind (or thought in us) which give form and rationality to our perceptions, ideas, reflections, and knowledge in the particular or in general. These principles, conditions, or laws of thought, are conceived to have a logical existence as such in our minds; and they enable us to conceive or imagine a Supreme Being as some kind of immaterial Spirit, apart from the world of Nature, in the actual existence whereof we may have belief or faith as a matter of reasoning and inference from all such knowledge of Nature as may fall within the reach of the senses and the Understanding, or within the scope of this scheme of principles and laws in our minds, with the help of the biblical revelation concerning it, — all considered as evidence tending to prove the truth of such belief. This is about the

¹ *Science of Thought*, London, 1887, pp. 63-64.

whole drift of the pure and the practical Reason of Kant. It means always our human Reason: it does not reach to a comprehension of universal and absolute Intelligence. It renounces all possibility of an ontological science of Logic, or of an *à priori* pathway to a metaphysical knowledge of universal Intelligence (or Soul) as it really is in its own essential nature and absolute being.

With Kant, as with Locke, the Understanding was merely our reasoning faculty: "Pure Reason" was an empty schematism of transcendental principles in our minds; and his "principles" were merely certain logical propositions of our imaginative faculty, and not at all any fundamental, universal, and eternal necessities, essential and necessary relations, or absolute truths. Therefore the *ens realissimum* of the Scholastics was a visionary dream, and the ontological arguments of Descartes, or of Leibnitz, for the being of God were transparent fallacies, and amounted to nothing. But the term *Reason* may just as well be employed (as it is by Hegel, Cousin, and other realistic idealists) in the wider signification of the universal Reason, and not merely in the narrower sense of the finite human reason (*Vernunft*). In the sense of the logical Notion (*Begriff*) of all Reality, it is simply a more elaborate logical development, and a more complete statement, of what was really understood or intended (however vaguely stated) in the Aristotelian and Neoplatonic philosophies by an absolute and universal Intelligence, conceived as the one immovable standing All of real essence and power, containing within itself as such self-movement (or eternal movement) under such necessities and necessary relations, mediations, and laws, and moving in such manner and to such ends and aims, as to constitute it at once and in one an essential living Intelligence; which therefore proceeded, as it must proceed, in an artistically creative manner in the perpetual evolution of itself into a sensible (and also an intelligible) world of Nature, in an established order, which was in some large part a necessary order, and

an "Adrastric" fatality as such, but was still, in its necessary freedom, in some measure, a providential order as well, looking to the True, the Good, and the Beautiful as its end and aim and final cause or reason why. In this view, the universal Intelligence has to be regarded as the whole unity of the logical Notion, in which all the categories of necessity and relation, and all aspects, are summed up and subsumed into the identity and universality of the one whole as a truly logical Concept of all Reality, or an intelligible theory of the Universe, and at the same time into that state of eternal movement or life which is the Ideality of the real Notion; and so the Notion is necessarily, by its very innermost constitution and essential nature and mode of action, a rational knowing Essence and Power, a conscious creative Potentiality, and a Personality as such.

||| N.B.

§ 11. CAUSE — CAUSA SUI — CAUSALITY — CAUSE AND EFFECT.

First Cause, Causa Sui, Causation, Causality, and Cause and Effect, are also much abused terms, or they are employed in vague senses, or in partial ways, by various writers. Conceived in the right way, or in the way of any true notion of the matter (if not altogether in the way of the Hegelian Notion), if we could once accept and be satisfied (as perhaps a truly philosophic mind should) with the first and last Fact of an absolute Standing All of Essence of such a nature as to contain within itself eternal and continuous movement, infinite as being without beginning, end, or middle, but active after the necessities, necessary relations, laws, and manner of Thought itself, we might succeed in clearing our minds of the difficulties which inveterately beset all endeavors to get over the apparent contradictions and the seeming absurdity involved in the ordinary sense of *First* or *Sui* as applied to such a conception of the absolute Cause. For if it be once conceived as an eternal Fact, there is no first, no last, no *Sui* or self, as yet about it, but only

that simple and very comprehensible fact. When we have the whole fact, the whole truth, the whole reality, what more, or else, or other, can there possibly be for the mind to ask for or expect, otherwise than as the result of thoughtless and inveterate habit? In truth, it is itself the absolute Cause, itself without a cause other than its own necessary and eternal constitution as such living Notion, or the absolute Ideality in the absolute Reality, which is thus capable of being the cause of all things else which are the effects of its action. An eternally active essence has no beginning, middle, or end, and needs no cause of itself: itself is the absolute and eternal Fact, and it must be accepted as such. We have no true Self until we have thus joined in thought and taken up into the unity of the Absolute all the elements of the logically completed One and All. Then we have infinite Ideality as eternal movement (the same thing as self-movement) in the eternal Reality; and also Knowing, for knowing is nothing else but the action of the Notion as thus constituted; and also Consciousness, for Consciousness is nothing else but the mere fact of knowing; and also Self-consciousness, for, in reference to this absolute One, consciousness is always the same thing as self-consciousness. There is no difference between them. It is only in our minds, and in reference to our thinking, that a distinction can be made between them; and then the only difference, in the finite mind, is that which may be said to exist between directing the thought (the attention) upon the whole thinking personality as a whole, and directing it upon some particular action, operation, part, or phase of the Whole; but, in the absolute mind, the consciousness must always be coextensive with the active knowing. This consciousness of the absolute Thought, if there is to be any purpose, end, or aim, choice, will, or providence, possible, must in some manner be capable of imposing some measure of law, restraint, limitation, and guidance, or special direction, upon the eternal movement, over and above what is absolutely given in the fact

of movement and in the eternal, unalterable, and immovable Necessities that are fundamental to its very constitution as such. We are at liberty, indeed, in our study of these several elements, categories, or aspects, to consider them separately, in the logical order of their necessity and true nature, though there be in them no order of succession in time, because there is in reality no such succession in time and no such actual division, but in truth they subsist eternally in one simultaneous unity and wholeness, in whatever possible distinction and distribution into the infinite variety of particulars.

This absolute One, thus eternally constituted, is the Jupiter's throne, to the foot of which the old poets figured the chain of secondary causes and effects to be tied. As to any particular thing or creation as distinguishable from such uncreated Essence and Power as Cause, that thing or creation necessarily had a beginning, and therefore a cause, and was an effect, which might be the secondary cause of another effect, and so on through an endless series of finite causes and effects, an apparently endless succession (as it would appear in an external view) in the field of material Nature, — a *progressus ad infinitum*, — though in reality never entirely cut off from its original source; for the continuity of Nature's chain is ever returning into the source whence it proceeded in a perpetual round or circuit of Causation: all such progression must begin and end in the one absolute Cause. The term *Causation* may very well be employed to designate the character and continuity of this perpetual circuit of successive particulars which constitute the links of the chain, each link being the cause of the next one and the effect of the preceding one; but the one whole Essence and Power is always one of the links in the whole chain, and is at bottom the necessary ground, conditioning limitation, and motive power of the whole succession; for the primal source and efficient cause of the successive stages of finite particular things is to be found only in that absolute Essence

which carries eternal movement within itself, the immovable standing All. "The great law of essence and nature" (says Bacon) "cuts and runs through the vicissitudes of things." This is that "last and positive power and law of Nature" which (he said) was itself "without a cause, for cause is, as it were, parent of effect." It was Milton's "bright Essence increate." It is truly uncreated. It has no beginning, no end, no middle, and is therefore in this sense infinite. It is eternal, and as such simply an absolute Truth; and it has, therefore, no cause, and needs none.

Little need be said about *Final Cause*: properly speaking, it is not a cause at all, but only a *reason why*.

Cause, Causation, Causality, as applied to any supposed origination of this absolute One and All, can have no intelligible meaning or sense, since, by the logical presupposition involved in its very nature and constitution, it had no origin, will have no end, and can have no cause in that sense; but *Cause* (in any proper sense of the term) necessarily presupposes an already existent Power and implies a consequent effect: it is power producing an effect. The term *Causality* simply expresses the fact of Essence and Power as cause passing into effect, and subsisting in it as result. "Causality," says Cousin, "is a triplicity in unity," — viz., Cause, Effect, and the Relation subsisting between them, — in which the substantial power as cause is presupposed to have an absolute existence and an eternal reality as a matter of absolute fact. It is eternally passing into effect, and continues to subsist in the effect; and the term *Relation* merely expresses the fact of the sustained continuity of that Essence and Power in the effect, while it continues to be what it is. Thus Cousin used this term *Causality* to designate that quality, character, nature, or aspect of the absolute Essence and Power, wherein it is considered as eternally in action and as necessarily passing into a creation as its effect in one eternal and continuous round of causation. But, considered in reference to itself, it was the absolute Substance, and in

so far as substance it was also absolute Cause of all created things, being itself without a cause. As being without beginning, end, or middle, it was infinite, dwelling in Eternity. The word *Substance* as here used means the same thing as *Essence*. The term *Causality* (properly understood) would seem to be unobjectionable, but Hegel appears sometimes to have preferred the term *Reciprocity*, or reciprocal Action and Reaction, to mean the same thing. It is apparent, in either case, that the term employed signifies that element or aspect of the whole One and All wherein it is contemplated as in a state of eternal action or movement. That movement involves both causality in the aspect of the active power and Reciprocity in the aspect of Action and Reaction. The Action is the eternal movement: the Reaction is upon the eternal necessities, the logical and necessary grounds of the whole as a whole, which is itself immovable. The term *Reciprocity* more especially expresses the relation subsisting between Action and Reaction; but it also involves and implies the eternally active essence and power. The term *Causality* more especially expresses the relation between Cause and Effect; but it also involves and implies that same active essence, and that same reciprocity of action and reaction. The two words cover essentially the same conceptions. As to the substantial or essential movement itself, that had to be taken by both of them as an absolute and eternal Truth and a logical Necessity. It comes to this at last. No evasion is possible. All idea of movement proceeding from "pure activity" alone, or from immaterial spirit, or from Nothing, or from any given Something in the sense of first origin, must be forever irrational and absurd. The truth is, that the movement never began to be at all, but, like both the Something and the Nothing, simply has an absolute and eternal subsistence and reality in point of fact: special and particular movements or motions only have a beginning, a middle, and an end, and therefore also a cause; and they are necessarily in this sense finite.

§ 12. NEGATION — NEGATIVITY — NOTHING.

These are somewhat vague terms, and are sometimes loosely employed. Much of the obscurity and difficulty of the Hegelian philosophy arises from an ambiguous and almost Protean use of these terms. The true meaning of *Nothing* or *Nothingness* has already been sufficiently noticed herein. The distinction of that *Negation* or limitation which is given from within, and that which is given from without, is intelligible enough. We may easily understand that a root growing in the earth may receive its actual shape in part from within the root itself, and in part from the pressure of the earth without. How far the fish takes its shape from inward growth and how far from the water without, and how far the bird takes its shape and characters from its own inward life or from the air and the elements in which it flies, scientific observation may not have exactly determined; but an Agassiz will discover a profound correspondence between the inner life and evolution and the outward defences of bony coverings, horny plates, scales, feathers, hair, skin, and finally not skin only, but clothes. The fish may be regarded as bounded by the water, the bird by the air, receiving their outline of form from the active life within, or from the external environment, or indeed from both at once. So the water may be seen as bounded by the air, the air as bounded in the æther, and the æther by the Void, or in something else. The atoms of Epicurus, as bounded in a Void, could have no limit of form or shape but that given with the atom itself: it was otherwise only bounded over against the Nothingness, or out of it and in it. Now we know that it is a question whether molecules, or atoms (if indeed there be any at all), are in a void merely, or are in the æther, or in a continuous essence; and the further question comes as to them, how far they may take their actual shape or form from the mode and manner of their own internal constitution, whether conceived as self-

existent from eternity, or as formed out of the æther as well as in it, and how far from the action or pressure upon them of the æther, or of some other enveloping essence, which contains them. On the theory of eddies or vortex-rings in the æther, this becomes an important matter; but as to the æther itself, whether made up of an aggregate of atoms or in any other way, the question still remains, *How is that bounded?* Does it take its external shape from its own internal constitution of essence and form, and wholly from within, or partly also from some external pressure? Whatever the true answer may be, it would seem to be logically inevitable and certain that we must finally come to an essence or a something, whether conceived as an aggregate of atoms or as a one continuous whole, which really dwells in the Nothingness, and can by no possibility take either form or shape from any other source or cause than itself. This limitation of form from within is what Hegel seems to mean by Negation. It is limitation so far and no farther: beyond that bounding of itself, there is only the negative non-entity or Nothingness; but this Nothingness has no effective operation whatever, being mere emptiness, freedom, possibility. But when there are more things than one, when there is a multiplicity of things, then they may be thrown, or may fall, against each other, and so modify their own external shape. A thing takes *form* from its own inward essence and cause: it may take *shape* from external objects or causes. The difficulty lies in conceiving how Essence, Soul, the Notion, or anything else, can give limitation of form to its own essence, or to itself, or can impose law or limitation on its own action.

The *Negation* of *Negation* is intelligible enough in the sense of a cancelling of a limitation of form, or a negation, already given in this manner, whether partial as by a change of form, or total as by the annihilation of the thing as such. When it is partial only, there is a dialectical proceeding into some other and different form, whereby the old form

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vanishes and the new appears. But all this presupposes the existence all the while of an Essence or something, which is capable of giving this limitation of form or modality to itself as a whole, or of effecting this change (or a total destruction) of form in some part or portion of itself. If we were to take *Negation* in the sense of Nothingness, and were then to speak of the *negation of negation*, we should have simply one Nothing negating another Nothing, and Nothing would still remain: to imagine it could produce a something would be nonsense. What must really be understood (if the phrase is to have any rational meaning) is, that an Essence and Power, which is capable of giving such limitation to itself, may cancel that limitation and give another (or none at all) instead of it. This would seem to be what Hegel means by restoration or renewal (*Herstellung*).

The term *Negativity* is used by Hegel in a very perplexing way. It may remind one of Darwin's use of the term *Natural Selection*. Not that there is any resemblance in the things signified, but that both terms are so employed as vaguely to imply the presence of an active power in the business, without saying what that power is supposed to be, or indeed that there is any at all. One would sometimes think that Hegel's *Negativity* had a soul of its own, so rational are its operations, so wonderful the feats accomplished by it; and so of Darwin's "Natural Selection." It is evident, nevertheless, that neither of them supposed that there was any soul in those terms; yet in both, the presence of some activity (if not a conscious intelligent activity) would seem to be necessarily implied and presupposed. We are left in doubt whether the activity implied in Hegel's *Negativity* means the action of an unconscious mechanical power, or presupposes always the action of the conscious, knowing, and intentionally creative power of the Notion, conceived as universal Soul. Schopenhauer concluded it was a blind, unconscious Will - Force, acting

mechanically. Sometimes one might half suspect, from Hegel's manner of treating the subject, that there was a Spirit in this Negativity, operating in some undefined way *ab extra* ; but clearly this was not his meaning. If his real conception were, that the whole Power of the Notion was knowingly, consciously, and continuously active or operative throughout the entire evolutionary process, however distributively directed in and through the different chains of causation or of mediation, or in different circuits of reciprocal action and reaction, and as dialectically determining the settings and cancellations of special and particular limitations of form and mode therein, with a deliberate intention, and to definite ends and aims, then the *Negativity* might be understood to signify only (or at least to lay the stress upon) the negating, annulling, canceling, and substituting phases of the process, while it was tacitly to be implied and understood that the active Essence and Power was consciously active and operative throughout the whole creation. But again, we are embarrassed by the reflection that it is not expressly said so, and by the further consideration that an unconscious mechanical power or force (such as we see in physical Nature) may, and in fact does, operate dialectically in natural processes; as in the operation and result of the environment of natural objects, conditions, and conflicting physical forces involved in Darwin's *Natural Selection, Struggle for Life, Survival of the Fittest*, etc.; the outcome being a continual change of characters, finally amounting to a transition of species. Chemical and electric processes also exhibit a dialectical character and mode of action in the compositions, decompositions, and other changes taking place therein physically or mechanically. Indeed, it is possible to contemplate the entire proceeding of a nebula into a solar system and all it contains as a mechanically dialectical process. Humboldt describes the aspects of Nature, the geological, geographical, and climatic conditions, the distribution and characters of plants and

animals, and indeed the whole Cosmos, as brought about in a mechanically dialectical way as the result of a balance of contending forces. Hegel's most primitive stage of "real Being" or Essence, where it is as yet vaguely "indeterminate," though still distinguishable from nonentity, where (in the purely logical order) Quantity is passing over into Quality, and the whole Notion is as yet in that initiatory seed-time of its evolutions when it has scarcely more than begun to difference and *deepen itself* into that universal variety, order, and locality of things which we see exhibited in the present state of created Nature, might suggest a comparison with the interstellar æther of modern science, which seems to be regarded as a one whole Quantity (however indeterminate its actual limits in spacial extension) and one Quality, not yet differentiated, or not entirely (but rather as still in a process of differentiation), into chemical elements or bodies, into nebulae, stars, solar systems, geological strata, minerals, plants, animals, men, and human societies and states, with almost endless varieties of essences and forms, destructions of quantities and qualities, measures and degrees, and differences of substances, accidents, and properties; the evolution of which, in a historical course, has to be conceived as going back well-nigh to the beginning of Time, — all, however, in a purely physical and mechanical way. The dialectic of *Negativity* is certainly capable of being contemplated in this external manner, as well as internally and from the point of view of the absolute Notion. As seen externally through the methods and instruments of physical science, it is perhaps not surprising that the process should appear to be purely physical and mechanical in its nature, operating under the unalterable and eternal necessities; nor that the operation therein also of those temporary necessities, which may properly be called laws, should be less manifest, or should remain undiscovered; nor that the guiding and directing influence of conscious knowing and determining Will, or providence,

should be doubtfully seen, or scarcely be recognized at all; nor that, when actually seen, it should be confounded with a blind perpetual motion and a purely mechanical action. As seen from the internal point of view, it has to be admitted that such whole Essence and Power, however absolute and perpetual, in any possible proceeding from the one Whole to parts in the Whole, from Universal to Particulars, from Essence to essences, from universal Form to special forms, from the continuity of Oneness to the atomicity of multiplicity, must of a necessity accomplish the work by imposing limitation on its own action, and giving fixity, or temporary permanency of essence and form, to such manifold particulars, and in that way only, until the whole vast scale of things, with all its differences of form and degree, should extend and be distributed from the one Essence to æther, atoms, suns, planets, and all they contain; that such limitation and fixity of things, while it continued such and to the exact extent of it, whether in an atom or in an æther or in a globe, must, in necessity as in fact, have, for the time being, all the character and fact of an adamant chain of absolute necessity and sheer fatality; that all external motions, actions, and operations of natural bodies upon one another, and all the various natures and properties of such bodies, which are inherent in them and necessarily consequent upon their fixed constitution of essence and form as such things, while they are such, must necessarily have the character and exhibit the actual fact, for the time being, of immovable necessity and blind mechanical action; and that any existent conscious Will, which might also have a real existence as an active power, must necessarily be thus far ineffective and inoperative in respect to such things, otherwise than as continuously maintaining and sustaining the existing state of permanency in them, such as they are and must be, if there is to be a world of variety at all. The action, interference, or influence of such conscious Will-power could be looked for only when some change should

take place in this state of fixity and permanence of created things in respect of their essential constitution and very natures, or in the order of their arrangement in a sensible world. It would seem therefore to be true and reasonable that there should be in Nature a certain external dialectic of mere necessities and mechanical powers, as well as an internal dialectic action in respect of the inner essential and necessary relations, mediations, and conditions of the choosing and determining Will-power, which, indeed, must itself also proceed upon the ground of those same eternal and immovable necessities, alterable necessities, and movable relations, but at the same time, in some large measure, independent of them, as a freely determining cause and a conscious directing Will; in a manner wielding the necessities, the relations, and the laws of its own essence into form and order, and working to an artistic end and aim, with an intelligent purpose and prevision. Dialectic Negativity, then, may be conceived as neither wholly a blind mechanical action nor wholly a conscious activity of Will; as not necessarily either wholly the one or wholly the other, but more truly as a combined union of both at once, and as the necessary (as it would seem to be also the proper and actual) mode of action of an intelligent and an intelligible Essence and Power. Thus cleared of ambiguity, and considered as employed in a special way to express the mode of operation and the effect or result of dialectic action, whether it be internal and metaphysical, or external and physical, in its nature, in working change in the state of permanency, or equilibrium of things, whereby old forms are altered, abolished, or renewed in the perpetual production of new and different forms, whether done in the way of mechanical necessity, or in the way of intentional will, or of both at once, this rather singular term may have an intelligible signification. In this sense, *Negativity* is the mere fixing, setting, and unfixing, or cancellation and transition, of limitation. It is surely an intelligible necessity and a fact that

every positive thing, every definite form, every determinate essence, must have limitation, boundary, and a negative side or aspect, and must in some way be bounded out of the void Nothingness of Oblivion, if it is to be at all in any other sense than that of the empty isity of abstraction and visionary predication. It is also an intelligible necessity and a fact that an absolute One and All of real Essence, in a state of eternal movement, not only actually is, and must be, but must also by its very nature be capable of imposing limitation on its own action, and of giving law unto itself, either in the way of blind chance, or in the way of conscious election. It is also an intelligible necessity and a fact that this One and All, as perpetually unfolding itself into a world of Nature, and also the entire world so at any time unfolded as it is, or ever was, or ever may be, does and must have plan, order, and artistic form, good and evil, utility and beauty, in it, under whatever positive or negative limitations; and that it is, therefore, an intelligent, knowing, conscious Power and determining Will, and an absolute Personality as such; for, in the last analysis, or in a complete synthesis, neither Intelligence, Knowing, Consciousness, Will, nor Personality is, or can be, anything else but that.

§ 13. SOMETHING — MATTER — SUBSTANCE — ESSENCE.

Something, Matter, Substance, Essence. — These terms all really mean the same thing: the difference lies only in the manner of conceiving that thing. The conception of it may be crude or refined, physical or metaphysical, analytical or synthetical, or both in one; philosophical or unphilosophical.

The *Something* merely signifies the whole actuality of real existence as distinguished from utter *Nothingness*. It is the simplest possible conception of the nature of the thing in itself (the *Ding an sich*), — not, indeed, in its entire constitution and actuality, but in that first phase of it in which it is

presented to our thought as an absolute Necessity, — that necessity which must be accepted as an eternal Fact and a necessary Truth, if any thought, any knowledge, any philosophy, be possible at all. Whoever doubts or denies this, must be given over to sheer *Knownothingism*, and there an end with him.

Matter is a crude term, which stands at the opposite extreme of possible conceptions, and expresses the crudest notion of the thing as it is first presented to observation as the solid, hard, impenetrable, indestructible substrate of objects or things in material Nature. It is not now necessary to repeat that this primitive notion of matter has been effectually driven out of the minds of all intelligent persons by the more recent progress of science. Now the phrase, *the conservation of energy*, is substituted for *the indestructibility of matter*. The term is obsolete in biology, and the word *protoplasm* has been invented to express an advanced state of knowledge, and at the same time to cover an existing state of ignorance, concerning it. Science itself, pursuing the analysis through all the stages of experimentation, may be said to have arrived at the point where the main question is, whether matter, in the last and absolute stage and state of it, is to be conceived as a something eternally subsisting in the form and mode of indivisible, insensible, infinitesimal atoms or particles, or as a continuous substance or essence, subsisting as a one whole something. In either case, it becomes purely and entirely a matter of intellectual — that is, metaphysical — conception only, though it may still be regarded as both physical and metaphysical in a true and proper conception of it. It is obvious that Science here has got into the realm of metaphysical conceptions where all seeing and knowing are of the nature of intellectual insight and rational comprehension.

The terms *Substance* and *Essence* mean nearly the same thing. Either may be understood in a universal or in a particular sense. Properly enough, we speak of a universal

Substance or Essence, and also of the substances or essences of particular things. Cousin preferred the term *Substance*; Hegel, the term *Essence*: with either, the term used is employed in both applications. Hegel even makes a distinction of the *essence* of a thing from its *substance*, but it is simply a peculiarity in the use of words, which can be justified only as marking a distinction of the aspects in which one and the same thing may be viewed, using one word for one aspect and the other for the other. This use is legitimate, if it be strictly adhered to and be clearly understood. With him, the *substance* of a thing is spoken of in a reference to its external aspect, or its accidents and properties; and the *essence* of a thing, in reference to its inner origin and metaphysical constitution: but the thing really meant is the same in itself in either case. Unquestionably, things in Nature may properly be regarded in these two ways: either way, what the thing (atom, molecule, or body) substantially or essentially is as such only — what is really meant by its matter, its substance, its essence — is only and exactly that state of permanence and persistence which it actually has, both internally and externally, in point of fact, for the time being of the observation made of it, without further consideration of what it is otherwise, or how it came to be such. This state of permanency, however, admits of further investigation, and is truly to be considered as merely a temporarily set or fixed determination of universal Substance or Essence into such special forms and modes of itself, continuously maintaining and sustaining those things in that particular state of permanency which they have for the time being; but the whole Essence and Power always lies under and within that special permanency, and is so far active within it as is necessary to maintain it in that state. Any alteration or change in respect of that must be the result, and could only be the effect, of the dialectically active whole Essence and Power, either from within the thing, or from without it, or both at once. There may be a change of the shape of a thing by the ex-

ternal pressure of other things upon it, without necessarily changing the essential form and nature of the thing itself. But if there be a change in respect of such essential constitution of the thing itself, by the action of external things upon it, that action must be that of a force in opposition to the force of the internal power, which is giving to the thing its essential inner constitution and permanency as such; but this external force is properly to be regarded, and can only be conceived, as acting instrumentally and mechanically through other bodies or forces, which, however, come from the same original source as the power that is active within the particular thing itself. And we have then the case of Power exerted from one and the same source, but in two different directions, meeting each other in collision, and either maintaining on the whole, and continuing the existing equilibrium of stationary balance or permanency in the essence and form of the thing itself, or overweighing that balance one way or the other, disturbing that equilibrium, and so producing a change of form and nature in the thing. In this way the disturbing power may be regarded in the twofold aspect of an internal or an external dialectic movement, but still proceeding, whether external or internal, in the last analysis, from one and the same source and Cause. The only difference would be, that, in reference to the action upon the thing from without, the external force would be instrumental, mechanical, and indirect, while the internal dialectic action would be more immediate and direct. In this view, Humboldt's conception of the Cosmos as an infinite agglomeration and environment of particular things (*æther*, atoms, bodies, forces, etc.) acting and reacting upon one another, until a certain more or less stable equilibrium is reached in an exact balance of forces for the time being, is neither an unreasonable nor an untrue hypothesis; but it is so far not the whole truth. It is a merely external view of the facts and phenomena: there is no attempt to gain an inside view, and no inquiry into the inward causes and inner

constitution of the things themselves, or none but that of the external method of Science, analyzing bodies into molecules, atoms, and forces, physically or chemically, and stopping short at atoms conceived as hard, impenetrable, indestructible particles of imaginary substrate. No insight is gained into the nature of this supposed substrate. On our theory, there is in fact no such dead substrate whatever, but only that temporary fixity and permanency of essence and form which is given to things by the action and instrumentality of the self-limitation of the universal Essence. This permanent fixity of things is an illusion only in so far as it is conceived as absolute, unalterable, and eternal. The question of the nature of that Essence and Power which can give such temporary form and permanency to things, and can alter or abolish the same, and in what manner it can be done, still remains. On the one hand, there is necessarily involved in this process of change a certain possibility of action and reaction of the particulars upon one another as such; but the source, origin, and determining Cause of that reciprocal action and operation, and of all the actual conditions thereof, is still, on the other hand, to be sought for; and it can be found only in that one and Whole Essence and Power which is universal Essence or the Notion; and the question of its own inner constitution and nature — what it is in itself — is resolved at last into the logical constitution and true conception of the Notion or Absolute Idea of the One and All of Reality.

§ 14. IDEALISM — REALISTIC IDEALISM.

Idealism is another ambiguous term. There would seem to be two distinct kinds of idealism among philosophical writers. Pure Idealism appears to have its ground in a certain inadequate and insufficient psychology of the human mind alone: it is what the man can imagine, or reason out, by the exercise of all his thinking faculties upon all the knowledge he can acquire, either from his experience of the

World of Nature around him, or from his own reasoning concerning it; and since he finds this knowledge quite limited, and in some large part illusory, he feels a necessity of invoking the aid of supernatural revelation, and indulges his speculative imagination in spiritual reveries and mystical visions, which have no other basis than his own imaginative reason thus employed. *Realistic Idealism* is quite another thing. It has reference to the universal mind, not to the finite mind only. It is not human idealism merely that is intended, but the idealism of the universal and absolute Thought. As such, this is, and must necessarily be, both ideal and real at once and in one. The idealism of the finite Soul is indeed ideal enough, and is not in itself, or as a work of thought according to the laws of thought, untrue; but as such it has no reality beyond the mind thinking it. It may or may not correspond to the truth and reality of Nature, or to the ideal reality of the universal Thought. So far as it is, or may become, an exact copy and a true representation — an apocalyptic vision, as it were — of the universal idealism as exhibited in actual Nature or in the universe itself, it may become identical with Realistic Idealism. This idealism, like the other, is founded upon a psychology of the human mind, and it assumes the validity of human reason; but, unlike the other, it carries the psychological analysis and synthesis to the depth and extent of discovering and establishing the necessary truth and universal nature of the fundamental necessities, the necessary relations, and the first principles, grounds, and necessary laws and modes of Reason, all possible Reason, finite or universal, human or divine. It thus seeks to gain an impregnable and certain foundation for an *à priori* conclusion to the truth of the realistic idealism of the Absolute Thought. This method constitutes the Metaphysical Bridge by which only it may become possible for us to pass over from the physical to the metaphysical side, and place ourselves at the point of view of the creative Intelligence itself, and so be able fully to

* (But in the course of the process of the mind, the mind is not able to pass over from the physical to the metaphysical side, and place ourselves at the point of view of the creative Intelligence itself, and so be able fully to

realize that the Universe (God, Nature, and Man inclusive) is thoroughly ideal, and at the same time thoroughly real, and none the less ideal that it is also real, as it is in itself. At this point the illusions vanish and disappear.

Pure Idealism may be more apparent than actual, even in Fichte: his own statement certainly seems to give it such an aspect. It was very much so with the statement of Berkeley; yet it is very clear that such was not his real meaning. He denied, indeed, that there was any such matter as that commonly conceived, but he held to an essential reality underlying the external appearances called Matter. There is some like vagueness in the statement of Emerson: "Of that ineffable essence which we call Spirit, he that thinks most will say least. We can foresee God in the coarse and as it were distant phenomena of matter, but when we try to define and describe himself, both language and thought desert us, and we are as helpless as fools and savages. That Essence refuses to be recorded in propositions; but when man has worshiped him intellectually, the noblest ministry of Nature is, to stand as the apparition of God. It is the organ through which the universal Spirit speaks to the individual, and strives to lead back the individual to it." . . . "Idealism saith, Matter is a phenomenon, not a substance. Idealism acquaints us with the total disparity between the evidence of our own being and the evidence of the world's being." . . . We learn, indeed, "that the dread essence — which is not wisdom, or love, or beauty, or power, but all in one and each entirely — is that for which all things exist, and that by which they are; that Spirit creates; that behind Nature, throughout Nature, Spirit is present; one, and not compound, it does not act upon us from without, that is, in space and time, but spiritually, or through ourselves: therefore that Spirit, that is, the Supreme Being, does not build up Nature around us, but puts it forth through us, as the life of a tree puts forth new branches through the pores of the old. As a plant upon the earth,

so a man rests upon the bosom of God." In this statement we seem to have a recognition of pure Idealism, after the manner of Fichte, rather than that realistic Idealism which conceives Nature to be built up around us by the universal Soul, creating Nature, not as a mere appearance and an illusion, but as partly appearance and partly reality. And probably neither Emerson, nor Berkeley, nor Fichte would deny this. It is through us that the illusions exist: we dispel them and discover the reality. Pure idealism is as old as the Vedic Hindus, at least as old as Buddha, who seems to have regarded the world as all illusion (*Maya*). He had arrived at no clear comprehension in what manner mind or spirit did or could create Nature as it is. Modern thought, with the help of science, has attained to clearer conceptions of the mode, manner, and law of this work, and finds that Nature is neither wholly illusion nor wholly a reality, but both in one. There is always a reality underlying the appearance. That reality is neither wholly temporary and evanescent, nor wholly real and eternal: it is a reality which is partly temporary, and in some part or in some respect eternal and necessary. It is only in part illusory. The term *illusion* has reference to ourselves, and the illusion consists in this, that the things which we think we observe in Nature turn out to be, on closer inspection, not exactly what we had taken them for, but something quite other and different from what we had inferred or expected. As the real truth becomes known, the illusion vanishes. Both science and philosophy are continually approximating to a certain knowledge of the exact and true realities in Nature, and they discover that Nature is in truth built up around us, as even our own bodies are, and is not in fact put forth through us, though it is only through ourselves that Nature becomes known to us, and that the realities are distinguished from the illusions. Indeed, Emerson himself says as much: "The world proceeds from the same Spirit as the body of man. It is a remoter and inferior incarnation of God, a

projection of God in the unconscious. But it differs from the body in one important respect. It is not, like that, now subjected to the human will. Its serene order is inviolable by us. It is therefore, to us, the present expositor of the divine mind." ¹

There is truth in these statements, but not the entire truth, or it is not expressed in the fullness of logical precision. Nature is, indeed, not entirely subject to human will, but it is partially subject to human control: neither is the body of man wholly subject to his will, but only partially so. The inner constitution and order of Nature is, indeed, inviolable by us; but the course of Nature in the details of particular things is, in some large measure, within our control and direction. The order of Nature may be taken as the expositor of the present state of the Divine Mind. It is ever stable and ever changing, never wholly at a stay, never wholly in a flux; but there is stability in the flow of change. The human soul finds itself existent in the midst of the flowing stream and as a part of it, not as a helpless floating block, but as endowed with a certain limited measure of power and control over the unceasing and inevitable process. As the universal mind creates the universal world, so man creates his own little world within the greater; for he, too, is a creator. In this unavoidable conflict of the finite will and power with the universal, there soon comes a limit beyond which the lesser providence can no further go; for the self-determined and established order of the Greater Providence is indeed inviolable and absolute. "O thou unfathomable mystic All, garment and dwelling-place of the *Unnamed*; and thou articulate-speaking Spirit of Man, who mouldedest and modeldest that Unfathomable Unnamable even as we see, — is not there a miracle!" ²

Scarcely less realistic, or more idealistic, is Emerson's verse than his prose. He appears to have conceived the

¹ *Nature: Miscellanies*, pp. 59-63, Boston, 1856.

² Carlyle's *French Revolution*, i. 344.

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universe as an absolute essence and power in one (however more exactly to be defined), and a persistent ideality of ever-changing substance and form in a continuous round or cycle of creation : —

“The rushing metamorphosis
Dissolving all that fixture is,
Melts things that be to things that seem,
And solid nature to a dream.

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All the forms are fugitive,
But the substances survive.
Ever fresh to the broad creation,
A divine improvisation,
From the heart of God proceeds,
A single will, a million deeds.”¹

¹ *Poems*, by Ralph Waldo Emerson, Boston, 1886, pp. 51-57 (Woodnotes).

CHAPTER III.

PRINCIPLES AND THEORIES.

§ 1. SCOPE OF THE UNDERTAKING.

HERE I propose to look inward upon mind itself, and examine into those principles, necessities, necessary relations, laws, conditions, and facts with which the purely metaphysical phase of our whole method is concerned. This part of the subject comes first in logical order. The first consideration that presents itself is, in what manner it shall be approached. I might content myself with a rigid and exact statement of my own conclusions, in the briefest style and most condensed possible form. This might be as much as the skilled philosopher would need, or would care to read: for the unskilled, it might be too abstruse, and so dark as to be unintelligible. My purpose is rather a criticism on what has hitherto been done for the elimination of error, for the discovery of deficiencies, and, if possible, for advancing philosophy a step further on the road to truth and certainty. Nor do I undertake a critical review of the whole history of philosophy, nor of all that has been written on this part of the subject. The work would exceed my ability and my time. I must rather confine my endeavors to certain topics, points, or aspects of the whole problem, which, in the course of my own philosophical studies, have impressed me as needing criticism, or elucidation and further demonstration. Philosophy itself may be said to be a criticism, an eclecticism, a search after truth, aiming indeed at the whole truth; and its end must be a complete

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 theory (if not a complete knowledge) of the universe. At this day of the world, an entirely new philosophy of mind, or an entirely new theory of all knowledge, may be said to be out of the question and beyond the compass of human thought or invention to produce. But the vague can be made more precise, the obscure more clear, the deficient more complete. The sophistical can be reduced to the logical, the unsystematic to system; uncertainty can be made more certain, error can be exposed, the untrue refuted, and the true established; and ideal visions can be replaced with veritable realities. The work must presuppose what already exists or is known, and advance upon it.

We may then first take a glance over the field of philosophical speculation in this direction with a view to this purpose, and to ascertain the main results of investigation thus far. The general course of philosophy, in this phase of it, exhibits a continual libration, as it were, between the two opposite poles of mind and matter, God and Nature, metaphysics and physics, theology and science; but on the whole we may note a constant tendency towards unity and reconciliation in a complete Science of sciences, or Philosophy itself. This restless alternation is exemplified in the most ancient as well as in the most modern philosophy. In the old Vedic Hymns, certainly more than a thousand years before our era, the Aryan mind had already made the whole advance from a merely sensuous apprehension of things in Nature to some vague philosophic comprehension of a universal Self.¹ In Indian as in Greek philosophy, we have the same round of conflicting systems in a more or less vague way. Parmenides and Democritus, Plato and Epicurus, Proclus and Lucretius, Descartes and Helvetius, Berkeley and Hume, Locke and Reid, Kant and Fichte, Condillac and Cousin, Hegel and Schopenhauer, Stirling and Mill, and

¹ *Origin and Growth of Religion*, by F. Max Müller, M. A., New York, 1879; *Select Books of the East*, vol. i., trans. by F. Max Müller, Part I. pp. xxii., 109-142, Oxford, 1879.

* In the history of Science, the

all the other materialists and idealists, may be said to measure the swing of the vibration, down to our time. In every period, the variant schools have emphasized some one phase of the whole problem, as if by some internal necessity or law it was inevitable that each and every aspect of philosophical thinking (as it was said by Cousin) should be brought forward into undue prominence in different systems in order that its weight and true place in the scheme of the universe should be ascertained and determined. This is the very business of philosophy itself.

§ 2. SYSTEMATIC STATEMENT.

In respect to systematic statement (under this head) we need go no further back than Plato. Taking knowledge as he received it in his time, and examining and comparing particular things, he endeavored to ascend, by the dialectic of exact logical thinking, in the exercise of the powers and faculties and intellectual insight with which he found himself endowed, to universal ideas and necessary principles of thought. It was not a mere process of generalization, nor a mere induction from facts observed, rising from individuals to species and from species to genera; but he used induction universally, that is, as a dialectic process of thought, aiming not merely at higher and higher generalizations, but at universal ideas and necessary truths as in themselves considered, and at the necessary principles and nature of such ideas themselves. It was not a process of merely subjective abstraction for the dreaming imagination only, but a logical order of ascent by the pathway of necessary reason to a knowledge of those first principles and absolute truths that must of necessity lie at the foundation of all knowing, of all thought, and of all creation. Seeing beauty in a variety of objects, as a rose, a star, a gem, a sunset, a human face, he induced, or rather deduced, by the dialectic of an inexorable logic, the absolute and necessary existence and reality of a universal idea or principle of the Beautiful.

What we understand by "universal, self-subsistent in and for itself,—the alone true,—is the necessary," says Hegel.¹ In like manner Plato arrives at a universal idea or principle of the Good, and of the Substance of substances, and the Intelligence of intelligences, and at a universal principle of motion in the *that which itself moves itself* eternally. In this logical way he arrives at conceptions of the first principles, necessary laws, and absolute truths of all being and knowing. There is not only analysis, but a synthesis of all these ideas, principles, truths, or aspects into the unity of one Whole, the absolute One,—the One and the many, unity and multiplicity, essence and essences, substance and form, activity and rest, actuality and possibility, totality and variety, life and death, Thought and Oblivion. In short, we have a complete doctrine of the evolution of Soul itself into a creation of the world as its thought, proceeding in a rational and artistic manner, according to the end and aim of the true, the beautiful, and the good;² for this is the general result to which his philosophy leads. We need not expect to find the theory perfectly developed or fully stated in his writings. Nor were all these principles and thoughts expounded by him in a manner to be entirely satisfactory to the modern philosophical mind. His thought, his knowledge, his style and manner of exposition, and his language, partook of the vagueness and insufficiency of all ancient philosophy. It would seem to be true (as stated by Prantl), "that Plato had but incompletely seized those antinomies which Aristotle more perfectly developed into his Categories. Plato's Ideas involve the common (*κοινά*), not the universal (*καθόλου*), and a certain sharing (*μέθεξις*); but he

¹ *Werke*, XIV. : *Geschichte der Phil.*, pp. 173, 174, Berlin, 1840.

² But (according to Zeller) "the question whether the good, which like all ideas is a universal, and as the highest idea must be the most universal and the highest class, can be at once the Deity, and thus become a person, Plato never raised; indeed, he never inquired about the personality of God." — *Outlines of the Hist. of Greek Phil.*, by Dr. Edward Zeller (trans.), New York, 1886, p. 145.

had not reached the unity of activity and essence, except in a certain mythical and poetical way. His Ideas had a sort of architectonic of genera and species under the highest genus. But the dialectic movement of the entire essence into the architectonic was not logically grasped: in Aristotle it attained to the Concept (*Begriff*) of the Idea or Thought itself, as in Hegel."¹ Though his logical statement was inadequate, and his philosophy incomplete, yet his conception must have embraced the whole realistic ideal theory in his own way. The outlines and ground principles were there. Soul was that which moved itself eternally. It was movement in a standing all: it had the Beautiful and the Good for its end and aim, its final cause. It was movement according to intelligence, and after the manner and law of artistically creative thought. It was the Divine Soul of the Universe, and the creator of all finite souls. The precise manner in which all this was conceived to be logically possible was, indeed, but imperfectly stated: it was grasped perhaps only in a certain vague, poetical way. The same thing must be said of Aristotle, though he laid more stress on the active cause, and pronounced the words, *Thought thinks itself*. And nearly the same may be said of the Neoplatonists. Indeed, much the same must be said of the old Aryan Self (*Âtman*) of the Vedic Hymns: it was evidently conceived as the Universal Soul from which all things else, even finite souls, proceed, and into which all return; and the finite soul, returning into identity with the universal, then sees, knows, and understands everything, and is immortal. The doctrine is set forth much in the same vague, poetical way as the Jewish conception of Jehovah was. With masterly ability and a lofty eloquence, Plato initiated, and Aristotle, with greater acuteness and precision, further developed (what all metaphysical philosophy from Aristotle to Hegel has been mainly busied with),

¹ *Geschichte der Logik im Aberlande*, von Dr. Carl Prantl, Leipzig, 1855-1870, i. pp. 59-86.

the work of further clearing up and establishing the logical dialectic of the eternally active essence, and the necessary truth of those fundamental principles, laws, relations, or necessities of the universal Intelligence, whereby the conception may become more clearly intelligible.

§ 3. THE CATEGORIES.

Plato set forth the Categories of thought in a vague way only. Aristotle endeavored to define and formulate them more distinctly. He treated of Essence (οὐσία), Quantity (ποσόν), Quality (ποιόν), Relation (πρός τι); of Time (ποτέ), Space (πού), and Position (κεῖσθαι); of Habit (ἔχειν), Action (ποιεῖν), and Passion (πάσχειν); of Motion (κίνησις), and some others. His exposition was neither perfect nor complete; but he considered these matters universally, and not merely as categories of the human understanding only. Kant revived this discussion of the Categories, psychologically or subjectively, in reference only to the human mind. He did not expound them as universal, necessary, and absolute truths, principles, or laws, though he distinguished what he called Pure Reason from the Understanding. His pure reason logically ended in mere subjective idealism: he denied the possibility of arriving by the pathway of metaphysical logic at a knowledge of universal Soul, or an *à priori* demonstration of the existence of God. For the proof of that, he made the practical human reason draw the conclusion as an inference from all the evidence before it (the biblical revelation inclusive), after the manner of positive science and dogmatic theology. The Logic of Hegel attempted a metaphysical (that is, an *à priori*) demonstration of the absolute and necessary existence of universal Soul, the Absolute Idea, Thought itself, or "God as he really is in his own nature and being." In respect of the Categories, he appears to have considered some of them universally, and some others in reference to external Nature and the Understanding only. It is difficult, however, to make

out where he would draw any distinct line of division. His Categories of Being, Nothing, and Becoming, of Quality, Quantity, and Measure (Proportion), of Essence, Existence, and Appearance, may certainly be said to have a universal reference; while those of Identity and Difference, Unity and Variety, Substance and Accident, Actuality and Possibility, Necessity and Freedom (contingency), seem to be taken in both references. Cause and Effect, and the relation of Causality, he treats (generally, if not entirely) as a category of external Nature and the Understanding; but that of Action and Reaction, or the Relation of "Reciprocity," is considered in a universal reference, and as a higher relation than that of "Causality." The distinction made here would seem to be, that the chain of causation in external Nature is conceived as a mere endless progression of Causes and Effects, — a *progressus ad infinitum*; while the continuous chain of Action and Reaction, or the relation of Reciprocity, comes round through Nature into the absolute Notion again, in a full and perpetual circuit of true infinity. The Notion is presented under the three aspects of the Subjective Syllogism and Judgment, the Objective Thought, and the Absolute Idea. All aspects and categories, or antinomies, are summed up into the Unity and totality of the Notion as the absolute One — the Unity of Universality, Speciality, Particularity, and Individuality or Totality, wherein resides the movement of Ideality. This Ideality is exhibited under the aspect of the dialectical dynamic of Thinking Power in the Notion, infolding and unfolding (or evolving) and self-determining itself, as an activity of Negativity, into the creation of a world as a process of thought, according to those categories; but transcending all limitations of Necessity, imposing law and measure on its own action, and so proceeding as self-conscious Knowing and Will, having in itself an End and Aim, or final cause, in the True, the Beautiful, and the Good.

Both Plato and Aristotle deemed it necessary to inquire

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into the nature of the first movement, the beginning of motion. Both are vague and unsatisfactory on this head. Plato contented himself with the statement that the beginning of motion was in the *that which itself moves itself* in a standing All. Aristotle accepts the same doctrine: it is the *that which itself moves itself* in the immovable.¹ Plato declares that this is Soul, for that such is the very nature of soul. It must move itself, since there could be nothing other than itself whereby it might be moved: otherwise, all things would collapse, and never again have any means whereby they might be moved. His conception would seem to have been that, without such self-moving essence, there could be nothing but absolute Rest, or total annihilation into an infinite abyss of Nothingness. Aristotle argues still more strenuously for his position; since, by the very hypothesis of a One and Total of Essence, there could not possibly be any other source or cause of the movement. Neither explains nor states, in any definite and explicit way, how such self-movement is possible, or is conceived to be possible. Neither declares that it is an absolute Fact, or a necessary Truth. Both assume it to be so. Plato treats of this Soul as the Substance of Substances; Aristotle, as the Essence of Essences. Plato laid the stress on the final cause; Aristotle, rather on the active cause. Neither of them unfolds or explains the nature of this Substance or Essence further: there is no clear, definite, explicit, or intelligible statement in what manner this Substance or Essence is, or can be, constituted so as to be able to move itself as Soul, nor as to the how, the why, or the nature of the movement. It is much the same with Hegel's treatment. He assumes a self-moving activity: he does not stop to explain the nature or the possibility of such a thing.

Ν. 35.
¹ — ἔστι γὰρ τι ὃ αἰεὶ κινεῖ τὰ κινούμενα, καὶ τὸ πρῶτον κινῶν ἀκίνητον αὐτό (for there is something that always moves the movable, and the first mover is itself immovable). — *Arist. Met.*, Lipsiae, 1886, ed. Christ, Γ. 7, p. 88; Δ. 1-3, pp. 247-256; Δ. 7, p. 258.

There is no attempt to prove or demonstrate that it is an absolute Fact or a necessary Truth, otherwise than as the whole statement of his philosophy may be accepted as a demonstration that it must be so. He hovers vaguely between the active and the final cause. He seems to ignore the very idea or principle of Causality. He assumes an activity of Becoming: he will not allow that it is Substance, Essence, or Matter. He designates it only as the infinite Ideality of the logical Notion, the Absolute Idea, — Thought itself. Neither Plato, Aristotle, nor Hegel declares a self-moving to be identically the same thing as an eternally-moving Activity, Essence, or Matter. Hegel reduces Cause and Effect to a category of the human Understanding in the field of external Nature, and appears to substitute for it, in the sphere of Ideality, Action and Reaction, or the principle of Reciprocity, which he therefore regards as a higher relation than that of Causality. This Reciprocity seems to be understood in the sense of an intensive outward evolution into Nature, and a negative return or withdrawal into self again. On this head, and upon his doctrine of Attraction and Repulsion, Hegel's exposition is obscure, indistinct, and unsatisfactory, if not quite unintelligible. Fundamentally, it would seem that his doctrine really carries the principle of Causality around from the central Ideality through the entire chain of Cause and Effect in Nature back into the Ideality again, in a complete and perpetual circuit of reciprocal Action and Reaction; but the continuity of the free activity is partially broken or suspended, and indeed almost entirely submerged and suppressed, in the necessary order of temporary fixity and permanency, in which the actual constitution of Nature and of material bodies is at any time established. And upon the basis of this temporary fixity of things, as thus established for the time being, there arises, and necessarily follows as consequent thereon, a certain blind chaos and merely fatal operation of mechanical forces and mere sequences of

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cause and effect, following each other in endless succession : it is that world of chance, accident, and fate that rages uncontrolled, for the most part, in the external sphere of unconscious, material Nature as such. Yet the free activity in this principle of Reciprocity would seem still to subsist at the bottom of all ; it is not absolutely broken off or ceased, though partially suspended in a kind of temporary equilibrium of stationary balance, but actually continues in a full circuit through Nature back into its own universality, and into the fullness of its freedom in the free Ideality of the Notion. Hegel, however, chooses to call it Reciprocity rather than Causality.

In the philosophy of Victor Cousin, these categories, or " necessary laws " of thought, are discussed in a somewhat different, if not a more satisfactory, manner. All things are presented under two ideas, the apparent contraries of each other : Eternity and Time, Immensity and Space, Cause and Effect, Essence and Appearance, Substance and Accident, Unity and Variety, Identity and Difference, Possibility and Actuality, Necessity and Contingency, Infinite and Finite ; and the True, the Beautiful, and the Good, and their contraries. With him, these apparent Contraries constitute a twofold division into the Necessary on the one hand and the Contingent on the other. But all these ideas on the same side have to be reduced in thought into one ; and the two sides have to be reduced into Identity in one Whole. The one idea implies the other and opposite one ; and the one side of the twofold division implies the other. The two opposites and contraries are merely the two sides of a relation, two aspects of one and the same Whole. We cannot stand on either side alone, but must stand on both at once. Neither exists independently. We cannot go to either pole, and rest there : both poles must come into one view. In logical order, unity comes before variety ; but in reality both come together. They are inseparable. The bond of this unity and identity lies in the idea of Cause,

in the self-moving (or eternally-moving) activity of Substance, the principle of Causality. Causality is a triplicity in unity: it is Cause, Effect, and the Relation between them, all at once. The Relation merely expresses the fact that the self-active Substance (or Essence), which is in itself active cause and is absolute cause, eternally passes into effect, and subsists in it, and is thus cause in so far as substance, and substance in so far as cause. It is substance and cause, essence and power, taken absolutely. It cannot avoid passing into action and effect. Evolution into a world, into a creation, is inevitable and necessary.

It would seem to be necessarily involved in this view, that Eternity must be regarded as the mere possibility of Time; Immensity, as the possibility of Space; and Infinity in reference to Substance, Cause, Activity, Power of Thought, merely as expressing the fact of the inexhaustible possibility of the existence of such thinking Actuality, or Universal Soul, and the necessary Fact and Truth of its existence as such. It is really the same thing as the Ideality of Hegel's Notion, or Absolute Idea, at once absolute, universal, eternal, and necessary. With Cousin as with Hegel, the reduction or summation of all the categories, antinomies, or principles of thought into unity as one Whole, at the point of the absolutely Synthetic Apperception, and to be grasped in its concrete totality as such, completes the circuit and office of the dialectic metaphysics, and constitutes the Universal Soul and its process of self-evolution into a creation, — God and Nature as they really are in themselves. "The God of knowledge," says Cousin, "is not an abstract God, a solitary being, relegated beyond the creation to the desert throne of a silent eternity and an absolute existence, which even resembles the denial of existence: it is a God at once true and real, at once substance and cause, always substance and always cause, being substance in so far as cause and cause in so far as substance; that is to say, being absolute cause, one and many, eternity and time, space and

number, essence and life, indivisibility and totality, beginning, end, and middle, at the summit of being and at its lowest degree, — trifold, in fine; that is to say, it is at once God, Nature and Humanity.”¹

§ 4. THE THREE HYPOSTASES OF PLOTINUS.

As a rational theory of the universe, this result would seem to be substantially the same as that propounded by the old Aryan Upanishad, or by Plato and Aristotle, and which was further elaborated into the Neoplatonism of their successors, of whom Plotinus and Proclus were the chief. Among them, there is indeed no critical discussion, no precise formulating, of the categories of thought, distinctly as such: but they proceed upon a like general method; they arrive at nearly the same fundamental principles, necessities, laws, and absolute truths; and they end in a similar theory of God, Nature, and Man. It is difficult to get at their conceptions with precision and certainty, and to express them truly in the language and terms of modern thought; but it may be said perhaps that they appear to have contemplated the universe as a totality of actual Being or Essence, other than which there was only the blank infinity of Nothingness or Oblivion. This one Essence was of the nature, wholly and absolutely, of self-moving, self-conscious Intelligence and Life, or Thinking Power and its thought, — Soul and Nature, — in an eternal state of creative activity, under the principles and laws or necessities thereof, as Proclus said, after the manner of “a proceeding Intellect,” producing the world of things which we see, not as we see it, but as it really is in itself. This was the view from the inside (as it were), and it was

¹ Preface to the first ed. of the *Fragments Philosophiques: Œuvres de V. Cousin*, Bruxelles, 1840-41, vol. ii. p. 38. M. Vacherot is also emphatic in his objection to an abstract and empty Deity: “Ce Dieu-là, qu’un philosophe contemporain nous représente relégué sur le trône désert de son éternité silencieuse et vide.” — *La Métaphysique et La Science, ou Métaphysique Positive*, par Étienne Vacherot, Ancien Directeur des études à l’École normale, Paris, 1858, vol. ii. 500.

reached by the pathway of the inward Reason. When they came to look upon Nature on the external and physical side, in the absence of scientific knowledge about natural phenomena, almost as a matter of course, they fell into the crudest errors concerning the facts, operations, and science of the material world. Nor were they able to clear their minds of what might be called the popular theology of their time: they could not free themselves entirely from the Greek way of conceiving of the system of Nature and of the gods of the current Pantheon. But after all, their errors and superstitions did not much vitiate their metaphysical theory. Contemplated thus inwardly and from the point of view of the creative Soul itself, and as it were intensively, this All of Being was comprehended as *the One*. At the same time, this One could be considered by us (the finite intelligences that we are) under several aspects, or as parts separable in thought, though inseparable in reality. In one aspect, the One might be regarded as Essence in its purest simplicity as such; and in this peculiar sense the term was often used by them. It was the conception of Essence as single, simple, and the same, in its most indeterminate character, but not as absolutely indeterminate and so identical with absolute Nothing. It may be that they intended to include in this conception the negative Nothingness or Oblivion, in which the eternally active One had its real being, its freedom, and the possibility of its existence as such Actuality. This One could be considered in these three aspects, especially: (a) as the Good; (b) as the Intelligence; and (c) as Soul and Nature (nature being the product or manifestation of Soul). These were the first principles (*hypostases*), the groundwork, the foundation. The Good (including the Beautiful) came first, rather as highest and best than as first in order of time, or first in logical order; "because," says Plotinus, "all depends on it, aspires to it, and holds existence, life, and thought in it." It was the cause of the creation, — not the active cause, but the final cause, the purpose, and end,

the *reason why*, of the creation. The Creator and the creation were good in the whole, and each particular thing was good in itself and in its place. Both in the whole and in the parts, there was as much good, as much beauty, as there could be, if there were to be a creation at all, and if things were to be what they are at all.

In the aspect of Intelligence (the second principle), they seem to have considered the One in the light of pure Reason, or those universal necessities, necessary relations, conditions, or laws of thought, which must and do exist absolutely, being such in their very nature and necessity that it is impossible to conceive or imagine the contrary of their truth. They were regarded as eternal, impartible (though partakable), and in themselves immutable. This first order of "Intelligibles" neither moved nor stood still, said Proclus; but "Intellect" was "both moved and permanent."¹ And so it would seem that they contemplated this Intelligence as intellectual, or as capable of movement; and they must therefore have considered these principles or necessities of Reason as in some way admitting of being wielded (as it were) into logical, dialectical movement in the process of thinking or creating, and in constituting subordinate and lesser intelligences, ideas, forms, and things in Nature; for they imagined a sort of ideal architectonic of intelligences, from the Supreme Intelligence itself downward through superior and inferior gods, angels, dæmons, and souls of men and animals, and even into the entire order of material Nature, in such manner that not only every finite soul, but every body, or thing, had its own ideal constitution of essence and form, or cause and form joined in one, somewhat as the Ghost is designated in the *Hamlet*:—

"His form and cause conjoined, preaching to stones,
Would make them capable."

"The Intelligence," says Plotinus, "embraces in its univer-

¹ Proclus on the *Theology of Plato*, trans. by Thomas Taylor, ii. p. 247, London, 1816.

sality all particular intelligences. In thinking itself, the intelligence possesses all things, it is all things, because in it the subject thinking, the object thought, and the thought itself, are identical." An idea, a thought, was both the essence and the form of the sensible object or thing in Nature.

The One as such neither stood still nor was moved; that is, it had no motion of translation, but there was movement within it; for, says Proclus, "intellect perceiving intellectuals, or rather being one with them, Plato says that it understands them by projecting energies, by intuition and contact, understanding itself, and beholding intelligibles in itself, on which account it intellectually sees what it is, and knows that it is at one and the same time both the perceiver and the thing perceived, for intellect is intelligible according to the being which is in it."¹ Again he says: "Intellect is threefold, one being that which *is*, another that which *has*, and another that which *sees*. For it is necessary that this second intellect should not only have the intelligible, but that it should be and have the intelligible; that it should *be* indeed the intelligible coördinate with itself, but *have* the intelligible prior to itself, so far as it participates of it. And it is necessary that the third intellect should *see* the intelligible, and should also *be* and *have* it; that it should see indeed the first intelligible, but *have* that which is proximately beyond itself; and that it should be the intelligible which is in itself, and which is conjoined with its own intelligence, and should be inseparable from it."²

In the aspect of Soul (the third principle), the One was conceived as being alive, as being in an eternal state of living activity, as self-moving (or eternally-moving) Essence, and as such the source and cause of all life and movement

¹ Proclus on *Providence and Fate* (*Theology of Plato*, trans. by Taylor, vol. ii. p. 463, London, 1816).

² Proclus on the *Theology of Plato*, trans. by Thomas Taylor, i. p. 324, London, 1816.

as well in the lesser intelligences as in all Nature. In this sense, the universe was said to be an animal, that is, it was animated, it was alive. "God is living Being (Ζῶον)," says Aristotle, "eternal and the best, so that life eternal belongs to God; for this is God."¹ This life, "the animal" (says Plotinus), "is beautiful in itself, is excellent, is not wanting in any kind of life, is imperishable, immortal. It vivifies equally the souls which dwell above, and those which dwell below. This life knows why it lives; it knows its principles and its end; for its principle is at the same time its end. This life is intimately united with the intelligence, and subsists in it and with it; and the universal Wisdom renders it still better, colors it with its own splendor, and makes its beauty more venerable."² According to Proclus, "the Monad is all-perfect animal," and is "only-begotten because its paradigm is One."³ The living Essence penetrated the intelligibles, and communicated to them an unchangeable life. It was in this eternal and supreme Essence that life and intelligence dwelt absolutely and eternally; for "it is Being itself, and possesses existence by itself, and is essentially in act." It holds all things "suspended from it; and they seek nothing beyond the Good." So, says Aristotle, "God is the eternal act of thinking." Here already, says Cousin, is the basis of modern philosophy as in the *Cogito ergo sum* of Descartes: "to think is to be."⁴ Proclus speaks of Will as "a triad in the One of Essence, Power, and Energy: analogously, the Intelligence is divided into Essence, Life, and the intellectual."⁵ He interprets Plato as meaning by Soul "the self-moving, animating power, and so different from the Intelligence itself, which is without

¹ Met. XII. c. g.; *Enneades de Plotin*, par Bouillet, vol. ii. p. 479; *Arist. Met.*, ed. W. Christ, Lipsiæ, 1886, A 7, p. 258.

² *Enneades de Plotin*, par Bouillet, vol. iii., Enn. VI. 6, p. 404.

³ Proclus on the *Theol. of Plato*, i. p. 342.

⁴ *Arist. Met. XII.*; *Œuvres de V. Cousin*, Bruxelles, vol. i. p. 478.

⁵ Proclus on the *Tymæus of Plato*, trans. by Thomas Taylor, London, 1820, vol. i. p. 312.

activity or life in itself : the world is animated, because self-moving ; and if it is perpetually moved, it is governed by Soul, for every body which is itself moved inwardly by itself is animated." ¹ The universe was "all-perfect animal." In all this it would seem that Essence was conceived as being eternally active ; Power, as capacity, potentiality, or the possibility of action ; and Energy, as the exertion into act ; and energizing proceeded upon the basis of the Intelligence, the immovable standing all, as a kind of *πρὸς στῶν*. So, also, Hegel makes the self-moving Will move into action on the basis of Cognition. It is a Reciprocity of Action and Reaction. ✓

Thus the three *hypostases* or first principles, gathered up into the unity of the one active Whole, constituted the universal, self-moving, intelligent Soul. As such, it was self-conscious Will : it contemplated its intelligence, and received forms in it, generating them within itself ; and it was "the life of all inferior souls and of all Nature." ² So says Proclus : "Soul, being self-motive, participates of a life according to intellect, and energizing according to time possesses a measuring energy and an ever-vigilant life from its proximity to intellect. And intellect, possessing its life in eternity, always subsisting essentially in energy, and fixing all its stable intellections at once in intellect, is entirely deific through the cause prior to itself." ³

Proclus makes a notable distinction between the universal or divine Soul and the finite Soul in respect of Will : "There is a rational elective potency in us, which is appetitive of the true and the apparent good, leading the soul to both, by reason that it ascends and descends, errs and goes aright. It may be called a two-wayed inclination to both. Wherefore the electional potency and the substance of the

¹ Ibid., p. 348.

² *Enneades de Plotin*, par Bouillet, Paris, i. p. 321, note.

³ Proclus on the *Theology of Plato*, trans. by Thomas Taylor, i. p. 45, London, 1816.

soul (the *τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν*) are the same. According to this potency, we differ from the divine souls and the mortal; for these are insusceptive to that inclination to both true and apparent good, — the former, because they are placed in true good only, by reason of excellence; the latter, in apparent good only, by reason of defect. Intellect characterizes the one, sense the other: the one is our king, the other our servant. But we are fixed in the medium of choice, and are moved and turned away from true worth and dignity: we incline to the better as intellectual, to the worse as sensual. Our souls have not therefore the power and potency of all; for what is all-powerful is a unial potency, and for this reason it is one and boniform in all. But what is elective is dual, and for this reason not all-powerful, because limited by these inclinations. It becomes subject to the impulsion of all else, if it have not the elective impetus and so be Will only. For willed life is according to Good, which makes the soul in us all-powerful, a deiform essence, by reason of which it becomes God, and transcends the whole world, as Plato said.”¹

And according to Proclus, “the universal Soul is wholly good, wholly intellectual, and without choice, as being under no necessity of electing between true and apparent good. Pure intelligence is impersonal: it becomes personal only in the participation of it by the lesser and finite souls. It makes evil only in making good. It knows as having knowledge of all things, unially; of partible things, impartibly; but of evils, boniformly; and of multitude, unially. It is self-moving (*αὐτοκίνητος*) eternal Cognition, unspeakable and unial in the One itself, knowing and producing all things.”²

¹ *Procli Opera*, ed. V. Cousin, vol. i., *De Providentia et Fato*, pp. 68–288, Parisiis, 1820; Proclus on the *Theology of Plato*, and on *Providence and Fate*, trans. by Thomas Taylor, vol. ii. pp. 463–496, London, 1816.

² *Procli Opera*, ed. V. Cousin, Parisiis, 1820, vol. i. pp. 68, 174, 288.

This Soul dwelt in eternity; and it was infinite, "because," says Plotinus, "it is universal and loses nothing; since for it there is neither past nor future. In effect, to say that it is universal and loses nothing, explains what is meant by the words *the life which is actually infinite*."¹ Its infinity, as it would seem, consisted in its eternal continuity and inexhaustibility as an ever-flowing fountain of power and life; it was "the ineffable fountain."

§ 5. THE ONE OF THE NEOPLATONISTS.

These first principles, or necessary and absolute truths (as they may be called), subsisted in the unity of the self-moving triad or triplicity. It is the One as a universal Whole proceeding into particulars (the Many), not as independent parts consubsistent in absolute antinomy or contradiction, but as still remaining in the unity of triplicity as one Whole; but in our thought, and for the purposes of logical analysis, the three principles might be considered in these three different aspects. It is Hegel's *quasi* "diremption" of Subjective and Objective. It is Plato's Triad, Hegel's triadic category of Universality, Speciality, Particularity, in Totality (Wholeness), or (as Rosenkranz defined it) Universality, Speciality, and Particularity solved again into the Whole as such, and Cousin's Triplicity in Unity. According to Thomas Taylor, Plotinus was the first distinctly to assert "the subsistence of the three *hypostases* that rank as principles (*ἀρχὴ καὶ ὑποστάσεις*), viz., the Good, Intellect, and Soul, and who demonstrated that there can be neither more nor less than these. But these three are thus denominated because they are not consubsistent, and they are not consubsistent because they are essentially different from each other. For, according to Plato, the Good is super-essential; Intellect is an impartible, immovable essence; and Soul is a self-motive essence, and subsists as a medium between Intellect and the Nature which is distributed about

¹ *Les Enneades de Plotin*, par M. Bouillet, Paris, vol. ii. p. 181.

bodies" (material organization). The Good was the first principle, exempt from all multitude, beyond Essence, and not to be coarranged with the other two as a Trinity, but as a Triad in which the other two proceeded from the One; for, in the philosophy of Plato, "in every order of things, a triad is the immediate progeny of a monad: hence the intelligible triad proceeds immediately from the principle of all things." ¹ According to Proclus, the first cause was not the soul, but the One. As One, it was above time, and dwelt in eternity; but as soul, it participated in time. "The One also (he said) was better than Intellect, and was beyond it, because every Intellect is both moved and permanent; but it is demonstrated that the One neither stands still, nor is moved. Hence, through all this, the three hypostases which rank as principles, viz., the One, the Intellect, and Soul, become known to us." ² It is evident that when Taylor said that the three principles were not consubstantial because essentially different, he did not mean that they were absolutely distinct, independent, and contradictory: in this sense his expression would be inaccurate. His meaning must have been that they were essentially different, or were contradictory, only in their aspect of severance, not in their aspect of Oneness. The Good was "superessential;" that is, as we may suppose, it was an ideal truth or quality, but a reality as such. It was the highest and best, and arose out of, or was consequent upon, the very constitution and nature of the living Intelligence or Soul, and coexisted with it. It was therefore in the sense superessential, and it was prior to the essences of things in time and Nature. The Intelligence was conceived as an eternal, impartible, and immutable essence or truth. They speak of it as the sphere of "intelligibles," and as one entire reality. They do not seem to have considered it as consisting of distinct laws,

¹ *Select Works of Plotinus*, trans. by Thomas Taylor, Introduction, p. lxxiv., London, 1817.

² Proclus on the *Theology of Plato*, by Taylor, ii. 247.

necessities, or principles of reason, subsisting in absolute severance from each other, but rather in some kind of unity. Something like this would seem to be necessary, if it were to be capable of being wielded into a constitution of ideas or things in Nature in a process of thought, or creation. They certainly supposed the Intelligence to be employed in this way ; but they do not state in what manner such wielding process was conceived to be possible. The Intelligence was impartible, eternal, immovable, and unchangeable in its own nature ; but, at the same time, it could be shared and participated in partially, though not wholly, by the lesser intelligences and by bodies or things in Nature. According to Proclus, it admitted of logical movement into a creation " as a certain proceeding intellect, established in eternity, but proceeding and abundantly flowing into the things which are generated in Nature ; " ¹ that is, we may suppose, it entered into their constitution as their ideal form and real substance. Some kind of dialectic process of the One Whole into parts and particulars would seem to be necessarily involved in this. There was no substratum of matter other than the fixity or temporary permanency that was imparted to things, or established in them, by such intellectual (or dialectic) constitution of them. The actual existence of this intelligence, its reality, its truth, could be positively affirmed ; but it was not otherwise material in the ordinary sense of the term : it was simply real and true, and as such might be spoken of as having essence, or essentiality. As entering into the constitution of souls, ideas, or bodies and things, it thus became the special ground of their existence as such, *i. e.* their substances : the self-moving Essence, through the mediation of the Intelligence, being thus thrown into them partially, and specially limited and fixed or suspended into them, became their essence, substance, or (as we call it) their matter. But, says Plotinus, " if we contemplate the wisdom and knowledge which thus reside in them, we shall no longer regard

¹ *On the Theology of Plato*, trans. by Taylor, vol. ii. p. 240.

without a smile this inferior nature to which the vulgar give the name of matter."

The Soul was more especially the self-moving aspect of the One Essence and power, and was intimately united with the intelligence, and subsisted in it and with it, and received wisdom, splendor, and beauty from it, and it became the medium between intellect and the matter of bodies; ¹ that is, as it would seem, it was the mediating activity or power. The whole One was a conscious, knowing essence or Essent-ity, so that, as self-moving Soul, it knew why it lived, and knew its principle and its end. As was said by Parmenides, *Being and Knowing were the same thing: to know is to be*. The term *Soul* is often used by them vaguely and ambiguously; sometimes as expressing the thinking totality, the One; sometimes as meaning Life, even animal life only; and again, as one of the three first principles, it seems to be used in the sense of the self-moving or eternally-moving, single, simple, indivisible essence of the Intelligence. In the unity of consubistence in the One, it somehow pervaded the Intelligence, was active under the necessary principles or laws of reason constituting intelligence, contemplated this reason, and wielded it into employment as a process of thought and creation, in the evolution of the One into the world of created things. As such it was a rational, knowing, self-conscious, and essential activity, a thinking, creating Power and Potentiality, and a universal Personality. Whether as the universal Soul, or as finite souls limited and suspended into Nature, it was in itself essentially self-moving power, and leaped to the modulation of thought and action as Will. But the Neoplatonists did not undertake to define more exactly the manner of the constitution of the finite soul in men or animals. There was not much attempt to point out how the special soul differs from the universal. A certain dreamy vagueness pervades their thought and ex-

¹ Introduction to the *Select Works of Plotinus*, by Thomas Taylor, p. lxxiv., London, 1817.

pression, as in all ancient philosophy, and it is difficult to reconcile their apparent contradictions. The modern mind requires a higher grade of precision and certainty. It is difficult to translate their thought into the conceptions and language of modern philosophy, without doing them either in justice, or more than justice. Speaking of the finite soul, with them, memory depended upon the thinking activity. "Memory," says Plotinus, "is not a certain repository of impressions, but a power of the soul exerting itself in such a way as to possess that which it had not. . . . When we reflect that life is motion, we do not conceive that it is a change of quality. But the natural energy of each part of the soul is life not departing from itself. . . . Recollections are not types impressed on the soul: imaginations are not configurations described as it were in wax. For everywhere in all passions and emotions, the soul must be acknowledged to subsist with invariable sameness in its subject and essence, and that virtue and vice are not produced in it after the same manner as black and white, or heat and cold in the body. But it must be admitted that the soul subsists with reference to both these, and in short in all contraries, according to the above-mentioned mode." ¹ There were no Brodies, Bains, Maudsleys, and Huxleys in those days, with their "residual" impressions on brain-tissues, generic outlines, and "relational perceptions," as if imprints on wax; but it is clear that these modern scientific notions are no novelties in the history of philosophy.

The Neoplatonists seem to have regarded all finite souls as in some manner specialized in and under the supreme Intelligence. They belong to an order or hierarchy of intelligences in a subordinate architectonic in the world of intelligibles. They partake, or participate in, the universal intelligence partially. The active essence and life flows into them from the one fountain of all life. This self-moving essence and life is shared partially also. The

¹ *Select Works of Plotinus*, by Taylor, pp. 127-131, London, 1817.

finite Soul was thus let down under the given limitations and suspended into the material body, and, being mixed and joined with it, became subject to appetites, passions, physical nature, and fate; but it was separable from the body, or not identical with it, and was capable of immortality in the intelligible world. They regarded the body as residing in the soul, rather than the soul as residing in the body. "We say," says Plotinus, "that the soul is in the body. If, however, the soul were visible and sensible, so as to be perceived to be full of life, to comprehend entirely the body in life, and to extend itself equally to the extremities of it, we should no longer say that the soul is in the body, but that, in the more principal nature, that which is not such subsists; in that which contains, the thing contained; and that which flows, in that which does not flow. . . . The soul is in the body in the same manner as if the pilot were in the rudder of the ship, managing it artificially."¹ In these sayings of Plotinus, there is some ambiguity, as is common among all the ancient Platonists. He does not clearly distinguish between the universal and the finite soul. If he were to be understood here as meaning altogether the finite soul, his doctrine would be contradicted by our modern science, which demonstrates that our souls do not create our bodies, but that the material organization and life of our bodies are a part of material Nature, existing, and carrying on a large part of the functions of life and organization, independently of our minds and wills; though our wills may have some control over the physical functions and operations, or may exercise an influence upon them. The electric battery of the *gymnotus* is an organ that exists independently of its soul, and even anterior to it; but still it is connected with the brain, and depends on the Will of the animal for its discharge. But if Plotinus can be understood as meaning that we, soul and body, live in the universal Soul (whereof our souls are but living streams), the saying

¹ *Select Works*, by Taylor, p. 370, London, 1817.

might be really true ; for then we might readily understand that our bodies and our souls flow in that which does not flow, but contains that which does flow, or is evanescent. The real meaning of Plotinus probably was, that the body lived in the universal Soul, but that its own special soul was in the body, as the rudder (or rather the pilot) is in the ship.

§ 6. THE "PROCEEDING INTELLECT" OF PROCLUS —
HARMONY.

This self-active, intelligent Essence was conceived as the One dwelling in eternity. It was therefore infinite, that is, without beginning, middle, or end. Its infinity consisted in the eternal continuity, inexhaustibility, and fact of its existence as such essence and power. In Eternity only was the possibility of time or times in succession. Immensity was the empty possibility of space or spaces in succession. Time and Space were the necessary limitations under which the creative Intelligence gave the forms and substances of particular things. Aristotle treated of Time as the measure of motion ; the Neoplatonists considered motion to be the measure of time. "Time," says Plotinus, "is unapparent, but motion is apparent ; and things unapparent are known and measured by such as are apparent." Time was "the transitive life of the soul, and was measured by it."¹ The eternally active soul, moving into particular intelligences, ideas, bodies, or things, measured them out of eternity and immensity into times and spaces, in the process of evolution into a creation. Archytas and Aristotle admitted time to be a continued and indivisible flux of *nows*. If, therefore (says Plotinus), "one should say that time is the energy of the soul proceeding in a transitive motion from one life to another, will he not appear to say something to the purpose?" So Proclus said, "Time is a medium between that which is alone the cause of motion as soul and that which is

¹ *Select Works*, by Taylor, pp. 127-131.

alone immovable as intellect ; ” and hence it was “ a certain proceeding intellect,” established in eternity, but proceeding and flowing into things in time and space, in the process of their generation. Taylor pronounces this definition “ uncommonly beautiful and accurate.”¹ Perhaps we should now say more precisely, that Time and Space are in themselves merely those necessary limitations, laws, necessities, and conditions of all possible thought, giving the forms of ideas, conceptions, bodies or things, in the process of creating and bounding them out of eternity and immensity ; in which only times and spaces, or the forms of existent things and realities, are at all possible or conceivable. They are the limitations under which particular things take their forms and substances.

It is as true in modern science as in the metaphysics of Plotinus, that motion is the measure of time. In the external and physical aspect, the motion of the earth around the sun is the measure of our year ; its motion on its axis measures out the day ; and that of the moon measures the lunar month. The clock measures out the hours, minutes, and seconds. If we were to take the motion of a light-wave in the æther, coming from the remotest visible star to the earth, as a measure of time, though the speed be enormous, the length of it would be too great, and too uncertainly ascertainable, to be of much practical use as a measure of time. If we looked to the universe as a whole, since that dwells in eternity, it could afford us no measure of time whatever : it is, in truth, itself the only possibility of any and all measures of time, and (as it dwells in immensity also) of space as well. In the internal and metaphysical aspect, or in reference to the one Whole of Essence and Motion itself (or the absolute Quantity and Quality), Time and Space are simply nothing other than those necessary limitations of Modality that are given in the infinitely

¹ *Select Works*, by Taylor, pp. 195-209 : *Works of Aristotle*, trans. by Thomas Taylor, vol. iv. pp. 552, 589 (note by Taylor), London, 1816.

movable boundary of limitation of the Whole itself, and of all special parts, or particular things, in the Whole ; that is, their Extension, their intensive and extensive Magnitude.

What we usually call Matter, the Neoplatonists conceived to be merely that farthest stage and termination in the evolution of the one active Essence into bodies or things in Nature, where it was ended, suspended, and limited into a temporary permanency, or a sort of equilibrium of stationary balance for the time being. This Essence, in its total constitution as Soul, and in the consubistence of the three first principles (hypostases) in the unity of one simultaneous whole, was motion and standing all in one. The Whole did not move at once, for this (as Aristotle said) would be "mere lation in space," the movement of translation of a finite body ; but the movement was of some part, or in some respect, while the whole as such remained stationary and unmoved, being in fact immovable ; for it was to be conceived as self-moving, or eternally moving within itself. The standing All might be regarded as an unmoved $\pi\omicron\upsilon\sigma\tau\acute{\omega}$, or basis, on which the self-moving or eternally-moving Essence unfolded itself into the variety of things in a creative process of evolution, in an artistic manner, according to Intelligence, having for its end and aim the True, the Beautiful, and the Good, and so with a conscious purpose. For it is necessary, according to Plotinus, that immobility should engender movement, that the life which is locked up in itself should produce another life, that calm being should project a kind of mobile and agitated breathing." . . . "In effect, as the world moves itself in the universal Soul, which is its place, it moves itself also in the time which it carries in itself. In manifesting its powers in a manner successive and varied, the universal engenders succession by its mode of action ; it passes in effect from one conception to another, consequently to what did not exist before, since that conception was not effective [final] ; and the present life of the soul does not resemble [is not the same as] its anterior

life. Its life is varied, and from the variety of its life results the variety of things in time."¹

If we were to undertake to interpret their thought into modern expression, it might be found to contain, or substantially to imply, that Time and Space are in themselves merely the result or consequence of the operation of the necessary principles, conditions, or laws of thought whereby conceptions, ideas, bodies, things, or actions, receive their modes, their forms and substances, in the process of creation, being thus bounded out of Eternity and Immensity, the mere negative and infinite blank possibilities (in which the creative Soul itself dwells, and has its being, as the absolutely existent Actuality and Reality), into the limitations of Time, Place, and Position, or into Times, Spaces, and Places. This activity was conceived as eternal and continuous, and as capable of thus limiting, setting, and temporarily fixing, its own Essence in them, and there was a more or less continuous change in the constitution and forms of things throughout the variety of Nature. They sometimes appear to consider this activity as flowing out of Nothing, or out of some "ineffable fountain," which is not further defined or described, but is left in the condition of a vague, mystical vision. Aristotle had expounded the only possible conception of Infinity as applied to an eternally moving Essence to be that of circular motion that perpetually returns into itself, without beginning, middle, or end. Such eternal movement in a standing All must have been conceived as coming round into the Whole again, infinitely, and as proceeding through the finite, or special and particular, back into the universal and simple whole Essence. Indeed, this is precisely what Proclus meant when he said that "what is converted to itself," or "has the power to revert to itself," is "incorporeal and impartible." And "intellect moves, being immovable, and energizes with an invariable sameness of subsistence," and "soul on account of intellect

¹ *Les Enneades de Plotin*, par M. Bouillet, vol. ii. pp. 30, 197.

participates of a perpetual energy."¹ Intellect moves, being immovable. Here, we are to understand, doubtless, that the Intelligence (constituted as before explained) moves in respect of some part or aspect, or in some respect, while the one Whole, in respect of its entirety, remains unmoved and immovable. In this absolute Whole, we have a basis of action and reaction where both are equal. In this way it becomes conceivable, at least, how the world may be in a perpetual flux or flow, as Heraclitus said. It is essentially the logical dialectic of "Negativity," or self-limiting action, as more precisely and definitely exhibited in the philosophy of Hegel. Something like this is probably what was really meant by "the ineffable fountain." All this is to be understood, of course, in reference to the universal Soul as such.

As to the finite soul, it was regarded as a specially limited exhibition in us of the one active essence and intelligence, whereby it became a special and limited power of thought, imagination, and knowledge in us, its consciousness being coextensive with its knowing; and it was governed by the same necessary principles or laws in the forming of its own conceptions, ideas, or acts. But it has to be remembered that the things which are conceived and carried on in the universal mind, as its conceptions and creations, stand for us (who observe them from the external side, as it were) as the material objects, bodies, and phenomena which we discover in the natural world. Our imagination reaches both to matters of sense-perception and to matters of original intuitive conception, and the power of thought in us wields those same principles or laws of intelligence, or pure reason, in which we participate (partially, though not wholly), into movement in the construction of our own ideas, or intelligible conceptions; which, however, may, or may not, have exact correspondence with the actual things in

¹ Proclus, *Elements of Theology* (*Theol. of Plato*, ii. pp. 310-315).

* This extended thought, however, as said in the text, would be a source of partiality. That things are conceived as bodies, and thus as material, and thus as limited, and thus as not absolute.

Nature. It is not probable that a blind man's ideas of colors agree exactly with those of persons who can see, or with the realities. But it is nevertheless possible that our minds, in forming images or conceptions on matters of sense-perception, may wield and employ the intelligence in such manner as to make those ideas or conceptions accurate copies of the real objects or things as externally presented to observation, and from which the sense-perceptions come, provided that our observations are made in a scientific and exact manner. Both the mathematician and the metaphysician must and do wield and employ this intuitive, conceptive imagination in a high degree and to a large extent: the superficial observer of objects and of acts in Nature has much less use for it. The strict methods of natural science sometimes ignore it altogether. The man of true science employs it according to the depth of his knowledge and ability. A common farmer may look at a tree, and not see whether it is an oak or a maple, or, if he sees it to be an oak, he does not distinguish the species. If he sees differences among the trees of a forest, he can neither distinguish nor name the trees correctly. The botanist, with his skilled eye, sees all the differences, even to the form of the leaf and flower, and gives the trees their several proper names. He may go so far as to see and name all the parts of the tree, cells, fibres, juices, gums; but there his seeing ends. The chemist now steps in, and, with his chemical eye, sees that the cells, fibres, gums, and coloring matters are composed of carbon, oxygen, hydrogen, etc., and there his seeing ends, though he may proceed further with his speculation, and endeavor to form ideal conceptions of molecules, atoms, and æthers. The physicist proper next comes in with his seeing instruments and experiments, and discovers that there are such subtle, invisible, insensible, and half-understood elements and forces at work in the affair as heat, light, electricity, magnetism, and ethereal media of motion; and for the most part there, perhaps, ends his seeing and

his sense-perception. He may even declare that there is nothing more to be seen by anybody in any way, or he may carry his speculation beyond sense-perception altogether into the sphere of purely intellectual intuition, where the intelligence sees directly and immediately by its own light, or by the consciousness of knowing. Suppose, now, that his intellectual vision were to become so expanded and deep as to be commensurate with the universal intelligence itself, and that he could place himself at the point of view of the absolute Soul creating Nature, what should hinder his seeing the whole universe of things, simultaneously and from the inward and supernatural side? This seems to have been the way in which the Neoplatonists endeavored to contemplate the universe of Soul and Nature. Thomas Taylor translates from Proclus thus: "The first intellect understands himself, and by knowing himself knows everything of which he is the cause, possessing a knowledge transcendently more accurate than that which is coördinate to the objects of knowledge; since a causal knowledge of everything is superior to every other kind of knowledge. Without busily attending, therefore, to the objects of his intellection, by alone knowing himself, he knows all things. Nor is he indigent [is not in need] of sense, or opinion, or science, in order to know sensible natures; for it is himself that produces all these, and that, in the unfathomable depths of the intellection of himself, comprehends an united knowledge of them according to cause, and in one simplicity of perception; just as if some one, having built a ship, should place in it men of his own formation, and, in consequence of possessing a various sort, should add a sea to the ship, produce certain winds, and afterwards launch the ship into the new-created main. Let us suppose, too, that he causes them to have an existence by merely conceiving them to exist, so that, by imagining all this to take place, he gives an external subsistence to his inward phantoms, it is evident that in this case he will contain the cause of everything

* i.e. Each "Soul" so much as he comprehends
of the universal intellectual emanation of the
One.

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which happens to the ship through the winds or the sea, and that by contemplating his own conceptions, without being indigent [in need] of conversion to outward objects, he will at the same time both fabricate and know these external particulars. Then, and in a still greater degree, the first or intelligible Intellect, possessing the cause of all things, both gives substance to and contemplates whatever the universe contains, without departing from the speculation of himself." ¹ For, as he says again, "the knowledge of causes is the work of science, and we are then said to know scientifically when we know the causes of things." ² So, the knowledge of Causes was the first and highest object of Bacon's imaginary "Solomon's House," in the "New Atlantis."

They saw an aspect of Oneness, an aspect of Variety, and an aspect of movement and change, in an eternally standing All. There was only a transient permanency in the multiplicity of things: if all degrees of permanency, or persistence of forms, were taken away, the one Essence was simply withdrawn out of them, and lapsed into itself again, as the single, simple, and same absolute One. They did not imagine the possibility of a total cessation of all activity and life in the One: that would be to suppose a state of absolute Rest, or total annihilation into an utter infinity of Nothingness, or at least into an unconscious, undifferentiated, simple, and same substance, or a dead *substratum*. As Plato said, the universe would collapse, and never again have any means or power whereby it might be again created. But, of course, when the creative Essence and power was withdrawn from some particular object only, the thing vanished and ceased to be as such, though nothing of the Essence and power that created it were lost. This was only a

¹ *Works of Aristotle*, translated by Thomas Taylor, vol. ii., book xii. p. 369, note, London, 1816.

² Proclus, *Elements of Theology*, (*Theol. of Plato*, translated by Taylor, ii. p. 308).

higher doctrine of the conservation of energy, or rather of Essence; for with them the Supreme Essence was eternally active and was an absolute Whole, an eternal Fact, a necessary Truth, the All and enough, the eternal One.

They speak of Intelligence as in its own nature impartible and immutable. They speak also of subordinate intelligences, and of a world of intelligibles. They speak of the active Soul as a kind of medium between the Intelligence and Nature. It is difficult to understand how they conceived these matters, if, indeed, they had any exact thought of their own about it. Perhaps they only meant to say that the Intelligence, as the necessary principles of reason, while unchangeable in their own nature as such, constituted a certain immovable or unmoved ground for the special and particular movements in the whole standing All; but as the active process was supposed to continue through the whole changing variety of things, like "a mobile breathing," and as particular substances and forms were given to things under the limitations of time and space (or those laws of the intelligence whereby only things can have their particular substances and forms), they must have allowed a kind of wielding, limiting, canceling, and controlling function and power in the One as self-moving or eternally-moving Soul, capable of employing the intelligence in this manner. This may be what they understood by *medium*, or mediation. In the philosophy of Hegel, this mediation is accomplished by the dialectical movement of "Negativity" (as he calls it), or self-limitation and self-determination, on grounds of necessity, essential and necessary relation, and absolute truths.

Such eternal activity under intelligence was thereby necessarily rational and knowing. A knowing activity was necessarily also a conscious one, since consciousness is nothing else but the fact of knowing. A conscious knowing activity, working artistically to an end and purpose, was

necessarily a self-determining power or Will; since Will can be nothing else but this, whether universal or finite. Consciousness was, as it were, the light of knowledge, as in Milton:—

“God is light,
And never but in unapproachéd light
Dwelt from eternity, dwelt then in thee,
Bright effluence of bright Essence increate.”

The One, therefore, as a Whole; was necessarily self-moving, intelligent, creative Soul. The order, good, and beauty in Nature and in natural objects (in themselves considered) was a verification of the theoretic truth by the evidence of fact in external observation, and demonstrated a providential order in the world. But this order of Providence was also an order of necessity, limitation, and so far of fate. The order and constitution of things under the limitations of Time and Space and Place, form and permanency, whereby things were just what they are, and could not possibly otherwise be what they are, if there were to be a world of variety, change, and degree at all, was an order of necessity and fatality, so far, even for the creative mind itself. But inasmuch as there is no absolute fixity or permanence in natural bodies or things, but the whole world of particular things is in a state of perpetual flow and change, from the slowest to the most rapid motion, no object or thing need be considered as entirely removed from the controlling power of Providence. It was an order of fixity and fate just so far as the fixity extended, and as long as it lasted, but no farther: it was an order of Providence in so far as that order of fixity and permanence depended on the Will, purpose, and plan of the creative power for what it was, or what it should become. The free activity was not exhausted in the given state of permanency, but remained over and above all, and included within itself the entire order and constitution of things. The self-motive power

was only just so far limited, and was self-limited. As to all over and above what was so fixed, it remained in the state of free activity as conscious, knowing power and personality. But within the sphere of limitation and fixity in Nature, all was necessity and fixed fate, while it continued fixed, and it thus became, secondarily, a sphere of blind mechanical forces, definite properties of bodies, an adamantine chain of natural causes and effects, mathematical magnitudes, quantities, numbers, motions, dynamics and statics, and, in reference to man as a part of created Nature, a certain chaos of chance, accident, and fate for him, since all these things must necessarily follow if there were to be a world at all. Such material things must necessarily, so far and temporarily, be removed out of the immediate sphere of the direct action of the free, conscious, knowing power, though all the while suspended in it, being created and upheld by it, and still subject to change, and dissolution in the movement of the creative wisdom in the eternal order of its Providence. Man, in so far as by his bodily constitution he existed in the midst of natural things, and was a part of created nature, was necessarily subject to this order of blind forces, chance, and fatality. But, as a specially constituted rational soul, he had some degree of power and control over Nature and its forces: he might, indeed, become master by obeying. In no other way could he presume to command Nature. The finite soul owed its existence and power to the universal Soul, and was in a manner suspended in it and limited and specialized out of it, as natural objects also were; but in the entire architectonic of the intelligible world, there was a diminishing degree of freedom and an increasing degree of limitation and fixity, downward through the whole creation to the final termination of the process in the established order of Nature as it is at any given time.¹

¹ *Procli Opera*, ed. V. Cousin, vol. i., *De Providentia et Fato*, Parisiis, 1820.

As Proclus interprets Plato's doctrine of Bonds, and of the dissoluble and the indissoluble, the dialectic power resided in the universal One, or rather in that aspect of the One which was mythologically prefigured in the demiurgic father, Jupiter. Some things were dissoluble, some indissoluble, and some were both dissoluble and indissoluble, and so were in fact perpetual; not as absolutely indissoluble, but because they never would be dissolved, since to dissolve what is well and beautifully harmonized could belong only to an evil nature; and therefore, as the demiurgic father was essentially and eternally good, such things never would be dissolved. Though they were not necessarily immortal, they might be perpetual through eternity. Hence, says Proclus, "everything which is bound is dissoluble. But one thing is thus dissoluble and indissoluble, and another is dissoluble only, just as the intelligible is alone indissoluble. Why, therefore, is that which is primarily bound at one and the same time dissoluble and indissoluble? Because it is *beautifully* harmonized, and is *well* composed. Therefore, being well composed, it obtains union, since *goodness* is unific. But from the intelligible it obtains the *beautifully*, for from thence beauty is derived. And from fabricating power it obtains harmony; for this is the cause of the Muses, and is the source of harmonical arrangement to mundane natures. Hence we again have the three causes, the final through the *well*, the paradigmatic through the *beautifully*, and the demiurgic through the *harmonized*. But it is necessary that a composition of this kind, harmonized by one fabricating power, filled with divine beauty, and obtaining a boniform union, should be indissoluble; for the demiurgus says that to dissolve it is the province of an evil nature."¹

¹ Proclus on the *Theology of Plato*, trans. by Taylor, ii. p. 117, London, 1816.

§ 7. NEOPLATONISM — HYPARXES — FATE — PROVIDENCE.

The philosophy of Plato, as unfolded by Proclus, abounds in profound conceptions, acute dialectical discussions, and deeply suggestive insights. It is comprehensive in scope, elaborate in inconsistent details, and in many respects merely fanciful and even fantastical. It is subjectively imaginative, vague, mythological, and poetical. His exposition of the One in the three *hypostases* or first principles of the *Good*, *Intellect*, and *Soul*, makes some approach to the Hegelian concept of the Notion or absolute Idea ; but it does not attain to a clear logical statement of it. His thought is dissipated into a mystical haze of the ineffable, the unknowable, and incomprehensible. There is in it a certain vague notion of the absolute All of true being, of unity and a process into variety and contradiction ; of immovable “intelligibles” and movable intellection ; of bound and infinity ; of *hyparxis*, or the first unical constitution of the One and of lesser and subordinate unities under the One ; of energy, motion, a fountain of life, first Cause, and a demiurgic proceeding of the incorporeal, impartible One into an established order of incorporeal essences and corporeal things, and of a certain cyclic conversion, reversion, or return into itself again ; of a certain participation, throughout all orders of existence, of the first principles of Intellect, Good, and Beauty, Life and Soul ; of true being and negation, or the nothing beyond the One ; of eternity and time, obscurely conceived and discussed ; of Necessity and Freedom, Providence and Fate, and other categories, which are not distinctly defined, but hover vaguely in thought. The Good is declared to be the same as the One, and to be the most final of all causes ; the Beautiful is only a higher perfection of the Good ; but they are mystically conceived as something ineffable and incomprehensible beyond the One. Eternity expressed the fact of eternal duration for the One, and both intellectual movement and intellectual permanency were established in

eternity. The first or true being was above time, and did not participate in time, but had a perpetual existence in eternity. All movement into anything other than the One itself was necessarily in time: it had in it bound and infinity. These vague notions of something ineffable, beyond the bounds of all possible knowledge, have ever since given countenance to visionary dreams concerning immaterial spirit above, beyond, and apart from the world of Nature. They had not arrived in a strictly logical manner at the conception of the absolute Idea as the alone true, good, and beautiful, in which all things that proceeded from it necessarily participated, in their proper order, degree, and measure, by the very necessities of their constitution and nature. Yet, says Proclus, "the whole hypothesis is a dialectical arrangement; and if it is not wholly syllogistic, but likewise demonstrative, it is doubtless necessary that the middle should be the cause of, and by nature prior to, the conclusion."¹ Here is some shadowy suggestion that the Syllogism is the necessary form of logical thought; and he had a clear conception that Evil had no independent or essential existence by itself, but only signified privation, deficiency, or absence of the Good, or diminution of degree.

His whole philosophy, like that of his predecessors, was overclouded and perverted by a poetical and visionary mythology. They seem to have labored under some unconscious feeling of necessity that philosophy should take in and explain the Greek mythology from Orpheus to their own times, and must somehow bring itself into accordance with it. It was evidently this influence upon their minds that gave rise to all that prodigious and fanciful architectonic of ineffable gods, intelligible gods, intellectual gods, supermundane and mundane gods, psychical dæmons or angelic gods, and divine heroes or god-men. With such a philosophical development of gods, dæmons, angels, and spirits, good and bad, it is no wonder that the later Neoplatonists fell off into a fantastic

¹ Proclus on the *Theology of Plato*, trans. by Taylor, i. 36.

spiritual theurgy, into magic, necromancy, and absurd superstitions. These notions pervaded the popular mind of that age of ignorance and superstition, and they have been the foundation ever since of all that dreaming about a plurality of divine natures, archangels, angels, spirits, ghosts, and devils that have been so prevalent down to this day. Nor need we wonder at this when we consider that, in like manner, through all the Christian centuries, nearly all idealistic philosophy has labored under a similar feeling of necessity that philosophy should adopt and unfold the Christian mythology, or bring itself into reconciliation with it. In both Heathen and Christian times there seems to have been a like foregone conclusion that the mythical supernaturalism of the received theologies must contain the substantial truth of this universe. The difference lies mainly in that change of mythologies which time has brought about. The advance of knowledge dispels the illusions. Such is the amazing effect of traditional education and custom on the general mind and thought of all peoples in all times. The customary way of viewing the universe and human affairs in it comes to be, seemingly, the only rational and true theory. Philosophy must be the same, or it is worse than useless. So it has ever been.

Yet, when cleared of its ineffable obfuscations and mythological visions, much remains in this Neoplatonic theory that is really comprehensive and profound. It certainly endeavored to comprehend the entire universe. It contemplated the One and all of reality, beyond which there was nothing. This One was, in its own essential being, incorporeal, intellectual, and (as we may say) spiritual, and it proceeded into established orders of incorporeal natures and of corporeal things. Their statement of doctrine about the One is vague, disjointed, indefinite, mystical, and altogether unsatisfactory. Sometimes the inference might seem to be justified, that they understood by the One the negative nothingness out of which "true being" was bounded; and,

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again, they speak of bound and infinity, defining infinity as a certain inexhaustible fountain of power and life. They seem to have clearly understood that active essence or life could not flow into finite things or forms without bound or limit. But whether or not this bound applied as well to the whole activity, or whether the fountain of power was an eternal flowing out of nothing, or in what manner they conceived such a fountal source of life and motion to be possible or conceivable, they give us no distinct intimation. It is plain that they had no clear thought on the subject, though they had some obscure sense of the difficulty; and hence they soared away into the cloudland of the ineffable and incomprehensible. Again, they seem to have had some conception of the universal nature of the One as an incorporeal and impartible essence in a state of circular movement, flowing outwardly and by conversion to itself returning inwardly again, in a perpetual cycle, — an idea that is, at least, suggestive of Hegel's doctrine of Reciprocity of Action and Reaction in a perpetual circuit. We may sometimes conjecture that they had some such conception as this of a universal Causality. It is made pretty clear that they had a conception of the totality of true being, beyond or other than which there was simply the negative nothing; and, on the whole, it would be safest perhaps to infer, from what they say concerning it, that they really conceived the One as comprising both the "true being" and the nothing in itself as a unity, but that, while the One and All of actual being was thus bounded over against the nothing, energy resided in it as the origin or source of the active power. It was a function of the One itself, rather than a streaming flow out of the nothing beyond. "Intelligibles" are said to be immovable, impartible, and eternal; but, as intellect, the One was somehow capable of energizing, or there was energy in it: it admitted of movement in some part or in some respect. It was, indeed, both immovable and movable. Exactly how this was conceived to be possible, there is no clear state-

ment, no satisfactory explanation. The One as Soul is assumed to be an eternal fountain of power and life as a fact, and to be capable of proceeding into movement and a creation. Soul was especially this aspect of life and motion in the One : its movement was measured in time, for all motion was necessarily according to time. But it was movement on the basis of the immovable intelligibles, in which it participated, partially, though not wholly. Soul was thus this living aspect of the One, and as such it was demiurgic or creative. Soul was prior to creations ; Intellect was prior to Soul ; and Intelligibles were prior to Intellect ; and sometimes it would seem that some ineffable god was prior to the One. This was not an order in time, but rather in respect of higher and better, or a logical order of conception of these several aspects of the whole Unity and Totality. As to the unity of the three *hypostases*, or as to how they were conjoined, their notions are vague and indistinct. They soar away into mythological clouds. Saturn, the oldest god of the Pantheon, somehow represented the Intelligibles ; Rhea represented the eternal fountain, and was the fountal source of all life ; and Jupiter was the demiurgic or fabricating Soul. But Soul, in some manner, participated or shared in the other two, and in such way as to wield and employ them in the work of creation. "As self-motive," says Proclus, "participating of a life according to intellect, and energizing according to time, it possessed a measuring energy, and as possessing an eternal life, subsisting essentially in energy, and fixing all its stable intellections at once in intellect, it was entirely deific through the cause prior to itself. All things are suspended from the One, through intellect and soul as media ; and intellect has the form of unity, but soul has the form of intellect ; and the body of the world is vital." ¹ There was a certain first *hyparxis*, or original constitution of the One as unity and totality, which instituted a subordinate series of *hyparxes*, or unities of lesser

¹ Proclus on the *Theology of Plato*, trans. by Taylor, vol. i. p. 45.

gods, dæmons, and souls, in architectonic succession and dependence, even downward to the termination of the process in material Nature ; and a certain participation or sharing, more or less partially, of the intelligibles, the moving power and the fabricating power, accompanied this downward progression, or continued through it, into the construction of the world of things. "Motion, being, and life," says Proclus, "proceed from a unical *hyparxis*, which connectedly contains intellect and soul, is the source of total good, and proceeds as far as to the last of things," and "all things participate of the One."¹ But exactly how intellect and soul are connected in this unical *hyparxis*, there is no intelligible statement. It is said further, that "every intellect is impartible and uniform, and at the same time possesses multitude and progression: it is, also, in itself, and is not only uniform, but multiform, and *one-many*." There is also a certain profound but indistinct conception of a cyclic conversion, reversion, or return of the movement back into itself; for these incorporeal natures or essences were in themselves imperishable and eternal as having in them true being, but corporeal things created by them had no real being of their own, but were temporary, perishable, evanescent, mortal: these things were dissoluble and might vanish into nothingness. In all this, a logical, dialectical unity of knowing and creating intelligence seems necessarily to be implied, however vaguely stated. It is perhaps essentially the same thing as Hegel's concept of the Notion; or, at least, it may be said that the Hegelian conception may furnish the only logically conceivable and intelligible notion that can be formed out of what they say upon the subject.

The One as conceived by them certainly embraced and comprehended within itself the entire universe. It not only constituted and established the inner essences and forms of all other existences interiorly, but it also embraced and contained them exteriorly. Considering that there was, in

¹ Proclus on the *Theology of Plato*, trans. by Taylor, i. 48.

those ages, so little scientific knowledge of the actual constitution of the material world, or of the bodies contained in it, this was a rather notable conception. They had some knowledge of an æther, and used that term, but only as meaning an æther above the sky, as a something more ethereal than air : they did not know nor imagine (what science has revealed in these modern days) that the æther filled all the sidereal spaces, and is the vehicle of light-waves from the remotest star that is visible to the largest telescope ; nor that it pervaded all earthly bodies, not only exteriorly, but interiorly of their molecules as well ; nor that all bodies are resolvable into molecules which swim, float, or whirl in this æther, if not actually made up out of it. This fact (so intelligible to modern science) may show that the conception of an incorporeal essence pervading and including the material world of bodies, or the molecules that compose them, while at the same time it constituted and established the inner essences and forms of the bodies or molecules themselves, was by no means an irrational or visionary notion. It is not an easy matter for science now to determine whether this æther is a corporeal matter or an incorporeal essence ; or whether it is an atomic or a continuous substance, or indeed both at once ; or in precisely what manner it is elastic ; or how indeed it is itself constituted, or in what manner atoms or molecules are formed in it, or out of it.

Their ideas of Necessity and Fate were equally profound, and in some respects equally vague. A certain "Adrastic law" was conceived as that adamantine justice which consisted in the eternal and immutable nature of intelligibles, and in which all secondary and subordinate intelligences, or states of being, necessarily participated, even to the termination of the material world. In itself it was absolute necessity. Even the demiurgic or creative Soul itself must participate in it, but could not alter it. It was the measure of all order throughout the universe, and "announced to souls the decrees of Fate." All things, even the One itself, was

necessarily bound in this chain. But self-motive souls that lived according to intelligibles and intellect could rise above it, comprehend it, and become free from its penalties; but no violation, no resistance, could possibly escape the law of *Adrastia*. It was the divine justice, and the demiurgic Jupiter was "the guardian power." It was measured by "the vision of intelligible good."¹ There was a necessity also which fell within the power of the creative Soul, since soul in a certain way and measure moved and wielded intellect into a process of creation; for intellect was both movable and immovable. What was established by a supreme and absolute necessity was indeed fate for all. What was established by a superior power as law was indeed fate for all inferior powers, while it remained such. And the established order of Nature was fate so far for all mundane souls; or it could be commanded only by being obeyed. They were not ignorant of the external relations of fixed and permanent bodies in Nature, nor inattentive to the external sphere of blind collisions, chance, and accident. Nor did they fail to make distinction of the mere sequence of cause and effect in this external sphere from the inner and truer relation of Causality that had its source in the One, and continued throughout the constitution of all incorporeal and corporeal natures beneath the One. No intimation is given of their opinion as to whether, or in what manner, the all-comprehending One did, or could, operate upon bodies externally, and control or direct their external relations, collisions, combinations, or dissolutions. But it is clear that they conceived that there was, in the whole, an overruling Providence as well as an uncontrollable necessity and a controllable fate. And in their scheme there was certainly a fate which was also providence.

In this manner, the world existed as a work of thought. The perpetual evolution of the creative Soul into a creation

¹ Proclus on the *Theol. of Plato*, trans. by Taylor, i. 258-9, London, 1816.

was the eternal order of Providence, freely self-moving on one side or in one aspect, but, on the other hand, bound in an adamantine chain of necessity and fate. It was, however, in some large measure, and in reference to the Creator, that fate which is also Providence. It was the true and real manifestation of the nature, power, and will of God — that in which his Word is his Deed — and the highest and truest possible revelation to Man.

This Greek philosophy, this strange compound of profundity and vagueness, thus culminating in the sublime heights of Neoplatonism in its best representatives, declined to a dreamy, mystical, and ecstatic piety, or rather degenerated into a miraculous thaumaturgy of spiritual powers and a superstitious necromancy, during the earlier centuries of the Christian era, and, becoming mixed up with the still more vague and shadowy conceptions of the Hebrew Jehovah, and with the like miraculous and supernatural theurgy of the gospels, passed over into the biblical supernaturalism of the Christian Church; sometimes therein reaching a corresponding height of philosophical speculation, but for the most part sinking to the lower level of a pious, miracle-working faith, a petrified dogmatic theology, and a supercilious self-righteousness.¹ Swedenborg, still hopelessly befogged in the biblical miracles, but with some deep philosophical insight and a quite Neoplatonic order of thought and manner, did his best to interpret the Bible into some keeping with a rational philosophy, some-

¹ It was a common belief in those early ages that an extraordinary man must be the son of a god. It was related by Epimenides, Eudoxus, and Xenocrates that Pythagoras was the son of Apollo, who made a spectral visit to his mother, Parthenis; a similar story was believed of Empedocles; and Olympiodorus tells a like tale of the birth of Plato, that an Apollonian spectre visited his mother, Perictione, and warned his father, Aristo, that the son would be a divine man. (Proclus on the *Theol. of Plato*, by Thomas Taylor, ii. p. 278, London, 1816.) And a like myth was readily believed of Jesus of Nazareth.

what after the manner of Philo Judæus at an earlier day, and made a prodigious effort to redeem the Christian theology from the deadly petrification and hateful spiritual pride into which it had fallen in the various sectarian orthodoxies. This theological, miraculous, and semi-theurgic part of Swedenborg's endeavor has ceased to have any interest for the enlightened culture or religion of modern times ; and his philosophy in like manner has fallen obsolete, as wanting in critical precision, logical certainty, knowledge of Nature, solidity of method, and depth or completeness in either thought or expression. It is essentially a vague, mystical, ideal dreaming and mere spiritual vaticination about "the Lord," the Divine Love, the Divine Wisdom, the Divine Power, Spiritual creation, spiritual Society, heaven and hell, celestial secrets, spiritual visions, and the supernatural Man-God, without anything deserving the name of critically philosophical analysis or synthesis, or any definite statement of the meaning of these canting phrases, or any attempt to show in what manner such mystical notions are, or can possibly be, conceivable truths and credible realities. It is for the most part a visionary doctrine couched in the conventional terminology of the biblical theology. It is a futile undertaking to make the miraculous God-man of the biblical revelation in some degree rational and intelligible. The time had not then come for sweeping all this biblical trash out of modern thought. Neither could Swedenborg, philosopher as he was, in that age, get clear of the fatal delusions. Some of his followers, in this age, in the depth of their spiritual emotion, and amidst the perplexities of advancing criticism and scientific knowledge, before which the miraculous twaddle is disappearing as the dew before the sun, affect to look down upon all science and all critical philosophy, Nature, and reason itself, and, in a certain supreme contempt and pretty scorn, even upon the biblical twaddle also, apparently feeling perfectly assured, notwithstanding, of their immortal and essential identity with the

Man-God himself, in a certain hierarchical order of Society }
in the purely spiritual kingdom.¹

§ 8. THE IDEALISM OF HEGEL'S LOGIC.

Like the idealistic realism of this Greek philosophy in its highest elaboration and most complete statement in Neoplatonism, the philosophy of Hegel had a universal scope: it undertook a complete theory of God, Nature, and Man. It has much in common with Parmenides and Heraclitus, and with Plato and Aristotle, as well as with Plotinus and Proclus; but it exhibits in a high degree the greater precision, exactness, and certainty of both thought and expression, the greater clearness, consistency, and unity of system, the deeper insight, the more exact logic, and the vastly greater knowledge, that belong to the philosophic mind of these modern times. His method starts from the basis of the Cartesian *I think and I am*. In one sense, it may be said to ascend from the ground of Hume and the Lockian "Human Understanding," through the Kantian categories thereof, to a science or Logic of absolute Reason. It seeks to distinguish what are properly categories of the Understanding from what are strictly categories of universal mind, and thus to demonstrate the absolute truth of those first principles, necessities, and necessary laws, relations, or conditions which lie at the foundation of all possible thought and of Nature also. He endeavors to pass over from the outside to the inside view in a rigidly logical manner. His course proceeds through subjective idealism, or the discussion of the laws, principles, and modes of thought in us (to which the scope of Kant, like that of Locke and Hume, was mainly limited) to a thorough criticism, elucidation, and summation of all those categories which belong to universal Reason (as they are disclosed in the Syllogism of the Subjective Judgment) into the unity and absolute Ideality of the

¹ *Society; or, The Redeemed Form of Man*, by Henry James, Boston, 1879.

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true logical Notion as it is in and for itself; in which the universality and necessary truth of these categories of first principles are made evident and certain as constituting the foundation and essential nature of Thought itself, the absolute Thought, or God as He is in his eternal nature, essence, and life. Something like this is certainly the scope of his endeavor, and such is the brief outline of the pathway of his method.

4.511 This Science of Logic appears, at first, to move in an ideal world of shadows,—a veritable dreamland, as it might be called,—which nevertheless the science seeks to establish, at last, as a realm of idealistic reality and absolute truth as it is in the identity of God and Nature, the All that really is. The whole proceeding starts with the self-evident fact of [our] own being and knowing, and with the undeniable fact of the existence of a world around us to be accounted for and explained. The Logic as such soars at once to the outer periphery (as it were) of the existent totality, and begins where that must necessarily be distinguished out of an absolute infinity of Nothingness. It denies, indeed, in the outset, and equally, the possible existence of an absolute infinity of the Nothing and an absolute infinity of the Something (in a spacial acceptation), by showing that the two related contraries, while necessarily bounded over the one against the other as such and in one aspect, are nevertheless to be subsumed into the unity or synthesis of both in one; the true infinity of which consists in the eternal and exhaustless possibility of its actual existence and reality as such One and All. This unity is found in the active movement or Ideality of the logical Notion. As pure Logic, the dealing is with determinate real Being or Essence, taken in its most indeterminate character and utmost simplicity (much as the Neoplatonists conceived of the One in its character of universality as single, simple, and the same), as self-moving or eternally moving Essence, but as yet undeveloped, or not yet differentiated, into the

deeper and more complex determinations involved in an actual evolution of itself into a creation, but where it is still distinguishable from absolute Nothingness ; for this appears to have been the actual though tacit assumption and presupposition, while the purely logical movement of the dialectic Negativity, merely as logic, has the appearance on its face of attempting to create a world out of Nothing by the Negation of Negation. Really, it is a defining of the Something, the All of real Being or Essence, out of the Nothingness, not as having originated from nothing, but as having existed coeternally with the Nothingness. The positive, affirmative reality is in necessary relation to the negative and empty unreality ; but both exist at once in one eternal unity or wholeness. At the same time, it would seem to be equally necessary that the standing All, as the positive and absolute One, should have a determinate reality bounded over (as it were) against the infinite abyss of Nothingness on all sides.

Here, again, it is even doubtful if the Logic of Hegel, as set forth and stated by him (whatever he may have really understood and intended), does in fact amount to anything more than a creation of both God and Nature out of Nothing, making Nothing, or the mere empty Negation of Negation, do the work ; for, in his category of Being, Nothing, and Becoming, there is no explicit statement of what it is that becomes, what makes anything become, whence or what the active power is, or whence, how, or why there should be any Becoming at all. A pure activity of Becoming is tacitly assumed as a fact, without further account of it. His reader is left to suppose that he means to say, that a purely spiritual activity need have no essence at all. In this respect, his philosophy would seem to be open to the objection which Cousin made to that of Aristotle : that it was an activity proceeding out of a mathematical point or mere zero.

Hegel does, indeed, undertake to answer the question of

the What? and the How?¹ But the only answer given is, that Becoming (*Werden*) is the immanent synthesis *à priori* — the in and for itself — being unity of distinctions, as contradistinguished from a synthesis conceived as a mere putting together of distinct particulars, after the manner of thinking of the common understanding; and he asserts that these questions of the What, Whence, and How, mean in what mode and manner, according to the categories of this Understanding; that they belong to the “ill manners of external Reflection,” which asks for the conceivability of it only according to the presuppositions of their own hard-and-fast categories, by means of which they are armed with a foregone conclusion against any proper answer that can be given. And he suggests that the question should be answered in the higher sense of the synthesis itself. But, admitting the ill manners of the Understanding, and also this synthesis according to necessity, still we have nothing but a Becoming, an existent activity assumed as a fact, and as proceeding from a unity or synthesis of pure Being and pure Nothing, which are declared to be equal and the same, when separately considered, but which are said to be real Being when combined into this unity of an immanent synthesis, in which the one is bounded over against the other by an ideal boundary line, which thereby becomes a real, positive, and affirmative Something, and is assumed to be the activity of Becoming, *i. e.* the What, the Whence, and the How of the whole affair. And this is in the very beginning of the Logic, and before he has yet arrived at any Essence, content, or matter at all (or even at the Notion) other than such ideal boundary line, which apparently divides a split infinity of Nothingness into two opposite sides or imaginary contraries. And all this certainly looks more like an attempt to create a world out of nothing than an intelligible answer to the proposed questions.

¹ *Wissenschaft der Logik* (von Henning), vol. iii. p. 90, Berlin, 1840-1844.

Hegel demonstrates clearly enough that pure Being in the sense of the mere abstract *isity* of subjective assertion, and wholly indeterminate, must be the same as pure Nothingness, which is wholly indeterminate, *i. e.* without bound; that infinite space and infinite time are, in like manner, mere absolute vacuity, or empty possibilities of spaces and times; but that any real existence must have determinateness, limit, bound, before it can possibly be an actual Something; that these abstract logical *isities*, taken in an absolute sense, express only the empty possibility and conceivability of the actual Somewhat that really is; that these antinomies and contraries are relatives, and are inseparable in reality from their opposite terms; and that the unity and immanent synthesis of the relations, the mutual negation therein of the absolutely separate truth of the other, affirms the truth of the positive Somewhat that really is. Neither can be said to be the ground or the cause of the other, or only upon the condition that either shall have gone over into the other. The kind of reference can be no further determined, unless the related sides shall be further determined. But this is no more than to assert that the total Somewhat exists absolutely, as bounded out of the abyss of Nothingness. Of a Somewhat thus really existent, the only further question would be of its nature, necessity, law, and manner of existence. But Hegel seems to assume that such a Somewhat actually arises, as a positive result (logically) of the mere negation of negation, the mere imaginary splitting of an infinite abyss of Nothingness into two opposing and mutually negating sides, which, through this synthesis, can become such a real Somewhat as can be the ground and cause of all other things. "The connection of ground and consequence has no longer mere Being and mere Nothing (he says) for its sides which it binds together, but expressly Being that is ground and Somewhat, and that is truly a posited Somewhat (*eingesetztes*), but is neither an indepen-

dent (*selbständiges*) Something, nor an abstract Nothing.”¹ Here, the meaning of the word *Being* is shifted from mere *isity* to a real Something that actually is. There is no longer a mere split infinity of Nothingness, or two mere Nothings placed side by side, nor a merely ideal and imaginary boundary line between the two, but there is now truly a positive Somewhat of real Essence that can be the ground and cause of all other things. As pure Logic, these statements may be necessarily true; but they give no explanation of the origin and nature of the positive Somewhat that is now assumed to be really existent, nor is the actual existence of such a Somewhat stated to be a last Fact or an eternal and necessary truth. Nothing whatever is said of its nature, essence, substance, activity, content, or matter. But there is an express suggestion of the idea that the Somewhat has thus logically been created out of Nothing by the mere negation of one nothing against another nothing, or one empty *isity* against another; while the fact of the real existence of a Somewhat, and as necessarily and eternally existent, is tacitly implied and is assumed. We know that the universe really exists as Somewhat; and we are obliged to infer that it must be determined and limited out of Nothing, or be bounded over against mere vacuity and blank possibility. Nor does Hegel say, that this real Somewhat is Essence, Substance, or Matter; he uses these terms to express something else when he comes to it. Nor does he say that it is an activity without substance or essence. It is here (in the Logic) stated merely as a logical affirmative or positive as against a logical negative or nothing. But there is an assertion that this mere logical *affirmation* can be the real ground and connection of all things else following in the evolution of a universe. This is the realm of logical shadows (*Schatten*), which, he says, are not empty shadows, but are the real,

¹ *Wissenschaft der Logik* (ed. von Henning), iii. 93-100, Berlin, 1841.

true, and eternal essentities (*Wesenheiten*), which lie at the foundation of God and Nature. These logical essences or truths may be true and necessary in themselves considered; they may remind us of the eternal and immutable Intelligence of the Neoplatonists; but when we inquire for the active essence, or any such essence as can be an eternal and inexhaustible activity, we are left in the dark. It is only when he comes to the full Notion, that Hegel arrives at a self-moving activity and a conscious Will; and this moves on the basis of Cognition, or those fundamental logical essentities or principles, and thus becomes a thinking, creating power or Soul. Yet here in the beginning of the logical proceeding, we have already a tacit assumption that a mere logical positive can move into a process of thought and creation, and become the Ideality of the Notion, or God himself, as a purely spiritual activity that can posit and create the essences of things in Nature, their content and form, their substances and accidents, their matter and properties, by means of this logical positive, or the negation of negation merely, without need of any essence, substance, or matter otherwise. It seems to be tacitly assumed from the outset that there lies in behind this logical positive an immaterial Spirit that is capable of doing the whole business in some unexplained manner. But this cannot be what was really meant.

Hegel criticises Plato's One and Many, and says "that with him Being does not come to the One, nor does the Being come to the Somewhat."¹ Here the word *Being* is evidently used in the active sense of the present participle as *coming to be*: he complains of Plato that his One was without the principle of movement or activity. But Plato clearly pronounced the One as Soul to be self-moving: nothing but Soul could move itself. "The One is," says Plato. This is "an empirical *Therebeing* (*Daseyn*)," says Hegel. The empirical Understanding strives against the unity of

¹ *Wissensch. der Logik*, iii. 96.

Being and Nothing, and insists upon a determined Somewhat that is immediately at hand (*vorhanden*), — Being with a limit or negation, rejecting that same unity. "And this," he says, "reduces Being to an empirical existence, which has an immediateness outside of the thinking." If this means outside of our thinking, it is true enough. But how does Hegel avoid it, or why does he complain of it? If it means outside of the universal mind, then how does he get it to be inside of that? Does he conceive the Notion, with its Ideality, to be inside or outside the universal Spirit? Neither, he would doubtless answer; but that it is Thought itself, infinite Spirit, the One and All that is. Is not, then, his Notion just as much a *Therebeing* as Plato's One and All? It is true he puts into the Notion (this One) an activity of Becoming, a moment of negation (*das Moment der Negation*, as he calls it); but where does he get that activity? How came it there? Did it ever begin to be there, or was it eternally there? Is it an activity of Essence or Substance, or is it an activity without Essence or Substance? If the latter, then his Spirit is in itself immaterial, unessential, empty nothingness, and mere subjective mysticism: if the former, then his active essence, which is capable of leaping into movement, or which was eternally in movement (if that be the supposition), is at the same time necessarily a *Therebeing*, just as much as Plato's empirically considered One. It must necessarily be a *Therebeing*, which either moves itself, or is eternally in motion, since it is the One and All that is, and could not possibly be moved by anything else or other than itself. It is necessarily bounded out of, and determined, limited, against, or in, the Nothingness beyond it; for if it were without all limitation, all determinateness, it would certainly be identical with Nothing, as his own doctrine teaches. There cannot be a really existent Somewhat, without a possibility of it: this boundary, this limitation or determinateness, is simply the possibility of its existence as such actuality:

X Notion is conceptually limited by itself as such
 — Notion is not a concept which can bound
 its limits. But there is no such thing as a self-
 limiting notion.
 (Cf. p. 202, 209, 236, 239, 244, 268, 278, 280.)

without it, the actuality were not possible or conceivable. The truth is, that Hegel's movement of Negativity (or rather his *Moment*, a vague term under which he seeks to veil the active cause), his Becoming, explains only the transition of the empirically existent and therebeing Somewhat into something else or other than it was before: it only states the fact of such transition. It does not include, nor give any account of, the Somewhat itself or its activity: it does not say what moves, what is moved, nor what makes it move, nor how or why it should ever move at all. His doctrine of Becoming answers well enough to explain the becoming and departing, the arising and vanishing, of particular things as such, out of the one substance of all substances; but it has no concern with that one Substance itself, the original, active essence, cause, reality, or ideality, or beginning of motion (whatever it may be called); nor does it explain nor state a philosophy of it at all. It is tacitly assumed as a fact, a reality, a truth, without so much as explicitly declaring it to be an eternal Fact or a necessary Truth. In short, on this point, Hegel adds nothing at all to what was taught by Plato and Aristotle and other Greeks. Once admit this assumption, and then all is clear sailing for the rest of the voyage. Then you may have a thinking essence that can be a reality, and not an immaterial, empty Spirit only.

Again, says Hegel, "it is the same with Nothing as with Being. The Nothing shows itself, taken in its immediateness, as *coming to be* (*seyenden*), and according to its nature, it is the same as the Being (*Seyn*). As represented to our thinking, it can be said that it is, also; the Nothing has its being in the thinking (representation)." This may be truly said, but it is not therefore *it*, is not the thinking itself, and has no reality. The word *Nothing*, like the word *Being*, is used here in the empty sense of the mere *isity* of subjective predication in our thought. We may say *it is*, but is what? Why, nothing; and of course in that

sense, it is not the thinking itself. And it is merely absurd to talk about Nothing *coming to be*. But "*Nothing* stands in relation to *Being*, but in a relation which likewise includes the distinction. There is a unity with *the Being* at hand." Here, *Being* seems to be used again in the sense of the present participle as a *coming to be*, as an activity, a movement. This is apparently conceived as the Negativity which includes in itself both *the Being* and *the Nothing* in a relation that includes the distinction; that is, it thereby becomes a real Being (a Somewhat), which can originate distinction within itself, can dirempt itself into two sides or aspects, into Subject and Object, and so become self-conscious: or it is an activity on the boundary line of the split infinity of Nothingness that can move dialectically into a distinction of Something and Nothing as a process of Negativity, can negate or posit itself into set and fixed forms of things, and then negate that negation into other things, and so on throughout the creation of a world of things, the essences of which are nothing else but this negated state of this activity of Becoming; but the activity itself has no essence, no substance, and is a mere spiritual movement of an empty Negativity. What Hegel complains of as the "ill manners of the Understanding" is, that it insists upon regarding matter (an atom, for instance) as a hard, impenetrable mass, existing absolutely by itself in a Void, and without any principle of motion within itself; but his assimilation of Plato's One to such a one as that is a sheer misrepresentation of Plato. Neither does he succeed in taking his Notion as an absolute One out of the same category of *There-being* that the supposed atom stands in. He continues: "In the manner in which the Nothing is declared and exhibited, it shows itself in connection, or (so to speak) in contact with a Being (*einem Seyn*), undivided from a Being, even in a Therebeing (*Daseyn*)."¹ Here, it seems to be admitted that this real Being, this activity of Negativity, (the Notion

¹ Ibid. p. 98.

itself?) has a *Therebeing* (*Daseyn*), and an empirical existence, just as before with Plato and the Understanding. But in this *Therebeing* we have nothing but a pure activity, a form of self-diremption, self-distinction, and self-consciousness, without any substance, essence, or reality otherwise. His system endeavors to make out that this sort of spiritual activity can create the essences, substances, and content (*Ding an sich*) or matter of things in Nature, and can evolve itself into both God and Nature as they are. It is *Therebeing* (it seems), but it is the *Therebeing* of God and Nature: all things else have their *Therebeing* in and within this *Therebeing* of God and not outside of it. And this, it would seem, we are to take as not empirical, but as metaphysical, speculative philosophy!

Ans.

§ 9. THE REALISM OF THE LOGICAL NOTION.

It is expressly stated, in the Logic, that wholly indeterminate Being (using the word now in the sense of a real Something) would necessarily be the same as Nothing; and this is true. How then does he get a real Something? Simply by imagining the whole infinity of Nothingness (for this is conceivable in our thought) to be split (as it were) into two halves by an imaginary boundary line between them. This line is still further reduced to a mathematical point, or mere zero, at the highest point of Subjectivity; and this zero is apparently represented as evolving itself by a dialectic of Negativity, hinging on the negation of negation, into God and the world. In the completed Notion, there is an explicit assumption, and indeed a positive statement, of an eternally self-moving activity as the Ideality of the Notion. This Ideality appears to arise out of the constitution of the Notion as somehow consequent upon it, and it is said to be active on the basis of Cognition; that is, according to intelligence, as conscious Will, having an end and aim in the Beautiful and Good. But there is no other explanation of the assumed fact, and no further attempt to

No.

account for the origin and nature of this self-moving activity. He does not admit it to be Essence or Substance. It is not expressly stated to be an eternal Fact. There is no attempt to demonstrate its necessary truth. Really, it can scarcely be supposed, nor can it be truly said, that Hegel intends to create a universe of God and Nature out of Nothing, but evidently, and in view of his whole philosophy, his scope and intention are to describe and define them as real Being (or Essence) eternally subsistent and actual in or within, and so in one sense out of, the boundless abyss of Nothingness beyond or other than it. The Logic begins, indeed, on the exterior periphery (as it were) and at the last dividing line between the Nothing and the real Something, and in fact upon the very outside of the real universe, as first seen and contemplated by the philosopher. He must begin somewhere. Both the Nothing and the Something are to be conceived together as an actual and eternal unity, and as absolutely existent, eternal, and necessary. He has not yet penetrated into the interior depths and grounds of the essential Reality. The existent totality may very well be said to be infinite as being without beginning, end, or middle, and true as the whole fact and the last fact of all knowledge. Real Being and pure Nothing are not to be taken as absolutely separate, nor as the same: the truth is both together in unity. Being does not merely go over into Nothing, nor Nothing into Being, but is already gone over, and was eternally gone over: it never was otherwise. They never were severed; but the going over of both, the transition of the whole actual Something into something else or other than exactly what or as it was before, is the beginning of distinction, the Becoming of difference, or differentiation within itself. But in all this, it is assumed and presupposed that an essential activity exists from eternity as the absolute cause and source of the movement of Becoming, or of the *coming to be* of the something else or other than the eternally active whole

* I said this in the David and Lucile Packard Foundation

alternation of freedom and necessity: the causal relation is brought round in a complete circle, and raised by Hegel into his higher relation of Action and Reaction (or Reciprocity), which appears to have its centre in the Ideality of the Notion, as a universal principle of Causality.

The Notion is said to be "the power of Substance in the fruition of its own being, and therefore what is free."¹ The "Idea" is said to be "truth in itself and for itself:" it is activity, life, process, ideality, cognition, Will, — the Unity of Subjective and Objective, — all in One. But there is no clear statement as to what this "power of substance" is, nor as to how it differs from pure activity, life, motion, ideality, or from the Notion itself as a whole. The Idea and the Notion seem to be the same thing; or the Idea is only the complete evolution of the Notion. Conceiving these logical first principles, necessities, essential relations, and antinomies as subsumed into the unity of the absolute Idea or Notion, and admitting that it is necessary that there should be movement out of the unity into "diremption," distinction, opposition, variety, the many, in order to get the organized whole into a process of evolution, still how does that movement arise, what starts it, what makes it start? Why should it not remain at a stand-still forever? or was it in movement from eternity, without beginning, middle, or end? What, then, is the difference between a self-moving and an eternally moving essence or activity? Or is the Notion to be conceived as an immovable standing All, in which a movement in some part takes place eternally, after the manner of Plato and Aristotle? Hegel seems to ignore the principle of Causality, and substitutes a principle of Reciprocity of Action and Reaction in a perpetual circuit of infinite movement in the standing all of the Notion. He will not allow that it is Force. He objects to viewing God as Force, or even as "the Lord." Force, Energy, Exertion, he treats as something pertaining

¹ *The Logic of Hegel*, by William Wallace, pp. 240-242, Oxford, 1874.

only to the field of external Nature, and as belonging to the categories of the Understanding. It is the blind mechanical force that is merely consequent upon the temporary fixity and permanency of the essences and substances of bodies or things in Nature as set and fixed in them by the logical ideality and power of the Notion; but this ideality seems to have been conceived as the power of Thought as such. As to Will, the doctrine is, that "Subjectivity at the starting-point shows itself quite abstract, a bare *tabula rasa*;" but, "on the basis of Cognition, it shows itself as the modifying, determining principle, and by this means we pass from the idea of Cognition to that of Will, which means that the universal must be apprehended as *Subjectivity*, as a notion self-moving, active, and imposing modifications."¹ Here, as in Aristotle and the Neoplatonists, Cognition, Reason, or the Intelligence, the ground-principles of knowing, become the basis and $\pi\acute{o}\upsilon\sigma\tau\acute{\omega}$ of this activity of subjectivity. With them, this Intelligence was eternal, impartible (though partakable) and immutable in its own nature; it was even prior to Soul: but it was somehow capable of being wielded into movement by the soul as "a proceeding Intellect." So, also, Hegel is obliged to assume for his subjectivity a power or capability of wielding the "Cognition" into movement, and of imposing limitation, negation, law, modification, stationariness, fixity, upon its own action and operation as the Notion in a process of thinking and creating; and this self-moving, conscious power is called Will. We have got a Soul fairly constituted, but we still seem to need another Soul to move and work it. Either we must have this other, or we must accept eternal movement as an absolute Fact and a necessary Truth. Really, this Fact is assumed by Hegel, without more concerning it. Having thus tacitly assumed the fact of an eternal movement in the Notion, he proceeds to show in what manner there is a perpetual Becoming of it into something else or other than it was. Perhaps the philosopher

¹ *The Logic of Hegel*, by Wm. Wallace, p. 321, Oxford, 1874.

* Not if the first "Soul" moves itself.

must bring himself at last to realize that such is the absolute fact and real truth of the matter, the all and enough, and therewith rest satisfied. But he will have to divest his mind of that inveterate habit which will insist on demanding something more or something further, when no more and no further is at all. When we know all that really is, the rest is unknowable, because it is not, or is mere Oblivion, and to be known only as such. Hegel's unity of Subjective and Objective, as embracing all truth, is essentially the same thing as Aristotle's Thought of Thought (*νόησις νοήσεως*), the Thought which thinks itself. It is the doctrine of Parmenides, that *Being and Knowing are one and the same thing*. The Logic which started with mere abstract *Being*, or that mere *isity* that may be predicated as well of Nothing as of Something, ends with the final constitution of the Notion, the absolute Idea or universal Soul, which has real essential existence as such, and so is God and Nature at once.

The Neoplatonists seem to have conceived the one single, simple, and same essence to be a real existence, distinct from the Nothingness, and, though independent of it, yet not existing without it: it also existed, but simply as Nothingness, or the empty possibility of the self-subsistent One. Nor was this One Essence conceived as a simple and same substance or dead substrate. Activity, the life of the soul, subsisted with and within the Intelligence, which was in itself an immovable, impartible, and immutable essence, essence, reality, or absolute truth. According to Aristotle, this self-moving (or eternally moving) activity of the essential Intelligence, as energy energizing and proceeding into created things or bodies, began and proceeded in the creation of them, from a mathematical point. "Absolute being [coming to be] is an eternal act," says the "Metaphysics": "God is the eternal act of thinking." In thinking, and in giving finite existence to bodies or things, they receive their forms and substances in time and space, being thus measured out of Eternity, Immensity, and the whole Essence of

the One into what they are and are to be. These are the possibilities of them. M. Cousin was therefore not exactly correct in saying that "Aristotle's being is only a simple possibility of being:" it was the absolute One that was the possibility of the *being* (coming to be), or Becoming (as Hegel calls it), of specialities and particular things. "Form," continues Cousin, "realizes that possibility, and gives it actuality; and form, therefore, is energy, the active element." This does by no means follow. It may be truly said that form realizes the possibilities of these finite things and gives them their actuality; but the form is not therefore energy, the active element. That lies deeper, even in the eternal activity of the One itself, or God (as Aristotle sometimes calls it). Neither was this One a mere abstraction, as M. Ravaisson is said to have asserted, but a really subsistent Essence; nor was it "all entirely in its manifestation," nor did it "remain concentrated in a mathematical point."¹ It could and did go out of itself. This misconception seems to have arisen from the ambiguity of the word *being*, which is capable of being taken in a past sense as Essence or *been*, and in the active sense of the present participle as *coming to be*. Hegel falls into the same ambiguous use of the word. He discusses the question how the "Infinite" can come out of itself into the Finite, which some think cannot be made conceivable. He insists that the question goes upon a false assumption of the Understanding in its manner of representation of images (*Vorstellungen*), which carries in it a foregone presupposition that renders any rational answer impossible; but that, conceived aright, the "Infinite" can, and does, go out into the Finite; that the Finite, conceived as an abstract unity by itself, has no truth, no subsistence in itself alone: on the other hand, the Finite, upon the same ground of its nothingness in itself, goes back into the Infinite, *i. e.* it derives its existence as such from that universal Essence which is infinite, viz., the Notion itself, and returns

True.

¹ *Œuvres de V. Cousin*, vol. i. pp. 475-485, Bruxelles.

into it. "The unity of the Finite and Infinite is the Ideal (*Ideelle*); and it is inseparable."¹ This is rather an explanation of the manner, the *how*, than of the cause of the movement. The movement itself is simply assumed, as usual, in silence; or it is passed over as merely a *Moment* of the Notion.

In the Calculus of Newton, the infinite series, based on the hypothesis of an infinite approximation of the straight lines (whereof the circle is supposed to be made up) to identity with the true circle, is assumed to begin at a mathematical point in the circle, where the straight line and the curve must be identical, and where the power that describes a circle must begin the work of bounding it out of nothing (and also out of the essential power itself) into time and space, or into the form and reality of the thing. In dealing with atoms (for mathematical purposes), Newton assumes the atom to be a hard, impenetrable particle of matter, the least possible degree larger than a mathematical point, which would otherwise be in itself an absolute nothing or mere zero. Following the strict letter of the Logic, it would be difficult to say whether Hegel, in like manner, assumes the imaginary boundary line or point between the two sides of his split infinity of Nothingness to be an absolute nonentity, or a real Something, a thought more or other than zero. He certainly states the *I* to be the abstract and empty centre, the *tabula rasa*, of subjectivity. His Becoming seems to come out of an empty possibility of Becoming, and to have existence only in the realizing form, or in a posited ground or essence: the active power itself he seems to regard as a mere abstraction. He quotes Heraclitus, that "*All is flowing* (*πάντα ῥεῖ*)," and that "Being no more is than is not."² Taking the word *being* in the active sense of

¹ *Wissensch. der Logik*, iii. 160-163, Berlin, 1841.

² *Phil. des Geistes*, Werke, vii. 2, p. 46, Berlin, 1845. *Wissenschaft der Logik*, von Henning, vol. iii. p. 75, Berlin, 1841: "Der tiefsinnige Heraklit hob gegen jene einfache und einseitige Abstraction den

the present participle as *a coming to be*, it may be true enough that *being* is never *been*: the flow is continuous, without stopping. Taking *being* (in this sense of a *becoming*) to be an eternal fact, then an eternally moving (or what is the same thing, a self-moving) essence and cause of the movement must necessarily exist and be presupposed, or else we have an eternal flowing and Becoming of "pure activity" out of nothing, which is merely absurd. Evidently, Hegel did not mean this; the *I*, the centre of subjectivity, was not absolute zero; but the Logic presupposes that least or most simple conception of real Essence, as yet as indeterminate as possibly can be imagined short of losing itself in identity with absolute Nothingness. This real Essence is, in his view, the Notion (or "absolute Idea in its fullness"), which is a self-subsistent reality and totality. But this Essence is not dead matter, but an eternally living Essence. And so he says, again: "Soul is not only for itself immaterial, but it is the immateriality of all Nature, its simple ideal life: it is nevertheless Substance, not matter or thing in a physical sense, but the absolute ground of all the particularizations of the Spirit, which has in itself all the material of its own determinations, and remains the pervading identical ideality of the same." But Substance, Essence, in this sense, was only "the sleep of Spirit,—the passive *voûs* of Aristotle, the possibility of all things."¹ This "sleep" was that merely theoretical, simplest, and most indeterminate state of the Notion, conceived as the absolutely self-subsistent One Essence, which as such is the potentiality of all other essences. Bodies or things in Nature subsist in a state of becoming, or perpetual change. Hegel's conception of Becoming, as in reference to created things, seems, after all, to be very much like that of Proclus, who "assents to

höheren totalen Begriff des Werdens hervor, und sagte: das Seyn ist so wenig als das Nichts, oder auch Alles fließt, das heisst, Alles ist Werden."

¹ *Phil. des Aristes*, Werke, vii. 2, p. 46, Berlin, 1845.

what is said by Aristotle concerning the perpetuity of the world; but he says it was not just in him to accuse Plato. For *to be generated* does not signify with Plato *the beginning of existence*, but a subsistence in *perpetually becoming to be*." ¹ Both Proclus and Hegel would seem to have understood that, in respect of the generating Essence and Power, that is, the essential ideality of the One itself, that was simply eternal and inexhaustible: but in respect of the things generated by it, they subsisted only in the becoming, the temporary stability, and the departing of them, in a continual process; though, while they temporarily are what they are, they are in a state of having become so far; that is, they are now Essences — *been*. Hegel's Becoming, then, can be properly understood only as meaning to express this perpetual transition of the One real Essence into the particular essences of other things, which have now become and are *been*. The appearance which the Logic sometimes has of empty abstraction, or subjective dreaming in a world of ideal shadows, or of attempting to create both God and Nature out of nothing, would seem, then, to be the result or consequence of the purely theoretical use made of the logical dialectic in the endeavor to bring into clear comprehension the fundamental grounds, necessities, necessary relations, and absolute truths that are in their unity the very nature and constitution of the One real Essence as the Notion, the positive actuality or affirmative reality of which is always (though tacitly) presupposed. The Logic makes no inquiry, and gives no special explanation, as to whence this real Essence comes, or how, or why, or what it is, otherwise than as his whole philosophy may show; but it is everywhere tacitly (if not explicitly) assumed that real Essence is, and is after the manner of the Notion. The whole truth is left to speak for itself. He does, however, say, that "an instinct of necessity leads us to attach to the No-

¹ *Fragments of the Lost Writings of Proclus*, translated by Thomas Taylor, p. 4, London, 1825.

tion the settled import of onward movement, wherein consists its true and concrete significance." ¹ It is self-moving Essence and Power as absolute Thought.

This doctrine is scarcely distinguishable, otherwise than in words and mode of statement, from that of Victor Cousin, that the bond of unity and identity of all the opposing categories or contraries in thought lies in the idea of Cause, the principle of Causality, the eternal activity of that essence which is absolute Cause, which is substance in so far as Cause, and is cause in so far as Substance, and which is therefore to be conceived as universal Essence and Power, self-moving (or eternally moving), after the manner, necessity, and law of artistically creative intelligence, and not otherwise. It is the doctrine of Aristotle and Proclus, who say it is impossible to explain how numbers are one, how soul and body, and, in short, form and thing, are one, unless we suppose that the Cause of this, in effecting it, operates as that which moves and is self-moving." ² This would seem to be true so far; but the difficulty lies in conceiving of a Cause which can be capable of that, or of the manner of it. Evidently, the One as Cause cannot be conceived as a mere unit of number, say (for instance) a one hard, impenetrable atom of matter; for such a one as that could only proceed into many as an external aggregation of many ones placed side by side, after the manner in which atomic science supposes bodies to be composed of atoms or molecules. But this Cause must be conceived not only as a One, but also as an All and as a universal Whole, having a principle of motion within itself. The oneness, the wholeness, and the universality are only so many aspects of one and the same reality. How, then, can such a universal Reality be imagined to proceed into the many particulars? Hegel speaks of a sort of diremption, division, or splitting of the

¹ *The Logic of Hegel*, by William Wallace, pp. 135-139.

² *Metaphysics*, xii: *Works of Aristotle*, translated by Taylor, vol. ii. p. 373, London, 4to, 1812.

whole into parts, — into Subjective and Objective sides or phases, — while the wholeness still continues. This can scarcely be called a diremption, division, or splitting: the term *distinction* is better. Perhaps infolding, or convolution upon itself, would be still more appropriate; for such infolding of the Whole into distinguishable portions of the whole may easily be conceived to give rise to distinction, opposition, and difference of the part or phase from the whole, while it still remains a one identical whole. The terms *Subjective* and *Objective* belong to mind, and imply conscious knowing, in the sphere of Reason: *diremption*, *division*, *splitting into parts*, are terms of matter, and belong to the use of the understanding in the field of Nature. In this way, the proceeding of the universal into the special and particular, the One into the Many, the Whole into parts, becomes rationally conceivable and intelligible; provided always that we have in fact a movement of that nature in the One Standing All. This movement and the absolute constitution of whole and parts in one must necessarily be conceived as self-subsistent so from eternity. And truly enough, it may be said to be impossible to conceive how the thing could be done without self-movement (or eternal movement) in the One and All. Such movement in such a one whole, in the very nature of the thing, must be at the same time conscious knowing and thinking, or creating; for knowing, thinking, or creating, is, and can be, nothing else but that, and consciousness can be nothing else but the fact of Knowing.

§ 10. THE CATEGORIES OF THE SUBJECTIVE SYLLOGISM.

The philosophy of Hegel has a universal scope. The "Logic" attempts a rigidly logical and metaphysical exposition of these first principles, necessities, essential and necessary relations, categories, and concepts of reason, which are the necessary and universal grounds of all being and knowing: these are the fundamental truths and realities in

which the Ideal and the Real have their essential identity. They are equally true, real, and necessary for the indwelling Soul of Nature as for the finite soul. They are the truth of Thought as it is in itself, or of God as he is in his own eternal nature and real being. In one sense, it might appear to be a world of unreal shadows; but in another and truer sense, these ideal conceptions are the real truths, the immutable principles, the eternal necessities, the essential relations and necessary laws, and the eternal essences or essentities, which may be said to constitute, not merely a "diamond network" (as Schwegler calls it) in which the universe might, as seen from the outside, be imagined to be constructed, but a dialectically movable reason, capable of involution and evolution into the actual universe which is, and as it is, when viewed (as it were) from the inside. Sensuous matter, or dead *substratum*, as seen from the external side of nature, was, for the most part (though by no means entirely), an illusion of the senses, a temporary state of permanency or persistence, or an evanescent existence or appearance merely. He undertook a complete and thorough critical sifting of the categories of thought, and sought to derive them one from another in a logical progression; and he subsumed them all at last into the unity of an "internally connected system of reason" (says Schwegler), and exhibited them in dialectical movement into a process and course of evolution into a creation as a work of thought.

He found his key-note in the subjective Syllogism of Synthetic Apperception and Judgment in ourselves, in the *is* of predication and logical judgment, and in the equivalency involved in the two sides or propositions in the logical determination of judgment. This proposition is involved in that one: in so far as one is involved in the other, the two are identical, equal, and the same. Nothing *is*, — but is what? Why, simply Nothing. Something *is*, — but is what? Why, Something. The predication *is* is the mere assertion of the fact that Nothing *is*, or that Something *is*. Taken

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universally and logically, the predication that *Nothing is*, may be as truly made as the mere empty predication that *Something is*. And all this is true enough; but it amounts to nothing more than to make manifest the subjective necessity in us of the conception of Nothingness or absolute negation. In like manner, the predication that *Something is*, merely makes manifest the fact and necessity of the Something, if there is to be a universe at all. These two facts or necessary truths, being subsumed into the unity of one conception, show that the Nothing or Negative is merely a necessary possibility of the existence of the actual Something in its Oneness and Totality. The next question is, what the Something essentially is in itself, and what is the manner of its existence and reality? Here, again, Hegel comes back to the Subjective Syllogism and the Categories of thought in us, as exhibited in the "Synthetic Apperception" of Kant; and he starts from Kant on this head. These categories he further criticises and develops, and subsumes them (which Kant did not) into unity in the movement of Ideality; and so he arrives at the true logical notion in us. But in this logical notion of the Synthetic Apperception in us, he finds the necessity and universality which enables him to propound the same truths universally and absolutely; and so he mounts to the Concept of the universal Notion (or, in its fullness, the absolute Idea) as the necessary and essential constitution of the Universe itself, or Soul and Nature as they are in One. At this point of the universal and necessary, his method becomes purely ontological and dialectic: here he assumes the purely "speculative standpoint." The dialectic of "Negativity" or Self-limitation is involved in the eternal movement of Ideality, and moves on the duality and contradiction of positive and negative; and the dialectic movement in a continuous process of the setting and cancelling of the oppositions and contradictions of the categories into the more or less permanent and persistent essences of things and their changes, makes

N.B.
Ch. 186

N.B.
Ch. 57.
Hegel's
Rationalism
jump.

* Here Hegel, like Kant, is critically examining the Idealism theory
the movement of the Idea is the
universal in itself. The logical

the full circuit of the involution and evolution of the absolute Notion into a creation in a continuous and eternal process of identity and distinction, of essential relation and changeable relativity, of creative progression and destructive retrogression combined, tending all the while, in respect of special creations, or particular things, to return back into its own more indeterminate or undifferentiated state in a complete round of intensive and extensive action, temporary and spacial suspension or limitation of action, and mediation of ends through means, cancelling and renewing (or dissolving and destroying) reaction or Reflection; and, on the whole, an eternal movement in the Reciprocity of universal Causality.

Hegel's Categories are chiefly and substantially these: —

- (a) Real Being and Nothing [Essentity and Nonentity].
- (b) Identity and Distinction [or Difference].
- (c) Necessity and Freedom [or Possibility].
- (d) Absolute Ground, Movement, Mediation, and Determination.
- (e) Absolute Quantity, Quality and Measure (Modality), and Quantities, Qualities and Measures, or Masses.
- (f) Potentiality, Actuality, and Accidentality.
- (g) Becoming and Departing: Existing and Disappearing.
- (h) Essentiality, and Essences and Existences (Appearances).
- (i) Internality and Externality in Essential Relation.
- (j) Substantiality, and Substances and Accidents.
- (k) Causality absolute, and Causes and Effects.
- (l) Reciprocity of Action and Reaction, or Reflection.
- (m) Individuality (Oneness), Universality, Speciality, Particularity, and Totality: the Notion.¹
- (n) Reality and Ideality in one: the Absolute Idea.

All the categories, which he regards as universal, and not

¹ The One in its three aspects of one whole Unity, after the manner of the Neoplatonists. *Wissensch. der Logik*, v. p. 50, Berlin, 1841.

merely as categories of the Understanding in the field of external Nature, are summed up or subsumed into unity in the Notion or Absolute Idea, which is to be grasped and conceived in its wholeness as a rational necessity, the absolute truth, as intelligence itself, possessing activity and life within itself as its Ideality, and as being, as such, the source and Cause of the entire process of evolution and involution into a world of things, — the Universal Soul and its process into a Creation, or God and Nature at once and in One.

CH 511 { In respect of method, the system of Hegel is grounded on psychology. It assumes the validity of human reason. It starts from the Cartesian *I think and I am* as the fundamental fact of consciousness and the initiatory certainty. This fact, this truth, is a matter of immediate knowledge: it does not lie in proof. It is the ultimate fact of being and knowing in us. Having ascertained and established a rational psychology of mind in ourselves, and thus arrived at the necessary principles and categories of reason, he then ascends, by the pathway of logical science, from this basis in human reason upward into the higher realm of the universal and absolute, and endeavors to constitute a pure science of Logic in a thorough Metaphysic of Thought and Reality. Having thus gained the ontological height of absolute, necessary, and universal truth, in the logical constitution of this real and ideal Notion, he proceeds by a rigid dialectic to pursue, theoretically, the entire evolution into a creation of bodies and things in Nature. In this proceeding, he passes through the categories of real Being and Nothing, of Identity and Difference, of Quantity, Quality, and Measure, of Becoming and Departing, to essences and existences, substances and accidents, as contemplated inwardly and from within. Finally, he comes from thence to a particular consideration of the categories of the Understanding as employed in the field of external Nature: Matter and Force, Cause and Effect, Attraction and Repulsion, Mechanism, Physics, and the Organics of the Mineral, Vegetable, and

Animal Kingdoms, and even up to Man and his works, as considered externally and from without.

In this evolutionary process, the essential Notion carries with it, and in it, the dialectic Negativity of self-determination, self-limitation, self-restriction or suspension, positing and cancelling, or renewing, its own determinations, under all the categories, in such way as thereby to constitute and establish the permanent or persistent substances and forms of things in all created Nature, or, again, to unfix and dissolve the same, in a perpetual round or cycle of destruction of the old in the creation of the new. In the established order of things, this indwelling Soul of Nature becomes in a manner estranged from itself in this fixity of necessary determination, losing its full freedom therein so far, and so (as it may be said) going to sleep in material Nature; but it nevertheless retains the power of overweighing and dissolving that fixity, and of recovering, by whatever slow and imperceptible degrees, its freedom and life in the ascending process of organization in the field of Nature, until it finally regains that special and still very limited degree of free activity, life, will, and reason which we see exhibited in the finite souls of animals and men. And in that specialized constitution of itself as a *quasi* copy or partial repetition in us of the Notion, it acquires a certain limited measure of external control over the lifeless inorganic forms of substance in bodies, over the blind mechanical forces in them, and over the necessities and fatalities involved therein; and, in short, comes to possess a power and practical faculty of building up all the works of man, all the civilization and institutions of human society as a creation of his own, all Nature helping, in conformity with its necessities, laws, and order. In the plant, only a formative, assimilating, and reproductive process is reached; but in the animal, by an uninterrupted intussusception, the conditions of individuality, free motion, sensation, perception, and conscious personality are attained to; and in man, this recovered freedom and life,

in a certain partial, limited, and specialized form of the Notion, reaches the height of the rational, conscious, knowing, thinking, intelligent personality that he is. Thus Spirit reawakens out of the sleep of Nature and mere instinct into self-consciousness and reason in the finite Soul. As practical intelligences, men proceed to create a new objective world of their own making, using the materials which are at hand, or fashioning new materials out of them, and advancing intellectually and morally through all grades of free will and individual right (Morality), of family and society (Ethical Right), and of the State (Civil Rights), to that still higher platform which approaches the absolute Soul itself in an æsthetic appreciation of the True, the Good, and the Beautiful, as seen in the Fine Arts (architecture, sculpture, painting, music, poetry, and religion); and thence still returning more completely into itself (as Hegel assumes and supposes) in Jesus, the Christ, the God-man of Christianity: but only a complete return into the fulness of the absolute Notion restores the Universal Spirit fully to itself again in its freest and least determinate simplicity as such. So far as there is any suggestion of the doctrine that Jesus was God himself, it is clearly contrary to his own theory, which would require that a full realization of the free Ideality of the Notion should take place only in complete identity with itself, wherein the finite and special existence would necessarily be extinguished in the one absolute and eternal Reality; and this was likewise the doctrine of Aristotle and the Neoplatonists.

Strictly by the logic and theory of this system itself, the realization could only be partial in man, or in Jesus as human, though in him it might be deemed to have reached a higher degree of fulness than in ordinary men; but, in the fulness of the complete circuit, it must return into absolute identity with God himself. "In the finite mind this return has only its beginning: it is full in the absolute mind."¹ But in all finite souls, as in all other incomplete

¹ *Phil. des Geistes*: Werke, vii. 2, p. 20, Berlin, 1845.

or partial embodiments of the true Notion, the Idea is but partly realized, and remains subordinate and dependent on the creative power. In the perfect logical cycle, the evolutionary progression into Nature and finite mind comes round and returns into the fullest freedom that is possible in complete identity with the universal Soul, through a continuous cancellation of the set and fixed relations or categories of Quantity, Quality, Proportion (Measure), Essences, Substances, and forms of things; and the circuit of Action and Reaction is fulfilled in the universal Relation of Reciprocity in the completed Notion. The self-moving (or eternally moving) Ideality of the Notion as thus logically constituted originates, produces, cancels, and controls the entire process and proceeding. This completes the absolute Philosophy. "The thought, knowing itself as all truth, reproduces the whole natural and intellectual universe from itself, having the system of philosophy for its development, and the complete cycle is accomplished, — a closed circle of circles," — says Schwegler.¹

The method of Hegel is, of course, Metaphysical, and may be said to centre in his Logic, which springs from the ground of the categories or antinomies of Kant, and brings them up to the point of view of Aristotle. Kant (in his "Critique of Pure Reason") left them in a state of unreconciled contradiction: he could get no further on. Hegel (and also Cousin) summed them up into unity and reconciliation at the point of beginning (as it were) of thought in creation, as Aristotle really had done (however imperfectly) before them. If we ask Aristotle whence the movement into a creation comes, the only answer he has to give is, that it comes from God, or from the *Thought which thinks itself*. The central point of the Synthetic Apperception (whether in the finite or the universal Soul) is that unity of the ideal activity in which the contradictions are cancelled; but

¹ *Hist. of Phil.*, by Dr. Albert Schwegler, trans. by J. H. Seelye, New York, 1856, p. 365.

whether it is a mathematical point and mere zero, or is simply that last dividing line which distinguishes the universal Essence itself from the gulf of Nothingness, Hegel may leave his reader in some doubt, but neither alternative could have been his real meaning. Properly understood, Aristotle's "possibility of Being" was not a mere possibility, but a potentiality of Essence, and was not conceived as centred in a mathematical point, but as movement specially and eternally existent in the unmoved Standing All as a one Whole: movement in such a Whole was not a motion of translation, but a change of Quality.¹ It is evident that Hegel's "Unity of Finite and Infinite" was conceived in like manner as the logical Notion or absolute Idea that carried eternal movement within itself as such, and must therefore, of a necessity, go forth eternally into change in respect of Quantity and Quality, or Modality; that is, into more specially determined finiteness as specializations and particularizations of the Whole within the Whole; and this movement was the Ideality of the Notion. This Ideality was not a point, nor that dividing line merely, but the whole essential reality; it was real Being, but it existed (or had its being) only in the essence, form, and manner of the Notion. The Notion had a *Therebeing* as such one Whole in the simplest state in which it could be logically conceived, though it never was in fact in a state so simple as that. It never actually existed in an undeveloped state.² Newton begins his Calculus of the infinite series of differences between a straight line and a curve at the point where the curve begins to be described out of nothing into the finite limitations which it must have. He assumes that a point moves in describing a curve; but he does not stop to inquire what moves it, or what it essentially is that is moved. That was not his present need, which was only to propound a Calculus for the use of the mathematician. They were all alike considering

¹ *Œuvres de V. Cousin*, vol. i. pp. 475-485, Bruxelles.

² *Werke: Wissenschaft der Logik*, iii. pp. 160-163, Berlin, 1844.

how a finite somewhat comes to be projected into a finite form; and they all equally realized, each in his own way, that it must, at the same time, be projected into these same categories of opposition and contradiction, under which only is it at all possible or conceivable that any finite thing could exist in Nature, or in the mind conceiving or creating it. Hegel's "Infinite," like Aristotle's "God," is a vague term. The proper sense of *infinite* is simply boundlessness, the unbounded, mere absolute Nothingness; but the word may be used to express the eternal continuity of existence that belongs to the actually existent Essence (conceived as the Notion itself), and the inexhaustibility of its self-moving (or eternally moving) activity and power. It may express the eternity and immutability of these categories of thought in themselves considered. In respect of these truths, space-limit, and time-limit (or boundary), has as yet no pertinency. Yet there is a sense in which the whole positively existent One, the total Actuality, may be conceived as bounded over (as it were) against (or out of and also in) the gulf of Nothingness beyond or other than it, as Thought may be distinguished from Oblivion. It is the definition of its absolute Quantity, Quality, and Modality as such. It is this one and universal Essence that throws itself out, and deepens its distinctions, into more specially determinate states, and into the particular essences and forms of finite things. The logical dialectic endeavors to pursue the whole manner, necessity, and law of this involution and evolution. In the first logical aspect, the one Whole Essence may be contemplated as being as yet only in its simplest and least determinate state, where it is barely distinguishable from wholly indeterminate Nothingness, or the sheer emptiness of negation; or it may be considered (as with Plato and Aristotle) as an immovable standing All in which there is also an eternal movement of change on the ground of the unmoved into other and different or more determinate states, or into things in Nature in the process of creating them as they are.

q. 186.
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* If this means anything, it means that the "Standing All" is not a limitation, but limited by a reality beyond, as well as actual as its being. But the "All" includes all that is

These things have a beginning and may have an end as such; as when that homogeneous, structureless particle of protoplasm called an *Amœba* protrudes out of its standing all some small portion of its own substance, in the special direction of an extended feeler, or throws itself into all manner of shapes, under these same categories (as is alone possible), and again withdraws such portion out of the finite feeler into the unity of its wholeness, whereby the feeler vanishes, though no particle of substance be lost. If this evolution and involution were conceived as going on eternally, we might get some true notion of the infinite movement of the infinitely movable boundary of limitation that perpetually returns into itself in a kind of circuit. Circular motion (said Aristotle) is properly infinite, because it perpetually returns into itself without beginning, end, or middle.

It is perhaps possible to imagine that the molecules of this organic material may be in such unstable equilibrium that the slightest chemical change within the mass, or the least impression upon it from without, might raise some mechanical commotion therein; and even that an external impression, coming in a particular direction, might initiate a tendency of some portion of the whole to move in that same direction until it should reach something that might serve for food, as when it is observed that a root will run towards some rich deposit, or a shoot towards the light and heat. All this would go on the supposition that the molecules were the only agency. The fact, however, is, that a subtle æther pervades the mass, and the moving cause may as well lie in the æther. It may even lie under or behind the æther. If it be a fact that the æther fills all interstellar space, and pervades all bodies (which must therefore be swimming, circling, vibrating, oscillating, or whirling in it), and we seek the source of motion in the æther itself, we may also imagine that a disturbance of equilibrium may be mechanically initiated therein in like

manner; but a still more subtile form or mode of essence within the æther may just as well be the fact, and a mechanical disturbance of equilibrium in that may as well be conceivable as the beginning of motion. That would still be a sheer hypothesis, without any ground of reason. Rationally, a universal All of atoms, or a one continuous whole substance, once in a state of perfect equilibrium of stationary rest therein, must continue so forever; and then, by the very hypothesis, there could never be any power or means whereby it could be started into movement. From the fact that all discoverable bodies, molecules, or atoms, are in motion, it must necessarily follow, either that they were, or that the primal source and cause of their motions was, in movement from eternity. We may just as well suppose that a one Essence of all essences is in an eternal state of self-movement, is perpetually returning into itself, and is therefore infinite, as to assume and suppose that molecules are eternally in motion. In fact, such a conception of eternal and infinite movement as that assumed as a last fact and a necessary truth for the absolute Notion (since we must choose) would seem to be far more rational, intelligible, and satisfactory than the like assumption for mere atoms and gravity. Even in this *Amæba* there appears to be something like life and motion in a standing all, or movement in the unmoved, as if it were a particular exemplification of the universal Notion. The source of the motion may lie deeper than the æther, and may be eternal in itself, and in that sense infinite, fathomless, and flowing from an inexhaustible fountain, however limited and special may be the finite exhibition of it in an *Amæba*, or in man. Real being, essence, life, conceived in this manner, can go out of itself into more finite states or things, under these same categories, but by no possibility otherwise if we consider it well; and it is not a going out of nothing, nor out of an empty possibility, nor out of a mere abstraction, nor out of a mathematical zero-point (though the work of finite crea-

tion, in reference to the things created, may always begin at such point); but it is an eternal movement of the one whole standing All of real Essence and Power into special and particular things, the going out and return (or reflection) of Essence into essences and itself, in a perpetual round or cycle of infinite Ideality. In all science, motion is the mere fact that something moves or is moving; as consciousness is the mere fact that something knows or is knowing.

These logical categories, or universal and necessary principles of all possible thought or real creation, were first partially defined by Aristotle, not as categories of the human understanding merely, but as universal and absolute truths of reason. Bacon's "universals" and fundamental laws, though not discussed by him in the manner of a thoroughly metaphysical logic, had the same drift and result. Hegel and Cousin gave them a more elaborate, critical, and complete statement. Kant considered them merely as categories of the human Understanding. The Logic of Aristotle was essentially a metaphysical philosophy of the universe: it was something more than a mere school-logic of argumentation, or an idle play of the human mind in reasoning, as it was taught by the Middle-Age Schoolmen, though it included that also. The Arabian commentators had a far better comprehension of Aristotle; and from them, and still more from the Neoplatonists, the later philosophical mystics of the Christian Church borrowed some higher notions of it, and mixed them up with their own biblical supernaturalism. A sound philosophy must be grounded on necessary, universal, and absolute truth. These principles, necessities, categories, essential relations, and fundamental facts may need further demonstration or elucidation; but it is of no use merely to deny their truth and reality, or to ignore them as unknowable, or to relegate all consideration thereof to mystical dreamers.

CHAPTER IV.

FURTHER DISCUSSION OF PRINCIPLES.

§ 1. CRITICAL CONSIDERATIONS.

SUCH, in a general view, appears to be the scheme of Hegel. One great difficulty, and perhaps the chief defect in this idealistic realism from Aristotle to Hegel, lies in a certain vagueness and insufficiency of statement, if not also in some want of logical precision in the thought; or, if this be the fault of the reader rather than of the writer, it may be for the reason that where the subject is so comprehensive and vast in the whole, and so multifarious in the parts, the treatment of any special topic will appear to be more enigmatic and obscure than it really is to a reader who does not carry the whole scheme in his mind as the author himself does. It would seem to be true, nevertheless, that Hegel fails to give any satisfactory account of the first movement. He does not explain, in any clear and comprehensible manner, in what way it is possible, or rationally conceivable, that absolute Spirit can really exist as such, nor how it does or can give existence to the matter, forces, and phenomena of actual Nature. He does not succeed in bringing them into intelligible causal relation and continuity with such mind or soul. The scheme does, indeed, purport to do all this; but question is still made in high places, and may be made in philosophy itself, if it does so in a thoroughly scientific and conclusive manner. Science for the most part ignores it, or rejects it altogether. The like insufficiency in the Greek philosophy drove one

* In the long run, this is a reasonable conclusion; but "occasional" is not a full proof.

class of thinkers to the materialistic view of the eternity of matter in the form of atoms, or corporeal elements of some kind (as air, earth, water, fire), and led another class to the conception of immaterial Spirit, having no causal continuity with matter and the world, but conceived as somehow moving upon the face of it and moulding it into form and order, in some unexplained and incomprehensible way of *fiat* creation. It continues to be nearly so, down to this day. Considering the ignorance that prevailed in all antiquity (and without so very much diminution even now) about the constitution of Nature (in the absence of scientific knowledge about Nature), this fact should not be so greatly surprising. We see in Plato, Proclus, and the rest, how largely the prevailing errors about the material world, and the popular theories and dreams about the gods, entered into the Greek philosophy. The metaphysical theories partook of the prevalent cosmological conceptions. For them, the earth stood still in the centre of the world; the starry sky revolved upon an axis; and there was the region of the earth, of the water, of the air, of the sky, and of the gods above the sky. Motion appeared to be circular throughout. Aristotle conceived that circular motion was the first and most perfect kind of motion, and was the only motion that could be perpetual, or through an infinite time, since it alone could return into itself eternally, without beginning, middle, or end. Accordingly, we have the Neoplatonic conception of the Supreme Intelligence as uppermost in the universe, and as letting itself down, and through a sort of hierarchical architectonic of gods, dæmons, men, and animals, even into material Nature. The cosmological and mythological parts or aspects of their theories were, of course, an idle dream: the cosmological and mythological conceptions of our time are quite different, but perhaps scarcely less wide of the real truth. But it does not follow that the metaphysical theory of either the ancient or the modern philosophy, however beclouded with such misconceptions, is

thereby essentially vitiated, or that it may not readily be cleared of such visionary extravagances, and brought into conformity with the present state of knowledge, or even perfected into a sound and true metaphysical science. Or, if the ancient theories must be laid upon the shelf as a whole, some parts thereof may furnish important suggestions for a more perfect theory, or a better exposition. The Intelligence of the Neoplatonists finds, perhaps, only a modified statement in the syllogistic Notion of Hegel, or in the universal Reason of Cousin; and it may yet find some further modification that may bring it into reconciliation (if not identity) with a scientific theory of Nature, even as seen from the external side. Aristotle's conception of the infinite circular motion would seem to have some exemplification in the Newtonian theory of the Solar System, which La Place found to be so perfect and admirable that he imagined (or was supposed to imagine) that it might go eternally without the help of any God.

With Plato, the Divine Soul was the oldest of all things, and moved itself. It was the source of motion in all things else. How it did or could move itself, there was not much attempt to explain. There was motion and standing, all in One; but how such motion could arise, or exist from eternity, there was no explanation. There was no logical and scientific development of such motion, or of the standing All, into the matter of bodies in Nature, or none that is intelligible or satisfactory now. It is not clear what his notion of matter was: sometimes he speaks of it as coeternal with the universal Soul, and again he intimates that God somehow created the first forms of matter; but there is no clear, systematic statement in what manner it was done. Aristotle discourses of the essence (*οὐσία*), of the matter (*ύλη*), and of the form (*εἶδος*) of bodies; but he gives no distinct exposition of the precise manner in which he conceived the matter of bodies to be originated and constituted. All is indefinite and vague. His discussion of the categories of

Essence, Potentiality, Energy, Action, Motion, Time and Space, Actuality, presupposes a process of the active element into form until the completion (*ἐντελέχεια*) of the process in the fully formed body.¹ But his Being or Essence is left in a state of mere potentiality, the process is in act, energy is energizing, and the body is the completed action and form. The creative Essence and power seems to come from a mathematical point, or from nowhere. If we inquire further, the only answer we get from Aristotle is, that it comes from God or the "First Mover." But there is no more intelligible statement of the manner of it than we have in Plato. The continuity of mind with matter is not clearly and satisfactorily established. Matter was said to be the antithesis of form. Form seems to have been considered as living activity as well as the ideal scheme of shape: a hand of a living person was quite a different thing from a hand cut off and dead. Soul and body were unified in their active producing cause; but how they were produced, or what was the nature of that cause, we were not informed. Whether he regarded the active Essence as thrown into the body with its ideal form, and as an energy continuing in it, sustaining that form, and so constituting its permanent substance or matter as opposed to the mere form, or otherwise, is not very clear; but it would seem that he must have understood it in some such way. Hegel is equally silent about the sustained continuity of the active ideal "Negativity" (as he calls it) in maintaining the permanent fixity (or *set*) of his essences of bodies; but it would seem that the continued, essential activity must be still there, even though in an equilibrium of stationary balance for the time being. A withdrawal or cessation of both essence and activity in the thing is a negation, dissolution, or cancelling of the object, and it vanishes. Any oversetting changes it. "Subjectivity" (it is said) "overlaps objectivity," and controls the determination, and modifies the fixity. Probably it was

¹ *Arist. Met.*, red. W. Christ, Lipsiæ, 1886, *l.* 1, p. 180.

not strictly the form which Aristotle regarded as the active element, but he would rather seem to have supposed an essential activity or energy of some kind within the form, giving both the form and the substance of the thing in the setting or completion of it. The state of fixity and permanence was the substance of the thing. The active essence, so setting and fixing itself in the thing, thus became and was its only essence, substance, or matter. The process of *being* had then become a completed *been*, at least for the time being, and so matter or substance was simply this temporary state of permanency in the constitution of bodies as they are in Nature, and while they remain such. In his doctrine of Essence, Hegel enters into an elaborate exposition of the logical process and manner of the proceeding of the Notion into the essences and forms, the substances and properties, existences and appearances, of bodies. His theory would seem to be much the same as that above attributed to Aristotle; but much of his discussion is so obscure, so vaguely involved in a loose and scarcely intelligible jargon of words and terms used in Protean senses, that it is hardly possible to get any clear notion of his real meaning, if, indeed, he had any himself.¹ This energy or activity seems to have been conceived by Hegel as the absolute Ideality of the Notion, moving itself. This self-movement was assumed as a fact needing no proof: Aristotle had taken much pains to show the necessity and truth of the fact. The Neoplatonists were equally vague and obscure on this head. They seem to have conceived the Intelligence as having (intimately united with it and subsisting in it) an active power accompanied with a faculty of giving limit to its own movement, and so constituting the forms of things, and, at the same time, of giving them all the substance which they had. Matter and form were therefore the same thing in reality, though they might be contemplated as in antithesis to one

¹ *Wiss. der Logik*, vol. iii. Berlin, 1844; Hegel's *Doctrine of Essence and Reflection*, trans. by Wm. T. Harris, New York, 1881.

another. All matter other than that, any notion of an unknown *substratum* or *Ding an sich*, different from that, was an illusion of the senses. Berkeley's conception of the constitution of bodies was something similar to this. The "thinking essence" gave both the form and permanent substance: there was no other matter. The real conception of Spinoza could not have been much different, however obscurely expressed. Schopenhauer and Von Hartmann seem to contemplate Substance as unconscious, blind force (*blinder Drang*), which evolves itself into the world of things under purely mechanical and physical laws, necessities, and conditions, without aim or purpose otherwise. Von Hartmann,¹ however, seems to suppose that even this unconscious force has a faculty of "representation (*Vorstellung*)," and a capability of foreseeing the end and aiming to reach it; but the manner of it is not clearly stated. Indeed, such a thing would seem to be quite inconceivable. Some similar doctrine was apparently involved or implied in Leibnitz's unconscious and merely appetitive monads; but in his system these inferior monads were somehow subject to the control of the one supreme and universal Monad, which, in some unexplained manner, as God, or as some kind of self-moving soul, established a certain harmony throughout the whole. The philosophy of Schopenhauer comes nearly to the ground of the atheistic mechanism of materialistic positive science. Hegel is nearly as obscure as his predecessors on this vital point in philosophy. He glides over the difficulties with equal facility. He makes astounding assumptions with equal unconcern; and he certainly appears to be expounding a science of logical shadows, purely ideal activities, necessities, relations, and essentiaes, whereof the universe of God and Nature, by means of a spiritual dialectic of sheer "Negativity," is so constituted and constructed as to have all the actuality which we see, or experience, and seemingly without any other essence, substance,

* ¹ *Phil. des Unbewussten*, von Edward von Hartmann, Berlin, 1873.

matter, or movement whatever. This marvellous "Negativity" appears to be capable of doing what it pleases, and these shadowy essentities seem to furnish sufficient material for the construction of all bodies, forces, and things in Nature. It can even create essence, substance, and matter. There would seem to be a tacit implication, at least, that mere Negativity can negate itself into things, as if it were itself an active essence and power; very much as Darwin assumes "Natural Selection" to be an active power capable of producing an animal kingdom on a basis of matter and gravity, without more. Hence the Logic of Hegel has been pretty generally regarded as quite as visionary and ineffectual as that of the ancients towards establishing a causal connection and continuity of mind with matter. For the greater part of mankind, the universe remains an unknown or unknowable enigma, the very despair of science, and an impossibility for philosophy.

But it is not so clear after all, if duly considered, that this logical Notion of Hegel can be so easily disposed of. We may find at last that it really has a solid foundation. We are to consider that, when thoroughly understood, it is the absolute category of all real existence, of Universality, Speciality, and Particularity in the unity of one absolute Whole, — the Universe as it really is, grounded on the eternal necessities. It is to be conceived as the outcome and resulting truth of fundamental necessities, necessary relations, absolute facts and realities (the eternal movement inclusive), which are logically demonstrated to be necessary, universal, and absolute truth. An eternal movement of Ideality in the Reality of the Notion is, indeed, assumed to be a fact and a necessary truth: it may be found that no other assumption is possible, or rationally conceivable. Pure Logic, or pure Metaphysic, must make this presupposition before it can be capable of giving any rational or intelligible account of mind in us, or of Nature, or of universal Reason. Without it, thought is impossible. The fundamental and indisputable fact is, that

we are, and that we think: it is equally indisputable that the universe as we know it is in fact in movement. It is a necessary inference that it was eternally in movement; since, on the hypothesis that it was once at a standstill, it would be impossible that it ever could have begun to move; for, by the very supposition of its being the All that is, there could not possibly be anything other than itself whereby it could be set in motion. Even considered as a round, solid globe in an absolute Void, a motion of translation would be impossible: its place would be ever the same. That it could ever set itself in motion, or initiate movement within itself, would be inconceivable and equally impossible. It must necessarily follow, therefore, that it was, and is, and will be, eternally in movement within itself. The assumption, then, or the presupposition, of eternal movement or (what is really the same thing) self-movement within the one whole standing All, is justifiable, unavoidable, and absolutely necessary. The Notion, as logically constituted, of the eternal necessities, essential, and necessary relations, and absolute truths, which, together with eternal movement in the unity of the one Whole, give this summary category of Universality, Speciality, Particularity, and Totality as the resulting whole truth, is thereby Intelligence itself. Being thus necessarily in eternal movement within itself, it must be a movable Intelligence: it must be capable of having movement in it. It is, properly speaking, Universal Soul. This Intelligence, therefore, cannot be a rigid "diamond network" into which a movable or moving Essence might be poured, as molten metal is poured into a mould. It is not to be regarded as an immovable, unalterable, rigid scheme of laws or necessities imposed upon the active movement from without, or from a source wholly independent of the self-moving Whole. The term *Law* implies a lawgiver, who has power both to give and to alter the law: it is not in its own nature immutable. In the sense of absolute unalterability, a law becomes an eternal necessity. Law, while it remains law, may be re-

garded as a temporary necessity, and, so far, as having the character of necessity for persons who must obey it. What are ordinarily called "laws of Nature" are either such eternal necessities, or such temporary necessities for us, who must conform and obey. Conceiving the Intelligence, then, to have the logical constitution of the Notion, it must have also the character of movable intelligence; that is, it must be capable of being wielded, or rather (as self-moving Intelligence) of wielding itself, into a continuous and eternal process of evolution into particular modes of itself, and of reflection and return out of them into itself again, thus giving the forms and essences of the particular things, while they continue to be such as they are. In this, no change in the nature of the fundamental necessities, essential relations, and truths of the Notion itself is necessarily involved. The absolute Whole as such still remains the immovable standing All that it ever is. It retains its universality, its Wholeness, its Oneness, and its capability of movement into distinctions, differentiations, specialities, and particularities, within itself. In this respect and so far, it may be said to be eternal, immutable, and "impartible" (indivisible), as the Neoplatonists held; but in reference to the particulars themselves, and to them only, it may truly be, at the same time, partakable, inasmuch as they share and participate in it partially, though not wholly. It is thus capable of a certain infolding (or rather convolution) upon itself and within itself, without involving any alteration in the essential nature of these principles, necessities, and relations of its own inner constitution as a one ever-identical Whole. In this involution, convolution, and evolution in respect of some special or particular, a distinction of whole and part necessarily arises just so far, and the special or particular as such becomes so far different from the Whole as such. Intelligence in movement into particular conceptions, ideas, or things, is thinking and creating; for, in truth, thinking, creating, is nothing else but that. Consciousness is nothing

but the fact of being, knowing, and thinking. The Notion in its wholeness, therefore, may be called the Subject, Spirit, Soul, Mind, or Intelligence, for these terms are but so many names for one and the same thing in reality; and in respect of its specialities, particularities, parts, phases, or aspects, it may also be spoken of as Object, Objectivity, or (in its external aspect) as Nature; for these are simply different names for the same reality. But all objects, all specials and particulars, must of a necessity still be within the whole Notion, and therefore necessarily more or less directly and immediately within the universal conscious knowing; though within the immediate sphere of fixity and permanency of things in Nature, and as to them, the freely knowing movement must necessarily be in some large measure temporarily suspended therein; and so they as such things must be thus far removed out of the inward and immediate sphere of the free conscious action, while yet, as a part of the whole process, they are still embraced within the universal knowing and consciousness. In Hegelian phrase, this fixity in things is called a state of temporary "estrangement." As knowing itself, the Notion may be said to be self-knowing and self-conscious, for it is a Self. Self is nothing else but that. The conscious intelligent movement is Will; for universal Will can be nothing else but that. An intelligent, knowing, conscious movement is thinking, is creating: neither thinking nor creating is anything else but that. That such conscious intelligent essence and power in movement, in respect of some part or aspect of the whole standing All, should, under all the necessities, necessary relations, and conditions of the whole internal constitution of the Notion as the Absolute Intelligence itself, be capable of controlling and directing the movement, and of arresting it in such part at some necessary, or some chosen, determination or limitation, of suspending its own action, stopping and standing there temporarily, or holding up the movement in a kind of stationariness, or in

an equilibrium of stationary balance for the time being, with a conscious intention and purpose, and to a definite end and aim, would therefore seem to be entirely possible, reasonable, and comprehensible. Something like this would seem to be what Hegel really means by "Negativity," taken as he takes it in the active sense of a logically dialectic movement of the universal Notion; for the term as used by him involves the meaning, not only of a movement outward, but also of a reflection and return inward, and a capability of stopping, or of being arrested and suspended, at any stage of the cycle of progression; that is, the whole Notion, as a conscious, knowing Self, can impose limitation, restriction, law, restraint, upon its own action or reflection; for the subjectivity overlaps and determines the objectivity. In this manner of self-movement, the Notion may be said to posit, set, and fix its own movable essence or essentia into special and particular determinations, thus giving to them their temporarily persistent essences and forms. The form is the result and effect of this ideal wielding of the necessities, essentia, and necessary relations of the intelligence or reason into the constituted substances and forms of objects or things in Nature; and so, forms are imposed on them as the necessary conditions or laws of their existence as such. These absolutely necessary conditions are the true meaning of times, spaces, and places (or relative positions) of such things; for they are in themselves nothing else but those necessary limitations under which only is it possible or conceivable that any finite thing, idea, or conception could possibly exist as such. Their essences or substances consist in the sustained continuity of the energetic action of this universal Essence and Power, acting always on the adamantine grounds of the eternal and unalterable necessities, the essential relations, the alterable necessities, and movable relations or laws, or rather of that quantity and degree of the same which is necessary to maintain them persistently in their actual substances and forms.

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In reference to the universal Intelligence itself, this permanence and persistence of things in Nature, making them what they are while they are such, may be said to measure the continuity of the universal Remembrance in them. Nevertheless, in so far as that fixity and persistence of bodies or things must extend, or actually exist, it must follow of an absolute necessity for the time being, even for the creative Intelligence itself, that all the immediate and necessary consequences thereof, their qualities, properties, accidents, and appearances, and their external relations to one another, must attend them, with the inexorableness of an inevitable fatality, while they are what they are, and if they are to be what they are at all. No spirit, no god, could make it otherwise; and this is that Fate which is also Providence in all that is created. This is the sphere of blind mechanical forces, chance, and accident, and of all the external properties and relations of bodies in the field of Nature, and of that endless chain or sequence of causes and effects as applicable to bodies, considered as secondary causes of other effects. It is the sphere of what is sometimes called "Natural Selection," "Struggle for Life," "the Survival of the Fittest," and the like phrases, or of the mere necessary consequences of the existing forces and conditions of things. These blind mechanical forces and their necessary operations, these mere limiting conditions, chances, and accidents, are indeed fatalities for us, who have our bodily existence in this same natural sphere, and must in some large measure be subject to its fatal necessities as being also a part of created Nature. No omnipotence could make it otherwise.

§ 2. CAUSE — CAUSES — EVOLUTION.

Plato laid the main stress on the final cause, the Good and the Beautiful as the end and aim of creation. He seems to have had less concern about the active cause. Soul, indeed, was the oldest of things, and moved itself in the standing All, and this statement of the fact was taken as

sufficient, or as needing no further explanation. Aristotle was more sensible of the difficulty here, and labored with the active cause as "the most important thing of all." He mentions four sorts of cause, which were (according to the interpretation of Cousin) the following: —

1. The essence and form of each thing (τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι), that whereby a thing is what it is, or is to be, — the *causa formalis*.

2. The matter and the essence (τὴν ὕλην καὶ τὸ ὑποκείμενον), — the *causa materialis*.

3. The principle of motion (τρίτην δὲ ὅθεν ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς κινήσεως), — the *causa efficiens*.

4. The purpose and the good of a thing (τὸ οὗ ἐνεκα καὶ τ' ἀγαθόν), — the *causa finalis*.¹

According to modern conceptions and use, all this may, perhaps, be better expressed thus: —

a. The essence and form of a thing, whereby it is just what it is, or is becoming, is the limitation of essence into that thing, and the form of the thing (so far as that is concerned) is a mere result, a consequence, and not a cause at all, properly speaking,* or only secondarily a cause as such thing, when formed, may affect some other thing; that is, again, unless essence (οὐσία), as distinct from the matter or substance of a thing (ὕλη), be understood to mean the one whole essence of all things, having a principle of motion in itself, and so being the active cause; and this would seem to be the real meaning of Aristotle himself, as when he speaks of the substance of a thing (τὴν ὕλην) and the underlying essence (τὸ ὑποκείμενον).

¹ Œuvres de V. Cousin, i. 401, Bruxelles; Arist. Met. A. 2, Recognovit W. Christ, Lipsiæ, 1886, p. 8. Mr. Wallace remarks that "in Greek philosophy the central questions turn upon such words as Being and not-Being (ὄν and μὴ ὄν), Becoming (τὸ γινόμενον), that out of which (τὸ ἐξ οὗ), that for the sake of which (τὸ οὗ ἐνεκα), the what-was-being (τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι), the what is (τὸ τί ἐστίν), this somewhat (τὸ δὲ τί)," etc. — *Logic of Hegel*, trans. by William Wallace, M. A., Oxford, 1874, p. cxviii.

* Yes, it is: for the form makes a thing what it is, and the matter is the stuff of which it is made, and a substance is that which is in itself.

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b. The substance (or matter) of a body, as signifying both its substrate and its form, or considered merely in respect of the fixity and persistence of it, is a result of the limitation of both essence and form into it, an effect, a consequence, and not a cause at all, or only secondarily a cause as the object thus constituted may be a further cause of some other effect.

c. The principle of movement, or (as Aristotle expresses it) *the whence the beginning of motion*, whether it be that which is self-moving, or is eternally moving, and whether as kinetic or static (ἀλλ' ὅλως πάσης ἀρχῆς κινητικῆς ἢ στατικῆς), is truly a cause in the proper sense of the word; and it may be either the first and absolute causality, or a secondary cause. Aristotle clearly distinguishes potency, potentiality (δύναμις), from energy (ἐνέργεια), and says that essence and form is energy (ὥστε φανερόν ὅτι ἡ οὐσία καὶ τὸ εἶδος ἐνέργεια ἐστίν).¹ He assumes the fact to be so; but he nowhere explains, in any very satisfactory manner, how it can be so, otherwise than as it is a necessary fact.

d. The purpose and the good of a thing is not properly a cause at all, but *a reason why*; it may be regarded, however, as the absolute effect of conscious, knowing, and artistically creative essence and power, aiming only at the good and the beautiful, but not as any mere result of blind force, chance, or accident, for that can have no purposive end or aim.

Aristotle states these four kinds of cause in reference to the doctrines of older philosophers, and it is perhaps not entirely clear in what precise manner he himself conceived the first cause (πρῶτον κινούν). Professor Bowen seems to think that Aristotle's Efficient Cause "signifies the maker or author of a thing, that which really produces it."² In one sense, this may be true enough; but it is not entirely accurate, and is misleading. It does not correctly express

¹ *Aristotelis Metaphysica*, Recognovit W. Christ, Lipsiæ, 1886, §. 8, p. 193.

² *The Idea of Cause (Gleanings of a Literary Life*, by Francis Bowen, LL. D., New York, 1880, p. 165).

* The matter causes a thing to be a thing, rather than a mere concept —
related essentially (ἐξ οὐσας)
in that it is the thing's
own essential right.

Aristotle's notion of the active cause, whence is the beginning of motion; for Aristotle found that in the energy of essence and form as it eternally is in itself, and not at all in any external Mover or Maker operating upon things *ab extra*. This erroneous notion comes from that external way in which the Understanding insists upon viewing Nature: it seems to be incapable of reaching to the inside view. Having assumed the absolute existence of matter and the material world, the reasoning then is, that such matter or world must have stood still forever, unless some God *ab extra* had moved upon the face of it and set it in motion and in order as the world of things which we see. According to the usual mode of proceeding of this method, the writer turns aside from the consideration of the question of the One eternal Cause as it is in itself, self-moving or eternally moving, evades all discussion of the mode and manner of its action and operation in proceeding into a creation, and of the causal connection and continuity of mind with matter, and proceeds at once to an inquiry into the nature of causation in our souls and in external Nature. It concludes that soul in us moves itself, is the unity of the Efficient and Final Causes, and acts on matter and organization external to itself. It then argues that, therefore, there must be a God external to all Nature, who acts or operates upon the world of material things, in some like manner *ab extra*. This is the common and orthodox Jewish and Christian anthropomorphic conception of God and Nature and Man, and of the mode of proving their existence, including, of course (and chief of all), the biblical revelation of the whole truth, in some incomprehensible, supernatural fashion. This sort of philosophy is only an exemplification of the old false issue between realistic atheism on one side and biblical supernaturalism on the other, — the fallacy of the Excluded Middle, — as if either one or the other must necessarily be the true theory of this universe.

Professor Bowen's argument against the Materialists and Agnostics is acute, able, and convincing. He leaves them

no ground to stand on. His refutation of *Pangenesi*s is complete enough. His view of unconscious instinctive action is even better than that of Hartmann; but it is considered as the work of the finite soul (in some way instrumented, indeed, by divine Providence), while there is no attempt to explain the constitution and mode of activity either of the finite or of the universal Soul. There is a vague suggestion that the finite as well as the universal Soul transcends Time and Space, and that the Finite is limited out of the universal and Infinite; but in what manner, there is no exposition. There is a statement that the soul is essentially immortal; but how or in what manner immortal, it is not stated. Perhaps this was enough to be said in an orthodox Review. The subject is remitted to the sphere of ontology, but no ontology is attempted: biblical revelation might answer for that; for the Kantian practical Reason, with the aid of Revelation, will infer the existence of the Jewish God and the Christian God-man, without the help of Ontology or Philosophy either. This seems to be the upshot of University philosophy at the present day.

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Aristotle's more elaborate argument brings him to the conclusion that essence and energy are eternal in a one immovable whole, and he objects to Plato's statement that the first principle of motion was the *that which itself moves itself* as soul; "for the soul," as he says, "is posterior to the heavens." Nor would he allow that potency (*δύναμις*) could be before energy. Plato and Leucippus had held motion to be eternal; but he complains that "they do not tell us through what, why, nor the cause. For, as nothing is moved by chance, what always begins, as now in nature here, must be moved by force, or by intelligence, or by something else. Then what is first? for this is as perplexing as important." If potency is before energy, "it must be said how;" and he calls Anaxagoras to witness that energy is before potentiality, for his "intelligence (*νοῦς*) was in energy."¹

¹ *Arist. Met.*, Recognovit W. Christ, A. 6, p. 265; see, also, Cousin's translation (*Œuvres*, vol. i. p. 507, Bruxelles).

Plato (as interpreted by the Neoplatonists) had considered the Good (the final cause) to be the *first* principle in the three *hypostases* of the One, but rather as some super-essential quality of highest and best than as the active cause. The intelligence was the *second* principle, and the soul as the active power and life in nature was the *third* principle; but this was, perhaps, not in the order of causation, but the mere order of logical treatment of the several elements or aspects of the one whole as the self-moving Intelligence; and Soul, so constituted, was the *that which itself moved itself* eternally in the standing All.

Aristotle maintains that energy and action are anterior to potence (*δύναμις*), which he defines as the mere possibility of acting or not acting, if there be anything having energy in it. Taylor translated this word by *capacity*, Hegel by *possibility*, and Cousin by *puissance* (power). Taylor makes Aristotle say, "I call motion the energy of that which is in capacity, so far as it is in capacity,"¹ that is, in potentiality. Aristotle seems to have regarded motion as the fact of movement, caused by energetic action, and action presupposed an active essence and energy of some kind. Again he says, "Motion is the imperfect entelecheia of that which is movable, and that which moves is already in energy;"² that is, motion is the movement of essence into some special or particular thing, the completion (entelecheia) of which is not yet accomplished, as when the child grows into the man (*τὰ σπέρματα καὶ ἡ γονή*). And again, he says, "Absolute being is an eternal act: God is the eternal act of thinking."³ There is, says Aristotle, the movable and the moving, and therefore, also, a middle something which moves, not being moved by anything else, the eternal essence and energy.⁴ It

¹ *Works of Aristotle*, trans. by Thomas Taylor, vol. ii. p. 326, London, 1816.

² *Ibid.*, vol. iv. p. 416; *Arist. Met.*, Recognovit W. Christ, Θ. 1, p. 180.

³ *Œuvres de V. Cousin*, vol. i. pp. 475-485, Bruxelles.

⁴ *Arist. Met.*, Recog. W. Christ, Α. 6, p. 256.

was the universal and absolute Essence in a state of eternal movement, whether kinetic or merely static in effect, in the immovable standing Whole. It was Intelligence itself, which knows itself by participation of the intelligible.¹ And this is Aristotle's First Mover. He argues at length that there can be but one first mover; that the beginning of motion is from that which is eternally in energy, moving the things that are moved, but being itself immovable (ἔστι γὰρ τι ὃ ἀεὶ κινεῖ τὰ κινούμενα, καὶ τὸ πρῶτον κινεῖν ἀκίνητον αὐτό);² and that the first principle of all things must be found in that which is immovable. He recognizes the necessity of some immovable ground of action and reaction for his eternal movement. Hegel really does the same thing, finding a necessary ground for the subjective action of the Notion, as Will, in the "Cognition,"³ that is, in the absolute and necessary constitution of the logical Notion of all Reality as the universally active essence and intelligence. The fundamental necessities, the essential relations, and the movement therein, he regards as coeternal in fact; but the necessities and the essential relations are logically first in the order of truth.

On this subject, Hegel discourses thus: "What evolution (*Entwickeln*) is, must be seen by distinguishing the elements (*Zustände*): the one known as beginning — possibility (the *Ansichseyn*, as I call it) — is potentia, δύναμις; the second determination is the For-itself-Being (*Fürsichseyn*), the actuality (actus, ἐνέργεια). . . Of evolution we can ask, What develops itself? What is the absolute content? The development may be posited as a formal activity without content; but the fact has no other determination than the activity, and through this the universal nature of the content is already determined. The In-itself-being (*Ansichseyn*) and the For-itself-being (*Fürsichseyn*) are the moments of the activity; but the fact holds such distin-

¹ Ibid. A. 7, p. 258.

² Ibid. Γ. 7, p. 88.

³ *The Logic of Hegel*, trans. by Wm. Wallace, M. A., Oxford, 1874.

guished moments in itself. The fact is thereby essentially one, and this unity of the distinguished is even the concrete. Not only is the fact concrete, but also the In-itself (*Ansich*), the subject of the activity which begins; and finally, the product is concrete as well as the activity and the beginning. The whole evolution is also the content, the Idea itself, which even consists therein, that we have one and another, and both are one, which is the third, in which the one is in the other with itself, not outside itself. So the Idea (after its content) is itself concrete as well in itself as it is also its interest that it is out and out for itself what it is in itself.”¹ Here might seem to be an endeavor to state an absolute activity that is self-moving, or eternally moving, after the manner of the Notion, or Soul thinking. It is assumed as usual that the fact is so. This formal activity that is without other content than itself, and has no other determination but that of the two distinguished moments of the concrete activity itself, seems to presuppose the possibility of motion apart from essence, matter, or anything that moves or is moved. He is discussing the beginning of movement into an evolution. What is known as beginning is possibility, potency: beginning of what? Why, evidently of particular things only; — for his discourse now is of such things as have a beginning by evolution, not of the Notion or Idea itself, which is eternal and infinite (*i. e.* without beginning, end, or middle), and is essence and form at once and in one. He assumes that a conception of such beginning as a truth is possible, without undertaking to show how the Idea itself comes to have an active power of originating such beginning of motion in itself, or how such an everflowing fountain of power is possible or intelligible. The fact seems to be assumed to be so, without need of further demonstration. We might almost say it was Plotinus’s “ineffable fountain” without the *ineffable*. It is Hegel’s conception

¹ *Die Geschichte der Phil.* : Werke, von Carl Michelet, xiii. pp. 33–36, Berlin, 1840.

of absolute Ideality ; but either it is mere activity without essence, or pure activity is essence, and essence nothing but activity, or it is the whole essential constitution and truth of the Notion that is the eternally active Essence ; and this would seem to be Hegel's mode of conceiving of this "formal activity." Cousin disposed of the difficulty here by his conception of the eternal activity as both substance and cause in itself alone, somewhat as Spinoza also did ; for with him, it was substance and *causa sui*, but the kind of substance he did not clearly define.

The philosophy of Hegel goes deeper into this Substance and Cause, exhibits it in its inward logical necessity and truth in the eternal movement of Ideality, moving in freedom on the ground of immovable necessity and Reality as Thought or Soul thinking, and makes it far more intelligible and comprehensible. The elements of evolution (he seems to say) are possibility and action. There is a formal activity without other content than itself, and the fact of movement has no other determination than that of its distinguishable moments. Through this distinguishing activity, the nature of the content is already determined. These moments are the In-itself-Being and the For-itself-Being, but the fact holds both moments in itself ; it is one fact all the while, and this unity of the distinguished moments is even still the concrete whole : it is essence and form and action in one. Both the subject of the activity and the product are concrete. The evolution is also the content ; for it is still the Idea itself in its wholeness, as well as in its particularity. The subject of the evolution is the essential Notion itself, which in its movement into the particular makes distinction within itself, "dirempts" itself into one and another, and both are still the one and the same, and the third in respect of the singleness or wholeness that still continues ; and so it is all the while out and out *for itself* what it is *in itself*. This is simply another mode of expressing the Universality, Particularity, and Wholeness,

which constitute the one absolute category of the Notion, which ever remains identical with itself through all changes in the course of the evolution. These changes are but modes or aspects of one and the same whole: the movement, the evolution, is mere change of mode, form, relation, or aspect in some particular of what still remains identical in its essential self. It is thus apparent that the Notion (the Idea) is Hegel's Essence; and he needs no other essence, substance, or matter. The activity, then, is not a pure, abstract activity, independent of all essence or substantiality: it is simply movement of (and in) the standing All. And this is Hegel's Spirit, which is, indeed, immaterial in the common acceptation of *material*, but is material in the proper sense of essential, substantial truth and reality. But there is still no answer to the questions: "What started the Notion into movement? or, Was it eternally in the state of movement? or, How is it conceivable that this Absolute Idea could at will initiate within itself an inward or an outward movement at all? It is like asking us to believe that the drop in a spirit-level is alive, has a soul, and is capable of moving itself either way at pleasure. It may even suggest the idea of Mosey Morison's stick of timber in the forest, that was hewn so skewingly that it could not lie still. A protoplasmic *Amæba* does seem to be such a living drop, endowed with a conscious power of initiating movement within itself; but in this case we may suspect the action of internal or external physical forces. All such causes are excluded from the Notion. Here we must have an absolute movement, either self-moving or eternally moving. If an eternal state of movement be the final fact, it must be a necessary truth, and there an end of the matter, however it may excite our special wonder. This is that Reciprocity that of its own motion makes the circuit of all Nature, perpetually returning into itself in an eternal round of infinite Causality. And this would seem to be Hegel's mode of conceiving the *Causa sui*. The move-

ment, the activity, the active Essence and Power, of the Notion or "Absolute Idea," is simply the eternal Fact and a necessary Truth, and is to be accepted as such: it is the absolute Ideality of the universal and essential Notion.

It is evident, on the whole, that Aristotle, no less than Plato and the Neoplatonists, did, in his own thought in some manner, however imperfectly or insufficiently, sum up and subsume all his categories into a certain unity or community of elements (*συνοικία*) in a one whole, as the first essence (*ἡ οὐσία πρώτη*), not one as merely a measure or number, but as the simple whole, holding itself thus;¹ that is, into the unity of the real and ideal movement of thought in the universal Intelligence. Cousin interprets him as saying that "the thought which is most thought is what most exists. The intelligence thinks itself in the perception of the intelligible (*κατὰ μετάληψιν τοῦ νοητοῦ*), and it becomes intelligible by reflection and thought. So that the intelligence and the intelligible are the same thing; for the intelligence is that which has the power to comprehend the intelligible and that which is; for it to have this power is to exercise it."² Again, says Aristotle, this intelligence has in it something wonderful and divine: "life belongs to it; for the energy of intelligence is life, and this is energy; but energy, the life hinging on itself, is eternal and best. And we say that God is living being (*ζῶον*), eternal and best, so that life and duration, eternal and continuous, belong to God; for this is God."³

Fundamentally, there is not much essential difference between Parmenides, Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus, Proclus, Spinoza, Berkeley, Hegel, and Cousin, as to the general theory that the Universe exists absolutely as Soul and its thought; the difference lies chiefly in the method, or in the

¹ *Arist. Met.*, Recognovit W. Christ, A. 6, pp. 256, 257.

² *Œuvres de V. Cousin* (trans. of the *Met. of Arist.*, xii. c. 9), vol. i. pp. 508-512.

³ *Arist. Met.*, Recogn. W. Christ, A. 7, p. 258.

mode of statement. There is much difference in the use of words and terms, and in depth, clearness, and precision of both thought and expression, but the general upshot amounts to nearly the same thing. There is really no difference between a self-moving essence and an eternally moving essence ; or, if any, what can that difference be ? Neither has any other mover than itself : in either case, it is that which itself moves itself. The One and Alone is in a state of Motion, and not in a state of Rest ; it is a something, and not a Nothing. It is Soul thinking, and not total Oblivion. It is the absolute Fact and a necessary Truth. This would seem to be the result at which they all arrive. The statement of neither is entirely accurate and complete. It may need a still further clearing up, and a more adequate statement, before all science (both physical and metaphysical) can be taken up into clear solution.

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fact.

§ 3. DIALECTIC OF SELF-MOVING (OR ETERNALLY-MOVING) ESSENCE.

The scope of this philosophy has been to demonstrate that the universe exists as Soul creating Nature, the Creator and the creation all in one. It rather assumes and declares the fact of an absolutely existent and self-moving (or eternally-moving) Essence and power than makes any effort to explain the how, the why, or the cause of it. But it assumes, at the same time, that this Essence exists after the manner only of Thought thinking itself, or "the Notion or absolute Idea" (as Hegel calls it). It then endeavors to follow the whole process of the evolution of absolute Thought into actual Nature, and to show the inner continuity of mind and matter, or to resolve matter and Nature into Thought. But as yet, for the world of Science, for the most part, it stands off beyond Nature, and out of the realm of natural science, as an air-castle in the land of dreams, and is ranked by the scientific mind alongside the theological dream of immaterial Spirit and a purely spir-

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* Yes. And it is this more assumption which makes it unsatisfactory as a piece of linguistics, or as a philosophy, & yet is the only authentication of our language.

itual Heaven above the skies. The Hegelian statement of it has been scarcely more effectual than the Greek philosophy was to bring this realistic ideal theory out of the dream-land of shadows into the world of reality for the general mind of our time.

The Logic of Hegel may be said to move on the dialectic of Negativity. It is a difficult thing to translate thought of this kind from one language into another: if languages differ, so do the modes of thought of the peoples that speak them. "All negation," says Hegel, "is a positing or affirmation of its contrary, the something: the result is not pure nothing, but a concrete something."¹ It is possible to take this in the sense that mere negation can create something out of nothing, or bring about this result. Such an idea could exist only as a shadow of the fancy imagining it: it could have no truth in the realm of Nature and reality. The negation of a negation, merely, is still a nothing, and is no concrete positive in any sense of producing a something. The negation of the one is not necessarily an affirmation or production of the many: it simply annihilates the one, and leaves the abyss of absolute Nothingness what it would have been if the one had never existed. It is very possible for the mind to conceive of utter blank nonentity, an absolute infinity of Nothingness, or Oblivion (as it might be called), the total absence of Thought, — what would remain if the Universe were annihilated. The mere negation of such infinite Nothingness in our thought is not necessarily the production of any positive Universe, or any actual Essence. The absolute fact being that a positive and real universe does exist, and that we are and think in it, any supposition, any predication, of the non-existence of it, would be an imaginary hypothesis and a mere absurdity of assertion. The assertion that Being and Nothing are equal and the same is contradictory in itself, and equally absurd. It is only true that, taking *Being* in an abstract sense of

¹ *Wissenschaft der Logik*, iii. p. 154, Berlin, 1841.

This is, however, not a necessary condition of the truth of the proposition, but a necessary condition of its being a proposition at all. Cf. 253

mere *isity* of predication (so to speak) in us, the *isity* of Nothing may be as truly asserted as the *isity* of Something. Nothing *is* ; but is what? Why, Nothing. Something *is* ; but is what? Why, Something. The empty predication of *isity* is the same in both cases ; but the truths are quite different, are indeed the direct contraries of each other. The significance of this is, that the whole existent and real universe must necessarily be bounded out of the infinity of Nothingness, or distinguished from it as its other, as the positive and actual : the Nothingness, the negative aspect, is simply the blank possibility of the actual existence of the real Something. The venerable Sanatkumâra of the Vedic Upanishads showed to Narâda (after his faults had been rubbed out) that "the Highest Self was the other side of Darkness." This must be what Hegel really means. Negation may presuppose and imply a really existent Something ; and then, the negation of that Something in some particular manner, or in some respect, may presuppose and imply the original state of the Something ; and the negation of that negation or limitation may restore the Something to what it was before ; and this is really all that Hegel means, though it is not what he appears to say ; for there is everywhere in the Logic a tacit assumption and presupposition of a really existent Somewhat, not a Something which ever had a beginning, but a Something which eternally is, namely, the essential Notion (or the absolute Idea) of all Reality. Whatever does, or can, begin to be, comes under the category of Becoming and Departing, not what is eternal, necessary, and absolute. He assumes an absolute self-activity of the Notion, and it is the Becoming of the Notion that is supposed to negate, stay, turn back, reflect itself upon itself, and thus, by a sort of infolding or convolution upon itself, to posit, set, or fix a something other than itself, which is thus uphoven into a special somewhat, or a special modification of the whole existent One. And this dialectic movement is what he calls "Negativity." But he also,

and often very confusingly, uses the word *posit* in the sense that the fact, the necessity, the absolute truth, so finds itself or is found.

The remaining question is, in what manner the real Universe does actually exist, and chiefly, whether it exists after the manner of Soul thinking, and creating Nature, or after the manner of blind unconscious matter or force, mechanically evolving itself into the universe which we see, or after the manner of immaterial Spirit, moving over the face of an eternally existent matter, and in some mysterious way forming it into a world.

It is true that one term of a relation implies the other. Such is the structure and habit or law of our thought. Such is the real truth in itself absolutely. Nothing implies Something, and Something implies Nothing. But, as Hegel says, both exist at once, absolutely and necessarily; but they exist in this unity after the manner of the absolute Notion or Idea, and not otherwise. This is a necessity of thought. That the negation of a negation results in a concrete Something, when no Something whatever existed before, is not a necessity, nor a necessary principle or law of thought: it can only be imagined in a certain fallacious habit of the mind thinking so.

It is true that wholly indeterminate Being or Essence would be identically the same as an infinity of Nothingness: the very definition or description of such an infinity is boundlessness, indeterminateness; and wholly boundless, indefinite *Being* could only mean that abstract *isity* that belongs as well to Nothing as to Something. By its very conception and definition, real Something must have some determinateness. The meaning of this is, again, that the whole existent Somewhat that really is must necessarily exist as bounded out of the absolute infinity of Nothingness, and as distinguished in it and from it, if it have real existence at all. The actual existence of such Something would, indeed, be contrary to the conception of such an infinity of

Nothingness, and would make of it only a "one-sided infinity" (as Hegel says), inasmuch as the whole Something and the Nothingness must necessarily be bounded over, the one against the other, both in thought and in reality. This is one of those necessities the contrary of which is both inconceivable and impossible. But under this category, the actually existent reality might as well be conceived as a hard impenetrable atom, or as an aggregate whole of such atoms, as to be conceived as an absolute Notion or a thinking Soul: the same thing would be true of either as a total whole. The real question here is not of the absolute existence of the Whole and All, but in what manner it exists, or what it really is in itself. Is it a mass of matter, or is it a Soul?

It may be justifiable that Logic as a method should go deeper than the certainty of fact involved in the Cartesian *Cogito ergo sum*, and penetrate to the very seed, germ, and central point, where it can only be said that *Something is*; for a true science of Logic must succeed in drawing the boundary line of distinction between real Being and a mathematical point, or mere zero, "the gulf of vacuity" (as Wallace calls it). Philosophy must make a beginning somewhere, and proceed until it becomes full circle. The Materialist begins with the atom, or molecule. Leibnitz began with Monads, or "Atom-Souls;" but the "Monad" (and especially the "Supreme Monad") was a something more than a zero-point, and something more than a hard impenetrable atom without qualities: it had organization and a principle of motion within it. It was, indeed, a soul from eternity, and was in itself capable of becoming "a reasonable soul" in man, and, if not also admitting of an evolution into a world of Nature, at least capable of establishing a consistent harmony throughout the universal body-politic of lesser monads. The Logic of Hegel goes upon a like presupposition that the least germ of real Being (or Essence) exists as the logical Notion of the real whole. The

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I of Subjectivity may, in one sense, be said to have in it that ideal centre which is a mere mathematical point, or zero; but the really existent I as the soul, the personality, is something more than a centre, zero, or (as Schopenhauer expressed it) "a dark point." It is the whole actuality of the Notion itself in the unity of its Reality and its Ideality. As the whole reality, it is bounded out of (or stands over against) the Nothingness: the gulf of zero is only the negative side, the aspect of bare possibility of a real existence, or (as Leibnitz expressed it) "the possibility of the Actuality." In its simplest form or state as substance, or in the simplest aspect of essence as germinal, it may be said to approximate a certain zero of motion or calmness; as when Bacon said, "Whence it is no marvel that the soul so placed enjoys no rest; according to the axiom that the motion of things out of their place is rapid, and in their place calm."

c/ 237 | This is further evident from what Hegel says of the category of Contradiction: "The thinking Reason, however, sharpens (so to speak) the blunted distinction of Difference (the mere multiplicity of image-thinking) to essential Distinction, to antithesis: multiplicity, when sharpened to the point of contradiction, becomes vital and active, each of its individuals manifesting itself against the others, and thus multiplicity obtains for itself the negativity which is the indwelling pulsation of self-movement and vitality. . . . Critically examined, the distinction of realities passes from the category of difference to antithesis, and then to contradiction, and the including totality of all realities goes over into self-contradiction. The prevailing horror of contradiction which possesses the thinking that deals with images, but not the speculative thinking, — a feeling similar to that which nature is said to have for a vacuum, — objects to this result; for it holds fast to the one-sided solution of self-contradiction in zero, and ignores the positive side of it, according to which contradiction becomes activity and abso-

lute ground.”¹ The contradiction is solved in the unity of the movement in the whole Notion. This absolute activity seems to be conceived as a movement in a standing All, whereby the Whole, at the point of beginning of the multiplicity, divides, “dirempts,” or distinguishes the totality into sides or phases of itself. It is assumed to be of such a nature as to do that eternally of its own mere motion, or self-movement. This parting of the whole Notion into self-distinction within itself seems to be what Hegel means by self-relation, negativity, reflection, or a turning back, — a relating to itself as a Whole. It is Subjectivity on one side or aspect, and Objectivity on the other. Between the two arises Self-consciousness. It is the whole thinking Power (the Notion) proceeding into ideas, thoughts, — the multiplicity of things. This is knowing, and knowing is consciousness also.

But, says the Logic, the first germ of “real Being” is “the Becoming.” Nothing is : everything is becoming to be. All is flowing. The term *Being* here has a different sense. It is no longer the abstract *isity* of empty assertion, but it is now used in the active sense of the present participle as a *coming to be*, and expresses an active process of becoming. *Becoming* is properly a transition from one state of existence to another state : it cannot be a proceeding out of Nothing. That would be merely absurd. Hegel’s real meaning must be, that the eternally existent All as the Notion, being in an eternal state of activity, is also in a state of perpetual transition from one state of the whole to another. This is what Plotinus calls “the transitive life” of the Soul. The term *Essence*, derived from the Latin form of the same verb *to be* (*Esse*), is another ambiguous word ; but usually it has the passive sense of something *been*, rather than the active sense of *now coming to be*. The process of “Becoming” terminates in a Therebeing (*Daseyn*). This

¹ Hegel’s *Logic : Doctrine of Essence*, trans. by Wm. T. Harris, LL. D., vol. i. pp. 74, 75, New York, 1881.

is Aristotle's complete *entelecheia* of action into a thing, whereby it becomes what it is. It is the one Essence (the Notion) passing into the essences of things, which are now posited, set, fixed, or determined, that is, *been*: the active sense has taken on the passive sense of the word. But this mere fact of Becoming (which the Logic appears to assume as a first and pure activity by itself alone) gives no account, no intelligible conception, of the origin, source, nature, or cause of the process. The terms *Essence*, *Substance*, *Matter*, he employs elsewhere to express another thing altogether. Here he will have nothing but a pure and simple Activity, as if it were possibly conceivable that such a thing could exist and proceed to become something else in that manner of a perpetual flowing out of nothing but itself. Really, the Logic here makes a tacit assumption, a silent presupposition, of some real Essence, substance, or causative power, which is itself becoming something else, or is making something else become, or is in a state of transition. What is thus presupposed is the Notion, again, or the Absolute Idea. This implied and presupposed Essence is then carried on into an evolution through the categories of Quality, Quantity, Measure, Quantum, Essences, Substances, and forms and properties of bodies or things in Nature, which receive in this logical and ideal constitution of them their particular substances and forms, existences and properties. The real category here exhibited is rather that of Essence and essences than that of mere Becoming: though Quality, Quantity, Measure, Quantum, and the rest go along with the dialectic process as expressing the successive stages or degrees of the limitation or "Negativity" (as it is called). In this, the conscious, knowing Idea is represented as imposing limitation or law upon its own action. These limitations have the character of laws imposed by a lawgiver, when considered in reference to their origin; but in reference to the things themselves as thus constituted, they have the character of necessities, or laws of Nature as the

external physicist chooses to call them. They are not regarded by Hegel as a "diamond network" of eternally established and necessary law, to which the active power itself is subject. Neither does Hegel discourse at all of an eternal, immutable, and impartible Intelligence (like the Neoplatonists) which is self-subsistent as an unalterable Reason. With him, what is unalterable and eternal in its own nature is the Idea in its eternal identity as the universal category of Universality, Speciality, Particularity, and Totality. That remains ever the same in itself considered. The category of Becoming and Departing is properly applicable only to the becoming and vanishing of these particular essences, substances and forms, and properties of things. It can have no reference, either in itself or in the Logic of Hegel, to the Becoming, the origin and nature, of the universal Essence itself (the real Notion), or to that activity, energy, or causality which, in absolute fact, eternally resides in it as one aspect of itself, and which produces the movement of the Becoming of all things else, other than itself as such; though his method finds it convenient to start with the simple and most superficial phase of the Becoming, considered by itself alone. But this is so only in appearance at the starting-point of his whole inquiry, where he is dealing with the first presentation of Nature in the sphere of externality, and before his proceeding has yet penetrated into the more inward depths of Essence in the absolute form of the Notion.

This self-moving (or eternally moving) Essence is presupposed as already existing and in action. It is quite intelligible, speaking of the particular bodies or things, that when the one whole Essence is thrown out or evolved into the constitution of the thing, it then arises, or becomes to be such thing, and that, when the creative Essence or power is withdrawn out of them, the things, the objects, the bodies as such, depart and vanish; for it would arise out of the preëxisting whole Essence and return into it again, where-

by the things vanish and disappear into the negative Nothing, out of which (in one sense or aspect) they were thus limited into existence. But this category of Becoming can in no manner be applied to the origin or nature of the whole Essence, without supposing it to come out of absolute Nothingness, as the Logic sometimes seems to do. But this cannot be the real meaning. If we might assume the existence of an absolute Soul apart from all material nature, we might reason that it was just as necessary, if it were to have ideas, that those ideas should have determination, limitation, bound, out of all the possibilities of ideas, as it is necessary that the same thing must be true of our minds in the formation of our ideas. But we must first get such a Soul: what we are specially seeking for now is, not a Soul apart from Nature, but such a Soul as may possibly be conceived to exist in continuity with Nature. On the presupposition that a real Essence or Something actually exists as bounded over against the infinity of Nothingness beyond or other than it, the two contraries may be conceived as subsumed into unity of subsistence as a one absolute whole, and as opposed to each other only in a certain sense of positive and negative, but as contraries only in their abstract severance. This unity is the whole essential Notion of all Reality as it eternally is in itself. The division, or "diremption," not the severance, of the Notion takes place only when such whole proceeds into the distinction of opposed and contrarious parts within itself. But if we were to conceive of mere Being and Nothing as equal and the same (as they truly enough are, as the empty *isities* of predication, or pure abstractions), then, indeed, we should have two Nothings posited one against the other. The unity of the two contraries would still be a Nothing, unless the mere negation of a negation can set or "precipitate" a real Something (as the Logic seems to say), and not still a Nothing. Then we should have a real Essence proceeding out of sheer Nothingness; and this would be simply

that same old and childish absurdity of a world created out of Nothing and by Nothing. The whole real Essence is, truly enough, both in the Nothing and out of it.

It is true enough that, on the supposition of a kind of oscillation of real Essence against the negative Nothingness, there would be a becoming and a departing of the determinate shape or form of the real Essence; but on the hypothesis of an oscillation between the imaginary sides of a split infinity of Nothingness, there could be no Becoming or Departing of anything but the shadowy ideal boundary of our own dreaming fancy. The Logic of Hegel, at the point where he assumes to have established a transition from Nothing (or mere *Isity*) to real Being, dropping out of the realm of shadows, very fallaciously assumes further that it has brought with it a settled precipitate of actual Essence (*Daseyn*). If he had in any manner obtained a real one Essence, then the evolutionary movement of it into a settling and setting of particular essences, and his definition of *Daseyn* as "existence with a determinateness of quality, quantity, etc.," or "limited existence," would be intelligible enough; as it is the same ocean water that is all the while constituting the waves that arise and depart upon its rolling surface. But a mere Becoming throws no light on the pre-supposed Essence itself. The gulf between immaterial Spirit and material Nature remains as before unbridged. So far as the Logic of Hegel did undertake to bridge this gulf, and to raise this mere dream of human fantasy to the platform of reality, it was a vain attempt, and may be called an utter failure; but, understood as an endeavor to bridge the gulf between matter or force (as commonly conceived) and real, essential, substantial, and universal Soul, it cannot safely be pronounced either a vain attempt or an entire failure, though it be scarcely more satisfactory to the general mind of our time than the like endeavors of his predecessors were in their day. But, in view of Hegel's whole system, it will appear that this apparent absurdity

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arises from a total misconception of his philosophy, though his manner of treatment in this part of the *Logic*, and a certain ambiguity of words and phrases, may seem to justify such a construction of his meaning.

§ 4. THE I NOT A POINT, NOR ZERO, BUT A REAL WHOLE.

Kant sums up his categories of the Human Understanding into a certain Synthetic Unity of Apperception, and speaks of the *I think* as a Transcendental Unity of Self-Consciousness. Hegel subsumes his universal categories into the Syllogistic Unity of Apperception and Judgment in the logical Notion, or Absolute Idea; but when the personality of the subject, or the I, is supposed to be the central point of the Subjectivity, it is not really meant, nor does it follow, that the I is mere zero, or a point, as if there were no soul at all; but the true logical import simply is, that the zero-point may be considered figuratively as the extreme limit of distinction, where the bounding of the whole circuit and totality of the thinking Subject, the All that really is, out of Nothingness or sheer Oblivion, is metaphysically complete: not that this was such a Whole and All as ever had a beginning or made a circuit, but only that the philosophical process of describing or stating it had a beginning and completion. The conscious process of the evolution and distinction of the self-subsistent Whole, that is, the specialization or differentiation, may, indeed, be considered, in reference to the special and particular things themselves, as having a beginning as they may have an end; but the real Notion itself exists eternally in its character of universality, speciality, particularity, and wholeness all in one, and simply dwells in eternity, without beginning, end, or middle; and it is therefore infinite in respect of the eternal continuity of its existence as such. It is something like Newton's imagination of a mathematical point, when he began to draw his circle for a diagram of his infinite series

for the Calculus. But the metaphor is not very aptly chosen. It leads the mind to suppose that the whole immense Universe may once have been such small "germ or seed," as if diminished "from the smallness of a gnat to air." Science discovers and knows that there is an interstellar æther that reaches to the farthest and faintest star, and is the vehicle of the invisible light-waves. Suns, planets, and nebulae sail in it; bodies, molecules, atoms, move in it: it contains them all. This universal Notion, then, must even contain the æther. So far from being a small seed of real Being, it must be wherever anything real is, and include the wide world, even God and Nature at once. It must exist absolutely, and dwell in eternity and immensity. The Logic is dealing with its essential elements or distinguishable aspects, which are separable in thought, though indivisible and inseparable in reality. The absolute Soul, thus existent, is in a state of eternal movement, is alive, a living essence, and cannot possibly be a zero of eternal Rest. The true central *I*, the Subjectivity, must be found in the conscious, knowing, and thinking Ideality of the whole living essence and constitution of the real Notion, the universal Soul. Therein consists its personality; for personality is nothing else but that. As to the finite Soul, that must be regarded as only a limited speciality of the one whole Essence itself. It has risen up through the æthers, atoms, molecules, and bodies of inorganic nature into that specialization of body and soul which it has in and under (or rather within) the physical organization itself; its first and simplest appearance being scarcely distinguishable to the eye of science, or not until it has assumed the character of instinct. At length it awakens out of the sleep of instinct into some degree of conscious, knowing, thinking Self, into all degrees thereof, from animal up to man and the greatest men. It thus becomes a special personality and an *I* by itself, under a special consciousness of its own. It is the partially realized Notion, reproducing itself so far, but still partially only,

not wholly ; since it must be dependent on the Notion in its wholeness for what it shall be, or become. It is therefore necessarily wanting in that absoluteness of being, and in that fulness of power, life, and self-conscious intelligence, that belongs only to the universal Soul itself. According to Hegel, this universal Notion is "what is mediated through itself and with itself." It is "the genuine first, and things are what they are through the action of the Notion." It is "the infinite form, or the free activity, which can realize itself without the help of a matter that exists outside of it."¹ So much is true concerning it ; but, of course, such simple expressions come far short of indicating the full Hegelian conception of the Notion. No brief synopsis can be expected to do that. But with him, the Notion as such has no beginning, no cause : it eternally *is*, and is so. It is, therefore, in this way, a *Causa Sui* ; or (in the language of Bacon) it is "that last power and cause in Nature" which, like the Cupid of the ancient fable, "was without parents, that is, without a cause" other than itself. It is the universal Cause, Essence, Substance, or Matter (if any one wishes to use the word in this sense). In respect of the eternal continuity of its essence, activity, life, it may be said to be infinite, *i. e.* boundless, or rather endless.

The physiological psychologist takes the imaginary zero-point to be all the soul that there is : he sees only matter which he imagines to be outside of all Soul. Rationally enough, these psychologists deny the existence of immaterial Spirit ; but, irrationally, they attempt to account for the universe on a theory of blind, unconscious matter, force, energy, gravity, laws, necessity, mechanism, sequence, contingency, probability, fatality, and mere extreme facts and phenomena, not raised by any thought to the height of Reason, Intelligence, Consciousness, Will, Mind, or Soul of any kind. With them, the organization of nerves, arteries,

¹ *The Logic of Hegel*, by William Wallace, M. A., p. 253, Oxford, 1874.

and tissues is gathered up to a central point in some ganglion, or in some convolution of the brain, not stopping there, not severed and disconnected at that point, indeed, but passing onward, not in a circuit of continuity, but in a to-and-fro oscillation from circumference to centre, and from centre to circumference, — a kind of reflex action between sensory and motor nerves and strands of nerves.¹ Nevertheless they have to imagine this point to serve as a pivot or hinge on which volition, as the balancing or weighing to and fro of sense-impressions against one another in the brain tissues, turns as easily as the beam of a chemist's balance. This mechanical weighing to and fro of motives (motions, or "relational perceptions," as they are sometimes called) are a sufficient substitute for Will: they are Will, and there is no need, and no proof, of any other. The brain is a mechanism, the body is a mechanism; and what we call thought, mind, soul, consciousness, will, is the mere working of the machine, or a kind of phosphorescence in the brain. The driving force is in the food consumed, and has its origin in the sun; and thought is measured by the consumption of brain tissue. In this scheme, the inner activity and life, the perceiving, conceiving, knowing, remembering, conscious essence and power is ignored, omitted, and sometimes derided as a useless hypothesis that is without proof. No scalpel, no microscope, no chemical test, discovers any such essence or activity. A theory which has no need of anything more than atoms and gravity and the principles of mechanics at the foundation of the universe, neither sees nor feels any necessity for having anything more in man at the top of organization. Intelligence, soul, universal or finite, can be equally well dispensed with. The question of the active power, life, the cause in Nature, has been the most important matter in all philosophy: Aristotle said it was of "immense importance" and the first thing to be inquired into. Bacon made the knowledge of Causes the highest ob-

N. 11. 5

¹ See *The Brain and its Functions*, by J. Luys, New York, 1882.

ject of Science. Hume, Darwin, and Huxley seem to ignore cause altogether. Even Hegel limits Causation to the sphere of external Nature and the Understanding; but he merely substitutes the term *Reciprocity* for *Causality* to express what he conceives to be the higher principle or relation of Ideality in the Notion as the infinite form and absolute cause in the free creative activity of the universal Spirit. Cousin preferred the term *Causality* to express the highest substance and principle of the universal Reason. The difference was more in words than in thought; though the language and treatment of Hegel are more thoroughly analytical, exact, and complete. The Hegelian, Rosenkranz, also prefers the term *Causality*, and gives a clearer exposition of it than Hegel himself did.

Indeed, Hegel seems studiously to avoid speaking of Cause or Causation in reference to the first principle of movement. His mind seems to have labored with the difficulty involved in any attempt to conceive of a *Causa sui*, or of a something moving itself, or starting into movement when once at a standstill; or, on the other hand, to conceive of an immovable standing All having an eternal movement within itself, or of anything whatever being in a state of eternal activity. He endeavors to evade it as unimportant, or seems to do so, by assuming that Spirit needs only "Moments," and by taking up the notion of a perpetual Becoming, as if that were all and enough; as Proclus also defined generation to be "a perpetual becoming to be." And this would do very well in reference to the things generated; but it gives no account of the generating power, or Essence itself. Neither does Hegel. He does, indeed, present us with the conception of a reciprocal relation of Action and Reaction, or *Reciprocity*, which would seem to be an eternal weighing or balancing to and fro, somewhat as we might conceive the drop in a spirit-level to be in eternal movement, if we did not know that the liquid merely gravitates on a change of level. But the escape

here is apparent only ; for still the question is, what gravitates it? Does it gravitate itself, or does something else gravitate it? and if so, what gravitates that? And we inevitably arrive again at the same difficulty, and there seems to be no possible answer but in the necessary Fact of a self-moving (or an eternally moving) Essence of some kind. And this we may as well call a *Causa sui* as by any other name. In fact, Hegel's doctrine amounts to this: it is his Notion or Absolute Idea. In his treatment of Essence as the ground of essences, and particularly in his discussion of the categories of Ideality and Distinction, he has unfolded the true notion of Cause and Effect as well ; and it is a mere difference in the use of words, or in the choice of terms, that he prefers to characterize the underlying movement of the essential activity as the "negativity of self-relation,"¹ as "Reciprocity," or as Ideality, rather than as Causality. This is both Real and Ideal.

In the logical treatment, Hegel's absolute Idea or Soul would seem to be a kind of full circuit of real Being (*i. e.* Essence) standing in vacuity. He starts with an absolute whole to be conceived as the Notion, comprehending all reality ; but, for the purpose of sharpening (as it were) the logical distinctions, he considers it first as shrunk or concentrated into an imaginary point, a thought larger than zero, but still having in it real Being enough to be the seed or "germ" of God and Nature at once and in one. Under the pure Logic, this whole germ appears to expand or evolve itself, by an internal intensive and extensive process into the universe of actualities. The least determinate periphery, where the whole reality is simply the unity of Quantity and Quality or the Modality of the one Whole, is apparently assumed to be oscillating, waving, wriggling, or unfolding and infolding, the entire circumferential outline into the essences and forms of special and particular things

¹ *Doctrine of Essence and Reflection*, trans. by Wm. T. Harris, LL. D., vol. i., New York, 1881, pp. 30-39.

in Nature; and the movable quantities and measures of the determinate things thus created in the field of external Nature, being thus set and fixed as they are temporarily into a certain permanency and fatality for them, are left to go blindly falling and dashing together, and shifting into other and different shapes of things as bodies and forces operating upon one another in an endless succession or sequence of finite causes and effects, through all the phenomena of the material world, — Mechanism, Chemism, and the substances and properties of bodies. When we ask what *Vis Viva* started the movement, or keeps up the intensive action and the continual binding and loosing, the answer is only certain "*Moments*" in the Notion, which result in a universal Reciprocity of Action and Reaction, in which the chain of causation perpetually comes round into the full circle and unity of the Notion again, and so the Reciprocity is continuous and eternal as pure Ideality; for (as it would seem, and as Aristotle said) the circular motion, because it alone of all motions returns into itself eternally, is the only possible infinite or perpetual motion. This Ideality of the Notion in a whole circuit is all that really, eternally, and unchangeably is: all else is in a state of perpetual flow and change. And here it may be asked, What, then, are "*moments*"? and where is the necessity of any *moment*, any movement at all? Why should not the central atom-germ just as well be at an eternal standstill? Why should not the Notion itself be at a standstill as well as have "*moments*," or be in motion and in process? Why may we not just as well conceive and grasp a ball of elastic æther, and imagine it diminished to the size of a needle's point, or again expanded to the dimensions of the Universe, or again as a globular totality of atoms floating in that same void of infinity? Why not assume either of these to be capable of oscillations, wavings, infoldings, unfoldings, and convolutions into a world of things, in an endless round of perpetual motion? It would be as truly the

All that is. The same logic might apply as well in either case. There could be Being, Nothing, and Becoming, and a continual process. There might be a like question, What started the process, whence the "moments," what keeps it in motion, or is the movement eternal? The same answer might do equally well for one as for the other, viz., that it is unknown, mysterious, incomprehensible. No doubt there is in the actual universe a continual process; but the process is not all. "What is," says the Hegelian, "is what has become:" there is only a perpetual becoming, which, however, "no more is, than is not;" and the business of philosophy is, "to unveil what is; it has no vocation to say why it is, or how it can be so."¹ To philosophy, the process is all. Then may we not as well "hang up philosophy"? Truly enough, philosophy has to do with *what is*, but it has, or ought to have, the further vocation of finding out what is, and of determining the whole manner, necessity, law, and fact of it, the nature of the causality of it (if there be any), and of both the active and the final cause. That causality may be a *causa sui*; but whatever it is, it must be a Something, and not a Nothing. If that Something have no other cause than itself, then, since the universe does actually exist, that Something must be a necessary Fact, and the first and last fact; and, since the universe is in motion, such cause must either be a self-moving or an eternally-moving essence and power of some kind. If an eternal Reciprocity of Action and Reaction as Ideality be a fact, then it should be shown to be a necessary and an eternal fact; or at least it should be positively affirmed to be the whole fact, the ultimate truth, the all and enough. The grasping of such an Ideality is more easy than satisfactory; for, at last, it would seem to be an eternally flowing fountain without a reservoir to flow from, as unintelligible and as unspeakable as the "ineffable fountain" of Plotinus. To

¹ *The Logic of Hegel*, trans. by William Wallace, M. A., Oxford, 1874, p. clxxi.

* This dispenses of the "possible as a condition" of an infinite. It changes...

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those who are in the habit of conceiving of God as absolute Thought in the sense of immaterial Spirit, and as such an ideal fountain of power eternally flowing from Nothing and Nowhere, the conception of such an Ideality may present no serious difficulty, or it may be accepted as the mystery of mysteries. This might be pure Idealism.

In our minds, there is doubtless a synthetic unity of Apperception in the subjective logical Notion; but, for anything said in the Logic of Hegel, it might be still possible to conceive the central point of the subjective *I* as zero, and not as in itself a self-moving Essence. The movement (Volition) might be equally well explained, after the manner of the physiological psychologists, as a reciprocal balancing to and fro of sense-impressions on the brain-tissues: the *I* would be simply the imaginary pivot on which the beam of the balance turned; and the overweighing of action and reaction would be Judgment and Will; while the source of all activity and power would reside in the mechanism of structures, and in the consumption of neurine, muscle, and food. From such a motion as that in our minds (or rather in our brains), no logic could advance by the syllogistic road to the universal Notion, or to subjective Ideality, absolute in and for itself. The gulf between matter and mind, or between finite and universal soul, could not be thus bridged. The certainty of fact, however, involved in the Cartesian *I think and I am*, with which the whole proceeding started, would still remain. It would still have to be explained in what manner I am, or can be, a thinking personality, and in what manner, especially, the *I* is (if it is), or can be in itself, an active power as Will, and not a zero-point, or a mere pivot, in a mechanism of matter. And it would still remain to be shown in what manner the universal Soul (if there be one) is, or can be, essential absolute Cause in continuity with material Nature, and without the mystery of an immaterial, empty Spirit, flowing from a mysterious fountain.

The method of Hegel moves in a kind of circuit. He does not ascend directly from mind in us to the Absolute Idea. His Logic is rather ontological from the outset, and actually begins on the extreme outer circumference of all real Being, where it is barely distinguishable from Nothing. He then assumes, at one leap, a Becoming between the Nothing and the Something — a process already existent and in action, — and then this Becoming process seems to be carried forward into an evolution of all Nature up to mind in man; and thence, on the last stretch home (as it were), he proceeds directly from the human mind, through the subjective Syllogism in the unity of Apperception and Judgment in us, to the universal Notion (or absolute Idea) of all reality, or the subjective Syllogism of the absolute whole and one in the unity and identity of Universality, Speciality, and Particularity, comprehending the entire universe of God, Man, and Nature. This completes the circuit of his procedure. In this conclusion, he arrives again at his starting-place, approaching it now, not from the outside, but from the inside and very bottom and ground of the essential Whole; only that what was this same Totality in the beginning of his investigation, but seen and characterized in its first presentation in a state of Being and Becoming merely, is now, at the end of the logical statement, to be conceived and grasped as the totality of Essence and Power in its internal identity and completest evolution of itself into a creation; and in this completed philosophical account of it, the metaphysical exposition also comes to an end. His course might seem to be a spiral winding, rather than a circuit. It is his logical way of dealing with the subject: the reality itself existed all the same when he began as when he ended. The Notion, so expounded and described, is at last to be conceived as the whole affair as it really, ideally, and eternally is in itself, — the absolute Thought.

But the trouble is, that the gulf between such Thought

*Hegel's
Circuit.*

and Matter, between God and Nature, was no more bridged (even less) in the beginning than it is now at the ending, where he is mounting directly from Mind in man to absolute Mind. Everywhere this gulf is rather leaped than bridged. The fatal defect lies in the fact that no clear account is given of the active Essence and power; but such an Essence of some kind must exist, both in the human mind and at the bottom of this Becoming of a created world. Such an active Essence is tacitly assumed. It is said that the Becoming is a concrete fact and begins; that the fact of activity has the two moments in itself of the *being-in-itself* and the *being-for-itself*; but what is meant by moments? What are moments? Is it movement, or merely an aspect? and then, what about the movement? Nothing is said about that: it is silently glided over as if it were a matter of no consequence, an empty abstraction not deserving of notice. There is no explicit statement that it is a first and last Fact and a necessary Truth. The Ideality of pure Spirit, presented as a kind of Reciprocity of to-and-fro balancing, and as a higher relation than Causality itself, is assumed to be sufficient and all; for pure Spirit (it would seem) must be wholly immaterial and unessential. An active Essence or Substance is denounced as a *thing*, a *Therebeing*, after "the ill manners" of the common Understanding; and to admit an Essence even in an eternal state of activity, might take God out of the category of immaterial Spirit and identify him with the universal Substance of Spinoza, or the thinking Essence of Berkeley, or with Matter or Force in Nature; and though such a doctrine might establish the continuity and causal connection of mind with matter, of God with Nature, it would be sheer Pantheism, and not the purely spiritual God of the biblical revelation. Hegel objects to Plato's Essence of essences, because it was an abstract Intelligence (*νοῦς*), and was not conceived absolutely as purely subjective thinking. But Plato's Intelligence was not immaterial or unessential empty spirit. It

was something more than supersublimated spiritual moonshine. Neither was it an abstract inactive Intelligence, but an active, real, and intelligent Essence. And to allow the human soul to be an active essence, and a finite manifestation or specialization of the universal Essence itself, might shake the doctrine of salvation and immortality. But after all, nothing but the vain conception of immaterial Spirit would be thus swept away. Nor would the universe be reduced to an atheistic mechanism, nor God or Soul to a dead substrate of Pantheistic matter, or to blind unconscious force; but rather our crude notions of matter, mechanism, and Pantheism would simply be cleared up, and matter itself would be raised to the height and power of thinking Essence. Indeed, Hegel himself elaborately distinguishes and vindicates his system from the charge of Pantheism, with which, however, he identifies the Spinozan doctrine of Substance, as well as the materialistic doctrine of Matter; but he supposes this Substance or Matter to be conceived as a hard and fast *thing*, without activity or life within itself. On the other hand, he labors with equal vigor to distinguish his ideal Notion, or absolute Idea, from the common conception of immaterial, empty spirit. And he conceives this ideal Notion, in the full logical constitution of it, as the absolute Ideality and Reality, and wishes others to conceive it, as the universal Essence and Power in one, and as the only Essence or Substance that really is. The amount of all this would seem to be that Hegel's Spirit is material, but not in the sense of atheistic or pantheistic materialism; and is also immaterial, but not in the sense of the common notions of immaterial spirit as an empty phantasm: it is nevertheless essential, substantial, and real. The distinction involves merely a proper conception of Essence, Substance, Matter, and Soul. This would be Realistic Idealism.

§ 5. HEGEL ON KANT—REAL SPIRIT.

At first view, the philosophy of Hegel seems to begin and end with a pure activity. In the beginning of the *Logic*, this activity plays on or against Nothing: in the end, it still appears to play on what it has itself evolved and created as essence and objectivity on one side, and against Nothing on the other. Universal Essence or Substance in the sense of the absolute essentiality of the whole Notion is impliedly admitted, if not expressly affirmed; but it is denied that it is a *substance* or a *thing*. Essences, substances, things, are created by it and out of it. The *Logic* starts with this activity in a state of Becoming, or moving into a process. But when he assumes thus the fact of such activity, he seems also to assume that it is already by itself alone a spirit, a soul, a conscious thinking power; for its movement is represented as that of creative thought, at once rational and artistic. It is already designing Will, having an end and aim: otherwise it could never evolve itself into a world of things in an orderly and self-conscious manner. In short, Hegel assumes the existence of God in the outset, just as Aristotle did, and then proceeds logically to define him out of Nothing, ending with the Notion or absolute Idea as the product of the complete statement of his philosophy, but with the assumption still of the fact of such pure activity as the Ideality of the Notion; and he declares that this is God, as he is in his own real nature and being. This Ideality has the appearance of arising out of the very constitution of the Notion, or as consequent upon it, and as contained in it; but it is all the while that same assumption with which he began, viz., God as pure Spirit, eternally active. Now, to the eye of scientific reason, motion is the mere fact that something moves, and motion apart from matter (or essence of some kind) appears to be an impossibility. It seems to be an attempt to attribute motion, activity, to utter emptiness; and it is therefore classed with all other futile endeav-

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the Philo-
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ors to conceive of God as immaterial Spirit, mere infinite Being, and pure activity, the *actus purus* of the old Scholastics.

Kant, treating of the human mind only, is represented by Hegel as saying that "the Reason (*Vernunft*) is that kind of an Unconditioned whereof the categorical synthesis is in a subject, and that thinking subject, thought as real, means Substance;" and he charges Kant with the fallacy of declaring the reason-idea of the unity of the transcendental subject to be a *thing*, a persistent substance. Hegel freely confesses himself persistent in his thinking, but only in the perceiving consciousness, not out of it. Says Kant, "It is the empty transcendental subject of our thought, and it is known only through our thought; but that what it is in itself, we have not the least conception." "An astounding conclusion!" replies Hegel, "since thought is even itself the In-itself (*das Ansich*)."
 "We can declare no being (*Seyn*) of it," says Kant, "because thinking is a mere Form, and of a thinking essence we have no external experience, but only a representation (*Vorstellung*) through the consciousness." "That is," replies Hegel, "we cannot lay our hand on it, cannot see it!" "We know," continues Kant, "that the *I* is subject, but to go beyond self-consciousness and say it is substance, is to go further than is justifiable." He "can therefore give no reality to the subject." Kant is here considering the finite mind, and he gets no experience that the thinking power is substance. For all we can know, thought, consciousness, will, may be (as the physiologists say) a result of organic processes, and not an essence or substance in itself. Soul may be no entity at all. As to a universal Soul, the upshot of Kant's philosophy is, to demonstrate that there is no *à priori* road to a knowledge of the existence of any, — that no *à priori* proof of any is possible. Consequently all we can know of external Nature is what we can learn by experience through sense-perception and the ideal represen-

* Such Reasoning may be substituted by the *à posteriori* road of intellectual perception.

tations thereof that are formed in our imagination ; and this knowledge can go no further than to furnish our practical reason with some evidences which as grounds of inference may come in support of the biblical revelation, and so help to confirm our faith in that as revealing a pure immaterial Spirit above Nature and apart from it, but moving over the face of it, fashioning and governing it, in some incomprehensible manner. This is the theological theory, which Kant seems to support.

Hegel denounces all this as Kant's "barbarism of representation (*Vorstellung*)," and says that Kant is right in saying "that the soul is not a thing, having a sensuous presence (*Daseyn*)," but is wrong in not asserting the contrary, viz., "that the *I*, as the universal or the self-thinking, has in itself the truest actuality which it could desire in an objective manner." That self-consciousness is not to be declared to have no reality, "because it cannot be held up in a sensuous manner, according to the categories of the understanding." Here it is actuality only, not a substance, that is asserted: it is not to be called a thing. "The living," says Hegel, "is no thing: much less is the soul, the spirit, the *I*, a thing. Its Being, its abstract immediate identity with itself, is even the least we can say of it, and that is hardly worth the trouble of saying."¹ Certainly to say it is what it is, is to say little or nothing. Universal Soul is not a thing in the sense of a created object, though any finite soul must be even that; but in the sense of the whole actuality that really is, it may very well be called a thing, and a very wonderful thing, and not a nothing. If *Being* means the mere abstract *isity* of assertion, then there would be no difference between the being of a thing and of nothing; but the question is, as to what it is in itself, in its reality, and whether the existent actuality be Essence, any real something, or a visionary abstraction of the dreaming fancy.

¹ Werke: *Geschichte der Phil.*, xv. pp. 522, 523; *Die Phil. des Geistes*, vii. 2, p. 6, Berlin, 1844-1845.

Hegel declares that it is simply the thinking subject, the spirit, the absolute Idea, as it actually is, in its real and eternal truth; that it is the absolute fact of being, knowing, and thinking in itself, — that such is the fact and the manner of it: this is what it is in itself and for itself absolutely. Truly enough, it is not a thing in the sense of a sensible body, nor a substance in the ordinary sense of matter. Neither can it be immaterial in the absolute sense of the word as having no essence or substance whatever; for that would make it an empty abstraction, a nothing. It is rather the thing of things, the essence of essences, the total "Substance wherein is the possibility of substances," as Plato said. If not a thing, it must certainly be a something, and not an empty nothing. We may as well call it at once the absolute, eternal, and universal Essence. It is easy to admit the reality of a principle, a necessity, a necessary relation, or a law, or a necessary truth, though not conceived as matter or as material. We may properly call such a reality an essence, an essentia, an actuality, as expressing merely its truth, its real existence. There is more difficulty in conceiving of a pure activity as such a truth, such a reality: strictly as such, it is an empty abstraction. It is a mere phase or quality, a phenomenal fact, that must inhere in or depend upon something else or other than itself alone, — some essential or substantial reality as its ground. Activity apart from essence or ground is as inconceivable, nay, as impossible, as motion apart from matter. But essence need not necessarily be such that we could lay our hand on it, nor such as to admit of sensible experience at all. On the other hand, it must necessarily be something more than an empty *isity* of subjective predication: that might have a certain abstract logical truth for us, but no essential reality beyond the play of the fancy imagining it.

Words are vague, sensuously metaphorical, and inadequate for the full and perfect expression of abstruse-metaphysical thought. Some philologists even go so far as to

say positively that there can be no thought without language, or that we think only in words.¹ The thinker knows that this is not entirely true. He becomes painfully conscious of the great difficulty, not to say impracticability, of finding words in any language that can fully express and convey his exact thought to other minds. The terms *matter*, *substance*, *essence*, *being*, *mind*, *soul*, *law*, *necessity*, not to mention any more, are especially open to ambiguous use. Language grows up on the popular tongue, and the general mind of a people never reaches to the abstrusest heights of thought, and has, therefore, never invented words to express such thought. The differences of meaning of these terms must be precisely distinguished and defined; and they should always be used in the same definite sense. One serious trouble is, that different writers use them in different, if not in ambiguous, senses. The greatest equivocations occur on the words *matter* and *soul*. In that crude state of philosophical thinking, where everything that is perceptible to the senses is called matter or material, and everything that is cognizable only by the mind is called spiritual, the use of words is as vague as the thought of those who employ them. And so we find some denying the existence of matter, and some denying the existence of soul. Hegel is certainly entitled to the credit of remarkable precision and uniformity in his use of language; but there is much ambiguity in him also. Especially, his use of the terms *Being*, *Becoming*, *Negativity*, *Positing*, and *Canceling* (at least when translated into English) is grossly ambiguous or indefinite. It is much the same with his use of the words *essence*, *substance*, and *cause*, though in general his employment of them, though peculiar to himself, is tolerably uniform and exact. His system has really no use

¹ Quite recently, an eminent philologist has repeated and positively reaffirmed this manifest absurdity, or at least seems to have done so, though it is difficult to make out how he really understands the matter himself. *The Science of Thought*, by F. Max Müller, London, 1887.

for the term *matter* in the ordinary sense. As commonly used, it is in truth a mere abstraction of the understanding, and a sheer illusion as conceived, though there is always a reality underlying the usual conception of it. With him, the Ideality of the real Notion in the active phase of its Becoming, its eternal movement or "moments," and the necessary principles, grounds, or laws of reason, or the logical necessities and necessary relations of Cognition, together with the assumed and inherent power or faculty of imposing limit or law upon its own action as self-limitation, operating as one whole under the category of Universality, Speciality, Particularity, and Wholeness, do knowingly and consciously set, posit, and temporarily fix this One and All of real Essence into the essences and forms, qualities, quantities, and properties, of things in Nature; and the given permanency and persistence of the thing as such as it is, and that only, constitutes and is its essence, substance, or matter (if any one chooses to call it by that name). The setting or positing faculty includes in it also the upsetting, cancelling, or changing faculty; and this of course necessarily involves conscious knowing and will — both the active and the final cause, or activity to an end and aim. This fixity or permanency (however temporary) is a fact, a reality, a truth, for the time being; so also is the activity of setting and cancelling; and so also are the necessities, necessary relations, laws, or categories of reason, which are involved in the process, real truths. All these elements may be said to have a certain being or mere isity as such while they are what they are. These truths, these realities, are even more certain, more infallibly true, than any sensible experience whatever of external facts and phenomena can be. The logic of reason and necessity is more safe and sure than sensation, is more certain knowledge than any experience can give. What the intuitive intelligence directly and immediately knows is more certainly true, as far as it goes, than the mere images of sense-per-

ception, or than our individual inferences from such phenomena.

With Hegel, living Spirit (or Soul) seems to be (or to express) the subjective ideality of the absolute Notion, which in its unity of Self is the one actual, persistent, and ever-identical whole of Essence and Power in a perpetual movement of Becoming on the ground and basis of the eternal necessities and necessary relations of its own fundamental constitution as such, and having in it a continuous and eternal (that is, infinite) potentiality of passing into something else or other than exactly what (or as) it was before. As a matter of fact, this must be something more than a sheer activity of Becoming: it is the Notion as it is in itself and for itself, absolutely and eternally (that is, again, infinitely). Hegel, however, will not admit it to be a thing: more properly speaking, it is only Soul. Neither is it without essence or substance and real existence; nor does it consist alone in the sheer activity of becoming, nor in the mere faculty of making one phase of itself an object of its own contemplation, and of so distinguishing within itself the two phases of Subject and Object in one whole. It is not easy to admit such a thing to be possible, or to be a reality anywhere else than in the subjective dreaming of the metaphysical imagination; nor is it much easier in any way to get over the logical necessity of such power of distinction, if only there be movement on such a basis, or to deny the truth of the fact as he states it. Perhaps we may as well accept the fact, and call it thinking Essence. *Notion, Ideality*, may do as well, if we may understand that the fact of a self-moving (or an eternally moving) essential activity is included under it. That Hegel conceived it in this manner, is very evident. As he is interpreted by Mr. Wallace, "the world is not made out of nothing, but out of the fulness of the divine thoughts and decrees;" the "Notion" is that "infinite form, or free activity, which can realize itself without the help of a matter that exists outside of it," and (as it may be added) with-

out the help of any Spirit or decree outside of the Notion itself; it is "the power of substance in the fruition of its own being, and therefore what is free;" and it is "a systematic whole in itself, and its identity with itself is thus purely and entirely characterized."¹

Hegel will not allow it to be "force." He objects to Herder as admitting Spirit to be "force or the Lord." The amount of all this would seem to be merely that Soul does not need the help of matter in the ordinary materialistic conception of it as some sensible substrate. Berkeley also could dispense with such a matter. Nor was it *force* in the sense of physical science. He employs this term to express those blind mechanical forces that work in external Nature, as between particular objects or bodies as established, and in their action or operation upon one another. Nor would he identify his "Spirit" with "the Lord" of Hebrew theology as a jealous and terrible God of power or force: his Spirit was the simple Ideality of the Notion, which had activity, reality, essence, and power enough in itself to think and create, and to evolve its own essence and reason into the quantities, qualities, essences, substances, forms, and properties of things in Nature, and to set, fix, change or cancel, and control, the entire order and constitution of things in the external world, and to work in and through the same towards its own ends and aims. In all this, he does not so much mean to deny that Soul is material or essential, as to require a higher and better conception of what it really is, — an adequate notion, instead of a crude, gross, and altogether inadequate one. In effect, he seems to recognize (what was the doctrine of the Neoplatonists) that the active power of the Soul so pervaded the knowing Intelligence as in a logical manner to wield or employ the same in the process of thinking and creating. He denies that laws exist absolutely in such manner as to be irresisti-

¹ *The Logic of Hegel*, by William Wallace, M. A., pp. 247-253, Oxford, 1874.

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bly imposed on the thinking ideality, and affirms rather that the subjective ideality makes its own laws, and imposes them on its own action. It transcends and controls all laws as such: it is itself the lawgiver. "Thought must be looked upon as a self-developing system of its laws and constituent elements. These laws are the work of thought itself, and not a fact which it finds and must submit to."¹ How this can be possible, or conceivable, he does not attempt to explain, otherwise than as his philosophy of the Notion is an explanation. The Neoplatonists seem to declare that the Intelligence is in its own nature eternal, impartible, and immutable. Conceived in this way, it would seem that it must be a hard, unalterable, and arbitrary "diamond network," and an inexorable mould of form for the active Essence. Plotinus hovers vaguely between these two conceptions. Hegel is somewhat vague and indistinct on this head; but he seems to distinguish between laws (in the proper sense of law) and those eternal necessities and necessary relations, or "constituent elements," which exist absolutely as such, and so are in themselves eternal and unalterable, though in a manner movable and partakable.

Properly speaking, *law* implies and presupposes a law-giver — both command and obedience — and persons. A law is a rule prescribed, and is repealable and changeable by the power that prescribes it. What are sometimes called the laws of nature are rather those same unalterable necessities than laws; or, in so far as they are not such unalterable necessities, they may be considered as the laws which are imposed on Nature by the creative power that establishes things in Nature as they are. In so far as they are eternal necessities, they must exist absolutely even for the universal Soul; but this would not preclude the possibility of laws in the proper sense (if there were a lawgiver), and so far as they were of the nature of rules prescribed by a sovereign power. A man can give law unto himself: why

¹ *The Logic of Hegel*, trans. by William Wallace, M. A., p. 25.

may not God as well? Over against the *tabula rasa* of abstract Nothingness and at the starting-point of the Logic, where essential Spirit bounds itself, or is bounded (as it may be said), out of Oblivion into the eternal reality which it is, the subjective Ideality shows itself from the first, and, indeed, from eternity, as the modifying power and principle of determination as Will, acting on the basis of Cognition or Intelligence; and so this universal Subjectivity has to be comprehended as eternally moving, or (what is the same thing) self-moving, rational, thinking essence and power, capable of imposing limitation, modification, and law upon its own action in the evolution of itself into a creation. No other conceivable power could be capable of doing such work.

§ 6. UNIVERSAL SOUL—THE TRUE MEANING.

The Neoplatonists often speak of the Intelligence as active. They sometimes, also, speak of the Soul as distinct from the Intelligence, but rather as one aspect of the One and All than as absolutely separate and merely coördinate. They sometimes, also, speak of the Intelligence as if it were an unalterable, impartible, and eternal Reason; but they do not clearly and definitely distinguish this Reason from the Soul as the active power, the life and movement. Neither does Hegel. He constantly speaks of this ideal activity of Becoming as determining, setting, dissolving, and controlling its own creative action, at its own will, according to its own ends and aims, after the manner of his logical dialectic of the whole evolutionary process. In this logical development he finds the categories of Being and Nothing, Becoming and Departing, Quantity, Quality and Measure, Essence and Form, Substances and Properties, Possibility and Actuality, Identity and Difference, Freedom and Necessity, the Internality and Externality of Essential Relation, Cause and Effect, Action and Reaction. But he does not expressly say that these categories are necessary and eternal principles or grounds of all possible thought or

creation. He rather seems to assert that the active Ideality can alter, abolish, or cancel, or at least transcend, modify, wield, and employ them in the process of creation; as if it could make and abolish necessity, or necessary truths, at will, and give both law and necessity unto its own action. Is this possible? It is easy to understand how the finite mind may establish rules of action for the governance of its moral conduct; but this is quite a different thing from establishing or abolishing those fundamental and necessary principles of Reason which must govern all thought absolutely and unalterably. Really, the admission that Will acts on the basis of Cognition would seem necessarily to imply that the Cognition, the Intelligence, is beyond the control of the Will as the active power, the pure Ideality. And in any view, it would seem to be necessary that the ground-principles of Reason, the necessary conditions of Knowing, must be in themselves eternal, impartible (though partakable), unalterable truths and veritable realities as such. If so, they must pervade all Nature as well as all Mind, so far as they can have operation and effect therein. As such they are eternal necessities and necessary relations, and they must be universally true.

What is meant, now, by *universal*? By the universe we ordinarily understand the whole of real existence, and by our theory this includes both God and Nature; other than this is only the blank infinity (though a "one-sided" infinity) of Nothingness beyond. Are these necessities, necessary relations, and ground-principles equally true and necessary within the pale of that Nothingness? Are they as true of Oblivion as of Thought? Perhaps it may be answered affirmatively, if there could be anything in Oblivion but Oblivion itself; but this Oblivion, this blank possibility, is only one of the necessary principles or conditions of all possible thinking or creating, and indeed of all possible reality, and is properly to be conceived merely as such. Why, then, may not these principles and necessities be ab-

solutely and universally true? They may be considered as operative and effective after their own nature, manner, and truth. They are not to be regarded as wholly discrete, absolutely fixed and contradictory entities, but rather as movable parts, phases, or aspects of the one and whole indivisible Essentia, which admit of being wielded and determined into special or particular essences and forms in the ever-continuous identity of the one concrete Whole as such; and that Whole may be conceived as absolute and universal Soul. Properly speaking, universal Soul can be nothing else but that.

After all, the real existence of such universal Reason, or of such an eternally active Essence and Power in reason, and only according to reason, may have to be accepted as a fact, the last fact, the whole truth, the all and enough; wherewith we may rest satisfied. In this, the philosopher may have to rise to that height of thought where he can entirely free himself of that inveterate habit of mind which will insist on demanding more when no more is. He may then be satisfied that no more is, or can be, and that to require more would be irrational and absurd. When all that really is, is comprehended and known, the rest will be unknowable because it is *not*, or because it has as yet no real existence and is mere Oblivion, and is to be known only as such. Said the venerable Sanatkumâra, "When one sees nothing else, hears nothing else, understands nothing else, that is the Infinite. . . . The Infinite indeed is below, above, behind, before, right and left, — it is indeed all this. . . . Self is below, above, behind, before, right and left, — Self is all this: . . . he who sees, perceives, and understands this, . . . he is lord and master in all worlds."¹

Hegel declares as the result of the history of philosophy that "the standpoint for the future must be, that the Idea be known in its necessity, in the two sides of its di-

¹ Müller's *Upanishads: The Sacred Books of the East*, vol. i. pp. 123, 124, Oxford, 1879.

remption as Nature and Spirit, — as the exhibition of the totality of the Idea, not only as identical with itself, but as bringing forth this one identity out of itself; and this is thereby known as necessity. The actualities of Nature and History are the image (*Bild*) of the divine Reason: the forms of the self-conscious Reason are also forms of Nature. It is the business of philosophy to reconcile thought with the actuality [and, of course, the actuality with thought]. The deeper the Spirit goes into itself in the evolution of a creation, the broader is the kingdom without; the depth is measured by the need with which it seeks externalization in order to find itself. The thought which holds itself within itself comes forth: it strives to make itself concrete in itself. The first activity is formal; first, the Intelligence (*νοῦς*) is the Thought of Thought, said Aristotle. The result is Thought, which is by itself, and embraces the universe and itself, and is employed in an intelligible world. In conception, spiritual and natural are thoroughly one harmonizing universe that flows in itself, develops the absolute in its sides to one Totality, that it may thereby know itself in its unity in Thought. Philosophy is therefore the true Theodicea against Art, Religion, and their emotions: this reconciliation of the Spirit, and truly of the spirit, has seized itself in its freedom and in the kingdom of its actuality." . . .

"Philosophy may be said to have begun with Parmenides,¹ and the thought of the absolute Idea, *Being and Knowing all in one*; but he dealt with it objectively rather than dialectically. Plato's universal Essence as abstract Intelligence (*νοῦς*) was not conceived as subjective Thinking. The Stoics and Epicureans had made an abstract severance

¹ Hegel might as well have said that philosophy began with Sanat-kumâra of the Hindu Vedas, in which (according to Prof. F. Max Müller) he taught much the same doctrine. — *Sacred Books of the East: Khândogya-Upanishad*, trans. by F. Max Müller, vol. i. pp. 109–125, Oxford, 1879.

of the subject into Thought on one side and Nature on the other. The Neoplatonists had reached the concrete Idea, the thought of totality in an intelligible world. The principle was the self-moving Idea in the identity of all reality; but they did not bring back the development of the Idea into self-consciousness in the complete return into itself. Spinoza had set being and thinking as opposite and identical; but the finite subjectivity of Kant ended, with Fichte, in the pure infinite form of self-consciousness as the absolute Ego. The intellectual Intuition of Schelling was the absolute content and form as identical; but a more definite and exact dialectical deduction of the absolute identity of Subject and Object was needed."¹ And so Hegel himself undertook the logical development, dialectically, of the Idea (*Begriff*) as the absolute unity and identity of Subjectivity and Objectivity, thought knowing itself, absolute Knowing (*Wissen*).

"Spirit," he says again, "produces itself as Nature, and as Mind and the State [or Man and his works], but as a certain unconscious doing, wherein it is itself another and not wholly itself as Spirit. In the State, in the facts and life of History, and in Art, it brings itself forth in a conscious manner, indeed, and knows of the various kinds of its actuality, but yet only as kinds of the same: only in complete Science or Knowledge (*Wissenschaft*) does it know itself as absolute Spirit; and this knowing is alone its true existence. And thus the circuit of philosophy is closed."²

This doctrine somewhat resembles that of Bacon, that Nature is placed in three situations: 1st, that of the free unfolding of herself in a regular course; 2d, that of detraction from her regular course by the violence of obstacles; and 3d, that of the artificial productions of man, the art and work of man on Nature, — "art added to Nature," —

¹ Werke: *Geschichte der Phil.*, xv. pp. 617-622, Berlin, 1844.

² Ibid.

whereby "an entirely new appearance of things takes its rise, forming (as it were) another universe or theatre,"¹ the world of man's own creation. But Bacon does not undertake to expound, in the manner of a logical dialectic, what Nature is in herself, nor in what mode, nor by what necessities, laws, or principles, this free unfolding of Nature into the world of things actually takes place. This is what Hegel endeavors to do.

The substance and meaning of all this would seem to be, that the universal Soul creates Nature as its thought, and, in animals and men, rises up through organic nature to the height of that limited and specialized finite mind that appears in them. And then, that the mind of man creates his own world of thought, — the facts and course of history, all human works, arts, society, and the State as his own special doing. The whole is, nevertheless, in a certain manner, the creation and doing of the universal Soul, which creates Nature and Man; but, within this sphere of nature and finite mind, the doing of the universal Soul is, in some large measure, an unconscious doing. The process that is going on, in the field of Nature as such, is in some degree beyond the reach and out of the direct and immediate sphere of the divine consciousness. It is in a measure submerged in what may be called the sleep of Nature. Man, his mind, and his works fall under this same condition as a part of created Nature; and they lie, partially, beyond and out of the immediate sphere of the direct action of the universal Soul. In all this creative process, which constitutes only a part of the full circuit of the Notion, and in each and every part of it, the universal Spirit is still in a manner gone out of itself, and has become estranged from itself, in the temporarily set and fixed permanency and persistency of things in Nature: it has not yet completely returned back into itself, and into the freedom and fulness of

¹ *Aphorisms of Nat. Hist.* i.: Works, by Spedding, vol. ii. p. 47, Boston, 1861; Works, by Montagu, iii. p. 427, ed. Philad. 1854.

its own self-consciousness. The wheel is not yet come full circle: finite soul in Nature is as yet only partially the Notion. There is only partial ideality, partial rationality. At the furthest extreme of the process, in the last forms of matter (atoms or bodies), where the fixity is temporarily more or less permanent, all consciousness, all rationality, has so far ceased, and there is now apparently dead material nature only, in which mechanism, chemism, and blind forces, and the mere sequence and reciprocal action of causes and effects, have their fatal play. Necessity prevails over freedom, and "the laws of Nature" appear to reign supreme. But in animals and men, there is a partial return to freedom, the fixity is cancelled and outweighed by the interior power, which at length makes its appearance on the field of Nature itself in the special form of the finite Soul, conscious of itself as such, partially knowing, partially rational only; and this (according to Hegel) is mind in Nature. This finite mind is self-active under its own special consciousness, and produces its own works in such limited freedom as it has; but these works are not done under the direct action of the universal Soul, nor within the immediate sphere of the universal self-consciousness. They are the act and product of the special soul by itself alone; though they may also, in a certain limited manner, fall under the general consciousness and knowledge of the universal Soul as well; for the fixity and permanence of things which is at any time established in the entire creation may be said to measure the continuity of the universal Remembrance in respect thereof. And so it may be said that, in respect of the universal Soul, and within this sphere of fixity, what is done by Nature, or by Man, is only an external and an unconscious doing. What man does, in this same external sphere, being also a knowing, self-conscious creature, may very well be, in respect of himself, either a conscious or an unconscious doing.

As to what happens with the finite soul, when the wheel

When necessary
are the...?

comes full circle in the Notion, in respect of it, — when the return is complete and the process ends in the full self-consciousness of the infinite Ideality itself, — Hegel seems to give us no explicit declaration. Logically, it would seem necessarily to follow from the premises and the theory, that the finite soul would then become identical with the universal itself, and absolutely cease as finite, becoming (literally) one with God. This was evidently the doctrine of the Vedic Upanishads. It was the doctrine of Aristotle also.¹ And there would seem to be no warrant in the Hegelian philosophy for the doctrine that finite souls may attain to an independent existence and an absolute immortality by themselves as such: in the philosophy of Fichte, some such doctrine may be found. This would necessarily imply that the circuit of the Notional Ideality could be completely effected in a finite soul; but in the theory and Logic of Hegel (as expounded by himself) this would be impossible. So far as partial and finite, the human soul must be dependent on the universal for its existence as such, now or hereafter, in this or in any possible world. If it could become independent and absolute by itself alone, it would be equal with the universal and absolute, and yet independent of it. To be equal, in this case, must be to be identical. On the other hand, there is nothing in the Hegelian theory that would contradict the hypothesis of a possible continuation of the finite soul in some subordinate sphere and state indefinitely, or without end, if such were the plan, or should be the will, of the supreme Creator. And this conception of immortality for a finite soul would agree with that of Jean Paul Richter, who believed “in a harmonious and eternal ascent, but in no created culmination” in an absolute identity with the universal Spirit.

But the circuit of philosophy closed with Hegel does not stay closed. Profound and admirable as the Hegelian dialectic certainly is, it is at least questionable if it has con-

¹ Grote's *Aristotle*, vol. ii. p. 232, London, ed. Alex. Bain, LL. D.

clusively settled the whole matter. To a large extent, both science and Christianity still insist upon the old Stoical and Epicurean severance of Spirit and Nature, of mind and matter. The reconciliation of thought with actuality, or rather of the actuality with thought, is by no means complete as yet. The scientific and practical world seems to be getting more and more deeply immersed in the external variety, and almost entirely ignores this inner ideal and subjective unity. An absolutely self-moving Ideality seems to be, with many, an incomprehensible and an incredible affair: a self-moving gravity (or eternally moving atoms) appears to them to be far more credible and quite as comprehensible. An interstellar æther is a conceivable totality; and so is a total whole of disintegrated atoms. It is perhaps true enough that such an æther, or such a world of atoms, may be conceived as existing absolutely and in a state of eternal movement. But the conception would be inadequate to account for the universe as it is. On that theory there could be no plan, no order, no system, no harmony, no artistic design, no aim or purpose, and no beauty in it: it must necessarily be mere chaos and confusion worse confounded. Or, again, if it were possible to imagine that an elastic æther, or mere atoms and gravity, could blindly fall into a cosmos of order such as the sensible universe is, then what difference could there be between such blind falling into order and a conscious, intelligent creation? A difference of words only. Not the name, but the thing, signifies; but the name should be adequate to the thing.

CHAPTER V.

PURPORT OF CERTAIN METAPHYSICAL DOCTRINES.

§ 1. DOCTRINES OF HEGEL AND COUSIN — TIME — SPACE.

If the philosophy of Hegel tacitly assumes the active element, or glides over it as unimportant, or sinks it into a mere possibility (*δύναμις*), or lays no stress upon it, so also is he equally vague and indistinct as to those eternal necessities, necessary relations, and universal truths, which he seems to recognize as lying at the foundation of all else. He speaks, indeed, of an instinct of necessity leading us to attribute movement to the absolute Idea, and insists that it must be "seen in its necessity:" his Logic is really grounded on necessary truth; but there is no explicit or critical discussion of these necessities as such. The antinomies of the Categories are said to exhibit necessity in their abstract severance and contradiction; but when they are subsumed into the unity of the logical Notion, the necessity of the contradiction is resolved into harmony in the freedom of the self-moving Ideality, at the point of beginning (as it were) of the evolution into a creation. The free self-movement is tacitly assumed; and we are left to infer that in this Freedom there is neither essence, necessity, nor law, but only what might be called pure spirit, as if spirit itself were not only above essence, but independent of essence, law, or necessity. In one aspect, at least, this is what his reasoning seems to come to, but it is evidently not what he really means; for it is plain, on the whole, that he recognizes an active essence, self-active or eternally

active (he makes no distinction which) under the eternal necessities, necessary relations, and universal truths (though not particularly defined as such), but at the same time in Freedom otherwise. Rosenkranz,¹ his learned and able successor, more explicitly defines these eternal necessities and necessary internal relations of "the logical Idea," and more clearly states the nature and truth of the absolute Causality. Like Aristotle, Victor Cousin laid more stress on the active power, the substantial Causality, and he expounds more distinctly the "necessary laws," or principles of the "impersonal reason." Like the Neoplatonists, he insists upon an impersonal Reason, — impersonal, that is, as not belonging to finite persons merely, but universal as all possible reason; and this doctrine is consistent with the Neoplatonic conception of the universal Intelligence, in which finite intelligences shared and participated, partially only, but not wholly. This universal Intelligence was considered as absolute, necessary, impartible, immutable, and eternal in its own nature. It was constituted of those eternal necessities and necessary relations which must be, at least, the basis of the necessary laws or principles of thought, taken universally. But with them, in the process of the evolution, a movement of the originally active intelligence into something other than it was in its simplest state did actually take place; and this would seem necessarily to imply a faculty or power of wielding the necessities and the necessary relations, conditions, or laws into the essences and forms of other things; as if it were legitimate to assume such intelligence to be a conscious power, capable of such wielding, or of acting with a purpose and to an end foreseen, without more. Strictly, we have not as yet got any such conscious activity, but only the eternal fact of a complex unity of necessities, necessary relations, and absolute truths, which may be conceived in their unity and universality as

¹ *Wissenschaft der logischen Idee*, von Karl Rosenkranz, Königsberg, 1858-1859.

Essence moving into things in freedom, and under the necessary limitations, conditions, or categories of all thought and of all reality; unless, again, we assume the absolute existence of some immaterial, unessential Spirit (what Hegel strenuously repudiates) lying behind or beyond such moving Essence itself, whereof no further account, no definite conception whatever, can be given. This is the mystical and visionary notion of spirit that is the Jupiter, the Jehovah, or the Lord, of the popular theologies, grounded with them all alike upon an external method of argumentation and inference from evidences of design as exhibited in Nature, or upon a mystically supernatural revelation.

With Hegel, the logical Notion is itself the self-moving Essence and Power. But where is the necessity of its moving at all? Is there any logical necessity that the Notion, or a universe, should exist at all? Might there not just as well be an absolute infinity of Nothingness? There is no absolute logical necessity that there should be a real universe rather than an empty Void. But we have the certainty of fact that we ourselves exist and think, and that a real universe does in fact exist around us, and is in movement. This is a matter of direct and immediate knowledge in us; it does not lie in proof, nor depend on inference merely. It is a necessary conclusion of reason that a self-moving or (what is really the same thing) an eternally moving Essence of some kind must and does exist. This necessity of reason is all the necessity there need be in the matter: it may be said to be a logical necessity, a necessary truth, as well as an absolute fact, if any philosophy is to be at all possible. What, then, is the whole constitution, manner, and law of this existent Reality? for this is the only remaining question. Is not a one whole Essence with eternal movement in it (whether conceived as the Notion, or in any other way), freely moving on the ground of those universal necessities, necessary relations, mediations, limitations, and conditions which are, at the same time, the necessary presuppo-

sitions and conditions of all possible Knowing, thereby necessarily Intelligence also? And since such movement in such a whole must necessarily have established order, plan, purpose, and end in itself, must it not necessarily be both rational and artistic, at once true, good, and beautiful in itself, without more? for these are modes, are qualities only. "Truth, beauty, and goodness are attributes and not entities," said Cousin.¹ And since consciousness is the mere fact of knowing, as motion is the mere fact that something is moving, what need can there be of any other consciousness, any other will, or any other spirit? This may be truly said to be Spirit or Soul as it is in its own essential nature, manner, law, and necessity; whereof all finite essences and souls are partakers partially, each in its own mode, degree, and form. And, however otherwise Hegel may be understood to express himself, this would seem to be the substance of his philosophy.

Whatever may be thought of Hegel, or of all other philosophers hitherto, the question of these necessary truths may be regarded as still open; though, if their labors have not satisfactorily and forever demonstrated their existence and necessity, any further endeavors to that end might well appear to be the despair of philosophy. Capable students of philosophy may reasonably deem the further undertaking superfluous. Nor shall I attempt to go over the whole ground again; but, presuming to exercise an independent judgment upon their achievements, however vast, profound, or illustrious, I will venture upon such observations as seem to me to be fit and proper, if not necessary.

In the first place, these necessary truths, principles, necessities, relations, laws, or facts (by whichever name they may be more properly called) are, and must be, seen directly by the knowing intelligence, if there be any possible ground of knowledge or of philosophy at all. They do not depend

¹ *Lectures on the True, the Beautiful, and the Good*, by M. V. Cousin, trans. by O. W. Wight, New York, 1857, p. 359.

upon evidence, upon proof and inference merely, nor upon hypothesis: they exist absolutely and eternally, and they are by the knowing intellect directly seen and known to be real, true, and necessary. The ground of this knowledge is the absolute necessity of their truth. The intellect sees it to be impossible, contradictory, and utterly absurd that it should be otherwise. Their untruth is not only inconceivable, but impossible. Inconceivability alone may not be a certain test of every truth for every person; but for the instructed and disciplined intellect to doubt or deny this impossibility is to doubt or deny the possibility of knowledge or knowing, and to reduce philosophy itself to a fool's errand. The coeternal truth of Nothingness, as sheer blank possibility, with the whole actual Something as the limited and determinate Reality, is such a necessary truth. The conception of any possible Something as unbounded, unlimited, wholly indeterminate, is an utterly contradictory, impossible, and absurd conception: it can find place only in the visionary and uncritical fancy that is dreaming it. Absolute Nothingness as the all that is would not be in itself inconceivable or impossible; but it would be contrary to the fact that a real universe does actually exist in the Nothingness as bounded over against it, or out of it, or as limited in it; and such conception is therefore untrue in point of fact, and is an utterly inadmissible hypothesis. It is logically (that is, necessarily) true, that any real Something, even the total One and All of actual existence, if it were to be conceived as absolutely unbounded, unlimited, and indeterminate, must necessarily be identically the same as absolute Nothingness: it would thereby vanish into Nothingness, and the conception would be really impossible and absurd, otherwise than in the uncritical, dreaming fancy of him who should try to imagine it.

Eternity is such a necessary truth. Without Eternity, Time is impossible; for eternity is simply the possibility of Time, — a time or times in succession. The word *time*

* If we say "Nothingness" really exists, it must be a
 "Total Reality," But
 "Total Reality" is not
 "Something," i.e.
 "Being" must
 "be" against the "not being" of "Nothingness."

is used ambiguously in our language, sometimes properly as time, but oftener improperly in the sense of "infinite time," that is, Eternity. This ambiguity is inadmissible in logic, or exact thought. Really, the phrase *infinite time*, or *infinite space*, is an irrational and absurd use of words, and shows a confusion of ideas. Time, a time, or times in succession, are never infinite or unlimited, but are always finite and limited. Infinity — the unlimited in respect of time — is properly Eternity, and that only : Time, properly speaking, implies limitation : it is limitation.

So also of Immensity. It is the simple blank possibility of space, or spaces in succession. The same ambiguity as in the case of *Time* confounds *Space* with Immensity, as when the phrase *infinite space* is used in the sense of Immensity. The word is constantly employed in both senses, without distinguishing them. In like manner as with time, the phrase *infinite space* is an irrational and absurd use of words. This misconception as to both Time and Space leads to what may be called *the bastard infinite*, that is, a never-ending series of finites, — a *progressus ad infinitum*, — the Lockian Infinite of our mathematics and physical science. Locke himself, however, doubted its correctness as a true conception of infinity.¹ Eternity, or the absolutely unlimited in respect of duration, is the true infinite in respect of Time ; and Immensity, or the absolutely unlimited in respect of space-extension, is the true infinite in reference to Space. The Neoplatonists were well aware of the distinction between the two kinds of infinity. Rightly considered, Eternity and Immensity are the mere empty possibilities of Time and Space, or rather times and spaces.

The import of all this is simply that Eternity and Time and Immensity and Space express, in the first instance, the bare possibility of the existence of the One and All of real Being, the absolute Essence itself, and, secondarily, are in

¹ *Life and Letters of John Locke*, by H. N. Fox Browne, New York, 1876.

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themselves merely those relative necessities or necessary principles or conditions of all possible movement of the one active Essence into things which may be regarded by themselves as other than the one Essence in its own self-identity; or, in other words, they are those necessary laws of thought whereby only it is possible or conceivable that such things could receive and have such distinction from the one Essence itself, and such boundary in time and space, as they do actually have as such things, while they are what they are. A time is relative to Eternity, and a space is relative to Immensity, because the boundary into which things are limited is a movable boundary, and may be expanded, dialectically, from the size of a needle's point to that of a planet, or may be shrunk from the dimensions of the sun to a mathematical zero, — dwindling

— "till the diminution

Of space had pointed him sharp as my needle;
Nay, followed him, till he had melted from
The smallness of a gnat to air."

But the Eternity and Immensity, the movable boundary in time and space, and movement into determined limitation (if motion and change are to be at all possible), are necessary conditions, principles, or laws, and are absolute truths as such. They are eternal and unalterable in their own nature. Moreover, they are just as necessary and true for the Universal Soul in the creation of Nature as they are for us in the creations of our thought, or of any possible thinking; for they are principles at once of the finite as of the universal mind. In reference to the universal mind, they are rather necessary principles, essential relations, and absolute truths than laws. Properly speaking, a law is in its own nature only a limiting condition, a restraint: it is not active, but restrictive only, and so it may be passively operative on something other than itself, which is in action or in motion. In a strictly proper use of the word, law implies a lawgiver; it is a rule prescribed by a superior power, and it presup-

poses a personal command and personal obedience. Laws proper have a double aspect: in reference to the lawgiver, they are not unalterable necessities, but are repealable or changeable; but in reference to obedience, they are, while they continue, necessary conditions, or restrictions and limitations. The sphere of law is thus different from the sphere of absolute necessity.

An object or thing in Nature must necessarily have boundary in time and space, giving the outline of form. An orange, for instance, has not only its outline of form, but also substance under and within the form; so also each molecule or atom which enters into its composition: the active essence thrown into the form, and maintained therein, is its substance (*Ding an sich*), its efficient cause, its matter, and it has no other matter. And so the thing is "cause and form conjoined." This must be taken, of course, in reference to the universal mind that creates it; but it is just so of the finite mind in reference to its own creations; for it is not possible for the finite mind, any more than it is for the universal mind, to create the idea or image of an orange in the imagination in any other way. That image may be, in the first instance, only an outline of form and color, according to the knowledge which the mind has of the object. If that knowledge be thorough, and reach to its whole interior constitution, it may image the whole in imagination; for that image is, as far as it goes, simply cause and form conjoined as before in the process of thinking the object. But, as so conceived, it is purely an ideal object of the mind thinking it. If, indeed, the finite thought could give to the imaged conception a thorough constitution, comprehending even the mode of formation of the molecules, the atoms, the æther, or whatever else is concerned in the necessary constitution of a finite body, and if it were capable of continuously and firmly holding and maintaining the full conception in exactly the same form and state for any given length of time, — that is, of thoroughly remembering it, — it would

have for the time being all the reality that any natural orange has; and if another person could see into the mind so creating and remembering that object, or if he could touch it and experience the resistance of that form to the touch, and if it were held thus with an equal force of persistence, it would be as solid, as actual, and as substantial for him as any orange in Nature is; for the whole difference would consist in the degree of active power, or energy of essential limitation, that is concerned in the process, and not in the nature of the cause, nor in the manner, law, or necessities that are involved in its creation. It is possible for the mind to conceive of an orange as it stands bounded into a globular circumference in time and space, where and when it is, as distinct from its actual interior substance, and to hold that ideal conception of the outline of form in the mind, even when the real orange is withdrawn out of that space-and-time boundary and position into another relative place; but now the form is purely ideal and empty, and a merely imaginary outline in the mind that conceives it. This merely shows that finite mind is capable of shaping purely ideal forms, having no other substance than the essential activity of thought that is thus thrown into the ideal conception as such. Undoubtedly, the thought may just as well (if it were able) also throw into this exterior outline all the forms of the interior parts, molecules, atoms, or æther whereof an orange may be composed, and thus conceive and create an ideal orange that would correspond exactly and in every particular with the whole structure and substance of a natural orange; for the natural orange is created in precisely the same way, and is just as ideal (though also real) as the other, only that it is a creation of the universal mind of Nature, and is, for that reason, more persistent, being as permanent as it is permanent in Nature, and no more so. If the finite thought could do the thing as completely and effectually as the absolute thought does it, another person (if he could get hold of and eat it) might find

it as good as any natural orange. This is in fact impossible; but the actual orange is really constructed in like manner by the universal Essence, and under the same categories of knowing and creating, as is alone possible. This Essence as the Notion may be considered as throwing, limiting, and determining its own essence into the object, and into all the parts and particulars whereof it may be composed, and as continuously maintaining itself therein under those same necessities, essential relations, and categories of thought. Among these will necessarily be the limitations of Time, and Space, and Place, giving the form, not only of the body as a whole, but also of each and every part or atom that enters into its interior structure and substance; and this is so effectually done in Nature that the object presents to our senses all the reality which our sense-perception ascribes to the actual thing. And it can make no difference that the æther, atoms, or molecules are first constituted in their own special forms, and then chemically combined, or mechanically aggregated. In this constitution or creation of bodies, the universal Essence and Power must necessarily be capable of giving determination and limitation, or law, unto its own action under all the categories of reason and necessity, thus producing both the substance or substrate, the internal forms and the external shape, of the body or thing: otherwise the universe must be reduced to a blind, inexorable machine. When a body is removed to another place, no change in its interior structure is necessarily involved; it may still retain the same limitations of substance and form as before, bounded out of the same eternity and immensity into the same limitations of time and space, but with a change of relative times and spaces, *i. e.* of relative place or position. Change of external form would be actual change in size or in shape, and change in the forms of its interior elements would be change of quality. In short, Eternity and Immensity are mere empty though infinite possibilities of Times and Spaces, that is, boundaries and positions

of finite things; and Time and Space, or Times and Spaces, are simply the necessary laws, or conditions and limitations, under which it is alone possible that finite bodies or things can receive and have their substances and forms out of, and through the action of, the universal Essence itself. This process is a process of thought in creation; for creation is nothing else but that. The upshot of Hegel's immense disquisition about "Negativity," the "Negation of Negation," setting and "positing," oversetting or "cancelling," and reflecting or restoring to identity, comes to this and nothing more. It merely expresses the interplay and interaction of these necessities and necessary relations, and the operation of the categories of reason in the course of the evolution of the one active Essence (the Notion, as he defines it), or of the one whole and absolute Quantity, Quality, and Modality of real Being into the quantities, qualities, and measures or masses, or in other words the essences, substances, forms, and properties, of particular bodies. In this process, the self-moving (or eternally moving) Essence and Power may be said to impose the requisite limitation or law upon its own action, but necessarily, at the same time, under the operation of those universal categories, necessary relations, and ground-principles of reason which must lie at the foundation of the universe, and are in themselves eternal and immutable; whereby only rational ends and aims are possible, and are accomplished in so far as they are at all possible, and just in so far as they ever are in fact accomplished.

§ 2. ESSENCE AND POWER — DIALECTIC OF "NEGATIVITY."

The existence of such self-moving or (what is the same thing) eternally moving Essence is, at least, an undeniable fact. The contrary is, indeed, quite conceivable, and is not impossible in itself: it is only untrue as a matter of fact. It would be an absurd hypothesis, because directly in contradiction to the actual fact. It is very easy to conceive the universe to be at a standstill: it may easily be imagined to

be annihilated into absolute Nothingness. But the universally observed fact, the necessary truth, is, that it not only exists, but is in motion. A beginning of movement, without a moving cause, is both inconceivable and impossible. It is a necessary conclusion of reason that the movement is as eternal as the essence itself, and is in this sense infinite. Movement being the eternal fact, it may also be said to be necessary truth. As such, it is not caused at all, and needs no other cause than its own absolute essence: Essence and Power in one is absolutely self-subsistent from eternity. Created things only are properly said to be caused, or to have a cause; for these only have a beginning, a middle, and an end. Since motion apart from essence or a something moving, or being in movement, is impossible, the absolute existence of an eternally moving Essence of some kind must necessarily be true. Since the one and all of real Being must necessarily be determinate, it must necessarily be in some measure limited out of the void Immensity into spacial dimension, however wide, and out of Eternity (the empty possibility of Time) into actual duration, however eternal, as the necessary conditions of its Actuality. The whole One, as having thus a determinate existence and reality, may have an endless duration and an absolute extension (however infinitely movable the boundary of limitation may be), may have existed so from all eternity in respect of its own internal ideality, and may therefore be said to dwell in Eternity and Immensity, as the mere possibilities of such absolute Reality.

It is a commonly received notion that God, or the supreme Spirit, must be wholly above Time and Space, and must be absolutely infinite in all respects. Such is the ordinary conception of Infinity; and it is not seen that such a Spirit must necessarily be identically the same thing as absolute Nothingness. But here we are giving a wider and a truer meaning to the words *Time* and *Space*, as also a more exact and true meaning to the term *Infinity*. This wider signifi-

cation of Time and Space is involved in the Hegelian conception of Determinateness as that least determined state of real Being where it is barely distinguishable from Nothingness; for Time and Space, truly conceived, are only those necessary limitations of determinateness which must belong to all real Being, Essence, or Actuality whereby it must be bounded and measured out of Eternity and Immensity, — whereby knowing Soul must be measured out of Oblivion. Without determinateness out of Eternity and Immensity into Time and Space, even the absolute Soul must be reduced to Nothingness: nothing could exist but mere oblivion, the absolute Void. But this, again, would be contrary to the known fact of an absolutely existent universe of reality; and it cannot possibly be the truth. It follows that Time and Space, properly conceived as mere limitation (or Modality), are absolute necessities or necessary conditions of all real existence. This widest limitation in Time and Space, this simplest or most universal determinateness, may be regarded as that where the one and all of reality is to be conceived in its unity of absolute Quantity, Quality, and Modality. With the further distinction and differentiation or evolution of the one Whole, all existing quantities and qualities, or masses, may arise or be produced out of the one Essence.

We may distinguish in thought a universal principle of Quantity and Quality as necessary conditions of all special quantities and qualities, and this ideal logic of our minds may be true enough in itself merely as our ideal thought; but the ideal phantoms of the logic of our thinking, merely as such alone, can have no reality in Nature beyond ourselves, without universal and absolute Essence. This Essence as the one and all of real Being is not a logical phantom of our minds merely, but is an absolute reality, an actual fact, and (as we have seen) a necessary truth of the existent universe, independent of us and of our thinking about it. As such, it is utterly impossible and inconceivable that it should not have in itself both Quantity and Quality

(or Modality) in whatever simplest degree or state. Our ideal logic may be a true expression of the necessities, necessary relations, or metaphysical principles under which alone this universal Essence can be conceived to exist, and be capable of evolving itself into a world of things as a rational and artistic creation. But these necessities, relations, and principles, though real and eternal essentities in their own nature as such, or as in themselves considered, are one thing; the active and potential Essence, in its proper conception, is quite another thing: it is a subsumption of all these into the internal unity and identity of one absolute whole, whereof the activity, the eternal movement, is but one phase or aspect, though coeternal with the whole as such. This logical Concept of the whole Reality is the Hegelian "Notion."

The Neoplatonists sometimes spoke of these logical entities (or principles of Reason) as active, but in more exact discussions they evidently regarded them as something distinct from the active Soul, or the life of the Intelligence, though they considered this life as intimately blended with the Intelligence, and as somehow subsisting in it and with it. As such living Essence, it was, with Plato, the Essence of essences and the *that which itself moves itself* eternally. Hegel endeavors to solve this distinction and remove the difficulty by substituting the term *Notion* or *Absolute Idea* in the place of *Essence*; and he confines his use of the term *Essence*, more especially, though not entirely, to express the essences of particular things. And he blames "the ill manners" of the Understanding that will attempt to conceive the one Essence as "a thing." He appears to insist upon regarding the Notion as purely ideal; it is defined and described as a complex of logical essentities (*Wesenheiten*) subsumed into the unity of a one whole; and as such it seems to be conceived as pure Spirit, that is somehow endowed with an activity of becoming what it wills and determines of its own mere motion, or purely spiritual "moments," without other essence or movement, and apart from all es-

sence otherwise than as such ideal Notion itself is the real truth. It is, nevertheless, plain that his logical Notion must be itself the universal Essence and Power; but he chooses to lay the stress rather upon the Ideality than upon the Reality of it. Nothing is said of eternal movement. The Notion is eternally active only in the "moments" of its Ideality. He discourses of the life of the Soul thus: "The concept (*Begriff*) of life [the universal life] is the immediate Idea, the Notion, which is commensurate with its Objectivity; but it is commensurate with it only in so far as it is the negative unity of its externality; that is, it sets itself commensurate. The infinite relating of the Notion to itself is (as the Negativity) the self-determining, its diremption in itself as subjective Singleness (*Einzelheit*), and in itself as equivalent Universality. The idea of life in its immediateness is only, first, the creative universal Soul. On account of this immediateness, the first negative relation of the Idea in itself is its self-determination as the Notion, — the setting in itself which is first as return into itself For-itself-Being, — the creative presupposition. Through this self-determination, the universal life becomes a special (*besonderes*); it has thereby dualized (*entzweit*) itself into the two extremes of the judgment that will be the immediate conclusion."¹

We seem to have here the statement that the Idea, the Notion, the creative universal Soul, is alive; its life is its subjectivity; the subjectivity, as single and also the universal, dirempts or dualizes itself, and sets some particular exhibition of its own essence into Objectivity for itself, and it is itself commensurate with that objectivity only in so far as the subjectivity is the negative unity of the externality thus produced. Exactly what is meant here by "negative unity" is not very clear; but the amount of it would seem to be (in any intelligible expression), that the subjective activity throws out this objective exhibition of its own essence, and by a self-negating faculty of giving and fixing limitation

¹ *Wissenschaft der Logik*, v. 241, Berlin, 1841.

to its own action — so far and no farther — gives to it a certain special or particular determinateness of essence and form by itself considered ; but this negation is still in the unity and identity of the Whole, and so, now, in reference to what is so limited, becomes a negative unity, or may be described as such ; but this active faculty, wonderful as it would seem to be, is quietly dropped out of sight, without any further explanation. It is left a sheer assumption. The universality of the Idea is its simplest determination as the Notion as it is in and for itself alone as such, eternally ; and this is the presupposition, the condition precedent, of any creative action of the Idea as subjectivity. The actual movement into a creation as its objectivity is the self-determination, is the “diremption” of the subjective Singleness, its dualization or distinction into subjective and objective aspects of its own absolute and complete Self ; and this activity, this movement, he calls “Negativity.” Perhaps we might call it the negating process of self-limitation, if there were any potentiality there which could be capable of imposing limitation or law upon its own action. It would seem to be implied that this “Negativity” was already of itself a conscious, intelligent power of choosing, of giving law unto itself, and of wielding the Notion into a process of creation. A very wonderful Negativity, surely ! Considered as merely intending to describe the manner of the action which does actually take place, it may do ; and we need not quarrel with his terminology. Really, it is all the while tacitly assumed or implied that a universal Soul already exists as the one and all of real Being, or universal Essence, grounded on the eternal necessities, and bounded over against the negative Nothingness, under the absolute category of Universality, Speciality, Particularity, and Totality. As such, it must be in a state of eternal movement under all the categories of Essence and Reason, and so acting only after the manner, necessity, and law of soul thinking and creating. Hegel does sometimes speak of movement, but oftener of “mo-

ments," and in such manner as to imply that over and above the Notion as such there is a Spirit that can do anything it pleases. He does not expressly declare that the movement is an eternal fact, or a necessary truth, yet the whole power of his logic of the Syllogism is brought to bear upon the problem, and for the purpose of showing that the Syllogism and the logical Notion are all one; and this is the logical truth of the universal Soul as it is in itself. If the undertaking may be considered successful, the logical Syllogism embodied in the Notion may be accepted as the absolute truth, the all and enough; for movement is involved in it as one phase of the whole fact and reality, and is its life eternal. Considered as method, he says, "it is only the movement (*Bewegung*) of the Notion itself (the nature of which should already be known), but firstly now with the signification that the Notion of the All and its movement is the universal absolute Activity, the self-determining and self-realizing movement."¹ It is also called "the dialectic" (*das dialektische*).²

Further considering of the manner of it, it is also stated that this "Negativity" is the turning-point of the movement of the Notion: "it is the simple point of negative relation to itself, the immanent source of all activity, of living and perpetual self-movement, and is the dialectic soul which has all truth in itself: through it is the alone true; since upon this subjectivity, the cancellation (*aufheben*) of the opposition between concept and reality, and also the unity which is the truth, alone rests."²

Hegel is dealing here with the logical categories of the absolute Syllogism, the Universality, Speciality, Particularity, and Totality of the one Whole, with the dualization or distinction of the one Essence into its Subjective and Objective aspects or sides, and with the dialectic movement of the One as the Ideality of the Notion. He is endeavoring to state or describe the logical manner and

¹ *Wissenschaft der Logik*, v. 320.

² *Ibid.* v. 332.

fact of the proceeding. The term *Negativity* covers and includes this dialectic movement, the self-limiting power or function, which is "the immanent source of all activity of self-movement in the dialectic soul;" that is, it would seem, it is the simple fact of the eternal movement or life of the Notion.

"Because the *first* or immediate is the Notion in itself, and hence only in itself the negative, so the dialectic movement consists herein, that the distinction which it contains will be posited in itself. The *second*, on the contrary, is the determined, the distinction or relation; and hence the dialectic movement consists in positing the unity which is contained in it. The *second* negation to which we come is the negation of that *first* negation," and so is the cancelling of that contradiction or limitation, which really "was as little an absolute, final, hard and fast contradiction as it was the doing of external reflection; but it was the immanent, most objective moment of life and spirit, whereby spirit is a thinking subject, a person, and free."¹ That is to say, free, thinking Soul, constituted as the Notion, can and does easily limit and temporarily set its own essence into a self-negated involution or convolution of itself upon itself in that manner. In this, and before the special movement begins, the soul is to be conceived as in the simplest state of the whole Notion, where the activity of knowing and consciousness is holding itself up in that continuous state which might be called absolute Remembrance, and, being thus already a conscious knowing potentiality, it is capable of such self-negation in a process of evolution and involution, with an end and aim. At the same time, it can just as readily, and consciously too, negate, cancel, overset, or abolish that limitation, and restore itself to its own inherent simplicity or original actuality, or it can impose and establish another and different limitation in place of the previous one, whereby and in virtue of the dialectic movement the

¹ Ibid. v. 332.

thing so temporarily existent may be altered, and enlarged or diminished, or even cancelled utterly into nothingness; for this "second negation" was the reflex stoppage (as it were) or reflection of the outward movement at that point of the limitation, so far and no farther; or it might go further into something other and different, or it might wholly withdraw itself inwardly again, or return into its simpler identity, whereby the special limitation utterly vanishes as such. This "relating of the Negative to itself," this "negation of the former negation," whereby the speciality becomes a something determined and set, is to be considered as the second premiss in the logical syllogism. "That *first* negation can be viewed as the analytic movement (if the determinations of analytic and synthetic are used in their opposition), in that the immediate [the Notion in its universality?] therein immediately relates itself to its other [*i. e.* stretches or throws some portion of itself out (as it were) into that other, so far constituting it an other]; and therefore it may be said to "go over into the same, or rather is gone over" into it. And this is analytic, since it is a kind of division or distinction into parts or aspects, still remaining in one whole, and, in respect of the relation back into the whole, it may also be regarded as synthetic, "because it is for another into which it goes over." And so this *second premiss* "can be determined as the synthetic, because it is the relation of the distinguished as such to its distinguishing" cause, *viz.*, the whole dialectic movement of the Notion, which initiates the distinction; that is, it may be regarded in that manner. As the *first* negation consisted in the movement of the whole universality into a division or partition of itself into a certain speciality and itself, so the *second* negation is determined, through that speciality, to some further particularity; and the whole, or the special, "as excluding and for itself different, relates to its other."

This cancelling Negativity, as the dialectic movement of

the whole Notion, "appears as the mediating" agency, "because it includes itself and that immediate" (limited part) "in itself all at once;" that is (it would seem), its mediating is merely the alteration of a relative and movable boundary, thus temporarily set and held within itself.¹ Now, "in so far as both these determinations [alluding to a certain relation] can be taken as external (*i. e.* viewed from the outside by the common understanding), the mediation can be considered as being only the mediating form (*formelle*)," as it was considered by Kant. As the absolute Negativity, however, "the negative moment of the absolute mediation is the unity, which is the Subjectivity and the Soul."² That is to say, the whole mediating, determining power or faculty lies in the subjective Ideality of the Soul, which has only, first, to establish, and then to alter, a relative, movable boundary of negation (or limitation), and is in itself such a self-active, conscious, knowing, creating, and destroying activity as is capable of proceeding in that manner, even to the evolution of a world of created things, and again destroying the same at will. The Kantian Syllogism, taking the categories in their abstract, hard and fast severance into irreconcilable antinomies and contradictions (as viewed externally), was the syllogistic manner of reasoning of the ordinary school logic and the common Understanding; but when these categories are all subsumed into unity in the dialectic movement of absolute Ideality in the one real Whole of the Notion as Soul, we have the living Syllogism as it really is in the entire universe and in a complete system of Logic: not merely a dead syllogism, nor an empty formal *schema*, but a living syllogism and an active dialectic of the one and all of Real Being or Essence, which is thus capable of evolving its own

¹ This set speciality seems to be what Rosenkranz designates as "Mittel" (medium, means, instrumentality), or the middle proposition, in his *Logie. Wissenschaft der logischen Idee*, Königsberg, 1859.

² *Ibid.* p. 333.

essence into a world of created things in a strictly logical process, and in a philosophical manner.¹

Still further (says Hegel, speaking of the turning-point of Negativity), "the method turns the course of knowing back into itself" in a sort of reflex relation or Reflection. This Negativity, as the self-cancelling of contradiction, is at the same time "the restoration (*Herstellung*) of the *first* immediateness [the Notion in its primitive fulness or Totality], that simple universality;" since it is "immediately the other of that other [the limited part], is the negative of that negation, and so is also the positive, identical universal." "This *second* immediateness [the restoration] is, in the whole course of knowing (if you will have a count), the *third* to the *first* immediateness and the mediated; but it is also the third to the formal Negative, and to the absolute Negativity. In so far, now, as that *first* negative is already the second term, so can that same, counted as third, be also counted as fourth, and the abstract form can be taken as a *quadruplicity* instead of a *triplicity*. The negative or the distinction is in this way counted as a *duality*. The *third* and the *fourth* is, in general, the unity of the *first* and the *second* moments, the immediate and the mediated. That it is this unity in such manner that the whole form of the method is a *Triplicity*, is only the superficial external side of the manner of knowing; but it is only this: but, truly shown, it should have been exhibited in determined employment [in a state of active determining], for the abstract count-form is itself especially crude and without concept (*Begriff*), and therefore its presentation, as presented [say, by Kant], has been without consequence; it is notwithstanding to be viewed as an infinite service of the Kantian philosophy. The conclusion, also threefold, is

¹ Kant's syllogism would seem to have been nearly what Bacon intended when he said of the *Novum Organum* that "it was no more but a new logic, teaching to invent and judge by induction, (as finding syllogism incompetent for sciences of nature)." — *Letter to the King*.

ever to be known as the general form of the Reason ; but it avails in general partly as a wholly external form, the form not determining the nature of the content ; and partly, where it runs in the formal sense of the understanding-determination of identity, there is wanting to it the essential dialectic movement, the Negativity [*i. e.* this faculty of self-determination] : but this movement steps into the formal Triplicity of the determination, because the *third* [the Conclusion] is the unity of the two first determinations [the *first* and *second* premiss] ; but these, where they are different, can be in unity only as cancelled in the *third* [the Conclusion], which embraces both in one. When this movement has stepped into the Triplicity, it has indeed “vivified (*bemächtigt*) the formalism, and bodies itself in the empty schema of the same. The shallow incongruity and baldness of the so-called philosophical interpretation [the Kantian, for instance] that counts in nothing but that formal schema, without dependence above all on the Notion and immanent determination, and only uses an external order, have made that form for a long time injuriously notorious. But it cannot lose, through the shallowness of this use, its inner worth ; and it is ever to be highly valued that even the conceptionless form of the Rational should have been discovered.”¹

Exactly how this counting is made out is not so very clear as stated : but the upshot would seem to be, that in the abstract logic of the Understanding, the universal proposition stands as the first premiss ; the specially limited proposition stands as the second premiss ; and the third (the Conclusion) subsumes the special proposition into or under the universal again. But these propositions (the Conclusion inclusive) are stated merely as abstract truths, and as external to any reality in Nature : it is an empty formalism of the Understanding, not a living Reality of the Reason. The common Syllogism is threefold, indeed, and a Triplicity, but the active element, the essential life,

¹ *Wissenschaft der Logik*, v. 332-334, Berlin, 1841.

is dropped out of it and overlooked. This makes it the dead and unfruitful Syllogism of the Understanding, as a formal school-logic of mere reasoning, which fails to ascend to the higher platform of the universal Reason. It deals only with the operations of the human mind as applied to practical affairs, or to the investigation of Nature from the outside as it is presented to observation in sense-perception only. Kant had himself recognized the "*I think*," the *me*, as "the transcendental unity of self-consciousness" in our minds, but he gave no essence, no activity, no life to it; he found it impossible to say what mind, or soul, was in itself, or whether or not it was anything more than the whole coöperation of sense-impressions on the brain-tissues in a kind of synthesis in the consciousness, after the manner of the physiological psychologists who have been his followers. Hegel restores this essential life and movement both to the finite and the universal mind as an immanent and necessary part, aspect, or function of itself as the Ideality of the Notion and the essential nature of Soul itself. He demonstrates that this living Essence is equally true of the syllogistic Notion in us as it is also of the absolute Idea. By this means (and it is the grandest achievement of his philosophy, and indeed of all philosophy hitherto), he rises to the height of the absolute and universal Soul, and demonstrates *à priori* the existence of God, or the absolute Personality as it is in its own eternal nature and being as a living essentiality, and not an abstract vision, — a demonstration which Kant pronounced impossible by any *à priori* method.

§ 3. QUANTITY — QUALITY — MODALITY — RECIPROCITY — KIND.

After all, this is not so much a denial of Essence, or a separation of activity from Essence, as a mode of describing and defining the precise manner in which he conceives the one active Essence to be and exist. It is the Notion, not merely "a thing." In one sense, this is true enough; but in a more general sense, the Notion as thus constituted is as

amount of Essence and Power, and "has its truth in the Notion."¹

Spinoza's Substance was really nothing else but this, however inadequate his logical statement of it: it is the universal Substance or Essence in potency and action. The *mode* and *extension* of Spinoza really mean nothing other than this unity of Quantity and Quality which makes out the absolute Modality of the one whole substantial reality of essence and existence, i. e. that same infinitely movable boundary of spacial limitation or "*extension*" which eternally and necessarily belongs as well to the one real Whole as such as also to all special or particular things limited out of it as their *modes* or spacial limitations. What Spinoza especially failed to state here, was precisely this Eleatic and Hegelian dialectic of the necessary and eternal reflection of Essence into the perpetual flux of change in this infinitely movable boundary of form.²

¹ *Wissensch. der Logik*, iii. 206-220, Berlin, 1841.

² On this subject, the views of Dortons de Mairan, as given by M. Paul Janet (*Les Maitres de la Pensée Moderne*, Paris, 1883, p. 121), are very significant. Indeed, it is evident on any critical study of Spinoza's doctrine that much of the difficulty of comprehending him aright arises, not only from the vagueness and insufficiency of his thought or his language, and especially from his use (sometimes erroneous) of such terms as *infinite*, *attribute*, *extension*, *mode*, *substance*, *necessity*, *freedom* or *liberty*, *thought*, *affections*, *ideas*, and the like words of common use at his day, or from misconceptions, misinterpretations, or total perversions in the minds of his readers and critics, but largely also from the controlling influence of the prevailing theological or spiritual notions of his time, and particularly about *Theism* and *Pantheism*, when God was scarcely conceivable otherwise than as some Jehovistic absolute power of personal will, above and apart from the world of Nature, or as some immaterial anthropomorphic spirit, creating, willing, thinking, and acting as man thinks, wills, acts, and creates. Even the critical discussion of Jouffroy, though learned and able in many respects, does not get entirely clear of these cloudy obfuscations. See *Cours de Droit Naturel*, par M. Th. Jouffroy, Paris, 1835, i. 163-190. Neither is the very able and profound "Critique" of M. Saisset (*Œuvres de Spinoza*, traduite par Emile Saisset, Paris, 1861, vol. i.) altogether satisfactory on some heads.

Dumas' doctrine of "the substitution of molecules" in certain bodies of organic chemistry, showing how the different qualities of bodies may depend on the particular arrangements, differences, and peculiar combinations of the ultimate molecules, and suggesting that the atoms may be in themselves identical with each other as the simplest discrete ones (that is, that they may be alike in respect of quantity and quality), approaches very near to the same metaphysical conception of the true nature of Quantity and Quality as predicated of the smallest conceivable masses. According to Hegel, intensive magnitude is essentially the same thing as extensive magnitude, or they are but two aspects of one and the same thing: ¹ intensive degree expands (as it were) into extensive size or spacial limitation, and this identity makes out the whole quantitative and qualitative Somewhat of Reality. The matter of the bodies (even of the atoms, if there be any) of ordinary science is only the temporarily limited and set form of their intensive and extensive magnitudes or masses; and so likewise the Forces of science are merely some determinate form or mode of intensive and extensive magnitude or degree of essential power, in the external manifestation thereof. In Mathematics, the Potentials of Gravity in bodies or masses, and of electric Quantity, considered as a state of stress in a one whole elastic incompressible Medium, appear to be governed by the same law of the inverse ratio of the square of the distance to the mass or quantity; and they are assumed to begin at the zero of infinity where is no mass and no quantity. In themselves, Matter and Force, Essence and Activity, are inseparable: they have one and the same content, viz., intensive and extensive magnitude at once and in one. This doctrine is consistent with the scientific teaching that force, or motion, is inconceivable apart from matter, and with the principle of the conservation of energy and the convertibility of forces. It finds its solution in the Unity of intensive and extensive

¹ *Logique de Hegel*, traduite par A. Véra, ii. pp. 50-51 and n.

magnitude, or Quantity.¹ Quality is mere spacial limitation, the *Qualis* or what kind; and "the unity of Quantity and Quality is Modality."² And Quantity is the total active Essence and Power of the Notion; that is, it is matter as it really is in itself, and is force as it is in itself. Mechanical force, the energy of a moving body, or of a machine in motion, or of a clock that is wound up, is only a secondary, subordinate, and temporarily limited and set form or mode of essential activity. The whole difference lies in the manner of conceiving the truth of it. *Matter* expresses that conception which regards only the permanent and temporarily persistent forms of bodies as observed from without: *Essence* expresses both the permanent and the movable state of matter, both that temporary fixity (which is still a movable boundary only, and is always changeable on the basis of the unmoved and the immovable) and that immovable and unalterable basis itself as well. But the eternally moving or movable Essence, truly conceived as moving only on the ground of the immovable or the unmoved, is the absolute Notion itself; and this conception, though quite different from what we ordinarily understand by *Matter*, may yet be, and in fact is, as necessarily, really, and absolutely true, and as much an actual fact, as the most solid body of our experience can be. It is even more so; for the solidity of experience is scientifically demonstrated to be an illusion of the senses, or only an accidental state or quality of matter, not an absolutely permanent and unalterable fact. More exactly, it is not altogether an illusion in itself, neither; for there truly is a certain temporary state of permanency and reality of all bodies in Nature: but the common notion of an eternally fixed solidity, liquidity, gaseousness, atomicity, or ethereality, as being absolute and eternal states or conditions of matter, is a sheer illusion. And no less illusory

¹ *Wissenschaft der Logik*, iii. 247, Berlin.

² *Wissenschaft der logischen Idee*, von Karl Rosenkranz, Königsberg, 1858-59.

is the idea of an atomic series of simple and same atoms, possessing a certain homogeneous and eternal identity throughout as such, or that of a continuous simple and same substance or essence, eternally and unalterably existent as such. It is impossible that either the one or the other could be a unity of matter and force, or of essence and action, in one. Such crude conceptions of the nature of Essence are merely vague and fruitless endeavors to ignore the fundamental categories of universal reason and necessity as well as the internal and necessary relations of the complex essentiaes which enter into the absolute constitution of Essence as the logical Notion of the one Whole and All of Reality. In truth, this is at once and in one, absolutely and eternally, the Universal, the Special, and the Particular in one and the same continuous and ever-continuing Totality; in which the eternal movement of Causality is to be regarded as a coeternal fact, and as merely one aspect of the absolute Whole. In this unity of Essence and Power in the one Whole lies its Potentiality as the absolute Causality. The movement is simply the eternal Fact. Its truth is as absolutely necessary *à posteriori* as it is *à priori*.

The idea of "Reciprocity" gives no satisfactory account of this action or activity. The term itself implies some kind of reciprocal action and reaction, or relation. If there is to be movement within a permanently standing whole and all, there must necessarily be action and reaction therein. The moving part must react upon the standing all, or it must both act and react upon the other parts; and, if there be actual movement, a change of relations within the Whole must follow. In respect of all the movable parts, or changeable aspects and relations within the Whole, there must, indeed, be both action and reaction in the relation of Reciprocity. But this is no explanation or account of the movement, the original active causality. The parts might as well be standing in a perfect equilibrium of stationary balance within the Whole. All might be at a standstill. In such case,

what should ever set it in motion? Any suggestion of a superessential (supernotional) spirit that could either start it into movement, or keep it in motion when once moving, or could itself exist at all, is, by the very hypothesis of such a standing whole and all of real being or essence, quite impossible and wholly inadmissible. Nothing remains but the absolute fact and the necessary truth of an eternal movement as the absolute Causality, grounded on the eternal necessities, essentiaes, and inner necessary relations, and whole essential constitution of the standing One and All itself. This is really the Hegelian conception of absolute Cause or *Causa Sui*, as distinguished from the simple relation of Cause and Effect, or causality in the chain of secondary causes and effects, and from the simple relation of Action and Reaction as Reciprocity.¹

Hegel's "Reciprocity" would seem to have been something like this: the one Whole throws itself out into a certain speciality of its own essence in a movement of reflection upon itself, or upon the unmoved portion of the Whole; and it takes its special form from its motion. This is what he calls a kind of *pushing off from itself* (*Abstossen von sich*). The part moving within the Whole is necessarily limited over against the unmoved portion, or also against the Whole as such; and so there is a kind of negation of negation between them. But the Whole, in accordance with its own internal constitution of immovable identity and movable form in one, is also in motion or movable, and consequently there arises a certain relation of external opposition between the two as two, and reciprocal action, or a Reciprocity of balancing or overbalancing movement must necessarily exist between the speciality thus constituted and

¹ Schopenhauer seems to have fully appreciated the inadequacy of "Reciprocity" as a substitute for "Causality:" "the conception of reciprocity," says he, "ought to be banished from metaphysics." — *The World as Will and Idea*, trans. by Haldam and Kemp, London, 1886, vol. ii. p. 61. ✓

the Whole as such; and there must necessarily arise also a certain reciprocal negation, and a movable boundary of limitation between the two sides of the whole identity, which may be set, posited, and remain fixed in a certain determinateness of form, or may be in a perpetual course of change in their relations to one another as the two opposed terms. Thus, a certain Reciprocity of action and reaction may readily be conceived to exist between them; but no account of the original activity, or of the origin of motion, or of any true causality, is given therein. This lies in the unity of the extreme terms in the fundamental ground of both, or in the absolute Causality.

Something quite analogous to this takes place when an eddy arises in a flowing stream. It is a speciality of water in the whole stream, and it acquires a whirling movement of its own, and receives its form from its motion, under all the limiting conditions. Lord Rosse noticed the commencement of a like eddying whirl, or spiral winding, in an immense nebula never before seen: it seemed likely to draw the whole nebulous cloud into the form of a revolving globe. The telescope could not discover the origin or cause of the movement. The nebula and its process are doubtless in and within the universal æther, but the reciprocity of action and reaction between the nebula and the æther is not seen by the astronomer. Emerson seems to have had some similar notion in his head when he wrote these lines: —

“A subtle chain of countless rings
The next unto the farthest brings;
The eye reads omens where it goes,
And speaks all languages the rose;
And, striving to be man, the worm
Mounts through all the spires of form.”

The Neoplatonists did not state the precise manner in which they conceived that their *paradigms* of form, unical *hyparxes*, or archetypal ideas were formed and constituted by or out of the universal Intelligence: they simply de-

clared their existence in point of fact as absolute truth. The mode of their genesis was not explained. Hegel seems to have some similar doctrine of generic, specific, and particular forms under the designation of kind or type (*Gattung*), but he is scarcely more definite and clear than they were. His theory would seem to imply, *first*, that the universal and necessary Essence and Form exists from eternity in the absolute constitution of internal and immovable or unmoved identity and externally movable form or boundary of limitation in one continuous unity of identity and difference, or of the Universal standing over against the specials and particulars as formed and contained within it; and, *second*, that all specialities and particularities of essence and form are thus whirled off within the Whole, and are so constituted by the Universal Essence and Form, and as the necessary result or effect of the absolute Causality residing therein from eternity. His doctrine of *reflection-into-itself*, when applied to the specials and particulars, or as predicated of them, implies that they are thus whirled into special essences and forms as *quasi* distinct and independent Wholes, or as having a temporary (not an absolute) existence as such by themselves, and that the specialities, in like manner, whirl off the particularities within themselves; and that so, as a final result, we have the particulars or least general types of form included within the specific or more general, and these again within the still wider generals, and so on, in a kind of subordinate architectonic, until we arrive at last at the universal archetype of all in the essential Notion or absolute Idea.

Hegel himself is not very explicit on this head. As conceived by science, this special whirling of a nebulous cloud, or of an eddy in water, air, gas, æther, electric medium, or whatever other form and mode of substance there may be, is regarded as a strictly mechanical process or operation. The Hegelian theory would seem to identify the mechanical and the ideal in one essential whole Content and Form,

wherein movement in Freedom and under Necessity was itself either an eternal necessity or an eternal fact; and in this, perhaps, we may find an intelligible conception of the Ideal and the Real in a one whole and absolute Essentia. But his more spiritual interpreters (if not himself also) will insist upon magnifying and exalting the aspect of Freedom (which is mere possibility at best) into some supernatural kind of purely spiritual Subjectivity of feeling, emotion, will, and power, that is not only immanent in the real Essentia, but somehow infinitely transcends all the necessities, necessary relations, actualities and realities of the internal constitution and very nature of the Essentia itself; as if Spirit were something above and apart from them, independent of them, and all-powerful over them, or could itself have any possible existence as such absolute transcendence at all anywhere but in the dreams of the emotional fancy.

§ 4. KINDS OF POSSIBLE MOVEMENT — ABSOLUTE CAUSALITY.

Of the one Whole and All, four kinds of movement only would seem to be possible or conceivable: —

1. A movement of circular revolution of the Whole as a Whole on an axis; and,
2. A movement of translation, or change of relative place or position of particulars, within the whole;
3. A movement of change of Quantity and Quality, or of Modality in respect of Essence and Form in the Whole, or of quantity and quality, or modality of essence and form in the particulars; and,
4. An eternal movement of absolute Causality in the Whole as such.

As to a movement of translation for the one Whole, as a Whole, involving both centre and circumference, whether linear or curvilinear, that may be set down as simply impossible, and inconceivable because impossible; for, being equally

much a thing as is an atom: it is a different thing, but still a thing, and indeed a very wonderful thing. It is the One and All of being and knowing, the whole actuality of real existence. As such, it is necessarily determinate in respect of both Quantity and Quality: it is the Essence of essences, the Quantity of quantities, the Quality of qualities, the Cause of causes, and the Potentiality of powers. But it is not infinite in respect of either Quantity or Quality: its true infinity consists in its dwelling in Eternity (in respect of duration) and in Immensity (in respect of intensive and extensive magnitude), in its absolute Allness in respect of Reality, and in the inexhaustibility (in respect of Activity and Causality) of its eternal movement into the quantities, qualities, and measures of special and particular things other than itself in its wholeness as such. The unity of Quantity and Quality is Mass, is Potentiality, is Measure, is Modality. This view would seem to be consistent with what Hegel has expressly said: "We have shown that the One as it is in and for itself goes over into attraction, into its ideality, and that hence the continuity is not external to itself, but belongs to itself, and is grounded in its Essence (*Wesen*)."¹ This Essence is the whole internal and necessary constitution of the Notion itself, and the continuity of the creative activity, the movement, is grounded on the standing All of that Essence: therefore it is not a mere activity without essence or apart from essence. It is not an empty abstraction of "pure Activity," or a sheer "Becoming." Hegel defines Quantity as the continued intensity of the one active Essence, or again as "intensive and extensive Magnitude."

The whole absolute Quantity of Essence and Power in one, there being eternal movement in it in point of fact, is thrown out and determined, or limited, into the quantities and qualities of other special and particular things by way of action and evolution, and is withdrawn, or returns, into the whole again by way of reaction, negation, and reflection;

¹ *Wissenschaft der Logik*, iii. 206, Berlin, 1841.

and this outward and inward movement in a perpetual flux of external form, on the basis of a certain internal and continuous "negative unity" in the one identical Whole, makes out the Ideality of the Notion, as both an absolute Causality and an absolute Reciprocity of Action and Reaction. It is the dialectic movement of creation and destruction of specials and particulars in the Whole, or a continuous creation of new in the destruction of old: it comes about in a perpetual cycle, and has its proper infinity therein. The infinite Ideality is simply the absolute Causality. All the while, the Notion remains identical with itself in respect of its essential constitution and nature. It merely changes its form and mode of existing and being. This change is a process of knowing and creating, of remembrance and oblivion (as it might be called), and it measures the course of change in the world of Nature. It is nearly what is meant by the ancient materialists (if they had properly understood themselves) by "the eternity of the World" amidst all changes of form: it is the hidden inner meaning of the ancient fable of Proteus.¹ Hegel quotes Spinoza as saying that "Quantity is (to the intellect) infinite, one and indivisible," and also Leibnitz as saying, "It is not improbable that matter and quantity are the same." In the *Monadology*, Leibnitz considers God as "the Supreme Substance, the Only, Universal and Necessary," and as "the magnitude of positive reality," outside of which is nothing but the empty possibility of its actual existence. The Logic of Hegel, with the deeper insight of the Eleatic school, subsumed the antinomial and contradictory categories of Kant into unity in the living Ideality of the Notion, and grounded motion "on the concept of Quantity in which it finds its solution." "The Eleatics [he says] did the universe the highest honor; for they have the pure reason of Parmenides for result in that they show the solution in it of all determined being, so that it is in itself *the flowing* of Heraclitus." Quantity represents the Whole intensive and extensive magnitude, the total

¹ See Bacon's *Wisdom of the Ancients: Proteus*.

free to move in any radial direction whatever from its central point, there could be no possible cause, agency, or potentiality, to move it in one direction rather than in another, and it must necessarily stand still as a Whole, eternally and immovably. The only possible relation it could have to anything external to itself would be that of the absolute Whole and All of real Essentivity to the outer abyss* of Nothingness or its own merely negative aspect, the aspect and sphere of Freedom or the mere empty Possibility of its own actuality as such Essentivity; and in reference to that it could make no possible difference with itself, if it could be imagined as falling in any direction whatever, or even as continuing to fall to all eternity.¹

As to the *first* kind of real movement, that of a circular revolution of the Whole on an axis, while both axis and revolving Whole still remain unmoved and immovable in respect of translation, this is both possible and readily conceivable. It is Aristotle's infinite circular motion, which is truly infinite only in the sense of a perpetual return into itself, without beginning, end, or middle. In this case, while every point or portion of the whole, even down to the least conceivable atomic point or line where the part or particular should return completely out of its particularity into the universality of the one identical Whole as such, or where, reversely, it began to enter into its particularity out of the universal Whole, might be imagined, indeed, as having a movement of change of position in reference to the central axis (conceived as a diametrically extended central point or line), still there would not necessarily be any change of relative place of the part or particular in reference to any other part or particle of the revolving Whole, or to the Whole as such; and it would be for the part or particle

¹ It was a tenet of Sir Isaac Newton's creed, that "The Father is immovable, no place being capable of becoming emptier or fuller of Him than it is by the eternal necessity of nature. All other things are movable from place to place."

* Cf. 186. There is no "outer abyss of Nothingness" to the Real. It is the Whole of a finite in itself - Space; but Space (Itself) can only be an infinite Real Possibility.

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 itself, and for the Whole, all the same thing as standing still. If any imagined part or particle were to have a motion of change of relative place in comparison with other parts or particles, or with the Whole as such, it must necessarily receive that motion from some interior action within the Whole, and that action must necessarily proceed from the eternal movement of the absolute Causality within the Whole: there could be no other possible origin or source of such motion. The supposed central point, or the axial line, can be no essence or essentia other than a purely logical necessity of Reason; and it is this only in the same sense and manner that a Void, or an abyss of Nothingness, is a pure necessity of Reason, and a truth as such, though in itself alone it is nothing else or other than that same sheer empty possibility of the actual subsistence and reality of the One and All itself, which is thus contemplated as a revolving Whole.

If two absolutely discrete and independent bodies, masses, or wholes, could possibly have any real existence in a void, otherwise than in the illogical conceit of the fancy imagining it, then a change of relative position with reference to each other (or in reference to a system of geometrical coördinates, ideally projected across Immensity and Eternity) might in like manner be fancied; but the real existence of any two such absolutely dis severed and discrete ones or wholes is as really impossible as it is rationally inconceivable. There cannot be but one absolute Whole and All of real Essentia, distinguishable from the void abyss of empty Possibility. But as parts or portions of the one essential Whole, receiving their existence from and within the Whole, and merely as distinguishable parts thereof, not only two but any multitude of bodies or masses, are not only possible, but a familiar fact. Such ideal, geometrical coördinates are not only conceivable to the finite imagination, or faculty of thought, as logical necessities, and as a mathematical basis of reference and comparison of the rela-

tive motions and changes of place of all the moving bodies, masses, or atoms, there are in the world, but they are also seen, intellectually (or by metaphysical insight), to be, of a like necessity of Reason, universally and absolutely true and real, in themselves considered. They have their ground of truth in the absolute logic of Reason and in Fact: they are no mere empty abstractions. They are real essentiaes as such. They are the necessary ground alike of all matter, all force, all movement, and of all essences, substances, or things, and of all mind or thought as well.

The *second* kind of movement is that of change of relative place or position of parts or particulars. It is a movement of some particular within the Whole, whereby there necessarily results a change of relative place for that particular in reference to other particulars, or to the Whole as such; and this would be necessarily a motion of translation in time and space for that particular, or in respect of the times, spaces, and places of other particulars within the Whole.

The *third* kind of movement is that of change of Quality, or, as it may be, of Quantity and Quality (or Modality) for such special or particular things. For the particular, it is a movement of change in place, that is, without change of relative position. It may be a simple change of Quality, that is, of shape and modality, without a change of Quantity also, or it may be a more inward and radical change of the Quantity and Quality (or Modality) of the particular at once, even to the ultimate return and final resolution of the particular itself into the one universal Quantity and Quality, whence it came; and in either case the change must be the result of the action and operation of the self-determining Whole. For though there never was a time when the one Whole was not distinguished, differentiated, and distributed into specialities and particularities within the identical and universal All (which as the unity and totality of the Essential, the Universal, the Special, and the Particular ever dwells in Eter-

nity and Immensity), nevertheless, the specials and particulars as such must necessarily receive their spacial and temporary relations, that is, their special limitations of essence and form, or (in other words) their measures of quantity and quality, that is, their modality, in times, spaces, and places; for these are in themselves nothing else but such contingent limitation and relativity. These specialities and particularities are neither absolutely necessary nor eternal as such: they are bound up, however, not only in the eternal and unalterable necessities, but also in those mutable necessities or alterable laws, which, however changeable, may yet continue unchanged, indefinitely (or even without end), or may, in any instant, be altered, modified, or annulled. These things lie in the field of contingency and change: they have their existence at once in Freedom and under all the necessities or laws of their actual constitutions and natures as such, and are perpetually subject to alteration and change, however slow or rapid, and they exist only in a state of possible flux, or of incessant flow. They are dependent, not alone upon the external dialectic of Action and Reaction in Nature, but also and finally upon the internal dialectic of the absolute Causality that eternally resides in the One and All.

The *fourth* kind of movement is that of the absolute Causality. While a movement of revolution of the one Whole on an axis may be conceivably possible, it is in no manner a logical necessity. Neither is there any proof of the fact in Nature. Physical science does indeed demonstrate a wide generality of circular and revolutionary motions, throughout the material worlds. They are common to all solar systems, and reach even to the Nebulæ. They descend to molecules, or even to atoms (if there be any). It is even probable, if not certain, that our Solar System has a curvilinear motion of revolution around some central point.¹ The

¹ The astronomers say that the Sun is moving directly towards the Constellation *Hercules*, at the rate of 2,000 miles an hour, or a half million of miles a day. — *The Story of the Heavens*, by Robert S. Ball, LL. D., F. R. S., etc., London, 1885, p. 436.

stars have motions of translation in various directions in reference to each other, if not in circular orbits about their own special centres. But these are motions of particular bodies or masses within the one absolute Whole and All of real Essentia; and when the question is of a movement of revolution of that Whole as such on an axis, we can only say that there is no proof, no evidence of the fact, nor any logical necessity of its truth. The logical demonstration of the impossibility of a movement of translation for such Whole, in a straight line, or in a curve, may render it highly probable that no such motion of revolution on an axis, in place, exists for the One and All of Reality, that is, for the Universe itself. Other considerations strengthen the conclusion that the absolute Essentia (as the logical Notion) must necessarily be a Standing All, within which all movements that are conceivably possible must take place, and then only upon the basis of the unmoved and immovable Whole.

Here, again, the nature of Time and Space has to be considered. Time is nothing else but limitation in respect of eternity of duration; Space, nothing but limitation in respect of immensity of extension. The absolute Whole as such must necessarily have an eternal duration. Such duration is infinite, in the sense of being without beginning, end, or middle. This merely expresses the eternity of the absolute Quantity. Spacial extension for the one Whole Quantity expresses merely the limitation which is its Quality. The unity of absolute Quantity and Quality makes out the absolute Modality of the one Whole as such. *Eternity* properly means only the abstract and empty Possibility of the eternal duration of the one Whole Essentia as the absolute Quantity, Quality, and Modality. *Immensity* properly means only the abstract and empty Possibility of spacial extension or the limitation of Quality. This possibility is infinite, in the sense of being without beginning, end, or middle, other than the absolutely eternal and necessary distinction of the Whole real Essentia from the Nothingness as its abstract

and empty Possibility. This distinction is infinite, in the sense of being without beginning, end, or middle, in reference to the eternal duration of the whole real Essence. It simply expresses the necessary truth that there never was, or could be, a time in which this distinction did not exist. But Quality as this distinction of spacial extension is a perpetually movable limitation, and not an absolutely fixed boundary. Quality, therefore, is infinitely changeable, that is, change as such is without beginning, end, or middle, and in this sense infinite. Quantity as expressing the Whole Essence and Power in one of the absolute Essence, its whole Potentiality, is in itself, as such, eternal, unchangeable, inexhaustible, imperishable, immortal: it is infinite, but not in the same sense that Eternity and Immensity are infinite as the empty possibilities of the Actuality of the whole real Essence, but only in the sense of the absolute subsistence and reality and eternal duration of the same, and of its eternal and inexhaustible movement of variability, that is, of potential and actual distinctions, differentiations, and distributions of itself into distinguishable aspects, parts, specializations and particularizations; of essences and forms, quantities and qualities, within the still continuing identity of the essential Whole as such absolute All of Reality. In this sense, both Essence and Movement may be said to be infinite as being without beginning, end, or middle. Only the distinctions, the differentiations, the specializations, the particulars as such, have beginnings, middles, and ends, and are therefore finite, as limited into times, spaces, and places. But this movement, simply as movement, or as the movable aspect of the one whole Essence, must necessarily take place, can take place only, upon the ground and basis, and under the absolutely necessary limitations (as well as in the absolutely necessary possibilities or Freedom) of all those eternal and unalterable necessities and necessary relations, and of all those alterable or movable necessities and relations, conditions, or self-imposed laws, which are constitutive

of the one whole Essentivity itself as it eternally and absolutely is in its own real nature as such. This movement is simply the eternal fact and a necessary truth: it is the absolute Causality, whereof Aristotle said it was such as to be "the standing of the One, and the motion of the Many (ὁλον στάσις τοῦ ἑκός, κίνησις δὲ τοῦ πλήθους)." ¹

§ 5. THE ADAMANTINE SPINDLE — SPONTANEITY — WILL.

Plato, in his celebrated myth of Err, the Armenian, seems to have figured the universe (after the manner of the astronomical conceptions of his day) as turning on the adamantine spindle of Necessity. On it were spools within spools, the spheres of the stars and planets, revolving in opposite directions. The bright band of the Milky Way encompassed the whole. Clefts opened upward and downward, right and left, through which all souls must pass on their several ways. The source of power and motion was at one end of the spindle, and the thread of life and destiny was spun off at the other. The three Fates, Lachesis the dispenser of lots in the Past, Clotho in the Present, and Atropos in the Future, daughters of Necessity and Freedom, were the spinners; and all souls and things that were spun finally reached the Careless river of Lethe, the waters of which no vessel could hold.

Here is no question made of the moving Causality. After his usual manner of dealing with points of greatest difficulty, Plato launches forth into the sphere of myth and fable. Under figure of these daughters of Necessity, there is an implicit assumption of a freely spontaneous personality that is both will and power in one, as if it were in itself alone a self-existent, self-moving, independent spirituality. The clearest notion we get from him, or from Aristotle, as to self-movement, is in what he calls *the that which itself moves itself*; and this he conceives to be *the very essence*

¹ Arist. Met., Redarguit W. Christ, Lipsie, 1886, t. 2, p. 66.

and true notion of Soul; but as to how that can move itself, or be a spontaneous freewill, there is no further attempt to explain. His doctrine is suggestive of the modern notion of *Spontaneity*. This is but another vague term, apparently invented to cover ignorance, rather than to express knowledge or any intelligible conception. The word comes from the Latin *spondeo*, which meant the doing of an act of one's own accord, — *sua sponte*, of his own freewill or mere motion. It expressed merely the popular sense of voluntary or spontaneous action. It involved no question of the inner nature of the soul or will, nor of spontaneous activity itself, whether that of personal freewill, or that of mere physical action, as in "spontaneous combustion," "spontaneous growth," "spontaneous generation," and the like. Some interior source of motion was always implicitly presupposed. It was a common belief in ancient as in modern times that pure spiritual activity was spontaneous: no question was made exactly how it could be so. It sometimes took the imaginary form of the Socratic *dæmon*, or good genius, lying behind the soul of the philosopher himself, and dictating his most inward action. It reappears in Shakespeare, as when the Soothsayer says to Antony, —

"Thy dæmon, that's thy spirit which keeps thee, is
Noble, courageous, high, unmatchable,
Where Cæsar's is not; but near him thy angel
Becomes a fear, as being o'erpowered;" — ¹

"Some say the Genius so
Cries 'Come!' to him that instantly must die."

And Browning speaks of the man,

"who lives by diagrams,
And crosses not the spontaneities
Of all his individual personal life
With formal universals."

¹ Theobald's *Works of Shakes.*, vi. 245 and note (25), London, 1733; Holmes' *Authorship of Shakes.*, p. 496.

The French *spontanéité* is used by Victor Cousin to characterize nearly all thought in the earlier stages of human progress, and before critical philosophy had a beginning, as a simple "spontaneous and instinctive intuition." It preceded "reflection and necessary conception," or any true knowledge of "universal and necessary principles." These ideas concerned only the spontaneity of the human will, or also the spontaneous action in natural objects. There was never any question of the origin of motion in Nature, or in the presumed spiritual activity: these were alike assumed to be spontaneous. If there had been an actual generation of animalcules in Dr. Bustian's hermetically sealed flasks, it would not have been a whit more or less spontaneous than it was when it did actually occur in some remote Laurentian period, nor indeed then a whit more or less spontaneous than it would have been if it had taken place in the artificial flasks. Cousin, indeed, gets his idea of "the principle of Causality" from the fact of voluntary or spontaneous action of the will in ourselves, whereby our reason comes to a direct and immediate knowledge of the necessity and universality of causation; and upon this ground of necessary cause we are justified in imputing to all action in external Nature a like necessity of causation therein; whence comes our idea of the necessary principle of Causality. And we are under the necessity of saying and believing that everything that moves must have a cause that moves it, until we come at last to that absolute one and whole *Essentia* that is eternally existent, being itself without a cause other than itself, and so is necessarily *causa sui*; but the activity, the movement, all potentiality of motion within it, must of a like necessity be as eternal as itself. In a certain sense, it may be said to be a spontaneous energy and a free activity, but by no conceivable possibility can it be an absolutely free and independent activity, spontaneity, or pure spirituality, but however spontaneous, or however spiritual, only partially free, being necessarily de-

N.B.
 (causality)
 ...
 ...
 ...

pendent as turning on the spindle of Necessity, and as eternally bound in the adamantine bonds of all the unalterable necessities, movable necessities, necessary relations, mediating conditions and instrumentalities, and necessary laws of its own absolute constitution as the one Whole and All of real Being, which is itself the absolute Causality.

A substance of the reason in us is as necessary as a substratum of things in Nature, in which causal action is exhibited. By the logic of reason and necessity, we ascend in both the inward and the outward directions, up to the necessary conception of the unity of that universal Substance, which (in the phrase of Cousin) is Cause in so far as substance, and substance in so far as cause, or (in Hegelian phrase) is universal Essence and absolute Potentiality in the logical Notion, and is the absolute Causality. This is conceived by Cousin, very much after the manner of Plato, Aristotle, and the Neoplatonists, as the absolutely active Intelligence, the true, the Beautiful, and the Good, the universal Personality, or indeed as God. Hegel arrives at the same conclusion under the form and phrase of the logical Notion or absolute Idea as the self-active universal Intelligence, or "God as he is in his own nature and being." But neither of them gives a clear, intelligible, and satisfactory account of the activity or movement. They seem to assume or imply a distinction between self-activity and eternal movement. Under vague terms and phrases, they leave us to imagine some kind of purely spiritual activity, a spontaneous Freewill or Spirit, that is in itself an arbitrary and absolute source of voluntary acts, moments, impulses, throbs, or fitful leaps, rather than as a continuously acting power and potentiality, an actual *Vis Viva*, and an eternal movement in the one absolute Whole of all Reality.

In the myth of Err, within the encompassing Whole, clefts opened up and down, right and left, through which all finite souls passed on their several ways of life and destiny. Exactly how these were therein constituted, we get

no definite conception from Plato. Plotinus and Proclus seem to have conceived the absolute Whole as universal Intelligence, and as in itself a unity or "unical hyparxis" of identity and difference in the one Whole. Their statement does not reach to exact logical precision; but their idea is suggestive of the syllogistic unity of Hegel's logical Notion. With them there was a paradigmatic architectonic of lesser intelligences under and within the universal One, even down to human and animal souls. Each new intelligence in successive order was itself also a unical hyparxis or hypostatized beginning of a generic character, and under these were still lesser generic or specific intelligible forms, each having its own hyparxis of logical constitution or unity of metaphysical essence and form, terminating at last in the multitude of individual souls. The more general included the less general in a descending series, as it were, of spools within spools, each turning on its own spindle in its own special sphere of limited motion or life, but always in due subordination to the higher spheres of intelligible paradigms. Leibnitz's "Supreme Monad," with its subordinate multitudes of lesser "monads or atom-souls," dimly shadowed forth some analogous scheme. The Platonic Soul, the Neoplatonic Intelligence, the Leibnitzian Monad, the Hegelian Notion, the "self-subsistent real Essence" or "primitive Matter" of Bacon, the thinking Essence of Berkeley, the divine substance of Spinoza, and the Substantial Cause of Cousin, all alike, were conceived in some way as being alive, or as having in them a principle of motion: that is, as being in some manner a self-moving, or an eternally moving and absolute spontaneity. Something like this, in whatever mode or form, was considered by them all as being the source of motion in all things else, whether in the included and including spools, in the hyparxes of the lesser intelligences, or in other syllogistic unities or Notional specialities, down to the simplest exhibitions of conscious will and thinking power, or even to the "natural motion of the

atom;" and each in its place turned in freedom and under necessity on its own particular spindle. The movement was apparently spontaneous. As in a mountain spring the water appears to flow perennially and spontaneously as if from an inexhaustible reservoir, so in the special soul, no less than in the atom or molecule, the stream of essence, life, power, and will appears to be spontaneous, as if coming from an unknown or an unknowable source, if not from "the ineffable fountain" of Plotinus.

"Man," says Emerson, "is a stream whose source is hidden. Our being is descending into us from we know not whence." . . .

"As with events, so is it with thoughts. When I watch that flowing river, which, out of regions I see not, pours for a season its streams into me, I see that I am a pensioner; not a cause, but a surprised spectator of this ethereal water; that I desire and look up, and put myself in an attitude of reception; but from some alien energy the visions come."

"The Supreme Critic on the errors of the past and the present, and the only prophet of that which must be, is that great Nature in which we rest, as the earth lies in the soft arms of the atmosphere; that Unity, that Over-soul, within which every man's particular is contained and made one with all other." . . .

"We live in succession, in division, in parts, in particles. Meantime within man is the soul of the whole; the wise silence; the universal beauty, to which every part and particle is equally related, the eternal One."¹

Man may indeed be said to be a pensioner and a spectator of the inflowing stream of the essential energy which is his special knowing and thinking power; but his thoughts, his visions, will be his own work, however they may seem to flow, spontaneously, from an unseen source, or to be breathed into him as it were by the divine grace. But the fact is logically certain, that neither thoughts, visions, nor

¹ Emerson's *Essays*, 1st series, p. 244, Boston, 1854.

events, are poured into him from any foreign source whatever, but only that essential energy wherein lies his power to think, will, and act. ||| J. H.

The saying of Rosenkranz is notable in this connection: "The organism contains mechanism and chemism in itself, can be both mechanical and chemical. Even so it is with Spirit (*Geist*). The higher contains the relatively lower, which consequently can go back to it. It can also be excited through the lower, which as essential, without the higher, is itself not thinkable. The Will (for example) contains the thinking in itself. We can think what we will. The Will appears, because it contains and cancels the thinking in itself as the higher moment, but can (since without thinking Will were not at all) be determined, through the thinking, to a special conclusion. Thinking is not heterogeneous to Will. As the lower potency, it can only become the awakening of the higher that it thereby finds itself again in it."¹

If this be a little obscure, we may gather the meaning to be, perhaps, that the willing essence and thinking power are to be conceived as a one syllogistic whole in itself. As such, the essential energy which is the Will or soul itself may be said to contain the thinking, which is, indeed, but one aspect or function of the whole as such, in which thoughts are conceived and cancelled at will. Without the thinking, there were, indeed, properly speaking, no will at all, but only blind force. The thinking and the will are one and inseparable. Will, as the knowing, conscious, thinking essence and power which the special soul itself is; thereby becomes, and only can become, capable of giving direction, limitation, guidance to its own action, and so of determining it to a special conclusion. At the bottom of all is the essential energy; but it is, at the same time, an activity in reason, that is to say, in freedom and under all the necessities of its own rational constitution as soul, or as that syllogistic unity or special Whole which it is in itself; and it is, therefore, inherently a know-

J. H.
Soul?
Reason
11

¹ *Wissenschaft der logischen Idee*, i. 410, Königsberg, 1858.

ing, conscious potentiality of self-determination to a definite end, with a foreseen aim. This function or phase of the soul is what is really meant by the term *Will*. But if it be wrenched from its true purport (as is usually done), and made to signify an independent and arbitrary power of choice, wholly apart from the essential constitution and nature of the soul itself, as if it were some kind of superadded spirit, genius, angel, or dæmon, lying behind the soul, it becomes a mere name for a visionary fancy and a sheer illusion.

Bacon, like Dante, held that "the substance of the soul" came immediately from God, and remained subject to his "secret will and grace;" it was not "included in Nature" as "extracted out of the mass of earth," but was "a spirit newly inclosed in a body of earth:"—

— "e spiro
Spirito novo di virtù repleto."

Nor did the mind, "as a mirror or glass," receive illumination directly "from the foreknowledge of God or spirits." Divine illumination did not reside in the imagination, "its seat being rather in the very citadel of the mind;" but (he adds) "the divine grace uses the motions of the imagination as an instrument of illumination, just as it uses the motions of the Will as an instrument of virtue:" it was, perhaps, that

— "Destiny
That hath to instrument this lower world
And what is in't."

As a mirror of Nature, "the mind of man dimmed and clouded by the covering of the body"—that "muddy vesture of decay,"—instead of being "a smooth, clear, and equal glass," reflecting things "according to their true incidence," was "rather an enchanted glass full of superstition and imposture." But "man as the minister and interpreter of Nature does, and understands, as much as he has ob-

served of the order, operation, and mind of nature; and neither knows, nor is able to do more" concerning it. Nevertheless, "the nature of man (the special and peculiar work of Providence) includes mind and intellect, which is the seat of providence;" and it followed, therefore, "almost necessarily that the human spirit was endued with providence not without the precedent and intention and warrant of the greater Providence."

All this, however poetical and vague, may show that Bacon really conceived the matter much in the same manner as other realistic idealists, though some few of the moderns have surpassed him in precision of logical analysis and in exactness of metaphysical statement. It is clear, however, that, with him, the human mind was somehow a specialization of the universal mind. It was in itself an intellectual substance or essence, a special and peculiar work of Providence, and a seat of imagination, memory, perception, conception, will, and providence in itself as such: it was a thinking power, and, "whether prompted by sense, or acting by its own permission, whether in the functions of the intellect or in those of the affections and will, leaped to the modulation of thoughts"¹ and deeds; and the prime object of its culture was, to make it "a complete power of action." It could be prompted by sensation: it was in itself an active substance. It could act by its own permission. The intellect, the affections, the Will, were only functions or phases of the One whole "Thinking Power, which holds the first place." Will, here, is evidently considered as that function of the potential whole (already by its own internal constitution a knowing essence and a conscious activity) whereby permission, guidance, direction, or self-determination to a foreseen end becomes, in a certain degree and measure, both possible and actual. This soul could impose limitation on itself — "a restraint to a determined scope."

¹ *De Aug. Scient.*, L. ii. c. 13: Bacon's Works, by Spedding (Boston, 1861), ii. p. 235.

This "permission" is nearly what Hegel must have really intended when he said, that "the freedom of the Idea unlocks and releases itself into the moment of self-determination;" that is, as we may understand, the really active, potential, and rational essence, in its conscious freedom and under all the necessities, relations, and conditions of its own actual nature, can impose limitation on its own action, or unlock and release the same into a predetermined moment of action as will. "Reason," adds Rosenkranz, "is no mere abstraction, but is personal in the soul (*Geist*), since soul is only the thinking which sets the concept of the reason as ideal in itself, without which there is given quite no reason at all;" that is (we may suppose), reason is neither an empty abstraction nor a fixed logical scheme or immovable diamond network; but, as the one syllogistically constituted whole essence and power, is a movable reason, rationality, or function of the special personality as so constituted, whose thinking consists in setting its own conceptions as ideal in itself, and in changing or cancelling them, at will. The syllogistic movement is at once both real and ideal. Conscious knowing and thinking are, indeed, nothing else but that. Iago, in the *Othello*, seems to have had a very clear conception of the nature of this "permission of the Will."¹

As conceived by Bacon, this inner special substance of the soul was an immediate creation of the universal Mind. Its activity or life flowed spontaneously (as it were) from the spring-head of all power and motion. It was in itself an active cause and a willing power: it was that "sparkle of our creation light," whereby the soul intellectually and spiritually sees, knows, perceives, conceives, imagines, remembers, reasons, thinks, and comprehends, and is self-conscious, and that power whereby it acts, wills, and creates. But when the question was of the original fountain whence all alike flowed,

¹ *Othello*, Act i. sce. 3; *De Aug. Scient.*, L. 2, c. 13; Holmes' *Authorship of Shakespeare*, p. 500, New York and Boston, 1866, 4th ed. 1886.

his doctrine was that "the first entity ought no less to possess a real existence than those which flow from it; rather more. For it has its own peculiar essence, and from it come all the rest."¹ It was to be laid down joined with the primitive form as also with the first principle of motion as it is found. He concludes that the ancients had "set down the first matter (such as may be the origin of things) as having form and qualities, not as abstract, potential, and formless." . . . "Almost all the ancients (Empedocles, Anaxagoras, Anaximenes, Heraclitus, Democritus), though disagreeing in other respects upon the prime matter, joined in this, that they held an active matter with a form, both determining its own form, and having within itself a principle of motion."² This first matter and cause of all things had been figured in the ancient fable as "Cupid or Love, the most ancient of the gods, . . . born of an egg over which Night brooded and coeval with Chaos:" it was "without parents, that is, without a cause." This Love represented the movement in the primal essence or entity, and was indeed also the origin of the "*natural motion of the atom*." And it is further said that "of this primary matter and the proper virtue and action thereof there can be no cause in nature (for we always except God), for nothing was before it. Therefore there was no efficient cause of it, nor anything more original in Nature; consequently neither genus nor

¹ This translation of "A. T. R." (Bacon's Works, by Montagu, I. 437, Philad.) is not exactly correct. Bacon's words are: "*Primum autem ens non minus vere debet existere, quam quæ ex eo fluunt; quodammodo magis. Authupostaton enim est, et per hoc reliqua.*"—Works, by Spedding, Boston, 1862, V. 298. *Authupostaton* is the Greek *Αὐτὺπόστατος*, from *αὐτός* and *ὑπόστασις*, meaning *self-subsistent, self-posit*, i. e. real Being, essence, or entity. Mr. Spedding's translation is more nearly correct, thus: "Now, the first entity must exist no less really than the things derived from it; and in a certain way more. For it is self-subsisting, and other things subsist by it."—Ibid. x. 352.

² Ibid. v. 296-298; x. 350.

form. Wherefore whatsoever this matter and its power and operation be, it is a thing positive and inexplicable [*surda*, dark, silent], and not to be judged by any preconception. For if the manner could be known, yet it cannot be known by cause, since it is (after God) the cause of causes, itself without a cause [*incausabilis*, uncausable]."¹ In other words, it was with Bacon (as with Cousin or Hegel) the absolute Causality, and as such it had both a real and an ideal existence. So also with Plato, the primal existence, comprehending "motion and standing" in one, the "*that which moves itself*," the "oldest and most divine of all things," is "nothing else but power" (i. e. essence and power in one), is "the beginning of motion" in all things else, and "imparts an ever-flowing existence," and is, in short, "the Divine Soul." Its movement, its spontaneity, was as eternal as itself, and was simply the absolute fact and a necessary truth.

And here we may remember Proclus' doctrine of the Bonds of the Dissoluble and the Indissoluble, which were "*beautifully harmonized and well composed*" in the One. Goodness was *unific*. The Beautiful came from the Intel-
ligible, and Harmony from the creative Power. Hence came "the Muses and all harmonical arrangement in mundane natures." Thus all was harmonized, and filled with divine beauty in a "boniform union." This celestial harmony was a prominent idea among the ancient as in the modern philosophers and poets. The starry heavens revolved in harmonious silence. The Soul (says Bacon) is "the simplest of substances:" whence it is no marvel that the soul so placed enjoys no rest; according to the axiom that "the motion of things out of their place is rapid, and in their place calm;" and "it was good to have the orb of the mind concentric with the universe."

And Milton's Sonnet would seem to have had its special inspiration directly from Plato and the Myth of Err:—

¹ *De Prin. atque Originibus*: Bacon's Works, by Spedding (Boston, 1862), v. 291; x 344.

" But else, in deep of night, when drowsiness
 Hath lock'd up mortal sense, then listen I
 To the celestial Syrens' harmony
 That sit upon the nine infolded spheres,
 And sing to those that hold the vital shears,
 And turn the adamantine spindle round,
 On which the fate of gods and men is wound." ¹

§ 6. "THEREBEING" — SELF-MOVEMENT — SELF-LIMITATION.

Kant's doctrine was that "Soul has no extensive magnitude, but only intensive," and so admits of diminution even down to nothing and utter extinction as soul. Hegel answers, "that being always comes to spirit;" that is, that spirit (soul) is always living and being. Its intensity is quite other than that of a quantity (*quantum*); for in spirit is the ideality of the Notion. The immediate limitation and fixity of Quantity in the body as a quantum, and all the antinomial categories of such a finite somewhat, are cancelled in the unity of the soul's movement as a one Whole, and the contradiction is solved therein. These special categories of the finite thing must be distinguished from the conception of soul as such. Neither Kant nor Hegel, perhaps, sufficiently defines the difference between the finite soul and the universal soul; but this distinction is too important to be overlooked. "It is further to be known," says Hegel, "that in the eternal nature of spirit (*i. e.* the universal Soul), there is Therebeing (*Daseyn*), consciousness, finiteness; and Spirit goes out of itself into the quantities of things, without therefore being itself a thing (*ein Ding*);" that is, a quantum, or such a finite quantity as an ordinary thing or body is. Nevertheless, the universal Spirit (as the Notion) has a certain finiteness, a consciousness, and a *Therebeing* of its own (as a finite soul also must have); but the *Therebeing* of the universal Soul dwells in eternity: its essential constitution, its movement and life,

¹ See *Sonnets and Canzonets*, by A. Bronson Alcott, Boston, 1882.

are eternal, inexhaustible, and immortal. But any special quantity and quality (or quantum) as such, and other than the eternal One, can exist only under those limitations of Time and Space, which only can give finite permanency of essence, existence, and form, and only as a special creation of the universal Soul. It neither is nor can be in and of itself alone either eternal, inexhaustible, or imperishable; but as intensive and extensive magnitude, as a special quantity and quality, it may be diminished to the point of extinction and vanish as such specialty into oblivion, if the inflowing stream of intensive and extensive essence be withdrawn, and the specialty as such be thus cut off from the eternal fountain of life : —

“She that herself will sliver and disbranch
From her material sap, perforce must wither,
And come to deadly use.”

With this conception of the Infinite, of what *infinite* properly is, namely, the Therebeing of the One and All as universal Soul, dwelling in eternity and immensity, and in which life and movement are as eternal as itself perpetually streaming into a creation and returning out of the same, the perpetual flowing of Heraclitus, the *that which itself moves itself* of Plato, the infinite cycle of Aristotle, the ineffable fountain of Plotinus, the infinite Causality of Cousin, and the infinite Ideality of Hegel, and, in short, the infinite and immortal Soul of the universe, may become intelligible and credible. In it, we live, and move, and have our being; but the vague, uncritical notion of an immaterial Spirit, without Essence and apart from Nature, that once created a world out of nothing and then left it to take care of itself, interfering only as an occasional Providence, and in some miraculous and incomprehensible manner, should be set down to the account of an ignorant and credulous age, and should be remitted to the limbo of myths and superstitions, without benefit of clergy.

This is the vital point in philosophy. In this question of

the constitution of the One and All of real Being, and more especially of the active movement in the triplicity of the logical syllogism as its essential life, lies the whole possibility of a philosophy that shall exhibit the causal connection and continuity of mind and soul with matter and nature. Without such continuity, mind, soul, spirit, God, is relegated to an empty sphere of abstract nothingness, and forever separated from the actual universe. Such conceptions are without essence, life, science, philosophy, or true religion, and can have existence only in the thoughtless visions of the uncritical fancy, grounded upon equally visionary myths, miracles, and revelations. Such things were credible to the ignorant and superstitious peoples of the earlier ages, and in the youthful stage of thought and knowledge; but they have for the most part ceased to be credible in presence of the knowledge, science, and philosophy of this Nineteenth Century. Such conceptions (or rather, want of conception) prevail (where they still obtain) rather as the fashion or custom of religious societies than as any real belief. They may afford a comfortable assurance of a future life to such thoughtless persons as can be content with vague dreams and childish illusions; but for thoughtful minds, and for the enlightened peoples of the coming centuries, if there is to be any faith in God, in Religion, or in Immortality, it must rest upon the deeper foundations of philosophy itself; for these myths and superstitions are vanishing like mists before the morning sun.

There is a difficulty in conceiving or admitting the fact of self-movement. A self-movement that dwells in eternity is also eternal movement. Really, it may just as well be eternal as have a beginning; a beginning of the universe is by far the more difficult, nay, is an impossible conception. The old materialists had no difficulty in admitting the eternity of the world. The modern materialists have as little difficulty in conceiving of the eternity of matter and material Nature. Newton and La Place had no difficulty in

assuming a world of hard, impenetrable atoms and gravity as existing from eternity for their mathematical purposes. What these things were, or might be, in themselves, it was not their purpose to inquire. The mere eternity of duration, then, can hardly be a serious difficulty with a rational mind.

Self-movement in an immovable standing Whole is really the same thing as eternal movement. The standing All is not a simple and same substance throughout, but an eternally essential complex of essentities, necessities, and necessary relations of whole and parts, aspects, phases, and mediate instrumentalities and conditions, in reference to each other as such. The parts, aspects, media, and relations are as absolutely necessary amidst all changes as is the Whole as such. The immovableness of the standing Whole, and the conditioned, temporary and spacial permanency of the determined and fixed media or instrumentalities, are the necessary grounds of all possible movement and change within the Whole. What, then, can be the difference between the eternal and necessary determinations that are involved in the fact of such movement and what is called *self-determination*, or between the eternal and necessary limitations and *self-limitation*? There is a certain delusive ambiguity in the use of these phrases, as there is also in the use of the phrase *self-movement*. There is tautology in the expression. Inasmuch as the determinations and limitations within such a one Whole are a necessary consequence of the movement of change (if there is to be any movement or change at all, or if the movement be as eternal and necessary as the standing All itself, and an absolute fact as such), it necessarily follows that all change in the determinations or limitations must be caused and produced by the one whole Essentia as such, since by the very hypothesis there cannot possibly be any other cause, power, or source of the same; and in this sense they may be said to be *self-determinations*, that is, determinations of the

whole *Essentity* itself as such. But they are not self-determinations, nor self-limitations, in any sense of being determined, or limited, by any other Self than the whole *Essentity* itself. In consequence of the habitual use of the term *Self* to express some vague notion of a superessential spiritual person, both in ourselves and in the universe, we unconsciously carry over that sense of the word into our conceptions of self-determination, self-limitation, and self-movement; as if, besides the eternal and necessary movement of change of determinations, limitations, and relations within the immovably standing Whole, and over and above all that, there were some other or some superessential spiritual Self that was doing the whole business. Whereas upon the basis of the Hegelian Logic and Metaphysic, if the whole and all of real Being (the logical *Essentity* as such) be an absolute unity of Content and Form, containing the whole reality of Spirit and Nature within itself, both in respect of its eternal and immutable constitution and nature as such and in respect of all possible or actual movement, process, proceeding, change, or life, within the whole, and of all quantitative, qualitative, and modal determinations, or all temporary and spacial limitations, or all special and particular aspects or phases of the Whole, or of special essences and forms, or particular things and relations, within the Whole, then it would seem necessarily to follow, that all movement, all determination, all limitation, into such mediating grounds and instrumentalities, and into all special and particular essences and forms, or into all temporary and spacial relations of things, so far as in any way distinguished, or distinguishable, from the Whole as such, and indeed into the whole universal variety and flow of external realities, however permanent or persistent, however fleeting or evanescent, they may be in their speciality or particularity as such, and also as well their resolution and return into identity again with the universal Whole, whereby they necessarily vanish as such, in the perpetual cycle of creation

and destruction, of remembrance and oblivion, must be the eternal and necessary movement of determination, limitation, sustentation, cancellation and renewal of the one whole and absolute Essence as the only Self or Spirit there need be, or possibly can be, in the universe of Reality.

Another difficulty is that of conceiving or admitting that a self-moving (or eternally moving) Essence can give law unto itself, or can set and fix limitation upon its own action, and unfix, alter, or cancel that limitation within itself at will. This would seem necessarily to imply conscious knowing and choice: such an Essence must be already a conscious thinking power. Such a power is tacitly included under Hegel's term "*Negativity*;" but it is difficult to find out from anything he says about it exactly what he means by it, and the term alone is quite unsatisfactory. That a moving essence, moving unconsciously and mechanically only, should proceed only so far and then stop, or simply cease to go further, would be intelligible enough, if there were any resisting or restraining hindrance to further movement: the physicists hold that a body once in motion (like the star *Groombridge*¹) in a direction across the sidereal heavens, with nothing to resist it, would move on eternally. And that must be true, if there were no restraining power in the rest of the universe, capable of operating upon it from without, or from within the body itself. But this is the case of a particular body: we are now concerned with the one whole Essence of all bodies. How can such an Essence impose limitation, law, or restraint upon its own action, or at once make and obey law? Such a function necessarily implies conscious knowing will. What is law? In any proper sense of the term, a *law* must be defined as a rule prescribed by a superior power, by a lawgiver: it presupposes persons, command, and obedience, and intelligent power and will. A lawgiver can certainly obey his

¹ *Popular Astronomy*: by Simon Newcomb, LL. D., Prof. at the U. S. Naval Observatory, New York, 1878.

own law, when it has any application to himself. That the human soul can impose laws upon its own conduct, would seem to be certain enough: every just, moral, and good man knows that he can lay down rules, maxims, laws, for the government of his own actions, and can govern himself accordingly. Indeed, without such a power, morality would be simply impossible; for the moral lies in just that and in nothing else. And if the finite soul can do this, what should hinder the universal Soul from doing the like, or why should the conception be more difficult? But we have yet to get a conscious, knowing, and willing universal Soul. That is what we are in search of. A law is not in itself an active power, but a limiting condition, a restriction, "a restraint to a determined scope." Laws may be passively operative: they are not active. Sometimes the laws of Nature are spoken of as *acting*. Evidently, what is really meant is, that they are passively operative as obstruction, restriction, or limitation on something else which is in action or motion. These laws of Nature (in the proper sense of them) are merely the necessities under which things and processes in Nature are limited to be what they are, and while they are what they are, or under which they undergo change when they are changed in any respect into something else or other than what they were before. They are a part of that adamant chain of necessity and fatality in which all created Nature is bound while it is bound; but it is a movable chain, and the power that can bind can also loose. In their uniformity and persistence as such, they have the character of necessity and eternity for us, and as necessary principles in the sphere of physical Nature we may attribute to them the character of necessary laws. But if we use the term *law* in the strict and proper sense, it necessarily implies a lawgiver, and a lawmaker must be an intelligent, self-conscious will and power. So far as these necessities of Nature are properly laws, they must be imposed by a supreme lawgiver, and as well upon himself as

upon things in Nature; and they must, then, admit of alteration and change. There may be providence as well as fate for us in Nature itself. But this imposition of law or limitation upon Nature must be conceived as done in the dialectical manner of the universal logical Notion, and not at all after the manner of a spiritual *fiat* from an immaterial nothing and nowhere, beyond the realm of real existence. As absolute necessities, these laws would be immutable and eternal. Are the principles or truths which constitute pure Reason or Intelligence of the nature of such unalterable necessities, or are they of the nature of mere rules or laws prescribed by the supreme power of the self-conscious Notion, and so alterable or repealable at will? In the latter case they could not constitute a part of the self-conscious knowing power itself, since that must exist before they could exist; and then that power would itself be without intelligence, or it would have to be a power that could create intelligence for itself. How could that be possible? How could it create intelligence without being itself already a self-conscious, intelligent power? Such a thing would be manifestly impossible. Here we seem to be driven back to the doctrine of the Neoplatonists, that the universal Intelligence is necessary, immutable, impartible, eternal, and absolute truth, in itself considered. They seem to have contemplated the soul, the active source of life, as subsisting in and with the Intelligence, and as somehow wielding and employing it in the process of knowing, thinking, and creating; but in what precise manner they supposed this to be done, or to be possible, they do not clearly explain. It would seem that Hegel's Notion must be conceived as intelligence itself, but as an intelligence having in itself the absolute constitution and nature of the logical Syllogism in a sound metaphysic of Content and Form in one identity, and being in movement as eternal as itself, not as anything distinct from it, or as a separable part of it, or as a distinct entity, but simply as one phase or aspect of the one and

True. |||

ever-identical Whole, which contains all distinctions within itself. Its movement, its life, being eternal, is in this sense infinite. As the first moment of bare existence as such, and (as it were) in a state of equilibrium of stationary balance of action and reaction within itself, it may be conceived as continuing in one and the same state of conscious knowing or Remembrance, or, in respect of activity, as in a state of positive and persistent stress or strain in which it may be contemplated simply as potential energy in a standing All, or as the actively sustaining power or potentiality, not yet proceeding into an actual movement of change or evolution into other states, or into other distinctions. Here may be said to begin that process of "Negativity" which is "the turning point" of the movement of the Notion where self-limitation commences; and the special movement, the specialization, is, at the same time, a "negative reference" or relation to the preceding state which is the "immanent source" of the action that is thrown into that movement of essential specialization, which as such is partially bounded out of the one whole Essence, and is at the same time limited in it; and here begins that dialectic process of the infinitely movable boundary of limitation that continues throughout all other states and things; and the process rests upon the preëxisting grounds of "Cognition," or that intelligence which is conscious Knowing, or the subjectivity of the Notion, and is controlled and directed by it. The specialization is limited through the means and mediation of the fundamental intelligence, and is grounded in it as the unity of Universality, Speciality, and Particularity in the one Whole, which is "the alone true."

This *second movement* is the movement into thinking and creating, or into the Becoming of other states or things. The Notion is knowing Essence itself. Consciousness is the mere fact of knowing. Self-consciousness is merely self-knowing, or the fact that the knowing Essence is a Self. Remembrance in the absolute Self is a continuous state of

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conscious knowing merely. Will absolute merely expresses the fact of the existence of the knowing Essence and Power in its total amount, in its absolute Quantity. As such, it is not so much free as a necessary fact in the unity of Freedom and Necessity. Freewill or liberty is freedom within limits, which are here only the constitutional limitations, necessities, and essential and necessary relations of the Notion itself. Absolute freedom, conceived as without bounds or limits, would be identical with absolute Rest, sheer Nothingness, or utter Oblivion. Freewill proper (that is, limited Freewill) is the simple fact of the proceeding into movement in special thinking or creating. Thinking is creating, and nothing else but that. The Notion is in itself energetic, potential, active: it is an actuality of knowing potency in a standing All; and as such, it is capable of unfolding, infolding, and convolving or evolving its own essence into a creation of special and particular things under all the categories of reason and necessity. The universality of the Notion remains ever immanent in the particular creations, which depend upon the dialectic of the one Whole, under the Negativity of limitation. These categories are the necessary principles and absolute truths, which we call intelligence or pure Reason. They are not properly laws in the sense of rules prescribed; they are rather laws in the sense of what Science calls the laws of Nature, viz., those necessities which appear to external observation to be uniform, absolute, and eternal in their operation, and are necessary for the constitution of material things as they are. Yet it is easily recognizable in physical science that there is no absolute fixity, permanence, and continuance of bodies or things in Nature, which exist under these necessities or laws of Nature; since a dialectic movement of change in form and state is found to be constantly going on, however slowly or rapidly, in all bodies, solid, liquid, gaseous, molecular, atomic, or ethereal. And if the scientific observer could place himself at the central point of the dialectic

* Only *appearing* activity, can limit *freedom* —
 ... *limit* *En-*
 ... *1/10*

movement itself, in the absolute logic of the syllogistic Notion (which is at once both Content and Form in one), and take an inside view of the whole evolutionary process, he might find his laws of Nature resolved into identity with these same categories of Reason as actually wielded into a creation of the world, after the art and manner of "a proceeding intellect," as Proclus said.

For a simile, take the drop of air in a spirit-level. It is stationary when the instrument stands on a perfect level. On the slightest departure from that level, the drop moves in some direction. It moves in the fluid. The circumferential boundary that distinguishes the drop of air from the fluid is thus a movable boundary; but there is no change in the drop or in the fluid otherwise. The drop merely changes its relative place. The alteration of level in the instrument may suggest the dialectic movement of negativity. But here the source and cause of the movement lies outside of both drop and instrument. A spirit-level is therefore only an instrument, a machine.

Suppose, now, that the drop were floating in an absolute Void. Change of relative place would then be impossible: there would then be no external relation to any other actuality of existence, since none would exist. If there were to be movement at all, the source of motion must necessarily be within the drop itself, and the movement must necessarily consist, not in any change of relative place, but in an interior change or evolution of its own essence; and this energizing (whether conceived, first, as merely maintaining an equilibrium of stationary balance in the whole drop as constituted, or, second, as producing actual movement) must exist and proceed under the necessary categories of Reason, and could therefore be only the dialectic movement of the universal Syllogism of the absolute Logic as it is in itself. It could be nothing other than being, knowing, remembering, and creating, — Thought and Oblivion, — all at once and in one. In this we may find an intelligible conception

in what manner an absolute Ideality in an essential Reality may be possible and actual.

1113.
In a cell there appears to be a nucleus, and in the nucleus a central germinal dot. The evolution within the cell seems to well up out of this dot. The microscope cannot discover whether the dot be a whit larger than a mathematical point or not. If we take the smallest particle of protoplasm that has life in it, it is equally uncertain whether the internal movement begins at a point, or is not rather an energizing movement in the whole particle as such. At all events, it is movement in a standing All, much after the manner of the dialectic movement of Ideality in the Notion. But this particle is not an independent totality by itself alone: it is only an infinitesimal part of the whole surrounding universe. So far as the logical Notion resides in it, or is exhibited within it, it is still but partially in it, not wholly. The Notion is wholly in the One and All of Being only, the universe of real Essence, which exists only after the form and manner of a Thinking Power, the universal Soul, that stands eternally in the void of Oblivion. Its dialectic movement, being as eternal as itself, is therefore and in that sense infinite. The inexhaustible fountain is thus also infinite, a last Fact, a necessary Truth, the All and enough. 11156
It is neither inconceivable nor impossible, nor is it unknowable, nor exactly ineffable; but it is still sufficiently wonderful, nay, miraculous,—the miracle of miracles, if we must have a miracle. It is not a whit more or less miraculous than the materialistic eternity of matter, atoms, and the world; but it is an altogether preferable conception, because it is a far higher and better, a more critically exact, a more rational, more truly scientific and philosophical, more beautiful, more moral and useful, and far more abounding in hope and promise for human progress and perfection, if not for immortal life.

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What, then, is this Hegelian method? It starts with the *I think and I am*. It then proceeds to the Categories of

Reason as they appear in the logical Syllogism of our thought. It follows them through their imperfect development by Kant and his predecessors and followers on the side of the Understanding and external nature, and through their imperfect development by Parmenides, Heraclitus, Plato, Aristotle, the Neoplatonists, and later philosophers on the side of pure Reason; and it raises them to a higher and more perfect development in the logical Syllogism of the living Notion, and thus demonstrates the universal Soul as it necessarily and eternally is in itself. It is thus a universal method that takes in and comprehends God, Nature, and Man. It is Idealism and Realism at once and in one. It is not properly a mystical Idealism. It is not an Idealism of the dreaming imagination only, whether founded upon a philosophy of the human Ego, or upon a Biblical revelation. It is not a method which takes in God and the spirit of Man only, but leaves Nature out; nor is it a method that takes in material Nature only, and leaves out God and the human soul. It takes little note of the false issue between Science and Theology, — *Which of these two is the true theory of this universe?* It thoroughly understands and refutes this patent fallacy of an Excluded Middle. It is, in short, thoroughly a system of Realistic Idealism.¹

¹ "Properly speaking, ideality is not somewhat outside of and beside reality: the notion of ideality just lies in its being the truth of reality. That is to say, when reality is explicitly stated as what it implicitly is, it is at once seen to be ideality. Hence ideality has not received its proper estimation when you allow that reality is not all in all, but that an ideality must be recognized outside of it. Such an ideality, external to or it may be beyond reality, would be no better than an empty name." — *The Logic of Hegel*, trans. by William Wallace, M. A., Oxford, 1874, p. 154.

* All this is excessively creative, more
 "common thinking," in that this "our"
 is not shown to be discovered in the "I" which
 is the starting-point for the theory but a profound
 theory of Universals can show this; and it
 is wanting both in Hegel and in Heidegger.

Myself
 "I think"
 and I am
 in the act
 of thinking
 immediately

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CHAPTER VI.

ESSENCE AND REFLECTION.

§ 1. ESSENCE — CONTENT — FORCE — SUBSTRATE — LIKENESS.

FOR the proper understanding of Hegel's system, the whole Actuality of real existence must be kept before the mind as always by himself implied, though not expressed, while he is separately treating of the several distinguishable aspects, parts, categories, and relations of the Whole. The one Whole and All is always the real, essential, and absolute Notion, or Concept of the whole Reality, in all its distinctions of difference and in its ever-identical Totality. The first aspect may be said to be that of the possibility of the actuality as a Whole and in all of its interior distinctions, relations, mediations, and reflections. Merely as such, this Possibility (as it is said in the smaller Logic) is "abstract and unessential, but it is a necessary element of the whole reality, but in the manner only of being a simple possibility."¹ The whole reality, however, is the universal Essence and Power in one, or the absolute Essentia as the Notion, or as (in its complete evolution) the absolute Idea. In the aspect of absolute Ground, "Essence is the unity of Identity and Difference. It contains the truth of both, and it forms the unity of reflection into itself and reflection into another than itself," that is, into some part or speciality of essence and form within the Whole; for this is the only possible *other* than itself, and it is only partially an other: it

¹ *Logique de Hegel*, traduite par A. Véra, ii. 153, Paris, 1859.

thus becomes an object, a thing. "Ground is essence posited as Totality (*Der Grund ist das Wesen als Totalität gesetzt*). Ground is essence, and essence is essentially ground, but it is such only in so far as it is the ground of something other than itself."¹ It is the internal and necessary ground of its own external existence.

Another aspect of the Whole is that of its absolute relation to itself: it exists absolutely as such Whole and Parts in one identity of essential relation. It is its own Content.

"(a) The immediate relation is that of the Whole and the parts. The Content is the Whole, and the Whole subsists only with the opposed parts which constitute the Content. The parts, as differentiated, constitute distinct elements. They are such only by the identity of relation which unites them, or rather because they form a Whole by their reunion; and the Whole as an assemblage of parts is the opposition and a certain negation of the parts as such." That is, there is a transition of the Whole into the parts, or rather an inversion, without breach of continuity or destruction of identity: the parts do not thereby become wholly severed and discrete ones. They are only partially severed, or distinguished, and so differenced from the Whole.

"(b) At the bottom of this unity and relation there is also a negative relation, arising from this, that the Whole and the parts form together a reciprocal mediation, which leads from one to the other. Both are distinct and contain at the same time a negative relation, whereby each of them, in being reflected upon itself, is differenced and reflected upon the other, and reciprocally, in being reflected upon the other it returns to its first relation with itself, and to its state of independence. This is Force and its exterior manifestation."²

That is (we may suppose), the internal movement of absolute Causality (here presupposed and implied), acting under all necessities and upon the ground of all the categories of

¹ Ibid. ii. 94-99.

² Ibid. ii. 132, 133.

reason (the necessary relation of Whole and Parts inclusive), and through the mediation of their operation, interaction, and instrumentation or reflection, is manifested, externally, as an exhibition of Force ; that is, in and through all specially constituted essences, masses, bodies, or things in Nature. And he criticises Herder as confounding this external exhibition of Force with the internal and absolute Causality, and calling it God or "the Lord."

In the larger Logic, it is said that "the relation of Whole and Parts goes over into the relation of Force and Manifestation." That is, it would seem, the Whole as itself the absolute ground of its own internal parts, relations, and phases as well as of its external aspects of existence and appearance, may be considered also as the immovable ground of reaction for that eternal movement within the Whole, which exhibits itself externally as mechanical force ; for it is so exhibited externally only in and through the mediation and secondary instrumentation of Whole and Parts, and of the internal and necessary relations, as grounds, media, conditions, and conditional limitations. But for the origin or source of all forces, for what lies at the basis of the scientific convertibility and correlation of forces, it is necessary to look further back, and even to penetrate into the absolute constitution and nature of the one Whole as such, and more especially into the nature of that eternal movement which resides therein as one phase thereof, and is the absolute Causality.

In like manner it may be said, and equally well, that the relation of Whole and parts goes over into the relation of Quantity and quantities ; for Quantity is "the unity of continuity and discreteness." The absolute whole Quantity as continuing into a quantity ("the one of Quantity"), or quantities, without breach or solution of essential identity, necessarily carries with it the negation or limitation out of the Whole as such into the special or particular quantity, whereby it is, and only can be, what it is, while it is such, or have its special content and form as a quantity, or as

a special exhibition of intensive and extensive magnitude, whether considered as a mass or as a force. The essential relation of Whole and parts still remains and continues. There is the same resolution of the apparent opposition or contradiction, in either case, into the same absolute unity of Identity and Difference. The particular quantity, or force, arises out of the whole absolute Quantity, and, in the whole course of the dialectic movement or process of internal mediation, instrumentation, and change of content and form, finally returns into the identical Whole, or vanishes as such.

Force may be regarded in the same way as Quantity. The movement of the whole Quantity or Force is limited into special modes or manifestations of force as forces. The same essential relation of whole and parts must necessarily underlie all external exhibition of Force into forces. Through the mediation of the whole and the instrumentation of parts, relations, and conditions, we have what are called *mechanical forces*. As the absolute Quantity is the one Whole of Essence and Power in the unity of continuity and discreteness, and as such the absolute Causality, it might be called the absolute Force as well. Hegel prefers to call it absolute "Might" (*Macht*), or "the Might of Substance;" but the common use of the word *Force* carries with it a sense or implication of mechanical force only. In its own nature, internally considered, the absolute Force is the whole intensive degree and extensive magnitude or Quantity: externally, or on the side of the discrete limitation into particular exhibitions of quantity, it is what is usually called *force* or *forces*. But a Mass, or a Quantity (electric quantity, for instance) as a Force, is the unity of Quantity and Quality: the one represents the internal intension, and the other, the external extension. The internal identity of absolute essential relation constitutes its substrate, essence, or content. And it makes no difference whether such masses or quantities are solid, liquid, gaseous, or continuous substances, whether sensible to the senses, or only to the subtlest instruments in aid

of the senses; but the same essential relation must lie at the foundation of the process. The Potential of Mass and the Potential of electric Quantity (regarded as Force) are grounded on the same law of action upon other masses, or quantities, externally; that is, it is always directly as the Mass (or quantity of Force) and inversely as the square of the distance; and the Potential of either, or both, as special or particular, arises out of (and vanishes into) the infinity of *zero*. But Essential Relation as the internal, necessary, and eternal unity of Essence and Power in the one absolute Whole does not vanish, but remains as real and as true as before: the Whole does not wholly vanish, but continues to subsist, exist, and remain as such, eternally and immensely, in the *zero* of infinite Possibility.

Hegel further proceeds to say that the concrete reality of a body or thing, as a *substance*, is "the immediate unity of its essence and its existence, or of the internal and the external," in the constitution of it as such. "The manifestation of the reality is also reality, but this is an *essential thing* only in so far as it is an existence," an "exteriorly immediate" standing forth of the thing as such a speciality of the one whole Essence or Essentia.

Hegel uses the term *Substance*, here, more especially in reference to the *essences* or substances of particular bodies or things. In respect of their substance, "the necessary is in itself the absolute relation, or the process where the relation is effaced by passing to absolute identity. In its immediate form, this relation is the relation of *Substance* and *accidents*. The absolute identity of this relation is the Substance as such, which (in so far as necessity) is the negation of the interior form, and which is thereby posited as reality; but it also negates this exterior existence, according to which the real in it, in so far as immediate being, is only an accident, and this real, by reason of the potentiality which it contains, passes into another reality; the passage having its ground in the identity of the substance in so far as it is the

activity of the form. The Substance is thus the totality of accidents in which it is manifested as their absolute negativity, that is to say, as absolute power [or (as we may suppose) the absolutely limiting causality within], and at the same time as an inexhaustible source of any and every content. This is nothing but even *the manifestation of Substance* [*i. e.* the external appearance of the inner substantiality], because the determinateness of the substance, which is reflected into itself as such to produce a content, is itself only the form which is annulled by the power of Substance [in the sense of the essential and absolute Causality]. The movement of Substance is the absolute activity of the Form [*i. e.* the universal Essence and Form] and the power of Necessity; and every content is only a moment of this process, where content and form replace one another."¹

The treatment is somewhat obscure; but the implication would seem to be, that the one whole Essentia, as the absolute Causality in the constitution and form of the absolute Concept or Notion in moving into the specialized contents and forms of particular substances, bodies, or things, is the negatively limiting power and inexhaustible source of all substances, through all stages of their evolutionary mediation and determination. This special constitution of content and form is the *Substance* of the body or thing, which is as permanent as it is persistent as such, and no more so. The external thing with all its superficial accidents is only a special exhibition of this inner Substantiality in the temporarily fixed relation of Internal and External. It is not an unalterable permanency, nor an absolute necessity, but is only temporarily thus constituted by the inner essential Causality, which, as the absolute Content and Form, only reflects itself upon itself to produce such special contents and forms or substances: it is, therefore, a movable determinability of

¹ *Logique de Hegel*, traduite par A. Véra, ii. 169-175. See, also, *The Logic of Hegel*, trans. by William Wallace, M. A., Oxford, 1874, p. 235.

limitation, and is only a "moment" of the absolute Form; but that "moment," or the temporarily determined content and form, may be altered or cancelled by the internal dialectic action in the further process of transition into other forms of substance.

In this way, one substance or content is dialectically transformed into another and different one, which is still only another moment or stage of the process; and so on indefinitely, one special content and form replacing another in succession. The external action or operation of substances or bodies upon one another, when once so constituted in whatever endless chain of secondary causes and effects, is another affair altogether. This internal movement of Substance into substances, or rather of Essence into essences (for the two terms mean the same thing), is produced by the activity of the absolute one whole of Essence and Power in the form of the Notion as the absolute Causality. This causality resides in the absolutely necessary Essential Relation of Internal and External, and is necessarily involved in the logical categories of the one syllogistic Whole, including the fact and necessity of eternal movement therein. Between one specially constituted substance or thing (considered by itself as a cause) and another into which it passes as an effect, the relation of *cause and effect* necessarily exists, and this is the ordinary meaning of the *relation of Causality*.

But the absolute Notion is not an effect in any proper sense: it is rather the absolute All and Whole of real existence, of Essence and Activity in one, eternally existent so, and without other cause than itself. In other words, it is *Causa sui*, or the absolute Causality, and the real cause of every change within itself, and so of every special or particular created thing other than itself in its own immediate identity as such, or as the one Whole and absolute unity of Identity and Difference, through whatever chain of secondary causes and effects, and in whatever circuit of mediation, instrumentation, or reflection, the causative necessity

and power may pass into the ultimate realities, contingencies, and evanescences of things, and return out of the same into the absolute identity of the one Whole again.

From this point of view, the brief and often obscure expressions of Hegel's Logic may become more clearly intelligible. He speaks of Substance and substances in the sense of Essence and essences. The absolute Substance is the absolute Essence, and the absolute Essence is the absolute Notion. "Substance," he says, "is the absolute power which sustains a relation with itself in so far as it constitutes a simple internal possibility: it is consequently the power which determines itself in the accident, and which is thereby differentiated in positing an exterior existence. This gives rise to a particular relation, distinguishable from that in which Substance exists in its first form of Necessity [*i. e.* as the absolute Notion]. This is *the Relation of Causality*."¹ But the absolute Causality itself is the Notion as *Causa sui*. This absolutely and eternally exists so, and not otherwise.

Again: "Substance is Cause, because, as Whole passing into accident, it is reflected upon itself, and is thereby first posited as Existence. At the same time, however, it suppresses that reflection upon itself, or its simple interior possibility [potentiality], or negates itself and produces likewise an *Effect*, a reality which is only thus posited, but which is necessarily posited by the process of the active principle [*i. e.* by the eternal movement and power of the Notion, which is a unity of Essence and Power in one]. Cause passes into Effect, but is not absorbed [or exhausted] in the effect, as if this were the only reality. It is in the Effect that Cause is, for the first time, Cause and real Cause. Consequently, Cause is, in and for itself, *Causa sui*."² For it is by that action only that the relation of Cause and Effect comes to subsist at all. Before that, there is only the absolute Notion, or that universal Essentivity, which is eternally

¹ *Logique de Hegel*, traduite par A. Véra ii. 152.

² *Ibid.* ii. 153.

existent as such, and is the absolute Causality in and for itself, and so may be said to be *Causa sui*, as having no other cause but itself. Neither is it an effect, since it never was caused, but was absolutely existent so from eternity.

But, again, it is said that "the relation of Causality passes into the relation of Reciprocity of action of one substance upon another;" that is, when special or particular substances have once been constituted as such, there arises, then, an actual reciprocity of action and reaction between them in their external relations to one another; and this would seem to be what Hegel really means by *Reciprocity* in so far as he makes it a substitute for *Causality*; but it is not made exactly a substitute for Causality, even in the sense of the reciprocal relation of Internality and Externality, or of Essence and Existence, much less in the more limited sense of the reciprocal relations of secondary causes and effects to one another in the field of external Nature.¹

In this endless chain of secondary causation, and of the lesser contents and forms within the greater, or, in other words, of generic and specific constitution, which is none the less essential and real because it is also metaphysical and ideal as well, we may find an intelligible theory or explanation of that real and ideal architectonic which is presented in the animal kingdom of divisions, branches, classes, orders, genera, and species, as also of individual animals under and within the same, however it may be also true that the individual only has also such a real existence as may come within the reach of the sensible observation of external experience in actual Nature as externally observed by positive science through sense-perception. It is the true explanation of inheritance or "heredity." In the

¹ It may also be regarded as a Reciprocity of action and reaction between the opposed extreme terms of the Essential Relation in their internal relations to one another. *The Logic of Hegel*, by Wallace, p. 241.

parents lies the essential identity of content and form which constitutes the species, together with all differences of sex or other individual accidents, and also the secondary causation and means to the end of offspring. The cause is active, the means are operative, only under and within the definite limits of their own essential constitution and form. The likeness of the offspring to the parents, however, there may be more resemblance to either one parent than the other, will still be nevertheless a certain definite, though compound, likeness to both; and it will be, in all cases, a sure repetition of the species, unless the causative action, under all the limiting conditions, be fatally detruded into some monstrous abortion; and the process will never transcend the existing species otherwise than by reason of an internal transition or change of the specifically constitutive idea itself, however persistent or changeable that may be in the actual course of Nature.

This absolute Essentity is both absolute Substance and absolute Cause. It is also the essential and necessary relation of Internal and External. It is Essence and Power in one, absolutely and eternally. This relation, or rather the whole complex of necessities and necessary relations in the Whole as such, constitutes *Substantiality*. "Absolute necessity," says Hegel, "is absolute essential relation or reciprocity, because it is not being as such, but being which is, because it is, being as the absolute mediation of itself through itself." It is being which is not a mere *coming to be*, is "being (says Mr. Harris) which expresses the ground of itself," or rather (as I should say) *being* which is also eternally *been*; for it can be "the absolute mediation of itself through itself" only by being also eternal movement in the eternal Essentity as the absolute truth. "This being," continues Hegel, "is Substance as the ultimate unity of Essence and Being: it is the being in all being. It is neither the unreflected immediate, nor an abstract something standing behind existence and phenomenon, but it is the immediate actuality

itself, as absolute reflection into itself, as *in-and-for-itself* independent existence." ¹ It is Essence and Existence, Substance and Power, at once and in one; it is what Science calls Matter and Energy; or in other words, it is the absolute Notion as the one and all of Reality, and the Notion is the absolute Causality. Its movement is as eternal as itself. Necessity is simply necessity; and the movement takes place in Freedom as mere possibility: it is absolute and eternal, and is a necessity as such. Both Necessity and Freedom have an absolute subsistence and truth as such. Actual Reality and ideal Possibility are equally necessary, and are indeed one and inseparable.

The Notion "exists in an absolute state of free universality," says Hegel, "while it is at the same time differenced as Subject and Object," or makes itself to object for itself in a syllogistic process of distinction or judgment; and so it is universal Knowing. "Knowing is, *first*, theoretical knowledge of the True; and, *second*, as active Will realizing the Good, it is the practical Idea in action." The "absolute Idea," as the unity of the subjective and objective phases of the one Whole, "is the Notion, which has no other object but the Idea" in its fulness: this is an object, "all the determinations of which are concentrated and identified in the Notion. This unity is the absolute truth, and the basis of all other truths. It is the Idea which thinks itself in so far as thinking and logical."

"The absolute Idea is for itself, because all in it is translucent." . . . "It is the pure form of the Notion which, in knowing itself, knows its content. It is itself its own proper content, because it differences itself ideally, and still remains identical with itself in all the differences; and the totality of forms in it is but the systematic unity of the determinations of the Content. This Content is the system of the log-

¹ Hegel's *Doctrine of Essence and Reflection*, translated by Wm. T. Harris, New York, 1881, p. 198; Hegel's *Werke*, ed. von Henning, vol. iv., Berlin, 1841.

ical determinations. In respect of Form, the Idea is nothing else but the method of the Content. This is knowledge determined according to the value of these moments."

The speculative moments of the Method are these:

(1) "Being" [that is, the immediate mere *isity* of the Notion as such as it absolutely is] "as the first aspect;" (2) "As self-determining, the speculative Idea is absolute Negativity" [*i. e.* it is in itself an absolute one Whole of real Essence and Power], "and is the Negation of itself" [*i. e.* it carries within itself an absolute potentiality of negating that wholeness of absolute limitation, where it is the absolute Quantity, Quality, and Modality of the one whole Essentia as it is, in the first instance, as the logical Notion of all reality, theoretically, and as such also a power of setting and determining other and special or particular limitations therein]; that is to say, it is "the negation of itself which constitutes scission" [division, distinction, judgment (*Urtheil*)]; and this is "the movement of the Notion." Consequently, it is not merely that first abstract *isity* of simply "being," but is rather that same potentiality of self-determination and self-mediation whereof the Notion itself is the necessary presupposition; and so we can say of whatever is so distinguished, mediated, and determined, that *it is posited, mediated, that is, in a word, presupposed*.¹ This Negativity is the mere process of distinction in the Notion, which, in thus distinguishing itself into an other than its whole self as such, still remains the same identical whole it was before, without any discontinuity. "In this we have the Notion, *first*, as determined in itself, in an immediate manner, as the absolute and universal, and, *second*, as further differenced;" that is, as distinguished, mediated, and set into the whole variety of special and particular things other than the original Whole in its absolute and eternal essence and form as the theoretical Notion. The eternal movement,

¹ "Qu'il posé, médiatisé, qu'il est, en un mot, presupposé." — *Logique de Hegel*, traduite par A. Véra, ii. 381-385, Paris, 1859.

* Cf. Spinoza's "Causa determinatio est in se." *

in this whole, constituted as it is in itself, is "the immanent dialectic," and the mediation is "the movement of Reflection." The complete differentiation into the ultimate specialities and particularities of all external Nature, where the process ceases by reflection and return into the identical universality of the one Whole again, is "the Absolute Idea" in its fulness, and is "Nature" as it actually is in any and every mode and form in which it ever existed as such. The Notion thus becomes the complete Idea of all Reality; and in this we have the true identity of the Real and the Ideal, not as two distinct and dissevered worlds, but simply as the two sides (or the inner and outer aspects) of one and the same whole Reality.

Finally, we have the explicit declaration that "the truth of Necessity is Liberty," and that "the truth of Substance is the Notion, which in all differences in its movement remains identical with itself, and the alternation of forms takes place within itself, and is never separated from itself." . . . "The Notion is the truth of Being and Essence." . . . "The Notion is free substantial Power, and exists only for itself. It constitutes a Totality, where it finds itself in each of its moments as a Whole and as an indivisible Unity: it is consequently identical with itself, and is determined *in and for itself*."¹ He concedes that "the Substance of Spinoza reposes upon a profound intuition," but insists that it is "not freed from its finiteness;" but that, "in the Notion, there is complete enfranchisement, for it is the Power which dominates Necessity and constitutes true Liberty."² There is Freedom as well as Necessity in the absolute Notion.

§ 2. ESSENTIAL RELATION — SUBSTANCE — ACTIVITY.

The doctrine of Essential Relation seems to lie at the bottom of Hegel's conception of Essentiality, Substantiality, and Actuality; and these terms may be regarded as meaning nearly the same thing. By way of introduction to his sub-

¹ Ibid. ii. 178-197.

² Ibid. ii. 195.

* 9. e. The mind is not a substance, but a process.

ject, Hegel observes that, "regarded as immediate, God would be only Nature," in its externality, and "in a certain abstract internality," not as "an actuality of spirit;" and this would be God only as "an abstract absolute," but not as "absolute spirit, which is alone the true nature of God."¹ He then proceeds to define what is meant by *Actuality*. He has already treated of the two sides or terms, and of the middle as the third term of the identity as constituting *Essential Relation*. And he now says that "the *first* identity of the *internal* and *external* is the identity opposed to the distinction of these determinations as an indifferent *substrate* opposed to the form external to it; that is, the somewhat is this identity as content. The *second* of the identities considered is the immediate identity of the distinction of the *external* and *internal*, viz., the immediate inversion of each into its opposite: this is the pure form. But these two identities are only the sides of one *totality*; in other words, the totality itself is only their conversion of each into the other. [That is, we may suppose, the one Whole subsists absolutely in the three aspects or phases of the two terms of the relation and the middle identity of both in one, or a triplicity in unity.] The totality as substrate and content is their immediateness reflected into itself by means of the presupposing reflection of form which annuls its distinctions [*i. e.* if there be movement in it], and posits itself as indifferent identity, as reflected unity opposed to it" [the form; that is, it would seem, it is found to be and is such, as the absolute truth of the matter]. "In other words, the identity is the form itself in so far as that form is defined as variety or indifferent multiplicity, and in so far as it reduces itself to one of its sides as *externality*, and to the other of its sides as immediateness reflected into itself, or as *internality*." [It is essence and form, substrate and form, content and form, at once and in one.] . . . "The transition of each of these

¹ Hegel's *Doctrine of Essence and Reflection*, trans. by Wm. T. Harris, New York, 1881, pp. 171, 172.

terms into the other constitutes their immediate identity as *substrate* ; but it is also their mediate identity, viz., each is through its other what it is within itself, i. e. each is one phase of the totality of the Essential Relation." . . . "The essential relation has thus defined itself as the identity of its phenomenal manifestation with its internality, and therefore now defines Essence as Actuality."¹

In other words, as it would seem, we are to take this exposition of Essential Relation as, logically and metaphysically, the internal and absolute constitution and nature of the One and Whole of real existence, and as such it is Essence or Essentiality, and this Essence is the real and absolute Actuality, is substrate and content, and there is no other substrate or content ; and this Actuality, this real Essentiality, as the absolute Whole of all reality so far, is the Actuality of concrete, essential, and real Spirit, which is none the less real that it is also ideal. It is the essential constitution of the logical Notion, not merely as logical, but as also real, which, in its completed evolution, will embrace and contain all the realities of the universe : it may be said to be the essential Concept of all realities (*das reine Wesen als Inbegriff aller Realitäten*).²

This statement seems to have the character of an external description of Essence and Essential Relation, and of the necessity, law, and manner of its action or operation, rather than any consideration of those absolute and eternal necessities which are tacitly assumed to be the ground of the whole complex unity of necessities, necessary relations, and categories whereof the one absolute whole is made up, or of the still more important question of the origin or nature of the movement which is also assumed to be in it, or

¹ Ibid. pp. 171, 172. The comments in brackets here are my own.

² *Die Lehre von Wesen*: Hegel's *Werke*, vol. iv. p. 4, ed. von Henning, Berlin, 1841 ; Hegel's *Doctrine of Essence and Reflection*, trans. by Wm. T. Harris, New York, 1881, p. 2.

somehow a part or aspect of it. The terms *Internality* and *Externality*, though intelligible enough in their own proper meaning, are vague and unsatisfactory in reference to the real matter in hand.

In the larger Logic, Hegel defines Essential Relation as, "*first*, the relation of Whole and Parts, i. e. the relation of the reflected and the immediate independence in which they mutually condition and presuppose each other." In this aspect, "neither of the sides is posited as moment of the other; their identity is therefore itself one side: in other words, their identity is not their negative unity. The *second* phase is that in which the one side is a moment of the other, and so is contained in it as in its ground — the true independence of both. This is the relation of *force* and its *manifestation*.

"*Thirdly*, this inequality or non-identity that still remains within the relation annuls itself, and the *final form* of Essential Relation appears, — that of *Internal and External*. In this form, which has become entirely formal, the essential relation goes to the ground, and there arises true *Activity* or Substance as the absolute unity of immediate and reflected existence." ¹

Essential Relation, then, in its *first* aspect, is that of Whole and Parts. Another and *second* phase of the relation is that in which the one side is a moment of the other side, and is contained in that other side as in its ground; but this ground is the true independence of both sides. It is that necessary *third* (or middle identity of both sides) as their absolute ground. This relation of the one side through the other to this fundamental ground of both is "the relation of Force to its Manifestation;" or rather it is the relation of Force or forces to the fundamental Causality that is the origin or source of the Force and of all forces, and which must lie in this ground, if anywhere. The relation

¹ Hegel's *Doctrine of Essence and Reflection*, trans. by Wm. T. Harris, pp. 156, 157, New York, 1881.

between the two sides only, as being unequal to each other and so non-identical, is annulled in "the final form of Essential Relation," which thus appears as the "entirely formal" relation of Internal and External, in which essential relation "goes to the ground," or involves the ground; that is, this ground is the fundamental, absolute, and eternal necessity, which is the necessary third term or middle identity of the two sides in their unity; and then (he continues) "there arises true *Activity* or Substance as the absolute unity of the immediate and the reflected existence."

But which is it, Activity or Substance, that arises? It is not said which. And whence comes the Activity? or what is the Substance? or how does either *arise* out of this fundamental necessity or ground? So far as he has defined Ground, *Substrate*, or *Content*, as distinguishable from Form, it is this same fundamental and eternal necessity. It is made the ground of the relation of Internal and External, of Content and Form, of Essence and Existence, of Substrate or Substance and Accident. As defined, this fundamental necessity of Essential Relation must be what is meant by Essence and by Substance, or else there is none at all. But how came this necessity, however absolute, eternal, or true, or real, in its own nature as such, to be an activity also? Is the activity in it, or outside of it? We may as well ask this question as to ask Science if the force called gravity is inside or outside the atom. Is it the Activity, or the Substance, that arises in this manner out of the ground? It is not said which. But this is the most important point in the whole business. There is no express statement that Essence and Activity, Substance and Energy, are one, or are only the two sides or aspects of one and the same absolute Whole. Neither is it here expressly said that the Activity is "pure Being," or "pure Activity" (*actus purus*), or immaterial spirit, apart from Substance or Essence of any kind; but this is the implication suggested by the tenor of the expression. The point is vital; for he has characterized that form

* 9. *any system, Substance = Infinite Energy,*
Essence = the essential Relational Con-
dition of Personality, Consciousness, and the
Freedom, Energy, and Personality Infinite Liberty
the whole of it, self-determining, Infinite Freedom.

of Essential Relation that appears only as the relation of Internal and External as "entirely formal;" that is, it has as yet no substance, no activity, no real Essence whatever, but is merely a visionary logical formula. But all the while the labor is to show that in truth it is not merely an empty formal schema, but that it has a real content, an essential substrate or substance, which is both real in itself and capable of becoming the essences, or substances, of all existent realities. This may be taken as a specimen, a fair instance, of the protean ambiguity and chameleonic fallaciousness of Hegel's style and manner of treatment, if not of his thought and his logic, too.

And yet, whether it is Activity or Substance that so arises, it is declared to be "the absolute unity of immediate and reflected existence." What he means here by "immediate existence" would seem to be the external aspect or outside of the affair as presented to external observation; and "the reflected existence" is the outside inverted into the inside view, or turned back and reflected into the ground of necessity, or into "essential relation," as into the source and origin whence it proceeded; and inside and outside, taken together into an indivisible unity of identity and difference, are to be considered as ground and what is grounded, as Internality and Externality, as Essence and Existence, as Substance and Activity, as Potentiality and Actuality, Content and Form, at once and in one identical, individual, and universal Whole; and this (it would seem) is to be taken as the fundamental necessity and absolute truth of the matter. Such necessity may, indeed, be solid and substantial enough whereon to ground a universe; but still, whence comes the Activity?

The result of his whole investigation of Essence and Phenomenon thus far, or as far as the demonstration of the fundamental nature of Essential Relation, in reference to Whole and Parts, Quantity and Quantities, Essences and Existences, Substances and Accidents or Properties, has as

yet gone, is, that he has got only a formal schema of the two sides or opposed terms of a necessary relation, and a negative unity of the same into one identical whole, which is the reflection or return of both extremes into a common middle or third term as their absolute ground, — a triplicity in unity, which is “entirely formal,” because it is as yet without real content, or is only a logical necessity as a formal schema, which might just as well be standing still to all eternity as to be moving at all. But after some recapitulation of previous statements, and when we are beginning to look for a real content, we are only to learn that, since the two sides return into this negative unity of both in one Whole in this logically theoretical manner, therefore “the content and form are absolutely identical,” and that there is nothing for it to do “but this, to utter or manifest itself: it is the revelation of its own essence, so that this essence consists merely in self-revelation.” A rare performance, surely! But we would like to know how it is done, — what utters or makes it utter or reveal at all, — since the day of miracles is past, and only “spiritual mediums” decline to explain the cause, or the *modus operandi*. But we have to wait only for the further announcement that this “Essential Relation” of ground and grounded, this formal schema which has nothing to do but utter itself and reveal itself, and which consists merely in self-revelation, “therefore now defines Essence as Actuality.” Is it, then, that hitherto there has been no actuality at all, no reality, no real Content, no Essence, but this same self-revealing Essential Relation? And is this that same that was “Activity” or “Substance” (either way), and that simply *arose* when the two sides of the essential relation went to their ground, as when Mephistopheles rose up out of the little dog in a cloud of fire and smoke?

We are further to learn, however, that “Actuality is the unity of Essence and Existence,” and that this Essential Relation, which was defined as only a formal schema, is

now "the absolute Actuality." Some persons have regarded "this activity of reflection" (it seems) as an external affair; but since this reflection essentially belongs to it (the essential relation), it (the reflection) is "the negative return of the absolute into itself." In the second place, "this unity of Internal and External (that same formal schema) is the Actuality properly so called;" for "Actuality, Possibility, and Necessity constitute the formal moments of the absolute, *i. e.* its reflection;" and in the third place, "the unity of the absolute and of its activity of reflection is the absolute Essential Relation;" and "this is called Substance." But we have still to ask, whence came the "activity of reflection," and how did it get into the formal schema? The only further account here given of it is, that "Actuality, Possibility, and Necessity" are "the formal moments of the movement of reflection." But what are "moments"? and whence the "movement"? Are they movements? Did they set the thing in motion, or are they only the grounds of the movement? All this seems very much like whipping the devil round the stump, without touching him or the stump, which was the very thing we most wanted to know about. But it is also declared that "the unity of the absolute and of its activity of reflection is the absolute essential relation," and that "this is Substance;" that is, Activity, added to the formal relation, is Substance, and so it is to make no difference whether we call it *Activity* or *Substance*.

But again: What is this "absolute"? Is it that same "Essential Relation" to which the Activity is also said to have been "united as its Substance"? No other "Absolute" has as yet been defined but this same Essential Relation of Internal and External, which, before the union, was a mere formal schema, an empty logical vision. But if this "absolute" is to be understood to be the one Whole of all real Being or Essence, so internally, externally, and absolutely constituted as to embrace and contain all those

necessities, possibilities, necessary and essential relations within itself in one complex unity, through the identity of the three terms of the absolute relation in all phases of the triplicity in unity, still it may be asked, how came there to be an Activity in it at all, or whence came it when it *arose* in that Mephistophelian manner? As oftentimes said already, Hegel gives no clear and satisfactory answer to this question. What he does do is, simply to assume and presuppose the Activity as an eternal movement within the immovable Whole of real existence as a fact or a necessary truth, as if it did not need to have any other or further account given of it. He assumes (and it was perhaps absolutely necessary that he should assume) the fact that the universal Essence and Power is in truth a one Whole in essential relation with its parts; that Essence and Activity are but the two sides or aspects of one and the same absolute Essentivity; and that the movement therein is as absolute, eternal, and necessary as the Essentivity itself, the Ideality as necessary as the Reality.

§ 3. REFLECTION — ABSOLUTE CONTENT AND FORM — CONCEPT.

Hegel makes frequent use of the phrase "*the activity of reflection*," but the stress is laid on the reflection, not on the activity. His use of the word *reflection* is somewhat peculiar. In the ordinary sense of the term, it has reference in general to Reflection in our minds. This is, truly enough, the use of the common Understanding; though sometimes, and more recently among the physiological psychologists, it seems to mean some kind of mechanical *turning-back* of tissues, convolutions, or nervic currents in the brain, called "reflex action." Following Locke, or Reid, there is, *first*, sense-perception of external things; *secondly*, a forming of ideal images or representations; and *thirdly*, an inward turning of the attention to a consideration of these images or ideas; and finally, a forma-

tion of generalized conceptions upon these matters of sense-perception ; and this is called a process of Reflection. It is usually conceived as a kind of *turning-back* of the conscious attention to these matters to consider them further, reason about them, and draw conclusions from them as generalizations. As such, reflection is regarded as a process or activity of the mind in thinking. In the physiologico-materialistic brain-theory of mind, *reflection* is regarded as a purely mechanical *turning-back* of one impressed tissue or convolution (or of one "relational perception") upon another in the whole brain, until it settles into a stable balance of judgment in a present state of thought ; as when a ray of light is *reflected* from a mirror (or refracted in water or glass), or bent into another direction, and so as going on bounding from one obstruction to another until it is converted into some other mode of force or motion, or is lost in an equilibrium of darkness and oblivion. In this Hegelian treatment, this kind of reflection has nothing to do with the subject-matter in hand : for him, the ordinary doctrine of Reflection is an external affair of the finite Understanding only, employing itself about external things (or their ideal images), or about Nature in its externality as presented to our observation. What he is considering is the internal and absolute constitution of Nature itself, the universe itself, or the one absolute Whole of all Reality ; and he is endeavoring to demonstrate that this is identical with Thought itself, with Intelligence itself, with the Notion, Soul, or God (or by whatever other name it may be called), as It eternally and necessarily is, in its own absolute constitution, nature, and being.

He has already treated of "pure Being," and of mere "Becoming," as only the most superficial aspects of the whole Reality, and he is now trying to define Essence as the absolute and necessary ground or internal identity of all Actuality and all Reality in the necessary and absolute relations of Internal and External, of interior Essence and external

Existence, of Ground and what is grounded, of Quantity and quantities, or Essential Relation in all the categories of Identity and Difference, of Necessity and Freedom, throughout the one Whole. But he finds it necessary to have an activity of reflection in it and within it. Without movement, it would be an immovable and unmoved Standing All throughout, and no turning, no reflection, would be conceivably possible. How, then, does he get movement into it? or how does he explain his "activity of reflection"? He does not explain it at all: he merely assumes it as a fact. He seems to have started with a foregone conclusion that it was the business of philosophy to show how "pure Activity" (the *actus purus* of the Schoolmen), or the Jehovistic absolute Lord, could and did absolutely exist, and create the world and himself out of nothing. Consequently, with him, this pure activity must needs be hovering about everywhere, or wherever it is wanted in the development of his system, and especially here, where he is undertaking to define what Substance is, what Essence is, what Potentiality is, what Actuality is, and what Reality is. And he seems to find himself, therefore, under the necessity of assuming, not only a pure activity, but an activity of Reflection also. His use of this term inevitably suggests (or carries with it) the idea that behind (or rather before) Essence, Actuality, or Reality, there is a pure activity already existent as conscious soul or spirit, that puts itself into a state of contemplation, consideration, and reflection on the business in hand. Whether he considered it in this way or not, his style and manner of treatment, what he actually does, is to make his "activity of reflection" perform the same or a similar office. Certainly, if such pure activity, or pure spirit alone, is to do such things at all, — is to posit Essence and Existence, all Actuality and all Reality, where none was before, — it must indeed have a capability of reflection, and be a knowing, conscious will, and a supreme power of action and creation.

But the very question in hand is, if any such reflecting activity exists at all, or not, at the bottom of the Universe; and if so, in what manner, by what necessity, law, fact, or logic, it does, or possibly can, so exist? It is evidently not exactly this sort of Reflection that is really meant by Hegel. What, then, is his sense of the term? One might try to take it, etymologically, in the root sense of the Latin *Reflectere*, as a simple *turning-back* of something, as of the neck (*Ovid*), or the head (*Catullus*), or the mind (*Virgil* and *Cicero*); but as to what, exactly, a *turning-back* of the mind was with them, or what a *turning-back* of the attention into a process of consideration and reflection was with Locke, or Reid, or what it is with the common Understanding, might be difficult to say, and is not now our subject. We are now to consider what a *turning-back*, or a "returning into itself," or a "negative unity of reflection," is, with Hegel. Clearly, if there were a something moving in a certain direction, it might run against something else, and be thereby stopped, or it might be imagined simply to stop of itself, — so far and no farther. But in either case, how should it stop itself, or turn itself back, unless it were itself a conscious willing essence and power capable of imposing limitation on its own action and determining its own motions? The scope of Hegel's endeavor would seem to be, precisely, to show in what manner such self-limitation is possible and actual. It is at least intelligible that, if there were a one standing Whole of real Essence and Power in one absolute identity of whole and parts, and of all the other essential relations and categories of necessity and freedom, as internal and external phases of the Whole, and without breach of continuity and causal connection therein, and if there were to be movement at all within such whole, then either the immovable standing Whole as such, or some determined, fixed, and unmoved part thereof, might be, and indeed must necessarily be, a ground of reaction for the movement of any other part, if it were in fact moving; and through

the mediation or instrumentality of the immovable whole, or of the unmoved part, there must necessarily be change of direction of such moving part, even until it should turn backward, and even return into the relative place or position whence it began to move as such. At the same time, it must necessarily displace other parts, moving or at rest, in just so far as change of relative place or position for them was therein involved, but still without any necessary breach of internal continuity within the whole, and without any absolute severance into wholly separate and discrete ones, though specially limited by reflection into themselves as such, and though thereby necessarily projected into certain external oppositions and conflicting contradictions to one another as such specially constituted particulars. But unless some part of the continuous Whole did move, there could be no motion or change at all; for motion is the mere fact that something moves or is moving. Neither could there be a movement of any part unless there were an active and absolute Causality of some kind within the Whole as such; nor could it be such Causality unless it were itself a unity of Essence and Activity in one, and so capable of moving some part of itself, or of being moved (or of moving itself), in respect of some part, while other parts stood still. Activity or movement in an absolute void must be impossible, because there could be nothing there which could either move or be moved.

Hegel really presupposes some such standing Whole of universal Essence or real Essentivity; but what he actually says, or what his peculiar method of logical investigation seems to make him say, is, that pure Being, or pure Activity, posits that Essentivity itself, establishes, or at least moves, the absolutely formal Essential Relation itself, puts life and movement into all the logical categories of "solid ground," and keeps up a continual dialectic "negativity" (or limitation) of action and reaction in them; but still there is no Essence, no Actuality, no Reality, it seems, until this "ac-

tivity of reflection " has worked out and posited, determined and established the whole variety of essences and existences, substances and properties, realities and phenomena, in the world of external Nature. Taking reflection to be a simple turning-back of some moving part within the whole, on the ground of the immovable or the unmoved, and through the mediating instrumentality thereof (and so much might be conceivably possible), we have still to ask, Whence comes the activity that turns or makes it turn back, or move at all? From Hegel we get no answer but this same Activity that arose when the formal Essential relation was defined, and which, united with that, was Substance. He assumes as a fact or a necessity, not only the activity, but the reflection, in the Substance; and there is everywhere in his treatment a tacit assumption, an implicit suggestion, and a very perplexing implication, that such activity is already from the first a conscious, reflecting Spirit, which not only unites itself with the formal relation to make it into real, active Substance, but also does itself posit, create, and establish Essence, but still only as a kind of metaphysical or purely spiritual Essence, which has not yet come to Actuality, and has no reality whatever; though this metaphysical essence can and does finally posit or establish, through this "absolute essential relation" or "unity of Internal and External" (or rather the triplicity of the three terms of the relation in the unity of one identity, or "the unity of Essence and Existence"), all essences and existences as "some-whats," which thus become special wholes in themselves, and are likewise unities reflected into themselves, while they are at the same time reflected into the absolute Essential Relation of the Whole; and as such special totalities their several "contents and forms are identical" also, and have nothing to do but utter or manifest themselves, or reveal their essences. In this way, it would seem, Essential Relation defines itself as the "identity of its phenomenal manifestation with its internality, and therefore now defines

essence as Actuality."¹ But Reality is yet to come, and comes only in the particular substances as the realities of bodies or things in Nature (*aller Realitäten*).

Are we to understand, then, that the one absolute Whole as such, with all its internal, necessary, and essential relations and logical categories, has no actuality, and no reality, but what consists in this special constitution of particular essences, substances, bodies, or things? One would think that such absolute necessities, necessary relations, and categories of logical essentiality must be the most solid, substantial, actual, eternal, and real things in the universe! But, after all, we are to find, further on, that this Essential Relation had thus defined Essence only as *an actuality* in a particular "somewhat," and that it is also in itself "the absolute Actuality," is "the absolute as such," and that "the activity of reflection essentially belongs to it, and is the negative return [or *turning-back*] of the absolute into itself;" that "Actuality, Possibility, and Necessity" are only "moments" of this reflection; and finally, that "the unity of the absolute and of its activity of reflection is the absolute essential relation," and is "called Substance." Still, we have no information as to whence came the "activity of reflection." We see that there is a tacit implication which supposes it somehow to *belong* to the Essential Relation, or to be *united* with it, or somehow to be in unity with it. Before that union, the relation was "entirely formal:" when the two extreme terms of the relation came to their ground of identity and absolute necessity, then activity or substance arose. But supposing now that the one whole complex, however distinguishable into parts or phases, still subsists without breach of continuity in the fundamental identity of Essential Relation, of Essence and Existence, of Substance and Phenomenon, throughout the entire field of external Nature, however persistent and real, or contin-

¹ Hegel's *Doctrine of Essence*, trans. by Wm. T. Harris, p. 172, New York, 1881.

gent and evanescent, the question still remains, *What is it, then, that moves or is moved? and what makes it move?* Evidently there is nothing in this whole complex but a necessity, or a necessary relation, that could either move or be moved. The Whole as such is an immovable standing All, and movement is possible only within that Whole. Can an absolute necessity, or an absolutely necessary relation, move or be moved? It would seem that it must be so, if any process is to be possible or intelligible at all therein: for otherwise the whole complex must stand an eternally fixed and immovable schema; and if the schema were to be itself Substance, then Substance would be immovable. But (says Hegel) Activity (or the activity of reflection), when united with Essential Relation, or when it arises therein, is Substance. Now the essential relation of Internal and External was found to be "entirely formal," and without content, until Activity arose in it, or was united with it. Then the contentless logical schema acquired a real content and became absolute Actuality, such as could be or become the ground and substrate of all special actualities or "somewhats," and of all realities in Nature. What is this but to declare that the absolutely existent whole complex of necessities and necessary relations is not an immovable "diamond network," nor a formal and fixed schema merely, but that the parts, as particular necessities or special relations within the standing All, are movable and do move, on the ground of the immovable or the unmoved, and that such movement (or the activity which makes them move) is as eternal and as necessary (if there is to be movement in the universe at all) as any other necessity in the whole complex of necessities; and, in short, that Essence and Activity are but the two sides or aspects of one and the same whole and real Essentiality, and that this Essentiality (or the one whole and absolute complex of necessities) is Substance, is Essence. We may as well call the one aspect *pure activity* as to call the other *pure reason*, and no better: they are really, absolutely, and eter-

A. B.

nally One, and as such are the whole and absolute Reality as distinguishable from the empty Possibility as mere Freedom. It is not the Oneness of an atom or a point, but the Oneness of the Whole as such. This Oneness may be called the "Individuality" or also the "Universality" of the one Whole. The amount of it all is, simply, that the one Whole is the absolute and eternally active Intelligence or Thought itself; and Intelligence, Reason, Thought, Soul, Essence, Substance, is nothing else but that. And there is no need of importing into it, or of superadding to it, from nothing and nowhere, any "pure activity," "conscious Being," or immaterial spirit, other than such absolute Whole itself. It is itself the absolute Reality and Ideality in One.

Substantial movement in respect of some movable part in such standing All, moving on the ground of the immovable or of the unmoved, in the unity of ever-identical Content and movable Form, together with the necessary internal mediation and instrumentation of the parts, relations, and phases therein necessarily involved (if there be movement at all), may be called *reflection*, perhaps, as well as by any other name, if only it be understood aright, and not as implying any externally existent "conscious being," or pure spirit, other than that to make it move, reflect, or reveal itself. And such necessary *turning-back* may be called "reflection into itself," too, in the category of change of movable necessities, or alterable relations, within the Whole, and of the Becoming and Departing of special and particular objects, bodies, or things as such in the ultimate determination of the whole absolute process into the infinite detail of external and contingent realities; but it is this absolute Whole which is the truly universal and individual, and from which all special objects, particular individuals, partial wholes, or dependent ones, must proceed while they exist as such. But how this "preservation of the individual in the universal," through "reflection-into-itself" as the basis of the preservation (though it may be "the especial insight of

Hegel"), furnishes any "escape from Pantheism" (however it may be an escape from "the abstract universal"), as suggested by Dr. Harris,¹ is not very clear.

The remark is made that "the movement of Essence is in general the becoming to the Idea"² (*Die Bewegung des Wesens ist überhaupt das Werden zum Begriffe*) or Concept.³ That is (we may suppose), an activity having arisen, or having been united with the formal Essential Relation, there is now a *movement* of Essence into the becoming of concepts or ideas of something else or other than what was before. Now, if Idea or Concept (*Begriff*) meant here the one whole of Essential Relation and the activity or movement in it, under all the categories of ground and grounded, of Internal and External, of Identity and Difference, or Essence and Existence, then a becoming of it as such Whole to something other than it was before, or into some different state, would be conceivably possible, and indeed absolutely necessary, as a change in respect of the merely external or existent Form, and (as it well might be) without reaching to any change in respect of the internal and fundamental identity of the one Whole as such. Nor would there be any necessity of an absolute severance of any essential part from the Whole, or a destruction of identity. In this movement, or Becoming, of Essence to Ideas, we are in the category of the Becoming and Departing of specials and particulars only. The added commentary of Dr. Harris⁴ to the effect that the becoming is "a genesis of the 'concrete Idea,' as the being which is both subjective and objective, i. e. self-determined as its own object, conscious being," seems to carry with it an implicit suggestion that the "activity of Essence" (or the "Substance") that arose, or was united with the formal Essential Relation, is

¹ Hegel's *Doctrine of Essence*, trans. by Wm. T. Harris, p. 122.

² Hegel's *Doctrine of Essence*, trans. by Wm. T. Harris, p. 169.

³ *Werke*, iv. 174, von Dr. Henning, Berlin, 1841.

⁴ *Doctrine of Essence*, p. 169.

itself a conscious being, is self-determining, and is both subjective and objective, like the "pure activity" of the Scholastics. Hegel continues to say, that "in the Essential Relation of the Internal and External, the essential feature (*Moment*) of the Concept (*Begriff*) makes its appearance, viz., the existence of such a negative unity that each of its moments is not only its other, but is also the totality of the Whole." This moment, then, is not any superadded conscious being or spirit, but is only that movement (*Bewegung*) that is a consequence of that same unity or union of "Activity" or "Substance" with the formal relation, and as such now puts the Whole in motion, and makes it a negative unity of its moments (i. e. if there be movement at all). The Concept (*Begriff*), then, is in fact the Whole itself; and "this totality is, in the Concept as such, the Universal," but is also "a substrate which has not appeared at the stage of the process where we have internal and external" (i. e. where the relation was only formal); and "in the negative identity of Internal and External," or in their immediate inversion into each other as entirely formal, "there is also lacking that substrate which is called thing" (*Sache*), or rather the *affair*, the content. But substrate, content, will appear (it seems) in a "somewhat" when once constituted in its full *entelecheia* from beginning to completion as such. And then Essential Relation, with the "activity or substance" in it, defines the whole universal Essence into an "Actuality" as a somewhat.

The one whole Essence now is, "*first*, the identity opposed to the distinctions of these determinations [of existent immediateness or externality] as an indifferent substrate opposed to a form external to it, or an identity as content. The *second* of the identities considered is the unmediated identity of the distinctions of the external and internal, viz., the immediate inversion of each into its opposite: this is the pure form. But these two identities are only the sides of one totality; in other words, the totality itself is

only their conversion of each into the other. The totality as substrate and content is their immediateness reflected into itself by means of the presupposing reflection of form which annuls its distinction and posits itself as indifferent identity, as reflected unity opposed to it [the form]. In other words, the identity is the Form itself in so far as it is defined as variety, or indifferent multiplicity, and in so far as it reduces itself to one of its sides as externality, and to the other of its sides as immediateness reflected into itself or internality."¹

The absolute, then, is simply the one and universal Whole. The activity of reflection stands in a certain relation of opposition to the absolute internal identity of the Whole, annuls its activity in this absolute phase of the Whole, and is merely the external display of its own internal action in the movable Form (or boundary of limitation), which always begins with it and returns into it, in the process of reflection into itself. The absolute as such is solely this absolute identity, and is only "the negative of reflection and determinateness in general." The externality of this absolute Whole is thus only the mode and manner of this external Form as reflected into partial wholes or special ones, or again, finally, into this absolute identity of the Whole, as its Modality or Quality, and as their modalities or qualities. As to matter, substrate, content, all other distinction of Content and Form has vanished in this identity of internal Essence and external Form; and the Reflection is only the dualizing and distinguishing of distinction and difference in the self-identical Whole, — or the negative as negative, — which all the while preserves its internal identity as such, and is indifferent towards all distinctions and differences within itself. Thus it is at once and in one absolute Content and Form in itself; and this is an exposition of the Absolute itself, and is, therefore, the whole Actuality.

¹ *Doctrine of Essence*, trans. by Harris, p. 171.

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Absolute

§ 4. POTENTIALITY — GROUND AND MOVEMENT — PHENOMENON.

The absolute Actuality includes all particulars in its universality. The internal categories of necessity and essential relation, the whole metaphysical complex of absolute necessities, movable necessities, or mediating parts, relations, and phases, becomes freely movable within itself on the basis of the immovable or the unmoved, and this activity of reflection of the external forms into the identical Whole, on the basis of the internal and necessary mediation, is a perpetual movement of change to which these internal and absolute grounds of the identity stand eternally indifferent. The absolute Content and Form is thrown out (if there be movement at all), unfolded, and reflected into the partially free, but still dependent contents and forms of all special essences or particular substances; but these are reflected into themselves as such, and also into the whole Content and Form as such, while they subsist as what they are: they are reflected into their own internal essences and external existences, into their substances and phenomenal appearances, however persistent or evanescent, in the field of external Nature. In this whole process, the phenomenal appearances, accidents, and properties belonging to them vanish with the interior essence or substance of the thing as such, and this vanishes also into the underlying identity of the essential relations and necessary categories of the absolute Content and Form, as a wave vanishes into the whole ocean.

If we still ask, Whence this activity of evolution, mediation, and reflection, no other answer is or can be forthcoming but this, that the activity, the movement, is as necessary and as eternal as the absolute Content and Form, or the one Whole itself is, — that it did not merely arise in it, was not merely united with it, much less superadded to it, as any externally conscious being or pure Spirit, but was from eternity merely one aspect of the one Whole and eternal Essen-

tity. And it may be further said to be essentially and actually universal Intelligence : its process is Knowing ; its Knowing is Consciousness (which was never anything else but the fact of knowing) ; its life is eternal ; and it is, in short, in itself as such, absolute Personality and immortal Soul. Universal Personality can be nothing else but that.

Having thus got an *activity* into the formal schema of essential relation as one phase of the whole fact or necessity, whereby it is finally constituted a substantial reality of Essence and Power in the unity of the one whole complex Essentity, Hegel then proceeds to say, that "the absolute" (*i. e.* the whole Essentity) is "the unity of the internal and external as the first phase of unity existing in itself, or Potentiality." It is now a substantiality of Essence and Power in one, an absolute Actuality, and a Potentiality as such. But this Potentiality of action, or energy, necessarily resides within the standing All of the absolute Individuality ; and therefore movement therein can only be a movement of some part within the whole, or in respect of some part, phase, or relation of the internal, eternal, and necessary constitution thereof. Hence reaction, mediation, instrumentation, and reflection, on the ground of the immovable Whole as such, or of the unmoved parts as such, must necessarily follow. As it is thus only some necessity, or some relation, of the whole complex of necessities and necessary relations, that moves or is moved, or changed, there is no possibility of this moving part or relation getting outside of the Whole, or being utterly severed from it, and thrown off (as it were) into the abyss of Nothingness, or mere Possibility beyond. Through this internal mediation of reflection (or instrumentation, as it might be called), the moving part or relation must necessarily be turned around and back into some position of determinateness or stable equilibrium within the indifferent standing Whole. This movement and return seems to be what is called "reflection-into-itself" as the return out of the *other-being* (*Anderer-*

seyn) of the moving part or relation (which thus becomes in one sense *an other*, or rather only partially an other), while it is moving around and back into the whole again, which is absolute "*being-in-and-for-itself*" (*Ansichseyn* and *Fürsichseyn*) at once and in one as the absolute identity of whole and parts, and of all internal and necessary relations of ground and grounded, and of all the categories of necessity and freedom, within the absolute Whole. Such other-being part, returning into the Whole, thereby vanishes as such partial other into the equilibrium of stationary balance (as it were) within the whole whence it came; for the ever-identical Whole stands eternally indifferent to the arising and departing of such special or particular others. But while it has existence as such other, it is necessarily bounded over against (or out of) the negative, empty possibility outside of (or other than) the Whole and it, and this limitation of form (always a movable boundary), which it receives from within, is its mode and manner of existing, its *modus*, its quality, in the external aspect; but the part which is thus moving or being moved, and so distinguished and differentiated from the Whole as such, considered by itself alone as such speciality of the whole Essence and Power thus thrown and determined into it as such, is internally its quantity, and externally (or as limitation) its quality; and the unity of its quantity and its quality (its whole intensive and extensive magnitude or degree) is the Modality of its essence (or content) and form. All these necessities, necessary relations, and absolute truths, however, together constitute the *Actuality* of the whole internal Essence (or real Content) and external Existence (or appearance) as Form; and to an observer through sense-perception, viewing it from the outside (as it were), the external aspect might be regarded both as existence or appearance, and as actual or real as such. But as all this necessity and fact is as necessarily true of the Whole as such as it is of any part as such, the whole Essentia has to be considered as in and for itself

eternally and necessarily the absolute Quantity, Quality, Potentiality, and Modality, at once and in one, to begin with. The Modality represents this reflecting activity of the whole absolute Content and Form. Such movement of reflection necessarily results in a continuous dualization, specialization, and particularization of content and form within the Whole: and so "the absolute" becomes "a self-sustaining activity of exposition as mode and manner," which is, at the same time, "absolute identity;" and the entire manifestation is "the absolute Actuality" of the universe. This is just as much an actuality, a reality (and in short an ideality), as the *other-being* was as such speciality; that is, it is just as much necessary and absolute truth. But it is only metaphysical and logical truth. It can be seen and comprehended only by the intellect or intelligence itself. It is not cognizable by the senses, is not to be apprehended through sense-perception merely, nor adequately grasped in the ordinary methods of the Understanding only. It is only by the inwardly seeing and knowing intelligence that these necessities, necessary relations, and absolute truths of universal reason are to be seized and cognized in their real and ideal truth. The knowing intelligence, though limited and finite in us, is yet capable of seeing and knowing that what is directly seen and known to be necessary and true in and for ourselves, must also be universally necessary and true as metaphysical, logical, and intelligible theory.

There are absolute, eternal, and unalterable necessities, and also movable relative and changeable necessities. Necessity in itself, indeed, simply is what it is, eternally and absolutely; but there may be alterable necessities or laws, and relative or movable necessities in necessary relations. The absolute Whole is Essentiality, Potentiality, and Actuality at once and in one, and as such absolute necessity; but it is, at the same time, a unical complex of unalterable necessities and of alterable or relative necessities and movable relations. It exists or subsists only in absolute Essen-

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tial Relation, whereof the ground or middle term is absolute and unalterable necessity, and in which the two opposed extremes, while involved in the middle or absolute necessity, stand in movable relation to each other. In the whole Actuality of Essential Relation as absolute Content and Form, there must be an absolute Potentiality of transition of one extreme of the relation into the other through the mediation of the common middle identity of the Whole as such (if there be eternal movement in it at all), whereby the special and temporary actualities of either extreme, their special relativities or movable necessities, are necessarily changeable, or subject to potential change; whereby they may vanish as such special relativities and temporary existences, being reflected and returned into the middle identity of the absolute Whole, whence they came to be what they were while they were such. This would seem to be the sum and substance of Hegel's exposition of the categories of Essentiality and essences, Potentiality and potences, Actuality and actualities, in respect of their internal, external, and absolute nature and truth. But then, if there are to be such special essences, potentialities, actualities, or existences at all, they must necessarily come into external relations of opposition and contradiction to one another, and all manner of limitations, conditions, and conditional limitations must arise, or rather externally exist also; for all these categories of necessity and reason, whether absolute and unalterable, or movable and changeable, within the absolute Whole, are as eternal and necessary as the Whole itself, such being the very constitution and nature of the one Whole. This changeable unity of Essentiality, Potentiality, and Actuality, of Necessity and Freedom, is therefore necessarily Contingency also; and there must be a necessary essentiality, potentiality, actuality, and contingency in all multiplicity of specials and particulars within the absolute Universality of the one Whole as such. And so there must be an absolute and eternal dialectic movement of the movable in the immovable, or of the moved on the ground of the unmoved.

"Absolute necessity is therefore reflection," says Hegel, "or the form of the absolute, — the unity of Being [in the active sense] and Essence. On the other hand, its determinations are nothing but determinations of reflection, only however as existent multiplicity, actuality full of distinctions, and this has the shape of independent somewhats opposed to each other as others. On the other hand, their relation is the absolute identity: it is the absolute conversion of their actuality into their potentiality, and of their potentiality into actuality. Absolute necessity is therefore blind. On the other hand, the distinctions of actuality and potentiality have the form of reflection-into-itself as being; and they are therefore both as free actualities, neither of which appears in the other, nor exhibits a single trace of its relation to the other: each is grounded in itself and is necessary in itself. Necessity as essence is included within this being. The contact of these actualities with each other appears, therefore, as an empty externality."¹ That is, the reflection into itself is reflection into the identity of the one absolute Whole.

"The unity of Essence and Being" (in the active sense) is Substance: they are one and inseparable. Science says the same thing when it declares that action or motion apart from matter is inconceivable. It makes no difference whether we call it Matter, Substance, or Essence; and we may say, with Hegel, that "Substance manifests itself, through the content of the Actuality into which it translates the potential, as creative might; and through the content of the potentiality into which it transmutes the actual, it manifests itself as destructive might. But the two are identical. The creative activity is destructive, and the destructive activity is creative."² For the negative and positive potentiality and actuality are absolutely united in substantial necessity.

¹ Hegel's *Doctrine of Essence*, trans. by Wm. T. Harris, New York, 1881, p. 196.

² *Ibid.* p. 200.

Again, what is posited as determined by this absolute might of Substance is an effect: the Substance itself, so eternally and necessarily existing as it is in and for itself, is Cause, absolute Cause (*Causa sui*), or the absolute Causality, since it neither has, nor by any possibility can have, any other cause than itself. The necessary relation that must always subsist between this absolute Cause and any determination of it as an effect of its absolute Might, is the simple relation of *Cause and Effect*, however persistent or evanescent that determination may be. This special relation must continue to subsist throughout any chain or succession of secondary causes and effects, even if its length should be drawn out indefinitely into a *progressus ad infinitum*. Such progression may, indeed, be considered, in a certain external manner, as an endless sequence of facts and events, of existences and disappearances, or accidentalities, or as a mere play of contingencies on the surface of Nature, and as having no causal relation of dependence on one another; as if Hume (as some have imagined) had abolished causation out of the universe. But, in any rational and true conception of the internal and necessary relation of Cause to Effect, or of Effect to Cause, it will be seen that all actual effects as limited and temporary existences and appearances, necessarily, eternally, and infinitely, vanish in being reflected and returned, with all their distinctions and differences of limitation in times and spaces, into the essential and ever-continuing identity of the one absolute Cause, that must ever dwell in Eternity and Immensity.

The absolute Causality as the substantial unity of Essence and Activity in the one Whole, in being mediated, limited, and determined (if there be an eternal movement at all) into the special essences (or contents) and forms as specialities of the one whole Content and Form, proceeds or is thrown into the special essence, substance, object, or thing, as a partial (not a wholly severed) other than itself as such, and is continued in it, sustaining or upholding it as such while it is

such; but by the continued internal action or operation of the inner absolute causality, the special content and form, as a temporary substance, object, or thing, may be made to pass on, through the internal dialectic of its own special constitution as such other thing, into still further and other limitations of content and form, *i. e.* into other and different substances or things, and that indefinitely, in a repeated relation of cause and effect; or the internally active and sustaining Causality may be diminished, or be entirely withdrawn out of that thing, whereby it, and all that is dependent upon it, vanishes as such in the reflection and return of the differenced Whole into its less differentiated identity, or into its absolute universality again. This resolution or return may take place suddenly, or in a long course of time; and the transition of cause into effect, and of this effect as again itself cause into another effect, may proceed indefinitely, or for any given length of time; but at last, in the whole circuit of the causal process, the causative substance and power of the specialities as such must necessarily be reflected, must decline and finally return into the one absolute and identical Whole whence the process began; whereby the last links in the several distinct chains of progression are, in the ultimate dissolution of the specialities and particularities as such, resolved into their original source and cause. The whole chain and progression of special and particular things, since the process is eternal, or never wholly ceases, comes necessarily to have the character of a perpetual flux in the continual arising and vanishing of particulars in the external field of contingent and evanescent realities.

In this whole process, the Causality may be said "to return into its absolute Ideal," and "to become the Idea (*Begriff*) itself" as the totality of the process in the three phases of Universal, Special, and Particular, in the total Individuality of the one Whole as such; and all this, however persistent or evanescent such specials or particulars may be in themselves as such. As absolute Content and Form,

inclusive of all existent realities, the Whole is the universal Concept, or the logical Notion, and the "absolute Idea."

In his treatment of "Phenomenon," Hegel recognizes the external scientific view of Nature, and considers the results of science as showing that the whole sensible world, as seen through sense-perception and all instruments in aid of the senses, consists of bodies or masses, with their forms, qualities, and properties; and as finding them to be either mechanical aggregates, or chemical combinations of molecules (or atoms, if there be any composing the molecules), even down to the more modern question whether the æther be an aggregation of particles, or a one continuous whole Essence. He notices the polarity of positive and negative in Electricity. He discusses profoundly the nature of Potential and Actual. Maxwell's theory of electric Quantity and Potential, or electro-motive force, as a state of special stress arising and vanishing in a one whole elastic and incompressible medium, may be considered as a step made in advance of the mathematical science of Hegel's time. Hegel's doctrine of Essence and Reflection is really an inquiry into the internal constitution and nature of molecules and of the æther (which is certainly ascertained to have a world-wide existence), and even of that one whole elastic, incompressible Medium itself; but it includes also a consideration in what manner, by what necessities, laws, or necessary relations, and by what absolute Causality of Essence and Power, any special Æther, Quantity, or Mass, or any particular atom, molecule, or body, is formed and constituted, or is brought into existence and appearance as such as it is while it is what it is.

§ 5. HEGEL'S MODE OF PROCEEDING — "ENTELECHEIA"
—THE NOTION AS THE I.

The method of his investigation appears to begin on the extreme verge or periphery of Whole and Parts, where a mere movement of the becoming of an internal something is

distinguishable from Nothing, the empty negative possibility or Freedom beyond, in the three necessary elements or phases of the actuality in its first presentation to our superficial consideration. It then proceeds inwardly and downward (as it were) into the internal constitution and nature of the internal something, into its special content and form and mode of action, and thence on further and through all these external objects and things in Nature into the still more interior constitution and nature of the Content and Form and mode of activity of the one absolute Whole of all Reality, which is their ground and source. And so he arrives at last at absolute Essential Relation as the unity of the internal identity as substrate, essence, content, with the existence (or standing forth) of external form in the merely inverted or ideally opposed relation of the middle identity to the contained distinctions of parts, phases, or particulars in the Whole, involving all the categories of logical reason or necessity in all their phases of identity and difference, of antithesis, contradiction, and reconciliation in the unity of the one whole Actuality in the form of the absolute Concept or Notion; finding at the end of the inquiry, and at the bottom of all, an eternal movement, activity, or life, in and within the one immovable standing All, and consequently a necessary and eternal process of mediation, instrumentation, and reflection between Whole and Parts, and between unmoved and moving parts, and a consequent reflection of the parts both into themselves as partial wholes, (or special contents and forms) and into the one absolute Whole or universal Content and Form.¹

This, in general, is the philosophical mode of proceeding

¹ At the conclusion of the lesser Logic, we have the remark: "We have now returned to the notion of the idea with which we began. This return to the beginning is also an advance. We began with Being, abstract Being: where we now are we also have the idea as Being; but this idea which has Being is Nature." — *The Logic of Hegel*, trans. by William Wallace, M. A., Oxford, 1874, p. 328.

with the investigation; but he insists that, in truth and fact, the absolute Actuality is, all the while, its own exposition and explanation of what it really and absolutely is in and for itself. At the very bottom and foundation of all, he finds, not only the fact of eternal movement (or activity), but also the absolute and eternal necessities, the internal, necessary, and essential relations, the movable necessities and changeable relations, the logical categories of necessity and freedom, as the solid ground whereon the universe and all it contains is built.

And consequently the true and direct way of conceiving it should be, not externally merely, and as beginning with the outermost peripheral circumference (as it were), where we have a merely superficial being or becoming, but internally also, and as the absolute and eternal Whole that never had a beginning, end, or middle, as such, but eternally was, and is, and will be, and therefore infinite in the proper sense of dwelling in Eternity and Immensity.

The Alexandrian disciples of Plato and Aristotle began with the highest Universal, and (as it were) at the very top of the universe, and descended downward through the architectonic of intelligible paradigms and hyparxes of gods, dæmons, and souls of men and animals, into the lowest terminations of all things in Nature. Hegel (in his "Doctrine of Essence" at least) begins rather with this lowest and most external aspect, as if it were the top of the universe, and descends (or rather more truly ascends) to that same height or depth (whichever it may more properly be called). At the same time it is possible, and perhaps more convenient, in a certain logical order of statement, to consider (as Hegel also seems to have done) the Whole, at first, in respect of absolute Content and Form alone, and as if not reflected and differenced into all or any of those special or particular contents and forms, which are the secondary essences or substances of things as such, or only in respect of the potentiality and power of such whole Content and Form to un-

fold and evolve itself into such other specials and particulars, as when a seed is unfolded into a plant, or a child is evolved into a man, a genus into its species, a class into orders, or Protoplasm into an Animal Kingdom, in the full *entelecheia* of its beginning, completion, decline, and ending as such, with all its divisions, differentiations, and differences of individuals; or, as one might also speak of the *entelecheia* of all movable parts, relations, media, or instrumentalities within the supposed absolute Content and Form, which may or do have a beginning, middle, and end as such in the course of its inner reflection and change. But as to the one absolute Whole in respect of its own fundamental identity and necessity, or in respect of its own absolute and eternal constitution and nature as such Whole, no such *entelecheia* is possible, conceivable, or actual; for in this aspect it is the immovable, universal, and eternal One in which all Multiplicity or change is contained, and is produced, and (as it were) also swallowed up.

The analogy of the evolution of the individual man, from his first inception to his maturity, decline, and disappearance, holds good for the species, and for the genus, and even further for the order, the class, the branch, back to Protoplasm: nor does it stop there, but holds also for the wider generals of the vegetable and mineral kingdoms as well, and even to Nebula or Æther, and indeed ceases only in the universal and absolute Concept of the One and All. Each has its own lesser *entelecheia* under and within the greater in logical order upward or downward (whichever way it may be taken), until lost in the one absolute and eternal Whole whereof no *entelecheia* is predicable, because it alone is without beginning, end, or middle, and is infinite as such. Bacon's pyramid of sciences, like the ancient Pan's horns, touched heaven in the uppermost sphere of "universals," where "the transition to Natural Theology" was "easy and short," but he did not complete the transition into the metaphysical Concept (or Notion) of the uni-

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versal One and Whole. This is what Hegel endeavors to accomplish. It is what Philosophy itself seems to demand.

But, again, in real truth, there never was a time when this absolute Whole was not already unfolded, evolved, and differentiated into some world of special and particular things, whether as æther, nebula, star, planet, mineral, vegetable, or animal kingdom, of whatever kind or form, or however primitive and simple as yet; for the life, the process, the evolution, and the arising and departing of specials and particulars, is and was as eternal and necessary as the one Whole itself. In this fulness of evolution, what was before supposed to be the absolute Content and Form in its seed-state of greatest logical simplicity as such, and was defined as the Concept or Notion in its simplest identity, theoretically considered, has become (or rather in this state of absolute Allness eternally was and is) the absolute Actuality and the absolute Ideality in one as the two sides or aspects of the one whole Essentivity.

In Hegel's order of treatment, the absolute Concept or Notion (*Begriff*) is the third stage in the whole consideration. He treats, first, of the absolute necessities, categories, and necessary relations of Being and Essence, taking the word *Being* in the active sense of a mere movement of Becoming, or a coming to be something other than exactly what was before, and the word *Essence* in the sense of a *been* in a "timeless past" as what is, and eternally was, the internal and immovable or unmoved identity and absolute ground of what is movable or changeable in respect of form and relation in a certain external aspect. He is endeavoring to show in what manner the Notion comes to have an essential, substantial, and real existence as absolute Content and Form, considered in a certain logical order of exposition of its truth which may be called the *genesis* of it, though in fact it never had a *genesis*, but eternally was and will be what it really is in itself; and that it is not an unreal and merely empty formal schema of the reflective Understand-

ing, or of our subjective imagination only, which is to receive a real content and be filled only through sense-perception, as in the philosophy of Kant and other sensationalists. For this Logic of Hegel is not merely a science of the human mind only, but is a metaphysical and theoretical science of the Universe, of Mind and Matter, of both universal and finite mind.

Really, the one whole Substantiality, taken in all its categories of necessity and essential relation, in its whole constitution of internal identity and external difference of form, and with eternal movement in it, is the absolute Concept or Notion; and the Notion is nothing else but that. It is both Content and Form at once and in one, and it is a reality and the absolute truth as such; but strictly as such merely, it is not yet completely all, but must still be raised to the further height and fulness of the absolute Idea, "which is the unity of the Concept and the Reality;" for all realities are given "through the nature of the Notion and as a consequence of it,"¹ in the complete Idea of the Whole and All.

In the following passages we seem to have some more definite expressions of Hegel's way of conceiving of the Notion: "The objective Logic, which considers Being and Essence, properly makes out the genetic exposition of the Notion. More nearly, Substance is already the real Essence, or Essence in so far as (united with Being) it has come forth into Actuality. Hence the Notion has Substance for its immediate presupposition: what it is in itself is what it is as manifested. The dialectic movement (*Bewegung*) is therefore, through Causality and Reciprocity, the immediate genesis of the Notion, whereby its Becoming will be produced. But the Becoming has the signification of becoming in general, viz., that it is the reflection of going over into its ground, and that the appearing other into which the first has gone over makes out its truth. So the Notion is the

¹ *Die Lehre vom Begriff*: Werke, herausg. von Henning, Band v. p. 19, Berlin, 1841.

truth of Substance ; and inasmuch as the determined manner of relation of Substance is necessity, its freedom shows itself as the truth of necessity, and as the manner of relation of the Notion." ¹

That is (it would seem) the movement or life of the Notion is at once in Freedom and under Necessity, or on the ground of the whole complex of absolute necessities and necessary relations of its own internal, eternal, and absolute constitution and nature as such. These necessities, categories, and essential relations, together with the movement and the mediation consequent thereon and the reflection therein (necessary if there be movement at all), have constituted such Whole to be in itself active Substance (or Essence) and Substantiality or Essentiality ; and the movement is, and only can be, in and under those categories of necessity, freedom, and essential relation, and can only be a movement in respect of the movable parts, relations, and mediating instrumentalities, or a change of relativities, within the standing All, while the necessities and necessary relations remain the same, and while the fundamental identity continues unchanged and unalterable in so far as absolute necessity. The Whole as the Notion is therefore in itself, in respect of this internal identity, just what it is in respect of the external manifestation of distinctions and differences ; for the identities and the differences are still within the one Whole itself, however changeable the differences and however perpetual the change of external form or mode of manifestation. There being thus an eternal movement of change within the Whole, a perpetual becoming into something other and different from what was before in respect of form, relation, and modality, and a perpetual reflection, return, and final resolution of existent differences as specials and particulars into the identity of the Whole again, is an absolutely necessary consequence. The Freedom (or mere possibility) as an absolute truth is also a necessity as such.

¹ Ibid. Band v. p. 6.

Comprehending Substance (or Essence) and Being (or Becoming) in this manner, it may very well be said that the free Notion, as the eternal movement and life of such Whole as a Whole, is "the truth of Substance;" that "the manner of relation in which Substance exists is Necessity;" and that the Freedom of the Notion as thus constituted is "the truth of Necessity," for that such is "the manner of relation of the Notion."¹

In this view of the nature of Substance, it becomes quite intelligible and altogether reasonable that Hegel should object to Spinoza's Substance that it was not raised to the speculative standpoint, or to the height of absolute thought or living Soul; and to Kant's transcendentalism that it was no more than a subjective formal schematism of the human Understanding, without content or life in it otherwise than as filled with an uncertain and partly illusory content from sense-perception, and that consequently he had to regard the Understanding itself (or the finite soul) as a thing, like all other things in Nature, whereof the internal content, or *Ding an sich*, was unknowable to the human intellect, and incomprehensible by any *à priori* method.

Nor in this reference need it be any matter of surprise that we find him declaring that "the Notion, in so far as it has come to such an existence that it is itself free, is nothing other than I, or pure self-consciousness." For such a state of existence as that, being in fact free movement in reason, or in and under categories of necessity, mediation, reflection, and necessary relation that are necessarily constitutive of pure reason as the ground and law thereof, is the one whole Substance or Essence as it really is in itself, and is a knowing process in a unical Whole; and since consciousness can be nothing other than the mere fact of knowing, it must be both self-conscious I and absolute Personality; for personality, in a universal sense, can be nothing else but that.

Hegel continues: "Certainly, I have conceptions; but the I

¹ Ibid. v. p. 6.

Hegel
vs.
Spinoza
and
Kant.

Notion
= I.

is the pure Notion (*Begriff*) itself, which has come to *there-being* as Notion; "that is, the eternal and necessary truth of it as such has, in the course of this logical investigation, been made thus to appear: its *there-being*, however, was and is as eternal as itself. It is no mere representation (*Vorstellung*) of our image-forming imagination; "but the I is, firstly, this self-to-self-relating unity, and this not immediately, but (abstraction being made of all determinations and content) it goes back into the freedom of limitless likeness with itself. Thus is it Universality, — a unity which appears (in the abstraction) only through that negative relation, but is unity with itself, and thereby holds all determinations as solved [or (as we may say) taken up into solution] in itself. Secondly, the I, which as self-to-self-relating Negativity is Singleness and also absolutely determined Being, and places itself over against its other and excludes it, is immediately as well individual Personality. This absolute Universality, which is immediately as well absolute Individuality, and a *being-in-and-for-itself* which is at the same time *posited-being*, or is this *being-in-and-for-itself* only through the unity with the *posited-being*, makes out the nature of the I as the Notion; and there is nothing to be conceived of either the one or the other but when both the given moments [or aspects] are seized alike in their abstraction and alike in their complete unity."¹

The doctrine of Essential Relation seems to underlie his whole exposition of the Notion. Substance, defined as the unity of this relation and Activity (the eternal movement), is absolute Might (*Macht*) and absolute Negativity in the one Whole; that is, the negative limitation is as absolute as the essential reality. It is further said, that "the proper and necessary proceeding of Substance is the positing (*Setzen*) of that which is *in and for itself*; the Notion is now this absolute unity of Being and Reflection, whereby the *In-and-for-itself-being* first is, and is as well reflection or *posited*.

¹ Ibid. v. pp. 13, 14.

being, and the *posited-being* is the *In-and-for-itself-being*." The exposition is to contain "the concrete genesis and nature of the Notion," that is, it will unfold the whole manner of its existence and proceeding. "Substance is the absolute, the *in-and-for-itself-being* Actual: it is, *in itself*, the simple identity of the Possibility and the Actuality, or absolute Essence containing in itself all Actuality and all Possibility; and *for itself*, it is this identity as absolute Power (*Macht*), or the simply self-to-self-relating Negativity." The movement of this Substantiality, as the original presupposition, sets this Essence into posited moments of itself as substances in the determined relation of "passive substance;" and the "active Substance, as the self-to-self-relating Negativity, simply relates itself to this posited or passive substance as to its other," whereof the original Essence and Power as absolute Substance is the necessary presupposition. "The presupposition is to be so conceived that the movement of Substance shall be under the form of the *in-itself-being* as one moment of its concept, and that the determinateness of any one of the passive substances, standing in the relation, is a determinateness of this relation itself. The other moment is that of the *For-itself-being*, when the Power has posited itself as self-to-self-relating Negativity, whereby the presupposition is again cancelled [or rather (as it might be said) restored to equilibrium with itself]. The active Substance is the Cause; it effects; that is, it is now what has been posited, as it was before the presupposition that the Power would give to itself the appearance of Power, and to the posited-being the appearance of posited-being;" that is (we may suppose), would bring them into external manifestation or existence in the determined equilibrium of the Whole. "Through the relation to the other in the Causality, what was in the original presupposition will still be what it was in itself: the cause truly brings forth an effect in another substance;" that is, the cause passes into the effect and subsists in it, under the necessary limitations. "It is now Es-

sence and Power in relation to another, and appears as Cause, but it is effect first through this existence (*Erscheinung*). The effect comes in the passive substance which now appears as posited-being; and it is first therein passive substance," — a determined somewhat.

But this existence is not all; for "(a) the internal Cause works upon the passive substance and changes its determinations, for this is merely the posited-being of it, and there is otherwise nothing else to be changed in it; but the other determination which it contains is the essential causality; and the passive substance will also be cause, power, and activity. And (b), Effect will be posited in it by the Cause, but that which is so posited will be the Cause identical with itself in the effect; it is this which posits itself in the state of passive substance. Even so in reference to the active substance (a), the Effect is the going over of the cause into its other as effect, as the posited-being; and (b), the cause shows itself in the effect as what it is, and the effect is identical with the cause, and not wholly an other; this cause also shows the posited-being in the effect as what it essentially is. According to the two sides, that of the identical as well as that of the negative relation, it will be the opposite of itself, but the opposition will be such that the other, and also this, will remain identical with itself. But both the identical and the negative relation are one and the same thing; the substance is in its opposition only identical with itself, and this makes out the absolute identity of Substance posited as two. The active substance will be manifested through the effect (*i. e.* in that it posits itself as the opposite of itself therein) as cause or original Substantiality, and as the cancellation of the predetermined *other-being* (the passive substance). Conversely, through this inner operation, the posited-being will be manifested as posited-being, the negative as negative, and therein the passive substance as self-to-self-relating Negativity; and the cause, in this other of itself, merely closes with itself [as we may suppose, in a

kind of stationary balance]. The presupposed or *in-itself-being* originality will be *for itself* through what is posited; but this *in-and-for-itself-being* is such only inasmuch as this posited is as well the cancellation of the presupposition; or the absolute Substance comes back to itself only in the posited-being, and is thereby absolute. This reciprocal operation is thus Existence cancelling itself, and is a revelation of the Causality into appearance, wherein the Cause is as Cause in that it is existence (or appearance) also. This infinite reflection into itself, wherein the *In-and-for-itself-being* is first such only in that it is posited-being, is the termination of Substance" [or (as we may say) what is ordinarily understood by *Substance* is only this certain temporary state of permanency and persistence of the posited and determined something]. "But this termination is no longer the Substance itself, but is a higher, is the Notion; the Subject. The transition of the Substantiality-Relation takes place through its own immanent necessity, and is nothing else but the manifestation of itself, and the Notion is the truth of this relation, and Freedom is the truth of Necessity."

That is to say, if there be such a complex Whole with eternal movement in it, and if the one whole Essence and Power would necessarily stand in this absolute relation of immovable identity and movable form, there must necessarily be movement in freedom and under necessity, and the movable form must be perpetually reflected back into the continuous identity out of the particular existences, and finally close up therein. This circuit makes out the truth of the Notion. It is movement in reason, is a knowing process, and is thereby Subject or Subjectivity; and these are nothing else but that.

"This is the only and truest refutation of Spinoza. It is the disclosure (*Enthüllung*) of what Substance is, and this is the genesis of the Notion." Spinoza did not unfold his Substance into the logical Notion; "but in truth the unity

¹ Ibid. v. pp. 6-9.

of Substance is its relation of Necessity, but it is only inner necessity; in that it posits itself through the moment of absolute Negativity, it will be manifested or posited identity, and thereby the Freedom which is the ideality of the Notion. This totality, resulting from the Reciprocity, is the unity of both substances of the reciprocity, so that now Freedom belongs to it, in that it is no longer its identity as blind, or only internal, but has essentially the determination of being as existence (*Schein*) or Reflection, whereby it immediately goes together with its other (or the posited-being), and holds that in itself, and so is, in its other, simply identical with itself." ¹

Still further, "in the Notion the realm of Freedom is opened. It is the free, because the *in-and-for-itself-being* identity (which the necessity of Substance makes out) is the same, whether as cancelled or posited-being; and this posited being, as self-to-self-relating, is even that identity. The obscurity of substances standing in the causal relation for one another has vanished, since the originality of its self-subsistence has gone over into posited-being, and has thereby become *for itself* transparent clearness; the original affair is this, in that it is only the cause of itself, and this is Substance brought to the freedom of the Notion." ²

There is still another determination: "Because the *In-and-for-itself-being* is immediately as *posited-being*, the Notion in its simple relation to itself is absolute determinateness; but this is, as self-to-self-relating, also immediate simple Identity as well. But this relating of the determinateness to itself as the going together of the same with itself, is even as well also the negation of that determinateness; and the Notion, as this sameness with itself, is the Universal. But this Identity has as well the determining of the Negativity: it is the negation or determinateness which relates itself to itself, and so the Notion becomes Particular. Each of these [the universal and the particular] is the To-

¹ Ibid. v. p. 11.

² Ibid. v. pp. 11, 12.

tality; each holds the determining of the other in itself; and therefore these totalities are as well simply one only, since this unity is the diremption of itself into the free Appearance of this duality, — a duality which, in the distinction of Particular and Universal, appears as complete opposition; but this is so much mere appearance that when we think and speak of the one we think and speak of the other also.”¹

§ 6. MIGHT — PERSONALITY — SUBJECTIVITY — OBJECTIVITY — END.

This statement is not entirely free from obscurity, and is beset with difficulty. There seems to be an implication that the Notion as the absolute Whole is the identity of its internal constitution with its external form, or is the unity of the Whole as universal and of the parts as specials and particulars in the Universal, and is both at once. This absolute identity of Content and Form in its allness as such, and in its limitation as such, is its absolute determinateness, as it would seem. This determinateness seems to be just what is meant when it is also said that the unity of absolute Quantity and absolute Quality is the absolute Modality of the one whole Essentity; or it is that limitation where the whole Actuality of real existence is bounded over (as it were) against (or rather out of) the empty Possibility beyond. There seems to be also a tacit assumption of an eternal movement within this absolute Whole, which is the Activity called *Being* or *Becoming*, and necessarily involves a change is this absolute limitation or determinateness of external form, and indeed also change in all special forms within the Whole; whereof there must necessarily follow some negation or annulment of what was before, and in just so far as any change of essence, form, or relation, takes place. This movement of change seems to be what is meant by the negation of negation, or where *Negativity* is spoken of as if it were an active power and produced the change.

¹ Ibid. v. p. 12.

One is perplexed by the apparently implicit suggestion that this negating power is a conscious, willing, choosing, and determining spirit. It is not made to appear otherwise how this Whole (already defined as active Substance) should be able so to relate a part of itself to the Whole as to distinguish that part into an external special, or into a superficial particular, within the Whole, while the essential identity of whole and parts, of the absolute Form and all special forms within it, still continued. The distinction or duality might indeed be only an external appearance of differences in an internally identical Whole, as a matter of sheer necessity, if there were to be movement in it at all. As a result of mechanical necessity, there might be specials and particulars in the Universal. The whole identity is spoken of as if the "negativity" in it were a power of determining the determinateness of limitation, or of positing, setting, and cancelling the special and particular determinateness of things within the whole; and there is an implication that this power is knowing and conscious, and not a blind, absolute necessity. In another place he speaks of this power as absolute Might (*Macht*); but this expression leaves it uncertain in what manner he conceives of this Might, and is vague, and may readily be taken in the ordinary sense of the Almighty. Beginning with the superficial fact of the mere being or becoming on the outermost periphery (as it were) of all reality, and delving deeper into the underlying Essence or Substance, and even further downward into the nature of the necessities and necessary relations, which, together with the activity in them, are constitutive of Substance or Essence itself as such in an indivisible though distinguishable complex of absolute identity and Wholeness over against the distinctions of parts, aspects, and media, it would seem necessarily to follow that, if there were to be such movement in it at all as matter of fact, all the supposed mediation, instrumentation, reflection, and closing return into the identity of the Whole, must take place eternally as a blind mechanical

necessity, or merely resultant fact, though as necessarily in Freedom as under necessity. It would seem to be absolutely necessary also that, in such a constitution of the one absolute Whole, there should be an eternally movable boundary of limitation of the Whole against the Nothingness of mere Possibility, as well as eternally movable boundaries of all specials and particulars within the Whole, and so a perpetual negation of limitations in the continual process of their arisings, subsistences, and vanishings as such, which might be described as an *infinite Negativity*. It would seem to be a kind of internal and eternal weighing or overbalancing of the particulars against the Whole, or of one particular against another. The Special or Particular is simply the one whole Substance and Power distinguished into two or more directions (as it were), but merely as the reciprocal terms of the Essential Relation in which they find their identity in their ground as the third term; and so there is a reciprocal weighing or balancing out of one extreme term into the other, whereby the special or particular arises and subsists, or declines and vanishes, in this process of Negativity, or negation of negations. All this would seem to be a necessary result of blind internal necessity in freedom. Besides this internal reciprocity of action, there necessarily results also the external oppositions, collisions, and contradictions of external mechanism and chemism, as special and particular operations within the Whole, and which are necessarily contained, comprehended, and overgrasped by the whole substantial Power as such, and must, therefore, be subject to its action and control. A state of perfect equilibrium in this one Whole seems to be what is meant by *absolute determinateness*. A temporary state of equilibrium in any special or particular content and form (or thing) is called its *determinateness*, or its *posited being*, while it is such. If the Whole could be imagined to have ever stood in perfectly stable equilibrium, it must have remained so forever; if it were eternally in motion, this whole determi-

* No — not unless the whole were a self-determining mechanism. Holmes does not mean a self-determining mechanism — thinks it is a possibility.

nateness must necessarily have been in a condition of unstable equilibrium, and so in a state of perpetual movement. If this be what is meant by *absolute Negativity* or by *absolute Might*, it would seem to be no more than the necessary consequence of the eternal and necessary constitution and nature of Substance, already defined as the unity of absolute Essence and Power, or absolute Content and Form, with eternal movement or life in it.

At the same time, it is expressly declared that when this universal Substance has thus been logically and conceptually disclosed, revealed, and unfolded, or brought to the Freedom of the living Notion as it eternally is, under all the necessities, categories, and necessary relations of its actual constitution and nature as such, the philosophy of it has come to transparent clearness as showing it to be the absolute I, as Intelligence, as Knowing, as Consciousness, as absolute and universal Personality, which are nothing else, and never were anything else, but that. In this view, it would seem that the Notion must carry in it, and with it throughout, all the plan, intention, end and aim, purpose, foresight, and providence there is in the Universe, even unto the completed fulness of the evolution thereof at any time existent, or into what is called the absolute Idea of all Reality.

Such would seem to be the purport of his own statement of his speculative standpoint that "the objectivity has the signification of the *in-and-for-itself-becoming Being* of the Notion, which cancels and restores the posited mediation of its self-determining to an immediate relating of itself to itself. This immediateness is thereby itself immediately and wholly pervaded by the Notion, and its totality becomes immediately identical with its being. But in that the Notion here exhibits as well the free *for-itself-being* of its Subjectivity, there comes in also the relation of the same to the Objectivity as End (*Zweck*)."

Here his language becomes difficult to translate with certainty of his meaning, but his idea seems to be, that the immediateness of the subjective Whole

as the negative towards the objectivity, and as being at the same time the determining power, carries with it the other signification "that the Objectivity is *in-and-for-itself* Nothing in so far as standing over against the Notion as such;"¹ for the Notion can cancel it to Nothingness. That is, an object as such has *in-and-for-itself* no independent subsistence or reality.

He then proceeds to define Mechanism, Chemism, and Teleology.

In Mechanism, objects, as partial and dependent wholes, have a certain existence as external to each other. In all their relations to each other as such, the subjective unity of the Notion is both internal and external to them; but

Secondly, in that this unity is the immanent law of the object itself, its peculiar difference will be grounded through its law, and this is a relation in which its determined independence is cancelled; and this is Chemism; and

Thirdly, this inner essential unity of the object is posited as different from its independence, and is the subjective Notion, posited as *in and for itself* related to the objectivity as End; and here comes in Teleology.²

End is again thus defined: "The Notion, which has thus cancelled as posited in its simple unity all moments of its objective presence as external, is thereby freed from the objective externality to which it relates itself as to an unessential reality; this objectively free Notion is the End."³ That is to say, the Notion carries plan, intention, purpose, in it: the end and aim goes along with the evolution, and is accomplished in the completion of the process. The purpose of the whole creation is exhibited in it, and not outside of it.

In the following passage, we get some nearer glimpse at what he means by Subjectivity and Objectivity:—

"In that here the Notion, in the sphere of Objectivity where its determinateness has the form of equivalent externality, is in Reciprocity with itself, the statement of its move-

¹ Ibid. v. p. 173.

² Ibid. v. p. 174.

³ Ibid. v. pp. 202, 203.

ment becomes doubly difficult and complicated, because it is immediately itself the doubled, and is ever a *first* and also a *second*. In the Notion for itself, i. e. in its Subjectivity, its distinction from itself is, as immediately, identical totality for itself; but whereas its determinateness is equivalent externality, therefore is the identity with itself also again immediately the pushing-off from itself (*Abstossen von sich*), so that what is determined as external and equivalent is itself much more, and, as itself reflected into itself, is rather an other. Only by holding fast this fact will the objective return of the Notion into itself, i. e. the true objectifying of the same, be seized, — so seized, that each of the single moments through which this mediation flows is itself the whole conclusion of the same.”¹

Here we have his idea of the movement; and it may very well be said that any statement of it is “doubly difficult and complicated.” The statement actually given, here as elsewhere, would seem to be rather a mystification in a plausible effusion of words than any intelligible solution of the difficulty, and is, on the whole, quite unsatisfactory. First, we have the Notion, the one absolute Whole, as it has been constituted in the essential relation of internal identity and external difference as absolute Content and Form. It stands eternally in that state of unstable equilibrium with itself in which that equivalent balancing of the internality against the externality is called Reciprocity. For the Notion itself, that is, in respect of its Subjectivity, the distinctions are immediately identical with the totality; that is, the internal identity and the external differences are one and the same Whole in which the external determinateness is the equivalent of the internality, and they exactly balance each other. Obviously, while they should in fact exactly balance each other there would be a stable equilibrium, and the whole thing would stand still; but now, further, the internal identity of the Whole as such, while

² Ibid. v. p. 227.

pushing itself into the external and equivalent determinateness as objectivity, and so rendering the equilibrium unstable, is at the same time and all the while as much itself as it is its other, which is reflected into the Whole; and this relation of return of the external form into the internal identity is the important point to be seized. That, no doubt, is a very important point, but it does not seem to have any bearing upon the difficult matter of the movement. It gives no light upon that *pushing-off* into an equivalent externality. There is rather a tacit implication that the Subjectivity, or that aspect of the one Whole Notion where it is *for itself* and free, is some kind of conscious spiritual power, if not outside, certainly over and above, or superior to, the whole identity of internal and external as the absolute Content and Form, and is of itself capable of doing the pushing, positing, reflecting, and cancelling the equivalent externality, or of dissolving it altogether into the internal identity of the whole again. But this sort of Subjective power is no explanation of the movement. It has no existence without the movement, or apart from it, nor apart from the Substance or Essence. If movement be only the fact that something moves or is moving, and if it did not begin with a standstill, or with a perfect equilibrium of stationary balance, then it must have been eternally moving or in movement. If movement eternally resides in this one whole complex of metaphysical necessities, essentiaes, categories, necessary relations, and absolute truths, and is only that phase of the Whole which makes it to be active Substance in the necessary internal and external constitution thereof as absolute Content and Form, and as absolute Causality in itself, then what need is there of introducing any such foreign Subjectivity of spiritual power, or will, to do the work? The Subjectivity is apparently made to do the whole *objectifying*, as if it were something other than the Notion itself as essentially and logically constituted, though not wholly severed from it, nor expressly relegated into the realm of emptiness for its dwelling place.

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If the equivalency, or reciprocity, did not quite react to a standstill in even balance, the movement might seem to go on of itself, if not necessarily, yet in point of fact, and so the Whole, in respect of external form, might appear to be essentially and in fact in perpetual movement, without more. There has been difficulty about the origin of motion ever since the beginning of philosophy. Homer seems to have had some idea of this reciprocity of action and reaction when he made Zeus hold up his scales and weigh Hector and Achilles in the even balance of his judgment. The Jews were satisfied with finding its solution in Jehovah or the absolute Lord. Aristotle found it in the "first Mover," and Plato in the *that which itself moves itself*. Epicurus could make no progress in creating a world out of atoms until he had got a falling movement into them, and then it would not work without the addition of a deviation of direction. But whence the movement, or whence the deviation, came, or how there could be either the one or the other, he did not much more trouble himself to explain than did Plato as to how a thing could move itself. La Place, when once he had a solar system of masses and gravity, velocities and momenta, centrifugal and centripetal forces counterbalanced into circular orbits, had no difficulty in concluding that the revolutions would go on eternally without any additional agency. The mathematical physicist can evolve a nebula into a solar system and all it contains, if only he can make his atoms fall, or can get a heat-motion out of some chemical change therein; and he will readily conclude that a mass, with a Vis Viva in it, might move on eternally into empty space. Berkeley scouted the idea that Gravity, or Force, could be laid down as the beginning of motion.¹ Democritus' atom, Bacon's matter, and Leibnitz's monad, had a principle of motion in it. St. Austin held to "a spiritual Substance moving itself." According to Plato, it is of the very essence and true notion of soul to move itself.

¹ "Patet igitur gravitatem aut vim frustra poni pro principio motus." — *De Motu*: Works, Dublin, 1784, ii. 125.

Hegel's immense exposition of Essence and Being finds it to be active Substance in the form of the Notion; and this Substance is of such a purely metaphysical constitution and nature, though a solid reality as such, that it would seem to make little difference whether one called it spiritual, or simply essential, or both ideal and real. In his system, however, actualities, realities, seem to mean only such realities as sense-perception finds to be such in external Nature. As before observed, there would seem to be no definable difference between self-movement and eternal movement, when predicated of the absolute one Whole of real Essence and Power; and it is impossible to avoid the conclusion, whether *à priori* or *à posteriori*, that the Universe is, and eternally was and will be, in motion in respect of some part or aspect of the Whole, and never was or will be entirely at a standstill. *

Hegel everywhere rather tacitly assumes than expressly declares this fact of eternal movement. It seems to underlie (if it be not the true meaning of) this unstable Reciprocity and this "pushing off" (or repulsion) of some part or phase of the Notion out of its whole identity into an other as object for itself, still standing in relation to the Whole and in the Whole as such; and when we consider the actual and necessary internal and external constitution of this Whole as the Notion, if there be an eternal movement within it as matter of fact or necessity, the internal mediation, out-throwing, and reflection into itself, with a perpetually movable boundary of limitation and form and a perpetual change of special and particular contents and forms, must necessarily be the result of the movement. If there is internal necessity, there is also external freedom; and if there be an external movability, there is also an internal immovability as its ground. Whether we call the one aspect Subjectivity and the other Objectivity, the one Ideality and the other Reality, it would seem to make no difference in the thing itself: that remains the absolute and eternal truth in the identity of the Ideal and the Real.

* Quite as much as between Reason and Nature.

In this view, the "Negativity," which is so much emphasized, would seem to mean nothing more than that absolute and eternal necessity of limitation in which Whole and Parts are bound as in an adamantine chain. The End or Purpose is involved in the process, and comes out in the conclusion. In reference to the End, the process may be described as a *should* and a *striving* (*sollen und streben*), but is nothing else or other than the Notion and its process; and the Notion in its Allness is the absolute Reality and Ideality in one.

CHAPTER VII.

THE ESSENTIAL NOTION.

§ 1. HEGEL'S MANNER OF TREATMENT — KANT'S SYLLOGISM.

UPON the logical constitution of the Notion as the one whole Essentia, the tenor of Hegel's style and use of terms, and his manner of treatment, is such as often to confound the reader, if not to perplex and dash his maturest counsels, or sometimes to be, for the most part, an unintelligible jargon, or, if intelligible, not such as he can approve, or concur in. In general, one might find it difficult to avoid the impression that some mystical spirit, or "pure activity," was doing the whole business, for the first time, and was caught in the act of creating a universe out of nothing, or out of logical shadows and ideal dreams; precipitating and positing essence, substrate, content, actuality, reality, and substantiality, when none existed before. But all this is probably to be understood as only his peculiar manner of approaching his problem, and of stating or describing the logical nature and character of the whole Reality and its process. Really, or in absolute fact, Essentiality, Substantiality, Potentiality, Actuality, Essence and Existence, Content and Form, never began to be at all, were never the result of a process of pure being, pure activity, or mere becoming, and were never created at all, any more than the absolute one and whole of real existence; but the Whole as such, the Essential Relation as such, Substrate as such, Content and Form, Substantiality, Actuality, Potentiality, Neces-

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sity and Possibility, and indeed all these internal and necessary relations, and all the categories of reason and necessity involved therein, are alike necessary and eternal in themselves, absolutely true in their own nature, and may be said to be infinite in the sense of being without beginning, end, or middle as such. Movement and change within the Whole, as thus constituted, are likewise eternal and necessary. With Hegel, Essence is not merely Being (*Seyn*), nor a Becoming (*Werden*) only, but also a *been* (*gewesen*), and a been in "a timeless past:" it is what dwells in Immensity and Eternity.

If we take as an axiom the scientific statement that matter and gravity, or essence and energy, are inseparable, or do not exist apart from each other, we accept the same truth, though obtusely and in the lump, and without any clear comprehension of its metaphysical truth or logical necessity. In science, essence and energy (mass and potential) are held to be inconceivable apart from each other; but in what way the two things, or the two phases of one and the same thing, are to be unified into a Whole, no definite statement is made, no clear conception given. Neither is there any intelligible explanation in what manner they can possibly exist alongside each other, or as external to each other, and without the internal continuity of a one Whole. Any endeavor to solve the enigma is cautiously evaded as speculative, metaphysical, and foreign to the purpose and business of science. This Hegelian philosophy may truly be said to be the most profound and masterly effort hitherto made to furnish an intelligible solution of this abstruse and difficult problem. To say that no solution is possible for human reason, is merely a flinching from the abstrusities of the subject, a confession of incapacity, or a voluntary handing over of the problem to the professed metaphysician.

To the imagination of the ancients, the world was figured under the image of the fabled Proteus, a creature that could shift itself into all manner of shapes and forms without los-

ing its identity. In method, style, language, and manner of treatment, this Hegelian Logic may certainly be said to be as protean as Proteus himself, if indeed its identity be not wholly lost at last, vanishing, like the baseless fabric of an ideal vision, into thin air. If it has any basis, if it be anything other than a subjective dream of the fancy imagining it, it is a schematic theory of the universe grounded on necessity and fact. His empty Negative is a necessity. His real Being (or Essentivity) is a necessity. His unity of Reality and Possibility is a necessity. His infinitely movable boundary of limitation, negation, and reflection between the two is a necessity. His eternal activity of Becoming and Departing is a necessity. His return of all movements (or "moments" of change) into identity with the one whole and absolute power and Causality is a necessity. All his categories of Essence, Reflection, Mediation, Distinction, and Identity, of Subject and Object, of Will, Judgment, End and Aim, and in short, of the theoretical Notion, or of the complete Idea, are alike necessities, or they are grounded in the eternal necessities whereon the universe is built.

The universe itself is thus resolved into an abstruse complex of unalterable and eternal necessities, alterable determinations, mediations, conditions and limitations, immutable essential relations and movable relativities, permanent realities and changeable actualities, eternal movement and temporary motions and changes, which are all alike grounded on necessity. There is mobility in the standing All. Essentiality moves into essences, Substantiality into substances, Potentiality into potencies and powers, and Causality into effects, but always under the necessary limitations. One Actuality moves into another. All movement is reflected (or turned back) into the Whole Identity, and all motions into their sources. Possibility, Freedom, Contingency, Accidentality, Appearance, Disappearance, and a perpetual flow of permanencies and evanescences, are all as necessary as the everlasting foundations. An eternal cycle of

creation and destruction is as necessary as the ever-identical whole reality: the Ideality is as necessary as the Reality.

In the three first principles or *hypostases* of the Good, Intelligence, and Soul in Nature, the Neoplatonists seem to have regarded the Intelligence (*i. e.* the pure universal Reason) as somehow an eternal, impartible (indivisible), and immutable essence (they do not say an immovable, unalterable, or rigid diamond network or schema); but how constituted in itself, or of what eternal necessities or necessary relations, or how united into a "unical hyparxis," or how wielded into a process of thought, or differentiated into the universal variety, or how it could be in itself an eternally active Reason, there is no intelligible statement, or their exposition is not clear and explicit. We might sometimes imagine that they supposed, or presupposed, some kind of universal platform, groundwork, or unalterable, immovable schema, as one thing, the Good as another, and the Soul as another, consubsistent alongside of one another, rather than as fused into the identical unity of one living and absolute Whole. With Proclus, "the first order of Intelligibles neither moved nor stood still," but "Intellect was both moved and permanent." Whether he conceived the Good, the True, the Beautiful, or Necessity itself, or any other eternal principles, absolute truths, or necessary relations, as belonging to this first order of intelligible realities, is perhaps not clear and certain, but evidently the Intelligence was somehow conceived to be both movable and immovable. With Plotinus, "Life [Soul] is intimately united with the Intelligence, and subsists in it and with it," but exactly how, he does not undertake to say. He seems, however, to have adopted Aristotle's doctrine, that (as he expresses it) "the Intelligence possesses all things and is all things, because in it the subject thinking, the object thought, and the thought itself, are identical." Some moderns treat of pure Reason, or Intelligence, as if they imag-

ined it to be a rigid, unalterable, immutable, but infinitely divisible and movable matter, ground, platform, schema, or "diamond network" of atoms and gravity, if not of fundamental necessities, eternal laws, and absolute facts, upon which, or under or within which, Force, or Soul as an active essence, or pure Spirit as superessential power, somehow acted or operated. It is difficult to get rid of the impression or feeling that some such underlying basis or schema must exist. We may even try to extend it into the infinite abyss of empty Space or absolute Nothingness lying beyond all bounds of the actual universe, or beyond the reach of matter and gravity; but reason drives us to the conclusion at last, that ground, platform, schema, and network, together with all else, must even be included within the absolute one Whole of all Reality. Considered as ground or basis, Reason or Intelligence, however internally constituted, cannot possibly be an inexorable schema, an inflexible network, or a rigid mould into which plastic material might be poured and formed. It cannot possibly be entirely unalterable, nor entirely immovable, though it be quite conceivable that it should be fundamentally immutable and indivisible in its own nature, or merely as ground or basis. In a certain external way, the standing Whole may be contemplated as unmoved and immovable, while, at the same time, in the internal aspect and constitution of it, it may, and indeed must, be conceived as partially movable, partially divisible and distributable into distinguishable parts, phases, special relations and forms, or into partially distinct specialities and particularities within the Whole, without absolute breach of continuity, or complete severance or destruction of identity in the essential Whole as such. If there is to be movement at all within the Whole (and the simple fact is, that all Nature is in motion), there must necessarily be absolute Causality, absolute essential Relation, and absolute Reciprocity of Action and Reaction within it, no less than absolutely necessary

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changes of internal relations of Whole and parts, specialities and particularities, just in so far as there is actual movement; and consequently there must necessarily be also specially determined and temporarily fixed media or means and instrumentalities, fixed conditions and limitations, and a continual dialectic of mediation throughout, or at least coextensive with the actual movements, even unto the end of the whole process; and the process itself can end only in a reflection, return, and final resolution of the movement, together with all the special relations, special essences, and particular existences and appearances thereby temporarily established, but still fundamentally dependent thereon, back again into the essential identity of the eternal Whole. A certain external and superficial succession of secondary causes and effects, or an externally observable sequence of facts and events, may indeed continue indefinitely, in an *ad infinitum* series of terms, or (for that matter) even eternally on some great circle of the circumferential All; but any absolute separation or complete severance of any part or particle of the whole reality, any plunging off into utter vacuity by itself alone, would be simply impossible. The adamant chain of causal continuity can never be broken asunder, or parted from its eternal and necessary ground. These are some of the necessities which lie at the foundation of the logical Syllogism or Notion of the whole Reality.

Kant's syllogism of synthetic Apperception and Judgment, and his whole question, *How synthetic Judgments are possible*, related to the Human Understanding only; and it was a lifeless formula. Hegel's syllogism of the absolute logical Notion relates to, and embraces, the entire universe of reality, which is in truth resolved into a logical and metaphysical complex of unalterable necessities, necessary relations, and absolute movement of the movable essences on the ground of the immovable whole Essence as such, whereby the standing Whole is transformed from a blind

mechanical aggregation of dis severed entities, and raised to the absolute height of a mobile unity and identity of the Ideal and the Real, full of life and power, not exactly an "ineffable fountain," but an inexhaustible source of creative and destructive activities. The logical syllogism is thus brought to real life and to life eternal. Its synthetic unity lies, not in any central "dark point," imaginary line, or empty zero, but in the Whole as a Whole. This whole Es-sentivity is, at once and in one, Essentiality and Potentiality, Substantiality and Causality, and is Universality, Speciality, Particularity, and Totality, in the eternal form of the logical Notion and absolute Idea. *

In the condition in which philosophy stood with Bacon, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibnitz, Kant, or down to Hegel and Cousin, there was a general acceptance or implicit assumption of two distinct worlds, — the world of Nature and the world of Spirit, a realm of Science and a realm of Revelation. The prevailing conception of absolute Spirit, or God, was that of some vague, mystical, unfathomable, incomprehensible, and purely spiritual power and personality. With the Scholastic mystics and mystical idealists, God was pure immaterial Being, pure activity (*actus purus*), a spiritual power as far as possible removed from any reach of science or philosophy. It was something that lay "beyond the reaches of our souls." As to how any such Being could possibly be constituted, could absolutely and eternally exist, or could act or operate upon the world of Nature, there was either no rigid inquiry, or no strictly logical thought, or none beyond the pale of subjective, emotional, reverential dreaming, or some kind of factitious Biblical and dogmatic speculation about divine Revelation and the God-man. Hegel seems to have approached the subject of philosophy from this general point of view. The chief scope of his endeavor would seem to be, on the face of his method, style, and manner of treatment, to reduce this vague and inadequate conception to some definite logical precision of thought

* I.e., the Idea of the Immanent Relational Constitution of All Real Being

and expression, and to demonstrate that absolute spirit is essential and real, and neither wholly immaterial nor entirely visionary; that the realm of spirit is neither severed nor severable from the world of Nature and reality; but that a certain essential and causal continuity of interrelation and dependence, of inner essential identity and outer unessential difference, prevails throughout the one absolute Whole. His Metaphysic goes through with an elaborate and systematic discussion of all these categories of reason and necessity. There is an attempt at complete analysis and complete synthesis. They are exhibited in all their relations of necessity, limitation, mediation, opposition, contradiction, and reconciliation into unity and identity. Within the Whole, all seems to be movable on the basis of the immovable or the unmoved. Yet he seems to commence with Nothing and mere Being and Becoming, and no real entity appears to exist until a pure activity of being, coming to be, or Becoming, has created it out of Nothing, and established it as Essence (*Wesen*). No real Essentia, no Actuality, appears to have an existence until some visionary mediation of pure Being and Nothing has set, posited, and established it as Essential Relation and absolute Ground. But really the absolute and eternal existence of the one whole and real Essentia is assumed, implied, and presupposed from first to last. His style and manner are singularly delusive and perplexing. As Swedenborg purports to describe what he saw up in the seventh heaven, so Hegel writes as if he had ascended into the realm of pure Spirit, had had a clear speculation of all that was going on there, and was now defining the necessities, grounds, and instrumentalities, describing the ways, means, and processes, and informing his readers of the whole truth and method of the proceeding. Everywhere an activity seems to be hovering, ready to posit, set, and cancel anything and everything that needs to be posited, set, or cancelled, with almost as much indifference to the question whence the active power comes as when

Darwin talks of "laws acting," or of "Natural Selection," and the like, doing things. But the reader cannot well help doubting of this invisible Ariel, or even if his facile informant has ever been there at all; and he grows suspicious that the whole affair is a magic web spun, Arachne-like, out of the imaginative subjectivity of Hegel's own head. Indeed, he does not hesitate to leave the surer path of the investigation of Nature, of metaphysical theory verified by natural fact, and, taking an eagle flight into the uppermost empyrean, boldly plants himself upon "the purely speculative standpoint," and (as it were) upon the very top of the universe itself. There might be less objection to all this if he had in fact rigidly pursued the logic of reason and necessity in a clearly systematic manner, and kept entirely clear of pure idealism and theological adumbrations. Notwithstanding all his obscurations, he displays a depth of insight, a comprehensiveness, a consistency of metaphysical theory and on the whole a logical precision of thought and language, that surpasses all his predecessors. His philosophy (if comprehensible at all) must be comprehended in its entirety and as a whole.

Theodore Parker thought there might be something in it, but that what it was, was scarcely worth the trouble of finding out. Others have considered it, as King James did Bacon's *Novum Organum*, as being "like the wisdom of God that passeth all understanding." It is even reported that Hegel himself said that "but one man understood him, and he did not." Schwegler rather seems to have regarded it as a dreamy diamond network of logical shadows; Trendelenburg, as "an intricately intertwined theory of logical conclusions, which left all real content outside its scope;" and Schopenhauer denounced him unmercifully as a magical charlatan, bent on puzzling and bamboozling weak intellects to keep them and himself within the pale of church and state: with him, it is always "the still grosser nonsense

of the clumsy and stupid Hegel." ¹ Such pithy aphorisms, though they may hint at some grain of truth, are entitled to little more weight than Pope's solecism on Bacon, that he was "the wisest, brightest, meanest of mankind."

§ 2. REAL ESSENTITY — DOCTRINE OF LEIBNITZ — MYSTIFICATION IN HEGEL.

What, then, must be the actual constitution and nature of that absolute One and All of real Essentivity which is called the logical Notion or Absolute Idea? and in what manner is it conceivably possible that as such it can be distinguished or limited, or can distinguish and limit itself, into all the specialities and particulars of actual Nature, or into finite souls in Nature? An answer to these questions seems to have been the burden and the aim, the difficulty, puzzle, enigma, and labor, of all philosophy hitherto, — a labor that is not likely to end until some intelligible solution of the problem shall be accomplished.

The Neoplatonists, at the summit of all philosophy in their day, seem to have arrived at some vague conception of an absolute Intelligence, having a movement of life in it, or somehow intimately blended with it, whereby it was active, as the universal, archetypal Idea of Essence and Form. It seems to have been conceived as a one Whole in itself, or as a "unical *Hyparxis*" of Essence, Activity, and Form in one. Indeed, the Hypostasis of the Three First Principles in the One of Plotinus, and this unical *Hyparxis* of Proclus, would seem to have been really conceived (however vaguely stated) very much after the manner of the Syllogistic Unity of Apperception and Judgment in the logical Notion of Hegel, or (as Rosenkranz prefers to call it) the logical Idea of all Reality and Ideality in one. As such, with Proclus, it was a certain "proceeding intellect," and it proceeded

¹ *The World as Will and Idea*, by Arthur Schopenhauer, trans. by N. B. Haldam, M. A., and John Kemp, M. A., London, 1886, vol. ii. p. 8.

into the "*unical hyparxes*" of the lesser intelligences or souls, and even into the forms of material things; but of Nature as it really is they had little scientific knowledge, and no adequate conceptions, and they could give no explanations of natural phenomena beyond certain crude, hypothetical fancies. They seem to have had some obscure notion of an absolute power and potentiality of creative evolution into a world of things. The philosophy of Leibnitz bears some general resemblance to this scheme. With him, the Supreme "Monad" or divine Soul was constituted as a one Whole of "unity and multitude" in one absolute "Substance, the Only, the Universal and Necessary," or "the Magnitude of positive Reality" (other than which was nothing but its possibility); and it had a principle of motion within it, and was at once individual and universal, whole and parts in one, and a living Personality. The ultimate particulars or elements of all bodies and souls were also conceived as monadic wholes, individuals, or "atom-souls." A "Monad" was a "simple substance," not a compound or aggregate of hard material atoms, and it had a principle of motion within it. So Democritus and Bacon insisted that the atoms (or "seeds of things") should be laid down joined with a principle of motion. The atom or monad was not a simple and same substance throughout, but was an integral whole of substance and activity in one, however distinguished into parts or aspects, and was interiorly capable of changeable relations, affections, unconscious "perceptions" and "appetitive" desires, even in the lowest forms (whereof all bodies as such were compounded), but was exteriorly unimpressible, unalterable, and indestructible; but in the vegetable kingdom the internal motion, appetitive function, and sensibility displayed only an unconscious vegetative growth or "shifting state," or a perceptive and appetitive capability, without memory or reason. In animals, the internal evolution of the monadic atom-soul reached a higher stage or degree of increasing "perceptions," and some small degree of

conscious memory and imagination. In man only, the supreme governing "Monad" (or "Atom-soul") of the whole body-politic of monads (whereof both body and soul were compounded), in the several stages of their development, attained to the still higher stage of conscious memory and reason, and became "a reasonable soul" in a human person.

Leibnitz had the intellect of a geometer, and he pursued the external methods of science rather than the internal dialectic of metaphysics. His system displays profound insight into the fundamental depths of philosophy. Still, as with Descartes and Spinoza, his mind was beclouded in theological mists, and his thought was obscured in a cloudy halo of poetico-imaginative symbolism, not unlike that of Bacon in his day. Nevertheless, he may be called the German Plato, with as much propriety as Bacon is sometimes styled "the British Plato." His reasonings partake of the current theories of his age and time, and he seems to labor uncomfortably with the prevalent notion of a world of matter and a world of spirit, coexistent, but apart from each other, or with no causal continuity otherwise than in some vague omnipotent *fiat* manner; and also with the current doctrine of Descartes that animals were mere physiological machines, having no souls, or none that could be saved and go to heaven; and with the Spinozan universal divine Substance, on the one hand, and the accepted mathematical theory of Atoms, Gravity, and a Void, on the other.

Leibnitz concluded that there must be atoms as "simple substances," since all bodies were ascertained to be compounds. But he was too much of a metaphysician as well as a mathematician not to see that atoms, as mere points, must be sheer nonentities, and that as "simple substances" they could not be merely hard, impenetrable particles, without qualities, and without any principle of motion within them. In this he agreed with Democritus and Bacon. But on his principle of necessary individuality, and adopting the atomic theory so far as to assume the necessary existence of

atoms or monads as discrete wholes of some kind, with a principle or fact of movement in them, he concluded that, by reason of this internal motion and change in the monad, unity and multitude must necessarily be involved in the one whole as such, and so, that there must be in the "simple substance" (the Monad) "a plurality of affections and relations," although there were "no parts" separable or divisible; and those "simple substances" entered into the bodies which were compounded, and a compound was only "a collection or aggregate of simples." No external influence could reach or affect the internal motion of this monad; but there was a continually "shifting state" in the whole internal unity; and this he called "Perception," which (he said) must be "carefully distinguished from Apperception or Consciousness." This unconscious "Perception" would seem to have been conceived as something quite different from what is now understood by sense-perception, which involves the idea of some collision from without with the inner perceiving soul. Leibnitz seems to deny any such external action, affecting the internal nature of the Monad. But this inwardly "shifting state" (which he called *Perception*) was said to be "inexplicable by mechanical causes." On the question how it was caused, he is not explicit; but evidently his Monad was not to be a mere machine. It seems to have been conceived rather as a one whole substance, essence, or essence, comprising unity and multitude in one and the same identical and continuous whole, without parts absolutely separable or divisible, though distinguishable in thought into manifold aspects, relations, affections, and differences within the Whole; in short, his idea of the Monad (and especially the supreme Monad), though vaguely and obscurely expressed, could not have been very far from the Hegelian conception of the logical Notion.

These "simple substances," or "created Monads," which as yet were only "perceptive" and "appetitive," but had no memory nor consciousness, might be regarded as *Entelechies*,

after the manner of the Aristotelian *Entelecheia*, which (as defined by Aristotle himself) would seem to have meant the completion of the process of the evolution or new creation of some particular thing (say, for instance, a Monad). Within the Monad itself as such, and by reason of the "shifting state," there was a kind of passage or transition from one state to another, or from one "perception" to another, which he called "Appetition" or "Desire;" and through this the Monad arrived at new "perceptions." In animals, these perceptions became more and more distinct, until at length they came to be accompanied with memory, giving to the soul "a kind of consecutive action which imitates reason," but still is not reason. They had some degree of imagination also. So Bacon supposed that insects, having voluntary motion, must therefore have imagination, though in gnats and flies, and in small birds, it might be more "mutable and giddy." But it was in Man only that the supreme governing Monad of the whole body-politic of monads or "atom-souls" (whereof he was compounded) rose to "the cognition of necessary and eternal truths," and became "a reasonable soul or spirit." But the body itself, in which this supreme Monad thus made its appearance as the rational soul, was likewise made up of monads which had not risen above the state of mere appetitive desire and unconscious "perception." If (he continues) we choose to give the name *soul* to all these atomic monads, it is very well, but he would prefer to confine that term "to such monads only as have come to possess distinct perceptions accompanied with Memory, Apperception, and Consciousness."

In view of any rational psychology in the present state of knowledge about the constitution of matter and bodies, cells, and protoplasm, and physical and physiological structures in general, as well as about mind and soul, this monadic Soul-theory must be set down as not merely deficient in logical precision, but as altogether fantastic and visionary. It gives no intelligible account of Sense-perception, Consciousness,

Memory, or Reason. And yet, in a kind of birds-eye view of the whole manner and history of the appearance of finite soul on the stage of Nature, it is, on the one hand, singularly suggestive of the more modern but scarcely less crude doctrine of the current scientific evolution, and on the other shows some prophetic anticipation of the deeper Hegelian dialectic ; and there is a certain obtuse show of plausibility in it.

Having thus arrived at "a reasonable soul" in Man that is capable of "the cognition of necessary and eternal truth," he proceeds with his doctrine of "Sufficient Reason ;" and mixing mathematical and metaphysical reasonings in a wholly external manner, he concludes that "the final reason of things" must and can only be found in "a necessary Substance, in which the detail of changes exists immanently as their source ;" and that this is "that which we call God." This "Supreme Substance" is the "Only, Universal, and Necessary : " it has nothing outside of it, but, "as a simple series of possible beings, it must be capable of limits, and must contain as much reality as possible." God is perfect, but is "nothing but the magnitude of positive reality taken exactly, setting aside the limits or bounds in that which is limited." Here is some vague but implicit appreciation of the necessary categories of Positive and Negative, of Necessity and Freedom, of Universal and Particular, and of absolute Content and Form ; and some indistinct approximation to the Hegelian conception of Quantity as intensive and extensive magnitude or degree, and of the unity of Quantity and Quality as Modality, and to the Spinozan conception of Thought and Extension as but two sides or aspects (internal and external) of one and the same whole Reality.

It is further said, with a like fundamental implication, that "in God, where are no bounds, perfection is absolutely infinite," and that God is "the source not only of Existence, but also of essences, so far as real, or of that which is real in the possible ; because the divine understanding is the re-

gion of eternal truths." Reality must be founded on something existing and actual, and consequently "on the existence of the necessary Being, in whom Essence includes existence, or with whom it is sufficient to be possible in order to be actual."

"Thus God alone (or the necessary Being) possesses this privilege, that he must exist if possible; and since nothing can hinder the possibility of that which includes no bounds, no negation, and consequently no contradiction, that alone is sufficient to establish the existence of God *à priori*. But we have also just proved it *à posteriori* by showing that, since contingent beings exist, they can have their ultimate and sufficient reason only in some necessary Being, who contains the reason of his existence in himself."

Nevertheless, there are certain "eternal verities," which are not dependent on his arbitrary Will, but are "necessary truths," which "depend solely on his understanding, and are its internal object." Perhaps we might say that they are the necessary ground of his own being as such. The *à posteriori* argument here would seem to be better than that *à priori*. Certainly, nothing could hinder the absolute truth and necessity of that which "includes no bounds, no negation, and consequently no contradiction;" but such Being as that could be nothing else or other than sheer non-entity or absolute Nothingness.

The mode of statement here has the character of the external method of our reasoning. There is in it nothing like the internal dialectic of the Hegelian Logic; and yet it contains profound metaphysical insights, and in a theoretical view, and in respect of universal method, it makes some vague approximation to the Hegelian Notion of the absolute Idea. Outside of the One Whole and All of real Essence or "necessary Being," there is only Nothing, or the mere Possibility of the real Actuality. But there are certain eternal verities or necessities that are the ground of the universal Reason itself. The absolute Intelligence or Soul

must have the internal constitution of the Monad also; and it is evidently contemplated as having within it an eternal principle of motion, and as being in itself, and by its own necessary constitution and nature, the absolute Essence or Essentity, and a living Causality, that can unfold, infold, and evolve itself into all the essences and souls that are, in any possible world, without solution of causal continuity anywhere within the ever-continuing identity of the one Whole and All as such. In what manner this one Whole is so actually constituted, or acts, or operates, there is no precise logical or dialectical exposition. All is more or less vague and undefined. There is some vague notion that Soul can exert no action or influence on bodies; and whether the action of the eternal Causality be continuous, or be by fitful impulses, or by both, there is no special consideration.

It is distinctly stated, however, that "God alone is the primitive Unity, or the simple original Substance of which all the created or derived Monads are the products; and they are generated, so to speak, by continued fulgurations of the Divinity from moment to moment, bounded by the receptivity of the creature, of whose existence limitation is an essential condition."

It is further said that "in God is Power which is the source of all; then Knowledge, which contains the detail of Ideas; and finally Will, which generates changes or products, according to the principle of optimism. And this answers to what in created Monads constitutes the subject, or the basis, the perceptive and appetitive faculty." And "the wisdom of God discerns, his goodness chooses, and his power effects, the Best possible."

This is rather a summary statement of an external inference or opinion about matter of fact than an internal exposition of metaphysical or necessary truth on grounds of logical necessity. But some notion of universal Essence, absolute Power, Knowledge, Will, and causal continuity, would seem to be implicitly involved. Somehow, the universal monadic

Soul constitutes the created monad to be such a subject as can be the basis, first, of perceptive and appetitive faculty, and then further, afterwards, of consciousness, memory, apperception, and reason, but exactly in what manner, or by what logical process of evolution, there is no further explanation. But the whole proceeding is optimistic rather than pessimistic.

His theory of soul and body would seem to be contained in the following curious statements: "The body belonging to a Monad constitutes, with its Entelechy, a living thing, and with its soul, an animal. The organic living body is a species of divine machine, or a natural automaton. A machine made by human art is not a machine in every part; but living bodies as natural machines are still machines in their minutest parts, *ad infinitum*. This makes the difference between divine and human art." There is a world of creatures, of living things, of animals, of entelechies, of souls, in the minutest portions of matter. Every particle of matter may be conceived as if it were "a pond full of fishes." Each living body has "a governing Entelechy," which in animals is the soul of the animal, and each part or member of this living body "has its Entelechy or regent Soul;" and "all bodies are in a perpetual flux." God alone is "wholly without body."

That is (it would seem), all matter is composed of atoms, which are unical wholes, or *entelechies*, capable of internal changes, or "shifting states." In the bodies of animals these become "perceptive and appetitive," or also conscious and imaginative, but in man only "reasonable souls or spirits." Moreover, "there is never complete generation, nor perfect death. Generation is development; death is envelopment and diminution." And there is "a preëstablished harmony" between souls and bodies, each following its proper laws, as also "between all substances as representations of one and the same universe." Souls act according to the laws of final causes; "bodies act according to the laws

of efficient causes, or the laws of motion ;” and the two kingdoms harmonize with each other. Descartes perceived that “souls communicate no force to bodies,” but if he had known that the law of Nature requires “the conservation of the same total direction in matter,” he would have hit upon the system of preëstablished harmony. “According to this system, bodies act as if there were no souls, and souls act as if there were no bodies ; and yet both act as though the one influenced the other.” Merely “sensitive souls” are “*elected*,” and “elevated to the rank of reason and to the prerogative of spirit.” Souls in general are “images of the universe of creation,” but spirits are “images of Divinity itself, the Author of Nature.” Hence “spirits enter into a kind of fellowship with God,” and the assembly of spirits constitutes “the City of God.” In relation to this “Divine City,” God possesses “the attribute of Goodness,” and there is harmony between the natural and moral kingdoms, between God as architect of the universal mechanism, and as monarch of “the divine City of Spirits.” Under this perfect government, there will be “no good deed without recompense, and no evil deed without its punishment.” Those who confide in Providence, do their duty, and imitate the Author of all good, following the nature of pure and genuine love, “will be blessed with the happiness of the loved.”¹

Such would seem to be the sum and upshot of the “*Monadology*” and of the philosophy of Leibnitz. Whatever else may be said of its method, its logic, or its form of statement, it is clear, for one thing, that it is out and out a system of Realistic Idealism. Certain emphatic insights may be specially noticed here : and *first*, that a soul, however metaphysically constituted such as to be capable of feeling, perception, memory, consciousness, apperception, reason,

¹ See the *Monadology of Leibnitz*, as given in the learned *Essays of Dr. F. H. Hedge on Atheism in Philosophy*, Boston, 1884, pp. 245-270.

must necessarily be in itself at least a *quasi* one Whole as such, however distinguishable into aspects, phases, relations, or special parts and particulars, within the unity of the one identical and continuous Whole; and *second*, that there must be certain "eternal verities," necessities, or necessary truths, that must underlie the whole universe and be the absolute ground of God and Nature, Mind and Matter, soul and body alike; and *third*, that his method is both empirical and rational, and has a universal scope, though it does not reach to the internal dialectic of metaphysical logic; and that it assumes that the Universe must necessarily be a one absolute Whole and All of real Being or Essentivity, and in itself an eternal and absolute Causality; and *fourth*, that at least "a preëstablished harmony," if not a logical necessity and law of limitation and causal continuity, must pervade the Whole; and *fifth*, that it must therefore necessarily be in itself both Ideal and Real in one.¹

In this Leibnitzian scheme there would seem to have been some prophetic anticipation of the modern physiology of protoplasm and cell-structure, and also some obscure approximation to the Hegelian doctrine of the evolutionary appearance of finite soul on the stage of external Nature. Still further, this notion of a human soul would seem to bear a close analogy to the Neoplatonic "unical hyparxes" of the lesser intelligences or souls as specially limited forms under

¹ In respect of the principle of motion and causal continuity, the doctrine of Leibnitz resembles that of Bacon: "Now the philosophy of the Greeks, which in investigating the material principles of things is careful and acute, in inquiring the principles of motion, wherein lies all vigor of operation, is negligent and languid, and on the point now in question seems to be altogether blind and babbling; for that opinion of the Peripatetics which refers the original impulse of matter to privation is little more than words, — a name for the thing rather than a description of it. And those who refer it to God, though they are quite right in that, yet they ascend by a leap and not by steps. For, beyond all doubt, there is a single and summary law in which nature centres, and which is subject and subordinate to God." — *De Sap. Veterum* (Works, Boston, 1860, xiii. 123).

and within the universal Hyparxis or archetypal Form of all forms. With the Neoplatonists, the order of the creative evolution proceeded in a continuously descending direction; while with Leibnitz, as with Hegel, there would seem to be implied, or necessarily involved, both a creative descent into Nature and a creative ascent out of Nature, before a human soul in an organized body was accomplished. With Leibnitz, the organic aggregation of "atom-souls" into the human body would seem to have been an external process; but the process of the evolution of the principal or supreme monad into a reasonable human soul was wholly internal and independent of the bodily aggregate as such. In the Leibnitzian statement, it would seem that the monad could not be in any manner affected, modified, altered, or annihilated by any external action upon it: it owed its inner activity of change of state, appetitive, perceptive, imaginative, or rational, to its own internal and inherent action or life. As to the manner in which this chief monadic soul derived its special constitution and life from the one "Supreme Monad" of all (the universal and necessary Monadic Soul or God), Leibnitz himself is not explicit; but he seems to have regarded the "Monad" as a thing immortal and eternal in itself. As to Sense-Perception in the modern use of the term, or as any possible collision of the external forces with the internal soul (if he had ever attained to any such conception at all), he rejects it altogether, and substitutes some unintelligible kind of fantastic dream of a "preëstablished harmony" between Spirit as such and Nature as such, between the physical kingdom and "the moral kingdom of Grace," and between soul and body. In this, his doctrine partakes more of mathematical science and theological vision than of critical philosophy. With Proclus, the creative Demiurgus "harmonized" all things.

There is some vague resemblance also, at least in respect of internal constitution and absolute nature, between the Leibnitzian supreme universal "Monad or Spirit" as God

and the Hegelian concept of the Notion or absolute Idea as God. In both, it is the One and All of real Substance, Essence, or Essentivity, other than which is only the possibility of the existent Actuality, having an eternal "principle of motion," an eternal "activity of becoming," or "moments" of change, or movement and life within it; but in respect of any rational exposition of the nature, action, and whole evolution of this ideal and real Whole into created worlds of Nature, or into finite souls in Nature, the metaphysical Logic of Hegel is beyond all comparison superior to that of Leibnitz. The latter pursues rather the external method of scientific and mathematical reasoning than the internal Dialectic of metaphysical and ontological science. In this department, Leibnitz leaves all in a confused and opaque condition, and soars away into a spiritual "Theodicea," that carries him beyond the pale of any truly philosophical consideration of either God, Man, or Nature. His method, however, had a certain universal scope. God was the Only, Universal, and Necessary Substance, there being "nothing outside of it or independent of it," but only the possibility of its existence as such, and having a principle of motion and life within it; and, "aside from the limits or bounds in that which is limited," it was "nothing but the magnitude of positive reality," and was "the Essence of all essences and existences, so far as real in the possible; because the divine Understanding is the region of eternal truths." The "eternal necessities," the "necessary truths," were not dependent on any "arbitrary Will," but were the internal and necessary ground of the divine Understanding itself. "God alone is the primitive Unity, or simple original Substance, of which all created or derived Monads are the products; and they are generated (so to speak) by continual fulgurations of the Divinity, from moment to moment, bounded by the receptivity of the creature of whose existence limitation is an essential condition."¹ Here the symbolic expression seems

¹ *Monadology of Leibnitz*, in Dr. F. H. Hedge's *Atheism in Philosophy*, Boston, 1884, p. 257.

to embody, and vaguely cover and include, the internal dialectic of a more exact logic; but no such dialectic is undertaken by Leibnitz.

Hegel holds fast to his metaphysical science of Logic as well as to the universal method, and rigidly pursues the internal dialectic of the absolute Notion into the universe of particular existences. He insists that Philosophy shall even embrace all true Religion in its comprehensive grasp, but that the one must be cleared of materialistic adumbrations, and the other of spiritual vagaries and mythical beliefs. It may be quite intelligible that there should be an established harmony throughout the Universe. It may even be said to be "preëstablished," since the power that establishes must necessarily coexist with, if it do not strictly precede, the establishment. The eternal Causality of the absolute Ideality in Reality may be conceived as dialectically establishing, and consciously controlling, the whole evolution of the eternal Essentia or Notion into created worlds of Nature, both directly by continued action, reflection, and sustentation, and indirectly by interrupted moments, impulses, or fitful leaps, or by continuous instrumentation, through predetermined media, means, and instrumentalities hinging upon the absolute constitution and necessary internal relations of Universal, Special, and Particular, within the ever-identical continuity of the Whole as such, while still comprehending and containing within the universal grasp a persistent, regulated, and "preëstablished harmony," amidst all distinctions, differentiations, divisions, evolutions, involutions, convolutions, oppositions, contradictions, collisions, over-balanings, outweighings, cancellings, annihilations, and new creations in the ceaseless arising of new and disappearance of old things, throughout the entire Providential order and perpetual flow of particulars within the creative potentiality, even into the minutest changes in the contingent and evanescent realities; and including, no less, what, for us and for all finite souls, down to the first appearance of feeling, appetite,

consciousness, sense-perception, memory, imagination, and finite reason on the stage of created Nature, is chance, accident, and inevitable fate. The externally mathematical and poetico-theological mind of Leibnitz seems not to have arrived at any clear and definite logical conception of all this. His reasoning partakes of the character of his "Differential Calculus," which must necessarily break up the continuous whole movement into steps, leaps, and units of number and measure, or into "Monads" or "Atom-souls," which are yet in themselves wholes and ones, whereof all bodies and souls, and all things in Nature, must be framed and compounded. What Hegel said of mathematics is as true of the method of Leibnitz, that its categories are only symbols, and no true determinations of essential relations, or of the potencies of Quantity for speculative purposes.

The system of Leibnitz seems to proceed upon the old theological assumption of a world of spirit and a world of matter apart from each other, eternally coexistent, but without any clearly developed causal continuity between them; though the material world was imagined to be in some way subject to the spiritual power. Both the one Supreme Monad and the lesser monads were conceived as constituted somewhat after the manner of the logical Notion, but no other causal continuity between them was stated than what might consist in some mystical sort of "preestablished harmony" between the two contradictory realities. This defect in his logic is distinctly emphasized by Hegel, who observes that "by the Monad of Monads and by the pre-established harmony, these substances [the multiplicity of lesser monads] are brought to a state of dependence and to an existence purely ideal," and that "his philosophy consequently contains the completely developed contradiction." The treatment of Leibnitz, as truly said by Véra, "has the general character of external reflection."¹

There is much appearance of a like cloudiness and spirit-

¹ *Logique de Hegel*, traduite par A. Véra, ii. 300, Paris, 1859.

ual mystification in the Hegelian deduction of the logical Notion and absolute Idea. He begins with a shadowy distinction of pure and real Being, with a mysterious activity of Becoming, and (apparently) with a positing or precipitation out of that of a determined and set something which he calls Essence (*das Wesen*), or essential Being. There has been as yet no exposition, no explicit statement, of those eternal necessities and necessary truths, relations, or essentia-ties which Leibnitz declared to be the very ground of "the Divine Understanding;" though he himself gave no further definition or explanation thereof. As to the principle of motion, or as to a pure activity of Becoming, or as to the dialectic Negativity of positing and cancelling, or as to the ground and nature of movement, or "moments," Hegel is as indistinct as Leibnitz. In truth, these eternal necessities, absolute verities, and necessary relations must be as eternal in their own nature as the universal "Substance," Essence, Essentia-ties, or Notion itself, and must indeed, in logical order, necessarily precede, and in actual fact be co-eternal (and at least partially identical) with, any possible intelligence, mind, thought, or providence whatever. It is nowhere explicitly declared by Hegel that the whole complex unity of these fundamental necessities and relations is itself the universal and absolute Essence, Substance, or Essentia-ties which he calls the Notion; though he is himself all the while expressly purporting to expound the Notion as the All of Being and Reality. Instead thereof, we seem to have a mystical kind of superessential "diremption" of pure Spirit into a subjective and objective phase of its own identity, before he has as yet given any account of Essence or Essentia-ties, or of those same eternal verities, or of the origin, nature, or ground of the activity of Becoming, the Negativity, or the diremption, beyond some vague suggestion that they are "moments" of Spirit, and that "an instinct or feeling of necessity," in ourselves, compels us to accept all that as absolute truth. The very idea of a principle of movement is

tacitly sunk out of view, or reduced to the level of vaguely defined "moments" of spirit itself; and yet it is elsewhere explicitly declared that Spirit is not *immaterial*, but is an essential, substantial reality, and includes and contains all the realities of the actual universe, which is said to have no other content. It might be conjectured that his real meaning or intention was to treat of the several phases, aspects, laws, facts, relations, and necessities of Spirit in a certain methodical order, while implicitly considering them always as the one inseparable and indivisible Whole, which he calls the Notion, or (in its completest evolution into a world of "realities") the absolute Idea. Even in this view, his statement, like that of his predecessor, however masterly and profound, may be considered as, on the whole, defective, insufficient, and unsatisfactory, if not in essential theory, at least in the manner of exposition of that theory.

§ 3. METAPHYSICS — MATHEMATICS — GROUND OF NECESSITY.

The logic of mathematics, no less than that of metaphysics, goes upon reason and necessity. Both alike are grounded upon those necessities, necessary relations, and absolute truths which are the grounds and necessary principles or laws of intelligence itself, and must lie at the foundation of the universe of Mind and Matter. The basis of all reason, of all logic, and of absolute truth, is to be found only in what Carlyle called "the adamantine circle of Necessity whereon the World is built."¹ "Mathematics," said Professor B. Peirce, "is the science which draws necessary conclusions." Metaphysics may be said to be the science that finds necessary premises. But the mathematical methods proceed upon a tacit assumption of the truth of these first principles and necessary grounds, and do not enter upon any critical discussion or demonstration of their nature and necessity. This is the function of metaphysics; and it involves an in-

¹ *Essays*, iii. p. 178, Boston, 1861.

vestigation of the categories of thought, universally, and with the end and aim of arriving at a true logical notion of the Whole and the All. Mathematical science assumes these necessities rather as principles of our reason than of the universal reason, or hovers vaguely and ambiguously between the two, and proceeds to its own special work of applying what science of them it possesses to the external investigation of Nature, which is assumed to be an external and absolute reality of some kind. All the physical and natural sciences pursue this same external method. This is essentially what they are, and they do not profess to be anything else.

The common mind goes upon a like presumption of the validity of human reason, and of the absolute reality of external Nature, grounded upon an intuitive appreciation (confirmed by experience) of the truth and certainty of these same underlying principles and necessities. Such is the method of common sense. But a scientific investigation of Philosophy itself must begin with a sound critical analysis of mind in ourselves. It is in this way only that we can expect to discover the true nature of those necessities, relations, first principles, and laws, or come to know their necessity and their universality; and this we can do, for we are capable of discovering and knowing, not only that they are true in and for ourselves, but that they are in themselves necessarily and universally true and real, and must in a certain manner pervade all Mind and all Nature. By this purely logical method of internal search, we may reach an a priori demonstration of the necessary existence and reality of the fundamental necessities, necessary relations, and absolute truth of universal Intelligence, not indeed as any immaterial spirit outside the universe, but as pervading the universe itself and constituting the theoretical basis of what may prove in the end to be definable as universal Mind or Soul, inclusive of all else. We may discover that a universal Reason or Intelligence of some kind must necessarily exist.

* No. I deny the existence of "external and universal" and all necessarily as a "metaphysical truth" before them. The "ideation" exists only in the "reality" and can only be understood in the result of Science. In the only possible beginning-point of Science, no such "ideation" is possible at all.

We may discover and know that of a necessity the universe must be a standing All of immovable ground and movable relations of parts in the one Whole, within which everything that moves, or is susceptible of movement or change, has its motion. We certainly discover and know as the fact of all observation and experience, that all parts of the sensible world are in motion, or are in a condition of mobility if in stationary balance for the time being; and we may intellectually see and comprehend as a necessity of reason that both the standing and the movement must be eternal; that an eternal movement upon the ground and basis of necessities, necessary relations, eternal essentiaes, and absolute truths, laws, or principles, which subsist, and only can subsist, in a one absolute Whole and All of Being, and are as such necessarily constitutive of Intelligence or Reason itself, must of a necessity be Knowing, and that Knowing can be nothing else but that; that such Knowing must of a necessity be conscious or self-knowing, since Consciousness can be nothing else but the fact of knowing; and that such self-knowing movement in reason must of a necessity be eternal Will, and that Will absolute can be nothing else but that. It follows from all this that there must necessarily be a process of distinction, mediation, instrumentation, and differentiation of the immovable Whole into variable parts and particulars in the Whole; and in this there is necessarily involved, either a self-limiting blind necessity, or a self-limiting Potentiality, and a determining power of election in freedom and a final determination to a definite end and purpose, or both at once.

We may see, indeed, that the process and evolution must necessarily proceed under necessities, necessary relations, and fundamental principles which are not imposed by the activity itself alone upon its own action, that is, are not self-imposed otherwise than as they constitute a necessary part and foundation of the whole existent Actuality from eternity. But this is by no means all; for, if there be move-

ment at all (as we know there is) in this Whole, then Freedom is as necessary and as absolutely true as are those other absolute necessities; and there may be, and in fact must be, action or movement in freedom over and above these other necessities which are unalterable and eternal, though in accordance with them so far as they go. Such movement in Freedom, and at the same time under the necessities and necessary relations that are constitutive of intelligence itself, and which must therefore be a knowing, conscious process, must of a necessity also be in some degree capable (it would seem) of having an aim, of foreseeing the end, and of wielding, in view thereof, the movable parts, necessities, relations, and laws into employment and use, and so (in some measure) of imposing limitation or law upon its own absolute action, within the given scope of freedom, and over and above the unalterable and the immovable necessities which are the adamant ground of all possible movement and of all possible reality; and that some such consciously directing control of the self-determining, self-limiting potentiality must, in some large measure, be the real truth of the matter.

Something like this, only, can be what is really meant by volition, will, or choice. The fact of such potentiality, choosing potency, or will, in us, however it may be defined or described, cannot be doubted: it is as certain as the fact that *I think*, or that *I am*. To say that this is no fact, but is an illusion, is to say that science and philosophy are alike impossible. Why, then, should the same fact, its truth and necessity, be doubted, or be more difficult of comprehension or admission, for the universal whole than for the finite mind? or how should the fact be possible for the latter unless it were true and real for the former? It would seem, then, that there must necessarily be both Necessity and Freedom, both unalterable truth and changeable contingency, both necessary limitation and self-imposed law, both Providence and Fate, throughout all that is. A true Meta-

Freedom

Intelligence

Will
Intelligence

physic of the necessary grounds, relations, and principles or laws of thought in ourselves, and (when recognized and known in their necessity and universality) of all possible thought, creation, or evolution in Nature, must constitute the only real bridge by which the human mind may be enabled to pass over (as it were) to an absolute ontology or science of all real Being. It is the pathway of the metaphysical science of Logic, and this science is as inexorable as Necessity.

But this ontological science can go no further, and be no more, than a universal theory. It may pursue the theory into a knowledge of the fundamental nature and being of universal mind, and into the creation and evolution of a world. So far as absolutely necessary truth, the theory may furnish us a ground of certain prevision, and serve as certain rule and guide; but it cannot go beyond that into the sphere of universal freedom, contingency, and providential will. Here comes a limit to our possible knowledge in this direction and by this method. We cannot proceed further to construct a world in detail for ourselves out of our own thought or imagination. All attempt to do this must end in visionary speculation or sheer mysticism. At this stage of our progress, it becomes necessary to turn about and confront the world of Nature itself, the actual work of the creative universal mind, the veritable book of the divine wisdom, laid wide open before us for investigation and interpretation. In this study, the metaphysical theory may be taken as foundation and guide, as a "provisional working hypothesis" (as it may be called). The theory may furnish an outline of the necessary, the possible, and the probable: if true, it must find its verification in the actual observation of the fact in Nature. A complete and thorough experience of all Nature as it actually is now, or as it has been heretofore, can alone furnish us with a knowledge in detail of what now is, or what hitherto has been, the order, process, necessity, law, manner, and history of created things, and of

the plan and designs of Providence therein thus far. The theory and the knowledge or verification thus gained must be the only possible ground we can have for certain provision within the sphere of the universal and necessary; but in the field of freedom and contingency, it can only be the ground of an uncertain judgment, or a probable conjecture, as to what may actually take place in the future continuation of the creative process. No other means or mode of revelation as to the future in this field of necessary contingency is, or ever was, possible or rationally conceivable to the disciplined intellect. The thoughtless visions of the uncritical fancy, or the poetical dreams of the emotional imagination, are of no value here, however instructive, useful, or charming they may be in other respects. At this day of the world's history and enlightenment, it requires no great learning or insight to discover that all the special and miraculously supernatural revelations that have hitherto been pretended were misconceptions and illusions, or mere myths and superstitions. In the field of universal freedom, necessity and contingency, the true Revelation is to be found only in a scientific study of the great book of Nature, the actual work of Thought and Providence itself (if there be any at all), in which we may discover and read all that we are capable of receiving, comprehending, and knowing, or have need to know, of the Providential plan, design, or purpose in that field. In the sphere of universal Reason, and to the extent that our knowledge thereof may go, we may know that we possess necessary and eternal truth; for within this realm of the universal and necessary, knowledge is, ever and always, foreknowledge also. It constitutes "the adamantine circle whereon the universe is built."

The science of Mathematics goes upon assumed premises. Its axioms or fundamental truths are taken to be so obviously true and necessary, as so directly seen by the intellect to be necessarily true, as either not to need, or not to admit of, further proof, or other demonstration; or it assumes cer-

tain facts hypothetically, as having been already sufficiently demonstrated to be true, or as provisionally supposed to be true, and so are taken as true for the purposes of the investigation which the mathematician has in hand. It is neither the object nor the function of mathematics to inquire into the nature of those first principles and necessary truths. It makes no question of how the universe came to be at all, nor of what it is in itself. The science deals only with the necessities, necessary relations, laws, forces, facts, and phenomena of Nature as presented to external observation and study. The universe is too big a thing for it to get any hold of at once and in the first instance. It is very much as if a child should attempt to grasp with its tiny hand a sphere as large as the ball of earth: it could not tell by any observation of the senses, nor by any calculation, whether it were a sphere at all, or only a flat plain, and much less what it was actually made of.

Mathematics is, practically, a science of numbers, measures, magnitudes, proportions, and relations, of quantities, forces, and motions, and of dynamics, statics, and equilibrium. In order that there may be numbers or measures, the science must assume everything to be reducible to some unit, or to a cipher: there must be a one, or a multiplicity of ones, and a void infinity of zero, before any subject-matter can be brought within the scope of its methods and operations. It cannot calculate without a unit of number, nor measure without a unit of measure. It does not deal with Quantity as such, with Quality as such, with intensive and extensive magnitude as such, with Modality as such, nor with Essence, Energy, or *Vis Viva* as such: but before it can begin to do anything it must have particularly observed facts, such definite quantities as atoms, molecules, bodies, or special energies, potentials, stresses, intensities, motions, time-and-space relations, functions, or degrees; specific masses, velocities, accelerations, weights, gravitations, momenta, inertia, equilibrium, and the like. A most curious

and singular illustration of this foregone exigency may be seen in the artificial units and names devised for the uses of electric and magnetic research; for in this way only can such things be brought within the range of arithmetic, algebra, geometry, trigonometry, the calculus, and other mathematical methods. For all the purposes of mathematics, the hypothetical assumption of a multiplicity of hard impenetrable atoms in a void, an unknown force called gravity, or potential, and action at a distance across a void, is enough and will do. The steps of a never-ending series of finites will do for a conception of infinity. Masses, energies, velocities, momenta, or "moments of momentum," inertia, and their time-and-space relations, intensities, and the like, will do for a knowledge of the nature of matter or essence. Gravity, or potential, will answer for a *Vis Viva*, or a universal law. An aggregate of atoms or masses will serve for a Whole. The science of mathematics seems to have no need of any conception of a universal Whole which is, at the same time, a One and All and a source of all particular ones, nor of an absolute essence which is an eternal dialectic of reality and ideality at once and in one. It endeavors to ignore the very idea of a one continuous Essence in a continuous and eternal movement into a creation. The manner in which the infinite series of the Calculus is, by this sort of assumption and hypothesis, made to become an imperfect substitute for the dialectic of continuous movement, and also the fallacy of such assumption, is unfolded by Hegel at great length, and exposed in an altogether admirable and unanswerable manner. The central point is, that the mathematician, in dealing with a continuous movement, must take it by arrested steps or moments, and thus create his imaginary units before he can get any hold of the subject-matter with his mathematical processes. When he has got his circle broken up into an almost inconceivable number of hypothetical straight lines, or his matter divided into an infinity of hard impenetrable atoms, or his incompres-

sible elastic medium constrained into local states of stress, or whirled into atomic eddies and vortex-rings, or when he has once taken an inventory of all the stars and nebulae that are visible in the sky, of all the metals, acids, alkalies, and simple elements, of all the minerals, animals, and vegetables, of all the solids, liquids, and gases, and of all the energies, velocities, pressures, and strains in Nature, with their numbers, measures, forms, relations, and proportions, then he can begin to count, measure, calculate, equate, and formulate. He has then got hold of something that he can set down as *a, b, x, y, z*, to the end of the alphabet. Then a mathematics of astronomy and chemistry, of dynamics, statics, and equilibrium, of mechanics and morphology, and of light-waves, electro-magnetic waves, and electric stresses in a one whole medium, can proceed. Once admit his assumed premises or his facts, and his conclusions are inevitable; for they go upon reason and necessity. But even the mathematicians, in these later times, seem to have attained to some higher and better conceptions of the actual truth of Nature as it is found.

The older mathematicians (say from Newton to Gauss) proceeded upon the assumed theory of atoms and gravity and action at a distance across a void. But since the undulatory theory of light has established the existence of an interstellar æther of some kind as the vehicle of the undulation, and since the researches of Faraday and others into the nature of Electricity and Magnetism have demonstrated the existence of a "dielectric medium" other than gas or a void, some distinguished mathematicians have adapted their mathematical methods, equations, and formulas to the quite opposite theory of a continuity of action in a whole or universal medium. Maxwell¹ has endeavored explicitly to support the hypothesis of continuous action in an elastic incompressible medium of some kind, considered as a whole.

¹ *A Treatise on Electricity and Magnetism*, by James Clerk Maxwell, M. A., LL. D., etc., Oxford, 1873.

He finds little difficulty in translating the equations and formulas of La Place, Lagrange, and Gauss, based upon the theory of atoms and action at a distance across a void, into other equations and formulas which answer equally well and are "mathematically equivalent," though proceeding upon the theory of continuous action through an elastic universal medium. Electricity, it seems, "obeys the same conditions of continuity as an incompressible fluid," and "it is therefore impossible to give a bodily charge of electricity to any substance." There is no such thing as specific or latent electricity, as there is latent heat in a body. Potential in electricity is like temperature in bodies, but not the same; the convection of electricity is like the convection of heat, but is not the same thing. "Neither positive nor negative electricity," says Sir William Thomson, "is a material fluid, capable of being heated and of communicating heat to other bodies." It seems rather to furnish an example of the conservation of energy, or of a continuous action in a whole medium. "A current of electricity," says Maxwell, "is not only like energy, but it is truly energy itself:" it is convertible into heat, or also "into mechanical work." It is "kinetic energy," that is to say, "the energy which a moving body has in virtue of its motion;" but "it is not necessarily a material body with a momentum." He treats "electric tension" as "a phenomenon of stress in an elastic medium:" it must be "in a state of mechanical stress." He explains polarization as a kind of "displacement" through a "dielectric medium." "The ratio of electro-motive force to the corresponding electric displacement," he calls "the coefficient of elasticity of the medium." Electro-motive force "acts on the electricity only, and not on the bodies in which the electricity resides." The mathematical demonstrations seem to show that light is an electro-magnetic disturbance in the same elastic medium. The respective velocities of light and electro-magnetic action are quantities of the same order of magnitude, if not exactly the same, and the mathematical forms of the disturbance in

both cases agree; the vibrations are similar, though not exactly the same, and they are alike transverse to the line of progressive motion. But while electricity is a stress in an elastic medium other than air, magnetism is a phenomenon of the molecules of bodies. Thus, electro-magnetism furnishes an independent and an equally convincing proof of the existence of such a medium as the undulatory theory of light itself establishes. The potentials, velocities, and forces of electricity appear to depend rather upon the state of stress in the medium, either as a whole or in respect of some part, and rather upon the principle of the conservation of energy than upon "any previous history of impulses given." They certainly lead to the suggestion of a one whole Essence in a state of eternal action as a Whole, and of some special and particular stress in the parts; and the mathematical mind of our time seems to be, at least, approximating toward such a conception. The old idea of an atomic matter and action at a distance, through an empty void, is dropped out of view, and the question of materiality becomes a question of the actual constitution and nature of an invisible, if not wholly insensible, ethereal, elastic, and incompressible medium, existing and acting as a whole. "Whether this matter," says Sir William Thomson, "is or is not electricity; whether it is a continuous fluid permeating the spaces between molecular nuclei, or is itself molecularly grouped; or whether all matter is continuous, and molecular heterogeneousness consists in finite vortical or other relative motions of contiguous parts of a body, — it is impossible to decide, and perhaps vain to speculate in the present state of science." But since it is established that all bodies are made up of molecules, which are supposed to be in motion in some free mean path even in the most solid bodies, and never in actual contact with each other, it would seem to follow that an ethereal medium of so subtle a nature as the mathematical theory of Electricity and Magnetism would seem to require, must be capable of pervading

all molecularly constituted bodies whatever, and must therefore be not containable or confinable within any receiver made of such material, however the wave-motions (or vortical motions) in it may thereby be obstructed or resisted. The pith of the suggestion of vortices, eddies, or rings consists in the fact that it presents a mode of conceiving in what manner atomic or molecular forms of matter could be formed out of and in a one whole and continuous essence, which must at the same time pervade all bodies in Nature and contain them. And we are almost driven to say of matter, as Torricelli in 1715 said of energy, that it "is a quintessence of so subtile a nature that it cannot be contained in any vessel except the inmost substance of material things."

A learned mathematician of our day claims to have shown (in various mathematical papers) "that electricity, magnetism, solar gravitation and rotation, planetary and stellar positions, spectral lines, chemical affinity, thermal energy, and other physical manifestations, furnish marked indications of an all-pervading elastic medium, vibrating with the velocity of light, and subject to the same laws of harmonic modal action as have been found to influence the air and other elastic bodies."¹ And here at least would seem to be enough to show that mathematical and physical science is beginning itself to approach very nearly that metaphysical realm of truth in which the science of logic, from Aristotle to Hegel, has had to deal with the nature of universal Essence, and with all the categories of absolute Intelligence.

§ 4. FORCE — MASS — QUANTITY — POTENTIAL — ZERO.

Activity apart from essence is no more conceivably possible than is force apart from matter, or energy apart from an essential medium. Activity is simply the fact that something is in action, as motion is merely the fact that something moves, or is moving, and consciousness the fact that some-

¹ *Photodynamic Notes*, II., by Pliny Earle Chase, LL. D. (Proc. Amer. Phil. Soc., Phila., No. 108, pp. 354-376.)

thing knows or is knowing. What else can the inmost substance of material things be, but the one whole and universal essence in a state of eternal movement in some manner, and according to some necessity, law, or relation? It would seem to be certain that the "dielectric medium" of the interstellar spaces cannot be contained in any vessel for examination, like air or a gas, though a disc charged with electricity and sealed up hermetically within an insulating receiver has remained in the same state for a long time; and a means of "storing" electricity for future use has been discovered. But this may be explained as a state of local stress, or as the stability of some new combination, and it does not necessarily imply that the receiver contains electricity in the same physical sense that air or water is contained in a vessel. Indeed, the later treatises show that it is not a literal "storing," but a mode of reproduction of electro-motive force. Dielectric media seem to have a close analogy with media that are transparent to light, though the manner and law of the transmission, and the vibrations, polarizations, and opacities are found not to be exactly the same in both cases. Maxwell saw no reason why light-waves should not exert some appreciable degree of mechanical force. Crookes at first thought he had demonstrated the fact; but it was found that his fact could be better explained by the action of the heat-waves on the particles of air still remaining in his partially exhausted receiver. Thus it would seem that the mechanical action of the light-waves alone was insufficient to move his delicate fly-wheel. But it is evident that the heat-waves moving in this same elastic medium, with the instrumental aid of the kinetically moving particles of air intervening in the receiver, was sufficient for the purpose. An experiment of Tyndall has shown that these heat-waves in the ethereal medium, concentrated to a focus in air by a lens, will char paper without heating the air through which they pass. The heat-waves at one extreme end of the spectrum would seem to have a greater

intensity of mechanical force than the light-waves in the middle portion, or than the chemical waves at the other extreme end.

Magnetism is regarded as a phenomenon of the molecules of bodies; but Electricity, like Heat, resides in a medium or vehicle, which is independent of bodies or their molecules as such. Whether this medium is itself atomic, or is a continuous substance or essence in which the first finite or atomic forms of substance take their rise as vortical motions or whirling eddies or rings, or in some other manner, is a question which mathematical or physical science leaves as yet undecided.

A distinguished chemist¹ has suggested (somewhat quizzically) that if the interstellar æther stayed the earth in its orbit as much as one tenth of a second, astronomers would know it, and that to make the æther the vehicle of so much power as the theory of light and heat requires, would be like an engineer making the belts of a cotton-factory of gossamer threads; to which "the æther-theory has to reply by giving the æther an indefinite elasticity and strength, — the magic of a fairy;" and he concludes that there must be a fallacy somewhere, and strongly suspects that it is to be found in "the ordinary notions of causation which have in our day culminated in the famous apothegm of a German naturalist, *Kein Phosphor, kein Gedanke*" (no phosphorus, no thought), and involve "the old metaphysical dogma of *nulla actio in distans*." The apothegm and its materialistic notions of causation are readily appreciated; but how the metaphysical dogma comes in is not so very clear. Is it intended to assert the contrary doctrine of *actio in distans*, and to deny the metaphysical dogma, or to interpret it only in some theological sense of an absolute *fiat* creation? There is, indeed, at the close, a large implication of a universal Intelligence, but whether as acting in causal continuity with Nature, or

¹ *Scientific Culture and other Essays*, by Josiah Parsons Cooke, Professor of Chemistry in Harvard College, New York, 1881.

in the magical way of fairy-like spirit, it is not said ; but it was not the author's "purpose to discuss the doctrines of causation." But this (one would think) is just the most important thing of all to be discussed at this stage of the business.

Professor Cooke explains the action of the Radiometer as "a heat-engine," on mechanical principles and "materialistic notions of causation." But to the philosopher who should propose to discuss the doctrine of causation, such notions can scarcely be deemed sufficient or satisfactory : they might remind him of the maxim of the lawyers, *Causa proxima, non remota, spectatur*. The little machine is itself a complex of instrumentalities, and it works in a wide environment of external instrumentation. Heat-waves (it seems) have force enough to set the aerial particles in motion, though the light-waves have not ; but they have sufficient force to impress the optic retina and the convolution of sight. The same æther (or other medium) is the vehicle of both ; but that is plainly only another intermediate instrumentality in the chain of causation. The sun is but another, and still only a proximate cause. The *causa remota* is still to be sought. The æther, though so subtle as to pervade all bodies, not staying the earth one tenth of a second in its orbit, is still manifestly an instrumental agency and a force, however delicate. If a chemist could catch it in his balance, he might weigh it, perhaps ; and if he would undertake to pursue the chain of causation to its ultimate source in the absolute Causality, he might possibly, with Bacon, Plato, and the old Greek poet, find it "tied to the foot of Jupiter's throne" in such a way that "the old metaphysical dogma of *nulla actio in distans* would give him no further trouble."¹

¹ Professor Stokes, giving an "extended signification" to the word *Light*, makes it coextensive with all ethereal vibrations coming from the sun, not only the light-waves, but the heat-waves and the chemical waves, beyond the end of the visible spectrum ; and the mechanical force of this ethereal radiation is conceived to be such that "the

The crude expression, *no phosphorus, no thought*, would seem to have carried with it (in the mind of its author, at least) a silent insinuation, not only that the finite thought is dependent on the existence of phosphorus in the brain, but that the burning of the phosphorus therein, or the light coming from it, the "phosphorescent gleam" (as it is called by Dr. J. Luys), is consciousness, is thought. Such a conclusion would be a transparent *non sequitur*. It may be true enough that neither brain nor body can have healthy life or action without the presence of phosphorus in the structure of the tissues, and the same thing might as well be said of iron or carbon; but that either the one or the other, or all the chemical constituents together, can or do produce thought or consciousness, does by no means follow, and the tacit implication is a sheer assumption, and is a logical absurdity in itself.

When light glows from phosphorus, it is because the phosphorus is burning at the given temperature of the air. Burning is simply a process of combination of the oxygen of the air with the particles of the phosphorus. This raises the temperature; but what is temperature? Simply a certain degree of heat. But what, then, is heat? Heat is motion, say Bacon and Tyndall. Motion of what? Why, of the molecules or atoms of the phosphorus, which are set into fervid vibration or oscillation by the chemical action, say the chemists. But how do these vibrations become light? The air seems not to be affected by them, but the æther certainly is; for the vividly moving particles do set the æther also into fervid wave-motions which reach the retina of the

amount of energy poured forth into space corresponds to, in round numbers, 12,000 horse-power per square foot" of the sun's surface. And he adds: "When we remember that the sun is a vast globe of about 855,000 miles in diameter, every square foot of the surface of which supplies energy at the above rate, and that that is continually going on from age to age, we cannot help feeling what a prodigious supply the sun must contain." — *Burnett Lectures on Light*, etc., by George Gabriel Stokes, M. A., F. R. S., etc., London, 1887.

eye, and even the convulsion of Sight (according to Le Conte), and somehow give rise to conscious seeing; not in the brain-tissue, however, but in the seeing mind or soul of the perceiver. If there were no perceiving soul there to see, these waves, or whatever kind of motions, might as well strike against a dead wall; or if they impinged upon a delicately movable tissue, that too might be set into vibration or some kind of motion; but the moving tissue could no more see than the dead wall, or the vibrating molecules. When a current of electricity passes between two carbon points in an exhausted receiver, the burning is different in kind, but is still a burning; for the intense electro-motive force detaches the infinitesimal molecules of the carbon, heating them to a white heat, and sets them into fervid vibration as before. But, again, the air is not affected at all, but only the æther, and the light-waves set up therein come through the glass and the air to the eye of the beholder as readily as they might come also from the sun's photosphere of super-heated metallic particles, which are intensely vibrating in like manner in this same ethereal medium. Still there is no light, no seeing, no consciousness, anywhere but in some perceiving soul. What that is, must still remain for further investigation.

The notable thing in these newer methods is, that they begin with the conception of the Whole as a whole, and then proceed by mathematical processes from the Whole to the parts and particulars; while the older methods began with the assumption of atomic particulars, and thence proceeded towards wholes, or towards a whole, which could never be anything other than an aggregation of disintegrated particulars. Yet that conception is still scarcely more than a vague and indefinite notion of a material medium of some kind, in which reside potential energy and mechanical stress; and hence comes the further notion of actual and potential energies, or special quantities and forms or modes of force, implying a one total force or energy under the designation of

the "conservation of energy," which always remains in itself the same. Faraday ventured the suggestion that all force proceeded from one centre. Neither Faraday appears to have entertained the idea that the centre itself, nor Maxwell, that the "potential" centre, had its origin in a universal Whole, and was lost again in the whole and universal, or that all finite motions began and ended in a one universal Essence, in eternal movement within itself as a Whole.

Maxwell professedly grounds his new equations and methods upon the researches, facts, and conceptions of Faraday: he endeavors to give them a mathematical expression. We are informed in the outset "that in mathematics the term *Force* is used to signify the supposed cause of the tendency which a material body is found to have towards alteration in its state of rest or motion. It is indifferent whether we speak of this observed tendency, or of its immediate cause, since the cause is simply inferred from the effect, and has no other evidence to support it." That is, of course, it has no other evidence for a mathematical science which grounds all knowledge upon sensational experience of the external facts and phenomena of Nature. And accordingly it is assumed that our idea of force, moving things, comes from "a copious store of remembered sensations" connected with our ideas of conscious power, exertion, fatigue, or yielding to pressure; but it is asserted that such ideas, "in mathematically trained minds, lead to no practical error." In this, perhaps, we are to understand simply that mathematics, as applied to the investigation of external Nature, merely proposes to subject the observed facts and phenomena to its own methods and processes of reasoning. In this business it has no use for metaphysics as such, and professedly ignores the methods and processes of speculative thought. But it is not, therefore, necessarily to be inferred, either that mathematics is not itself, in some large measure, a metaphysical science, nor that it does not largely deal in purely metaphysical conceptions.

When Maxwell criticises the error of speaking of "the force of an electrified body" in that it is not the force of the body, but "the quantity of electrification" that is meant, his use and sense of the term *quantity* is strongly suggestive of the Hegelian conception of Quantity as intensive magnitude, or the degree of power, the amount of energy or action, that is in operation; and, indeed, the term as used can mean nothing else. This given amount of active energy is called the "Potential;" and *Potential*, again, is suggestive of the potency (*δύναμις*) or potentiality of Aristotle and Hegel. Descartes' method of geometrical coördinates for determining the position of a point in space, going upon the theory of atomic matter and action at a distance, is, in this new theory of an elastic, incompressible medium acting as a Whole, transformed into a method for determining the positions and actions of potential centres of force in the medium. As in the old theory an atom of matter was supposed to exert a force across a void upon other atoms or bodies at a distance, in the direct ratio of the mass and in the inverse ratio of the square of the distance, so, in the new theory, a "potential" centre of force in the medium is supposed to be governed by the same law: it corresponds equally well with the observed fact. This Potential also, at an infinite distance, becomes zero or nothing: in other words, it is merely the necessary relation of positive and negative. This conception of infinity will doubtless answer well enough for all mathematical purposes; but a philosopher may desire to know what is the real meaning of it. Suppose the Potential were removed so far away as to reach the extreme outer limit and circumference of the material medium itself, or even into the absolute void beyond it, it would then, truly enough, be easily conceivable that it should there plunge off into the gulf of nothingness, and become mere *zero*; and in that case "the infinite distance" would mean simply the jumping-off place. Or, again, if "Potential" should be taken to mean only that point within the medium where

the *stress* began or ceased, we might readily conceive the point to be that place where the special activity, or the limited potential energy, first made its appearance this side of zero or no activity, and then proceeded through all degrees of quantity or intensity of strain until the whole stress should diminish and finally cease, ending in no stress or zero again, having vanished into a state of rest in the medium; and here, again, "the infinite distance" would mean merely the zero of intensity, or the state of rest or equilibrium of the whole in which it had ceased. Or, if the Potential were taken to mean the whole medium itself as a whole, in which the sum total of all energy resided, "the infinite distance" of the Potential could mean nothing else or other than the absolute gulf of *zero* beyond the medium; or it would mean simply the state of rest in an equilibrium of stationary balance into which the whole medium had itself fallen. Or, again, the assumed Potential may be conceived as the central point of beginning of any special and particular energy or movement, where the finite movement arises out of, or is again lost in, the universal movement of the medium as a whole. This hypothesis of a state of rest goes upon the assumption that a one and total material medium, whether composed of atoms or of a continuous substance, could ever be and remain in a state of rest; or it would imply that, if once at rest, it could start into movement of its own mere motion. The only other possible supposition would be, that as a whole its movement, its active energy, its Potential, was, in itself and in respect of the whole, eternal and absolute; but that in respect of some part of the whole, there might be a state of rest of the nature of a temporary equilibrium of stationary balance in that part, while the movement in the whole and as a whole still continued.

These imaginary points or centres of origin of motion are evidently assumed, hypothetically, and merely for the mathematical purposes; for the mathematician must first reduce the subject-matter to some sort of unit, before his processes

can get any hold of it. He must have his potential unit, his unit of quantity, his unit of measure, number, etc., before his work can begin. Then he can proceed with his potentials, points, centres, line integrals, double and triple integrals, solid angles, closed surfaces, lines of force, spherical harmonies, and the like, in a very admirable and effective manner. The newer methods begin with the whole and proceed to the parts; but this whole is conceived as an elastic, incompressible fluid, or a simple and same substance of some kind, as it appears to the observer from the external side of it; and what is sought to be investigated is, in what manner, and to what extent, the external phenomena of it can be explained, or rendered intelligible, on a mathematically mechanical theory of matter, energy, force, stress, motion, inertia, momentum, etc., and of a continuous mechanical action through such material medium. Undoubtedly this is a step in advance towards a more philosophical theory of the universe; and if the new theory does not yet reach a completely philosophical conception, or rise to the full height of Ideality in science, it has the great merit of approximating more closely to it than the old and very absurd notion of disintegrated atoms and action at a distance across an empty void could pretend to. This Potential, which becomes nothing at an infinite distance, may truly and philosophically express the point of beginning of finite movement in a universal Whole. The phrase, *conservation of energy*, may fitly express the total amount of power, active energy, or intensive quantity, in the universal One and All of real Being. The proceeding of the universal Whole into some particular form or mode of limited and finite motion must necessarily begin and end with the *zero* of such motion. This finite and special process must necessarily take place in Time and Space, or under those absolute necessities or laws which only can give finite form or mode. "All progressive actions," says Maxwell, "which require time for their accomplishment, . . . are therefore of the

nature of motions," i. e. finite and particular motions; for, as Aristotle said, time is the measure of motion, or, as the Neoplatonists better said, motion (which is apparent) is the measure of time, which is not directly apparent to the senses. But it is quite different with a movement which is not properly in time and space, but is in eternity and immensity, which are infinite in the sense of the mere empty possibilities of the real existence of the whole absolute Actuality of universal Essence and of eternally continuous movement in it. Nothing conceivable but such an Essence can contain such a potential movement. But in this sense, infinity does not mean merely a *zero* of absolute nothingness, but it more properly signifies and expresses the fact of the absolute subsistence of such One and All of real Essence and of the eternally continuous movement in it. That is truly infinite: it perpetually returns into itself without loss or diminution, and without beginning, end, or middle. It is not an external movement which proceeds by a never-ending series of definite steps, — a *progressus ad infinitum* merely, — but is an internal movement in one eternal and continuous round or cycle. This is the kind of movement which the Calculus really aims at and presupposes; but its mathematical equations, and its differential and integral processes, can get no hold of the problem without first artificially breaking it up into finite units. Such are its atoms, points, centres, potentials, and steps of the infinite series. When the one real Whole has once broken itself up — or rather since it has eternally broken itself up — into local or special stresses and potential centres of mechanical force, or whirled itself into vortex-molecules, masses, or quantities, then the mathematician can find real units on which he can effectually work in his own external manner, and on his purely mechanical theory, to very grand and useful practical purposes. The logical categories of universal Essence, of real Being, Nothing, and Becoming, of Universality, Speciality, and Particularity, and the rest, have to deal with the whole problem directly as the whole

thing really, necessarily, and absolutely is in itself; and, indeed, the whole metaphysical philosophy has for its object and end to expound the logical Notion of the absolute Reality and its movement of Ideality as it actually and necessarily is, in and for itself, and as it is seen inwardly by the intellect, and not merely as it is seen outwardly by the senses and the understanding of the scientific observer.

Particular motions, or modes of motion, may very properly be said to require time and space for their accomplishment, since time and space are in themselves simply those necessities or laws under which the finite limitation is alone possible. They are made up (as Proclus expressed it) "of bound and the infinite energy limited into bound; and the bound is the form and *morphe* of this power." The infinite energy of the one whole Essence gives the special quantity of "potential" under these same limitations. "All generation," says Proclus, "consists of bound and the infinite power or energy." In like manner, Hegel conceives that the infinite activity of the one Essence, in the logical constitution of the universal Notion or absolute Idea, imposes limitation and law upon its own action in the perpetual evolution of itself into the special and particular quantities of potential energy; which in their set and permanent forms give the finite essences of particular things or bodies, together with their peculiar natures, accidents, properties, and qualities. Matter, in its inmost substance, is only this essential energy: this Essence is matter as it is in itself. The speculative philosophy thus conceives the One Whole of real Essence and power to proceed into finite parts, phases, aspects, or particulars, within its whole self. The dialectic method really begins with this Whole, and thence descends to the particulars. Physical science, beginning with the external observation of Nature, has analyzed the largest bodies of the universe into molecules, into atoms, into æther, into a one and universal, elastic, incompressible medium of continuous energy, acting as a whole. These newer mathemat-

ical methods also begin with the Whole, and thence proceed to the parts and particulars; and "the unit of Potential" becomes a *quantity*, a definite measure, of the infinite and inexhaustible energy. But the further analysis and more exact statement of the whole manner, law, necessity, and fact of it belongs only to metaphysical or speculative philosophy.

Proceeding in this external manner, physical science resolves solids into liquids, these into gases or vapors, reduces whole solar systems into dust-clouds and "fire-mists" of dissociated molecules, and regards forces as material energies or potencies; but there is still found ever present an unknown Proteus, that, however bound in an adamantine chain of necessity throughout the realms of space, everywhere underlies the very constitution of Nature itself, and will neither be cut up into units, nor be subjected to mathematical analysis, nor be caught for vivisection or chemical research, nor be racked on any experimental machine, nor be put to death, nor be extinguished or annihilated. No wonder that so many should conclude the creature to be an incomprehensible enigma. Nor is it more wonderful that the old Platonists should have conceived the universe to be an animal, or an animated being ($\zeta\psi\omicron\nu$). And it still remains true (as Hegel said) that "the mathematical categories are only symbols for the expression of living or spiritual relations; that is, they are untrue determinations of the same, and still more of the potencies of Quantity and Numbers for speculative purposes in general. They are a means only, but of no real use or necessity, for the determinations of conception (*Begriffsbestimmungen*)."¹ Aristotle said of the mathematicians, that "cutting off some part of the Whole, they theorize about that which has happened;" but that "in the search for the highest cause, it is necessary to consider, not beings merely according to what has happened, but essence itself ($\eta\ \omicron\upsilon\sigma\iota\alpha\ \mu\acute{\alpha}$), the being by which all beings are ($\tau\omicron\upsilon\ \delta\upsilon\tau\omicron\varsigma\ \eta\ \delta\upsilon$)."² Bacon expressed a like

¹ *Wissenschaft der Logik*, iii. p. 382, Berlin.

² *Arist. Metaphysica*, Recognovit W. Christ, Lipsiæ, 1886, F. 1, p. 61.

opinion, that "mathematics could only give definition to natural philosophy, but could not generate or give it birth."¹ In truth, physical science is an external analysis: metaphysical science is a synthesis of complete conception, the full Concept of the unity of the Real and the Ideal in the absolute Causality of the one whole Essentity.

§ 5. SUMMARY VIEW OF HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY.

In the philosophy of Hegel, we have a colossal endeavor to reconstruct all science, and to propound a comprehensive theory of the universe, God, Nature, and Man inclusive. On the whole it must be admitted to be of surpassing depth, comprehensiveness, logical precision of thought and language, clearness, and eloquence; though his peculiar manner and style of treatment may sometimes appear to vanish away into an empty play upon words, or into an unintelligible refinement in a visionary realm of ideal shadows. His writings on nearly all great subjects of human interest are instructive and admirable. We are not to suppose that it was altogether a new philosophy: it was rather a masterly summation and improved statement of all that had gone before him. Still there are flaws and insufficiencies in his theory, or in his exposition of it, even on its metaphysical side, which leave it inconclusive and unsatisfactory to many philosophical minds; and upon the side of Nature and science, it fails to furnish all the necessary explanation. It does not effectually take up all Nature into clear solution: it by no means supersedes the work or the methods of exact science. This would doubtless be too much to expect from any speculative philosophy which it is yet possible for the human mind to conceive or state. Nevertheless, it may be of the highest value for human culture and progress. It might be difficult to say to what extent physical research has been, or still may be, aided and advanced by this philosophy, or by speculative philosophy in general. With some,

¹ *Nov. Org.* i. 96.

the questioner of the soundness of the Hegelian scheme only raises a doubt of his own capacity or patience to understand it. Perhaps no one can be entirely certain on this head; but so many great minds have attacked his positions that it is evident that they need either further demonstration, or further elucidation, or some modification or addition. The apparent drift and exigency under which his mind was laboring (whether from the pressure of his position, or of his time and country) of reconciling philosophy with the Christian religion, or with the biblical revelation concerning the God-man, has impaired the confidence of these later times in the entire validity of his speculations. Not that philosophy must negative the doctrine that the human soul is of a divine origin and nature, or that man is, in his own nature, both divine and human, both spiritual and animal, but that the assumption of a miraculously superhuman nature for Jesus of Nazareth, on the authority of traditional miracle and revelation, can no longer be admitted in any critical philosophy. Later historical and critical researches have effectually reduced these miraculous stories to the level of the myths and superstitions of that age, dispelled the illusions, and rendered them incredible henceforth to the enlightened mind.

But it is in respect of method that the philosophy of Hegel has been most questioned, if not most liable to criticism. The objection seems to have been, not so much that he pursued an ontologically dialectic and deductive (rather than an experimental and inductive) method, but that he made an unsound (or a too exclusive) use of the purely logical dialectic, or employed it in an unsatisfactory manner, and that he depends too much upon conclusions thus arrived at, and does not sufficiently resort to inductive science in the field of experimental research, or to observation in the whole field of Nature, for the verification of his theoretical deductions; for a sound and reliable philosophy must, with Bacon and Cousin, unite both the empirical and the rational meth-

ods. Hegel does, indeed, take a wide range in the study of Nature and history, according to the state of knowledge existing in his time, as Aristotle had done before him in his time; but knowledge in the sciences, in history and criticism, and in philosophy has made a great advance since his day. His mode of dealing with the subtlest questions in physics and in metaphysics has become in some degree obsolete and insufficient. This is merely something of the same fate that awaited all his predecessors, however glorious their actual achievements.

By the dialectics of exact logical thinking, in a systematic course of procedure, Hegel endeavors to ascend from the human mind (for he, too, is obliged to start with the Cartesian *I think and I am*) to an absolute Ontology of all Being, and thence dialectically to deduce both Spirit and Nature. He begins his ontological excursion (as it were) upon the outermost periphery of all actual Being, where it is bounded out of the infinity of Nothingness beyond, and thence, taking real Being (as distinguished from that purely abstract being which is mere possibility, or that empty *isity* of predication which may be asserted equally well of Nothing as of Something) to be the essential activity of Becoming, he proceeds, through a pure dialectic in what appears at first to be a world of logical shadows, but which are at length seen to be veritable ideal realities, to a definition of absolute Spirit (or God) as it is in its own eternal essence, nature, and being, and thence to an evolution of the creative universal Soul itself into all Nature (finite mind in animals and men inclusive), finally closing the circuit of his whole philosophical endeavor in a return of the evolutionary process into its original source in the ever-identical whole of the logical Notion of the absolutely flowing Idea of all Reality as thus defined out of the abyss of Nothingness. This whole is, all the while, to be grasped and conceived in its totality as essential Spirit, self-moving, self-limiting, self-conscious, and artistically creative, to the definite end of the True, the

Good, and the Beautiful. In this evolutionary proceeding into Nature and Man, the God-man of the biblical revelation is not omitted: even he comes in as a higher stage in the whole circuit of reflection into final identity with the absolute Spirit. It seems to have been the scope and purpose of the Logic to demonstrate the necessary truth and actual subsistence of universal Soul as Reality and Ideality in one. Essential spirit, as demonstrated to exist eternally in the logical form of the Notion, or of the absolute Idea, was to be conceived as infolding, unfolding, and reflecting its own essence into a created world of Nature as an actual process of thought, until self-limited and terminated in the more or less fixed and permanent essences, and into the substances and accidents of natural bodies or things, over the constitution of which a controlling power is still retained; and there was especially a certain capability of overcoming, cancelling, altering, or dissolving that fixity, and of rising out of that determined state of temporary permanency and estrangement from itself into a higher stage of freedom in organic Nature, and of thus returning, in the vegetable and animal kingdoms, towards itself again, and, in man, more completely awakening out of that "sleep" of Nature and Instinct into self-conscious and intelligent though finite soul.

One great point or principal feature in respect of which the Hegelian system appears to the world of science essentially to break down, and has proved least satisfactory to the philosophic mind of our time, consists in its supposed failure to demonstrate or establish the continuity of his absolute Spirit with the active essence or matter and life in Nature. It is denied that this gulf is bridged by Hegel, even if his method be capable of bridging it. Certainly, to many of the scientific men of the present day, and to much of our modern philosophy, spirit and matter remain apart and infinitely severed; and no philosophic statement hitherto made has been sufficient to remove the difficulty, and incon-

trovertibly establish the identity at bottom of mind and matter. The scientific and theological schools seem to be agreed that the thing is impossible; but the one insists that there is no spirit, no mind at all, but matter only; the other insists as strenuously that spirit, soul, mind, is altogether above and beyond matter, and has no continuity with it, though it can somehow operate upon it, and live in connection with a material organization. This is only another development of the standing false issue between science and theology.

It certainly lay within the scope of Hegel to establish this continuity and to clear up this inveterate false issue. The objection to his mode of doing it would seem to have some foundation. It is not true that he undertakes to produce a world out of Nothing, and make Nothing do the work. But he does assume the existence of some determinate real Being other than the Nothing, though in coeternal unity with it. He assumes also for this determinate Being an activity of Becoming; but he does not otherwise explain the origin of this actual Being, nor of this activity. He does not say — indeed, he rather seems to deny — that this real Being is *substance* or *essence*; he appropriates these words to another use altogether; and he denies the existence of matter in the sense of a dead substratum of material which is both self-existent and eternal as such. He does not stop to tell us at once that activity is real Being (or universal Essence) in an eternal state of movement within itself as the standing All. He simply assumes, in the first instance, an activity of Becoming. Though not explicitly stated, it seems to be implied that real Being is such an essence as is capable of movement into an active becoming. He does not explicitly state or explain how such Being is, or can be, self-active, nor does he expressly declare it to be eternally active simply as a last fact, or a necessary truth. But having apparently assumed that it is such a real Being (or Essence, if we choose to call it so) as

is capable of being in an eternal state of Becoming something other than what it was before in some particular, or in some respect, he proceeds to carry that self-active (or eternally active) Essence ("determinate Being," as he chooses to call it) through the categories of Quality, Quantity, and Modality — Mass, Measure, Essences and Existences, Substances and Accidents, Causes and Effects, and Reciprocity of Action and Reaction — into a complete evolution of all Nature in a continuous dialectic process of "Negativity," self-limitation, or the setting and cancelling of its own essence, in the course of change and return into the ever-continuing identity with itself; realizing thus the final End and Aim in the Real and True, the Beautiful and Good. In this Reciprocity of Action and Reaction, the whole proceeding comes round in a full circuit to the original source in the absolute Causality of the self-active (or eternally active) Essence, now constituted as the Notion of the ever-flowing Idea, which, being absolute and eternal as such, is itself without a cause in the proper sense of absolute Causality. But, in his system, the term *Causality* seems to be more especially confined to the relation of Cause and Effect as a category of the Understanding merely, and applicable only to the endless chain of finite causes and effects in external Nature, externally observed as a *progressus ad infinitum*. And in this way the identity of the active Essence (conceived in its unity and totality as the Notion) with what is called Matter, and the continuity of Soul with Nature, may be said to be explicitly and logically established. At the same time, of course, the old notion of matter as some sort of dead *substratum* (or unknowable *Ding an sich*) other than the essences, forms, and properties of the bodies or things in Nature as thus constituted, is as effectually negated and excluded by Hegel as it was by Berkeley before him, and only in the same way.

The point of the objection really should lie against the first assumptions. In the manner in which these assump-

tions are made in the Logic, there is certainly some appearance of an attempt to create both God and the World out of Nothing. He begins by asserting that Being and Nothing are equal and the same; but by *Being* here, he means "mere Being," wholly indeterminate being; that is, the abstract and empty *isity* (so to speak) of our predication, which truly enough may be asserted by us as well of Nothing as of Something. We may say, *Nothing is*; but is what? Why, just Nothing. And we may say, *Something is*; but is what? Why, Something. This does not make them the same. A wholly indeterminate Something would indeed be the same thing as Nothing: it would simply be an absurd proposition; for Something must necessarily be determinate in order to be at all anything other than absolute Nothingness. But Hegel seems to fall into the fallacy of assuming that a determinate Something, because conceived by us quite indefinitely, or because we do not yet perceive the limits of the determinateness, though we do perceive the indefinite Something, is the same thing as a wholly indeterminate Somewhat, identical with Nothing. And he appears to make the mere negation of a negation produce a Something out of Nothing. He appears to make his phantom Logic in the world of shadows split a whole absolute infinity of Nothingness into two halves (as it were) by an imaginary ideal line, which is taken to be a boundary line between the two halves, which have thus only become "one-sided" abysses of Nothingness; and he even reduces this line to a mathematical point, and out of this imaginary ideal line or point he assumes a Becoming of Something as a self-subsistent activity, however vaguely or indefinitely determinate as yet, which thus becomes "real Being," having in itself the constitution of the Notion, and evolves itself into a world of Nature. His Logic thus has the appearance of making an actual Something proceed out of Nothing, which is merely absurd. What Hegel really means, or at least what he really does, is to assume the

actual and eternal existence of some real Being, an active essence, bounded over (as it were) on all sides against and out of the supposed absolute infinity of Nothingness; and this real Something is ultimately defined or described, and is to be conceived in its totality as the Notion or the Absolute Idea. This is at least intelligible. Plainly, Hegel's Being and Nothing are not equal and the same even in his own Logic. The word *Being* is used in different senses, very ambiguously: *first*, abstractly as the mere *isity* of predication; *second*, in the active sense of the present participle *being*, as coming to be; and *third*, as actual Something (or Essence), which has come to be and is, or is *been* from eternity, that is, absolutely. All the while, Something and Nothing really remain as different as ever in reason and in Nature. In one sense it may very well be said that the actual Being, Essence, or Something, which really is, is equal to the negative Nothingness, out of which it is actually bounded and measured into the existent Actuality which it is; and also that the actually existent Essence, in the process of evolving itself into a world, necessarily bounds itself over against, or measures itself out of, the equal negative Nothingness into the creation which is given. The Logic of Hegel certainly makes it appear as if he intended to assert that out of Being and Nothing, posited as equal and the same, that is, out of that Nothingness from which only Nothing can come, there was an actual Becoming of Something. He does not, at first, explain what becomes, nor what should make it become, nor how or why there should be any becoming at all. Aristotle's question is not answered. No origin, no cause, no reason, is assigned for this first activity, or beginning of movement. It is not expressly said to be an eternal state of movement, without beginning, middle, or end, and in this sense infinite, though something like this would seem to be implied in his Logic. It is not stated to be an absolute or last Fact, or a necessary Truth, though something like this is tacitly assumed to

be so. It may be that the dialectic of Negativity did not require him to be more explicit in the phantom Logic, in the world of ideal shadows; but I find nowhere else in his writings any more explicit treatment of this vital matter. He does indeed say that the true standpoint of philosophy is that the Idea be known in its necessity, and that the identity of Subjectivity and Objectivity must be known as necessity.¹ His Logic purports to be grounded on necessity, or the necessary laws or principles of reason or intelligence, as all logic must; but the actual existence of a self-moving or an eternally moving Essence, activity, or life, is a matter of Fact, not a matter of pure logical necessity. Hegel speaks of "Negativity" in an active sense, as if mere negativity could do anything, as Darwin speaks of "Natural Selection" as if that were an active power. His Logic seems to turn on the negation of a negation, as if that could produce an actual something when nothing existed before. He seems to take a pure logical abstraction to be such a something as could become, or move itself, or start into Becoming. Clearly, the negation of a negation, though abstractly conceivable, is in itself nothing but an empty conception of the mind thinking it. It is possible to use words in that way, but it amounts to nothing. The Greek language employed two negatives, not to make an affirmative, but to make the negation more emphatic.

Hegel's object seems to have been to expound a metaphysical theory of the Notion, the Absolute Idea, as a self-moving, self-conscious, self-limiting, knowing Ideality, or living and thinking Soul. It is a very profound and truly admirable piece of work; but the determinate real Being, the Essence, the Activity, the Life, is rather tacitly assumed than otherwise satisfactorily accounted for. So far as he undertook to explain it, or to expound the Notion as an eternally active universal Essence, equivalent to (or the same thing as) self-moving Essence, and so far as he stated

¹ *Geschichte der Phil.*: Werke, xv., 617, Berlin, 1844.

it to be a last Fact, the truth of which all science and all knowledge, both physical and metaphysical, tends to prove and establish as a necessary conclusion of the human mind, he placed himself on the same ground on which all modern science and philosophy are tending towards some unity of conception with Plato, Aristotle, and the Neoplatonists; but on this platform, his scheme cannot be said to justify the popular Christian conception of immaterial Spirit, nor the common conception of the supernatural God-man of biblical revelation. Properly understood, the philosophy of Hegel furnishes no more basis for the doctrine of immaterial Spirit, apart from and above Nature, and infinitely severed from Nature, holding no continuity with matter, than did that of his illustrious predecessors above named. The immateriality (or rather the materiality) of Hegel's Spirit is the substantial, essential, and real Notion; the activity, the life, of the Notion is its Ideality; and the Notion, with its Ideality in the eternal Reality, is the absolute Soul of the universe. It is not an immaterial, unessential, empty Spirit, not a visionary phantasm, but a real Essence, an essential Potentiality, — a substantial Reality and a superessential Ideality in One.

§ 6. THE REALISTIC IDEALISM OF HEGEL.

The philosophy of Hegel must, on the whole, be classed under the head of Realistic Idealism, though not to be taken as the soundest possible exposition thereof. Such, at least, would seem to be its innermost theory and real meaning; but it is obscured in a spiritual halo that might almost rank it with mystical Idealism. In its theory of the universe, it is radically and profoundly different from the pure idealism of Fichte. It is more nearly akin to that of Leibnitz, Berkeley, Spinoza, Aristotle, or Plato. Like all these predecessors in the school, his thought seems to have been powerfully influenced by the prevailing theological conceptions of his time and country. It sometimes seems as if he had a main purpose of vindicating the biblical conceptions of Jehovah

and the supernatural God-man of the Christian religion ; and yet his whole system is grounded on the metaphysical Logic of reason and necessity, and pursues the methods of science and critical philosophy, independently of traditional authority. His theory, if not altogether fatal to those conceptions, certainly necessitates a considerable modification thereof. His style and manner of treatment give more apparent countenance to a mystically idealistic interpretation than his essential theory and real meaning, when properly understood, would seem to justify. Regarding his philosophy, with all its errors, obscurities, difficulties, and deficiencies, as on the whole the most elaborate and profound endeavor at a sound philosophical theory of the universe that has hitherto been given to the world, however much the statement of it may have been improved or perfected by his followers, it has been made the subject of especial consideration in this work. Some further summary of its general scheme and scope may be sufficient in this place to justify the designation of it as Realistic Idealism.

The Hegelian philosophy may be said to start from the platform of Psychology, and to ascend through all science, and by the pathway of the speculative Logic, up to the ontological height of the one and all of, real Essence and Power in the absolute constitution and form of the logical Notion, which, in its complete self-evolution, makes out the absolute Idea of God, Nature, and Man ; and from this height it may be said to descend in a continuous dialectic of Necessity and Freedom, through the entire evolution of the ever-identical whole, into finite things and special souls in Nature ; wherein free universal Spirit (so constituted as the essential content and form of the Notion) arrives, in the merely external aspect of its modality, at a condition of partial "sleep" (as it were) in the unconscious determinateness of the fixity and permanency of finite Nature. Nevertheless, it is not dead, but only asleep, in this external sphere of things ; for even here it inwardly awakens into movement, life, and freedom

* § 2. *Heal reasons from the Ego to Man, from Man to God from God to Nature. But he does not really reason from Ego to Man at all ; and the converse, except through Nature, reasoning from Man to God at all. This Holmes*

in the mineral, vegetable, and animal kingdoms, and therein returns towards its own inward and free self again, and, through and within the organic bodies of animals and men, reaches those special forms of the logical Notion which, in their partial and limited character, are called finite souls in them, even from the lowest manifestation of self-conscious action up to the highest exhibition of human intelligence; or (as it may be) even rising to higher and higher stages of freedom, intellectual capability, and moral sense; and, in this, ever approximating towards complete return (or rather expansion) into the identity and fulness of its own absolute Self, — not stopping or ceasing in Man only, but continuing onward to the superhuman elevation of the God-man of the Christian revelation. In this universal evolution, the internal dialectic of the logical process finally closes up, through all special and particular forms of things and souls, into the inner identity of the essential Notion, and in the external form of the absolute Idea of all Reality and all Ideality in the one whole, as the total System of the Universe. Universal Soul is thus neither material, nor immaterial, nor supernatural, but is essential and real as well as ideal, and is perpetually passing into Nature and returning out of Nature into itself again, in an eternal cycle. It is both Natural and Supernatural at once and in one. *

In the process of creating Nature, the absolute Soul dialectically posits or sets its own essence into special and particular forms, setting and cancelling its own negations of itself, and determines the fixed essences and forms of all material things in Nature; but, in the sphere of inanimate bodies and determinate mechanical forces, there is an endless chain of secondary causes and effects, merely natural operations, and unconscious processes, which become thereby estranged (as it were) from the free creative spirit, and fall beyond the immediate conscious action or direct influence of the purposive providence. But the creative spirit recovers itself from this state of fixity and estrangement, and in ani-

* This "cycle" of self-actualization is not a fiction. There is eternal evolution of the Many in the One (Nature) and eternal evolution of the One in the Many (Spirit). This is the truth.

mals and men arrives at the stage of partially free and independent Soul, though finite. Nature has a real existence, not as directly perceived by the senses, or as imaged in sense-perception, nor always exactly as apprehended by experimental science, but as it truly is in its own internal and actual constitution; nor is it either unchangeable or eternal as such, but is changeable, temporary, evanescent, or only more or less persistent. It is truly in a perpetual flux, however rapid, or however slow; but the flowing stream is actual. Nature is, indeed, both natural or essential and superessential, both real and ideal. Universal Spirit (in the essence and form of the Notion) is the absolute Causality, and there is, more especially, in the sphere of Nature, a certain Reciprocity of Action and Reaction, of Repulsion and Attraction. In the whole evolutionary proceeding there is a kind of centrifugal determination and expansion outwardly into special and particular things, and a centripetal reflection or return inwardly into itself again. The essential activity is both intensive and extensive, both positive and negative; and there is a continuous dialectic of Negativity in a continual round of positive determination in the negation of negations; but the eternal Reciprocity comes about in a perpetual cycle of infinite ideality. As a philosophy, pursuing a speculative or metaphysical method, it seeks to avail itself of the results of all science, and to furnish a theory of all science and all Nature. Real Spirit is, in essence and form, simply the logical Notion, and is, in its fullest evolution of itself into an actual world of Nature, the absolute Idea of all Reality. As such, it is necessary truth. It is self-conscious, self-moving Intelligence. It is thought thinking itself. It is the absolute All and One. "Thoroughly another," says Hegel, "is indeed for the spirit not forthcoming at all: it knows in itself all that there is in Heaven and Earth." It is the unity of real Being (or Essence), Nothing, and Becoming. In the movement of Becoming, the infinite ideality of the essential Notion evolves

itself into the actual world of things, and creates Nature, not exactly out of Nothing, but out of itself, placing something where nothing was before. Finite soul is an actualized exhibition of the universal under special limitations of essence and form, and is an image or copy, and a kind of exemplification, of the absolute logical Notion itself. It may grow or expand indefinitely: Hegel does not say, either that it must be ultimately lost in identity with the one whole, or that it will have an independent, self-subsistent immortality of its own. As to how or why absolute Spirit should start into the movement of Becoming, or how it could move itself, or how be in a state of eternal movement rather than at an eternal standstill, there is no particular attempt to explain. Nor is it expressly stated that self-movement, or eternal movement, is a last fact and a necessary truth; but it is tacitly assumed to be so.

In Hegel's manner of treatment, in his *Logic*, the negation of negation, or two negatives, appear to make an affirmative: one Nothing posited against another Nothing seems to produce a Something. Real Being (the Something) appears to be only an ideal boundary line, severing a split infinity of Nothingness into two halves or sides. Either half is then said to be a "one-sided" infinity. There can no more be an infinity of Nothing than an infinity of Something: the two must therefore coexist in unity as one Whole. The absolute one Whole is the only real Being, or it is the universal and eternal Essence in the mode and form of the logical Notion, and it is in an eternal state of Becoming something other than exactly what it was before, after the manner of Thought thinking or creating. It is the eternal truth and reality as such: its eternal movement is the infinite Ideality, moving on the ground of the essential identity of the one absolute Whole. As such it is both real and ideal: its other is only the Negative, the Void, the empty Possibility of the actual Reality. The Machine-Theory assumes an infinity of Something in the form of Atoms: this

theory assumes an infinity of Something in the form and mode of the real and ideal Notion. Neither defines very clearly what Infinity is, or how it should be conceived. Since the universe does in fact really exist, both are right in assuming the fact of its existence; the difference lies in the manner of conceiving it, and of stating a theory of it.

In this philosophy, God as the absolute Idea is not wholly outside of Nature, nor wholly in external Nature, though in continuity with it. God is all Nature as external and something more, namely, Nature as internal also: it is Soul creating Nature as the absolute Personality. The active power, the substance, the real essence (which is no other than the essential Notion itself), is presented to our contemplation as a complex subsumption of abstruse logical categories, necessities, necessary relations, or metaphysical essentiaities, into the unity of a one absolute Whole, which is eternally distinguished and distinguishable into parts, aspects, and relations within itself, and is capable of the distinction or "diremption" of itself into the two phases of Subjectivity and Objectivity, wherein lies the possibility of Knowing and Self-consciousness. The One appears to be self-moving or eternally in movement (it is not distinctly said which) as universal Soul. Either way, it is assumed to be an absolute and a necessary truth. It is Essentiality, Potentiality, Universality, Speciality, Particularity, and Totality in one individual Whole. If Hegel said of Schelling's "Absolute Intellectual Intuition" that it was "blindly shot out of a pistol," it may be said as well, perhaps, that Hegel's "Absolute Idea" is a pistol, which, without ever being fired at all, can somehow shoot itself eternally.

Doubtless, Kant did a great work towards laying the foundation of a sound transcendental æsthetic; but in erroneously assuming, not merely that our minds gave forms to external things in sense-perception (which, in a certain limited sense, was true enough), but also that things in Nature had no like forms of their own (when scientifically and

rightly known), coming from the Mind of Nature in which such things are constituted, and not at all from our minds merely in sense-perception (which was a groundless assumption and a mistake), and still further by failing to put life and action into his logical Syllogism and centre of synthetic Apperception and Judgment, he missed that "high road of thought," which, by the help of a sound metaphysical Logic, might have conducted him to an *à priori* demonstration of the existence of God as universal mind or Soul, and enabled him, ontologically and dialectically, to deduce Nature from Thought, and establish the continuity of mind and matter in an intelligible theory of the universe. Indeed, it is said that his latter days were actually employed on an undertaking of this nature.¹ This error of Kant was distinctly pointed out by Hegel,² and was more amply demonstrated by Victor Cousin;³ and the bridge which these two erected across that dark gulf, which Kant had neither bridged nor leaped, may be taken for the masterpiece of all philosophical speculation hitherto.

Fichte proceeded admirably well with the beginning of his philosophy of sensation and sense-perception, but when he approached the purely metaphysical side of his subject, he seems to have departed from the course of his own method, got off his own track, lost his way, and fell headlong into the abyss of subjective idealism, visionary shadows, and mystical dreams; and his whole system became mixed and beclouded with the old Scholastic supernaturalism. The errors of Kant and the deficiencies of Hegel (or some total misconceptions of him) seem to have led Schopenhauer off in the opposite direction, until he landed in the atheistic materialism of a blind, unconscious machine-philosophy. Schelling had made some notable attempt to bring these

¹ *Life of Immanuel Kant*, by Dr. J. H. W. Stuckenberg, D. D., London, 1882.

² *The Logic of Hegel*, by William Wallace, London, 1874, pp. 75, 76.

³ Cousin's *Hist. of Mod. Phil.*, by O. W. Wight, New York, 1854.

* No — but to find Thought in Nature.
 † What remains is to abolish the gulf — which is a huge mistake.

opposite tendencies into reconciliation and unity in his Identity-Philosophy, in which he endeavored to establish an intelligible continuity between the universal Soul and Nature, but at the same time to establish it in a vague, partial, and semi-theological way, in conformity with the biblical revelation wherewith all his philosophy was infected. Victor Cousin, recurring to the method of Descartes, and profoundly studying the philosophies of Plato, Aristotle, and the Neoplatonists, and more thoroughly versed in the methods and discoveries of physical science, marked out the outlines and first principles of a sounder and safer method of arriving at a satisfactory theory of the universe (God, Nature, and Man inclusive), and of finally bringing science and philosophy into harmony upon one and the same universal platform. Not that Cousin himself ever gave a complete and perfect exposition of this method, or carried it out into a complete statement of all philosophy, but that the earnest seeker after method may find the elements, principles, and fundamental ideas clearly stated in his writings, whereby he may be set upon the right path. And in like manner, if his search were sufficiently patient and thorough, having eyes of his own to see with, he might discover in the writings of Bacon many rough outlines, ground principles, and far-reaching suggestions, which, however crudely stated, or however enveloped in poetic phrase, might place him on the same high road, leading to the same end, the reconstruction of the Science of Sciences, or Philosophy itself.

§ 7. FUNDAMENTAL ELEMENTS OF THE ESSENTIAL NOTION.

Among the fundamental elements of the absolute Notion or Concept of the whole ideal Reality as it eternally is and must be in its own constitution, nature, and Self, these postulates would seem necessarily to be included : —

1. The eternal, absolute, and unalterable necessities that are the necessary ground of the whole existent Reality ; and among these, —

(a) The universal and necessary distinction between mere empty negative possibility and actual reality (though both are inseparably involved in the one Whole as the eternal and absolute truth in the full Concept of the All), as the only conceivable possibility of an infinitely movable boundary of limitation or modality of subsistence for the one whole Actuality as such ;

And (b) the necessary Universality in the unity of the one Whole and All, comprehending all possible distinctions of parts, aspects, phases, and relations, and of specials and particulars, within the ever-continuous but ever-changeable Identity of the Whole ;

And (c) the eternal necessity and absolute fact of movement or change of relation in the movable limitations as alterable necessities or laws, that is, change of the essential (though temporary and spacial) determinations of permanence and persistence of the specialities and particularities of essence and form, on the ground of the immovable necessities and unalterable relations of the eternally standing Whole, or upon the basis of the specially determined parts and unmoved necessities and relations within the same ;

And (d) the eternal necessity and absolute fact of Freedom (as mere possibility) of movement and change under the limitations of all the other unalterable necessities and essential relations (or also of the alterable necessities and changeable relations) of the one Whole as such ;

And (e) the eternal and necessary unity of the whole intricate complex of metaphysical essentiaes, unalterable necessities and necessary relations, alterable necessities and movable relations, movable categories and changeable relativities, intensive degrees and extensive measures, immovable or unmoved grounds and movable limitations, in the one Whole of internal Essence and Power and external mode or form, moving (in so far as movable) on the basis of the unalterable and immovable Whole, or of the alterable but unmoved parts within the Whole.

And (*f*) in short, a unical subsumption into a complete synthesis of all distinctions and differences into the one identical whole *Essentity*, which as eternally moving is the absolute and universal Causality, or the logical Notion of Content and Form in one, the absolute Concept of the whole existent Reality, or universal Essence and Power in one.

2. And consequently there must be (*a*) an eternal and necessary dialectic action of Causality upon the movable necessities, categories, and relations of the essential parts, and reaction upon the eternally immovable (or upon the temporarily unmoved) conditions and limitations as mediating instrumentalities (or means to ends) within the ever-continuing identity of the one absolute Whole; and (*b*) a necessary possibility of a perpetual arising and departing of the specialities, particularities, and special relations of essences and existences, substances and accidents, contents and forms, realities and appearances, through such mediation and instrumentation; and further, as a necessary consequence thereof, (*c*) an infinitely multiple complexity of external relations of such special and particular things to one another in all manner of external oppositions, contradictions, collisions, and externally dialectical compositions and dissolutions of the contingent shapes, characters, and properties thereof, in superaddition to that internal dialectic of their inner essential constitutions of quantity, quality, and measure (or modality) which may go to the extent of the utter annihilation of such special and particular things as such in the complete resolution of them into the whole essential identity whence they came as such particular things merely; and yet there must exist always a certain resultant accord, or "preëstablished harmony" (as it might very well be called), and a certain regulative control, throughout the entire internal and external process of the eternal Evolution, Reflection, and Resolution of such particulars into the Whole again.

3. The whole *Essentity* simply is (or expresses) the abso-

lute Quantity, Quality, and Measure (or Modality) of the one Whole as such: it is the whole intensive and extensive Magnitude of the positive Reality, considered apart from the other aspects and included internal distinctions and limitations; the terms *Magnitude*, *Intension*, *Extension*, *Quantity*, *Quality*, and *Modality*, expressing merely so many phases or aspects of the one whole Essentia, so absolutely, necessarily, and eternally constituted as it really and ever is, in its own essential nature and being as such, viz.: as the absolute logical Notion of all Reality.

4. Such a Whole is in itself a living Syllogism of Thought, in which the universal and necessary stands for the *first* Premiss; the special media, as predetermined instrumentalities, serve as the *second* Premiss; the living Ideality of the eternal movement, under all the necessary limitations, is the causal determining Judgment; and the final effect or result in the ultimate detail of contingent realities, however lasting or evanescent, is the Conclusion into that *first* Premiss which, from the beginning, was the ground of the whole process, and at last sums up and contains all and singular in itself.

5. The Whole Essentia, thus constituted as the logical Notion of all Reality, is in itself the absolute Intelligence or universal Reason; and pure universal Reason is nothing else but that.

6. Such eternal movement of Ideality in Reason, or in the logical form of the Notion, is Knowing, and Knowing is nothing else but that.

7. Consciousness is the mere fact of Knowing, and is nothing else but that, whether in the universal, or in any special knowing soul.

8. In this eternal movement of conscious Knowing in the necessary form of the logical Syllogism lies that synthetic Unity of Apperception and Judgment in the one whole Essentia, which necessarily makes it an absolutely knowing (or conscious) Intelligence, a real Ideality (or an ideal Reality) and a creative Power as such.

9. This eternal movement of Ideality in the universal and necessary Form of the logical Syllogism, being thus necessarily a conscious knowing Power or Potentiality, is Will ; and Will is nothing else but that. It is movement in Freedom and under all the necessities of the whole internal constitution and nature of the absolute Essentity or Notion ; and Will as such is only partially, not absolutely, free, and is only partially, not absolutely, a necessity. Absolutely free and omnipotent personal Will is an impossibility.

10. This whole Essentity or Notion, being thus a knowing potentiality of partially free self-determination as Will, is universal Personality : absolute Personality can be nothing else but that.

11. Such Personality may be regarded as a certain limited potentiality of free election or choice (so far as choice can have any meaning in a power that aims eternally at the greatest possible Good, or the True and the Beautiful, in all and singular alike), or as capable of some limited degree of freely purposive prevision and intention to a definite end and aim, and of some degree or measure of providential direction and control over the whole evolution and new creation, in whatever dialectic alterations, cancellations, and dissolutions of specials and particulars throughout the whole, even to the ultimate actualities of what shall be, within the limits of what possibly can be, and over and above the adamantine bounds of what necessarily must be.

12. The purposive intention, the providential aim, must necessarily go along with the creative action and knowing control, even unto the end, in the final determination and completion of the purpose, end, or actual thing, and of all ends and things in created Nature, in whatever infinitesimal detail, and however permanently persistent, or ephemerally evanescent, such created existences may be as such, in the perpetual flow of ever-changing realities ; for with the absolute Thought, the Word must be the Deed, and the Deed must be the Word for us.

13. Such a Power can scarcely be imagined to have anything less than the greatest possible Good in the Whole, or in the parts, for its object and aim; and any actual world must be the best possible under all the necessities and necessary limitations. It may be presumed to look to the True, the Good, and the Beautiful; but there can be neither absolute Good nor absolute Evil. There is always Good and Evil at once and in one: in the aspect of freely self-determining Will, there may be Providence; in the aspect of necessity, there must be Evil and inevitable fatality; and there may be a Providence which is also Fate for us.

N.B.

N.B. It is remains a
complex & abstractions — an idea,
not a Person. Cf. with it my
"Fundamental Philosophies,"
"Fundamental Analysis," and
"Universal Schema of Human
Philosophy."

CHAPTER VIII.

THE METAPHYSICAL BRIDGE.

§ 1. NO NEW THING — THE METAPHYSICAL FOUNDATION.

THE Metaphysical Bridge is really no new thing in the world. In the old Iranian Zend-Avesta, good souls, at the resurrection, stepped over the bridge *Chinvat* into Paradise, and the Rainbow, in the Norse Edda, bridged the chasm between Midgard, the abode of men, and Asgard, the home of the Gods.¹ The philosophical poet, Goethe, once wrote "A Tale," which the poetical philosopher, Carlyle, thought to be the "Tale of Tales."² He feigned a Time-River, flowing between the Natural and Supernatural worlds. There had been two bridges and one ferry over the eternal stream. The first bridge was the Giant's Shadow, over which poor souls walked into Elysium; and this the poetical philosopher took to mean ancient Superstition. Next came the Ferry, and the Ferryman lived in a hut on the natural side. His tolls were tithes: gold was too heavy for this new Charon's spiritual boat, and would sink it, with all its precious freight of souls to be saved, in the bottomless Time-River; and this our poetical philosopher took to be the Priest and his Church. Then came the Snake-Bridge: an immense snake, at noon, lifted his wavy folds into a steady arch over the fearful stream, and allowed all Heaven-aspiring souls to

¹ *Sanscrit and Kindred Literatures*, by Laura Elizabeth Poor, Boston, 1880, pp. 151 and 282.

² *Carlyle's Essays*, Boston, 1861, vol. iii. p. 435. See, also, *Sartor Resartus*, c. ix., London (Chapman), p. 164.

pass over, dimly lighted on their way by certain flaming "Will-o'-Wispes," carrying magic lanterns, whose capacity for gold was something enormous; and these our philosopher imagined to be the Sciences and Elegant Literature. This bridge he admitted to be the best, but only the "bad-best," that had been. But still another was to come. Under the powerful thaumaturgy of the poetical genius, the earth opened and a new and brilliant Temple arose, lighted by the Man with the Lamp. The Giant's Shadow disappeared. The Snake-Bridge crumbled into scattered jewels, which sunk into the Time-River. The Ferryman lost his vocation; and a new bridge, broad, stately, and perennial, appeared; and now all souls freely passed both ways, under the guidance of the Man with the Lamp. Indeed, it seemed to make the two worlds into one. Even the fair Lily, who had dwelt upon the supernatural side, and could never before cross over, and her lover Prince, who dwelt on the natural side, hitherto fatally separated by the impassable flood, crossing either way at will, could now meet in happiness in the newly risen universal Temple. This potent Man with the Lamp, as our philosopher conjectured, might signify the "Celestial Reason:" the other personages he scarcely ventured to name at all. We may be thankful to him for even a hint as to the meaning of any of these strange characters, for that was more than the poet himself would condescend to do for us. He leaves us to solve his riddle in our own way. We may more than half suspect that, in his own mind, both bridges and ferry were shadowy illusions. They seem to vanish into a dream of the imagination, when the new Temple appears. The thing more especially to be noted here is, that the purpose of bridge or ferry was, to enable good souls to pass over into — or, as it may be, to discover that they were already in — a celestial Temple and an immortal world. The Metaphysical Bridge does not aspire to such lofty poetical flights: it seeks rather to reach the eternal foundations of the Temple itself, and to enable

thoughtful minds not merely to pass over the natural Time-River, but to ascend directly to the supernatural source whence it perpetually flows; for when the Natural and the Supernatural are once seen to be but two aspects of one and the same Reality, then the fountain-head from which all movement flows may become intelligible and knowable.

More nearly approaching to a rational demonstration of this truth was the metaphysical bridge which Victor Cousin built upon the absolute categories and necessary laws of thought. By showing that these categories and laws were necessarily true, not only for us and in a sound psychology of the human mind, but were absolutely and universally true and necessary for all possible mind, and even for Nature itself, he projected them (as it were) across that imaginary gulf (which in all science and philosophy hitherto had seemed to be forever impassable) between a science of Nature and an absolute ontology of the universe (God, Nature, and Man inclusive). The abutments of this bridge are to be considered as resting on absolute and eternal necessities. Cousin called it "the passage from psychology to ontology by means of the absolute principles of reason."¹ And again, it was further said, and I think truly said, if there is to be any ground at all for a philosophical theory of the universe, that "It is necessary to conceive that in the contingent and determinate fact, I wish to move my arm and I move it, is a relation of the movement as effect to the will as cause, which relation, disengaged from its two terms, is seized by reason as a universal and necessary truth. Hence the principle of causality, by the aid of which we can reach external causes, because the principle surpasses the reach of our consciousness, and because with it we may judge universally and necessarily that every phenomenon, whatever it may be, has a cause."²

This doctrine, so fundamentally important in all philoso-

¹ Cousin et son Œuvre, par Paul Janet, Paris, 1885, p. 169.

² Hist. of Modern Phil., trans by O. W. Wight, ii. 268.

* By "imaginary," intent need of any

phy, may bear repetition more at length in his own words: "All the systematic pretensions of sensualism are broken against the manifest reality of universal and necessary truths which are unmistakably in our mind. At each instant, whether we know it or not, we bear universal and necessary judgments. In the simplest proposition is enveloped the principle of substance and being. We cannot take a step in life without concluding from an event in the existence of its cause. These principles are absolutely true; they are true everywhere and always. . . . Natural history does not study such or such an individual, but the generic type that every individual bears in itself, that alone remains unchangeable when the individuals pass away and vanish. . . . Necessary and immutable principles found a science necessary and immutable as themselves; the truth which they give us is neither mine nor yours, neither the truth of to-day nor that of to-morrow, but truth in itself. . . . Universal and necessary truths are not general ideas which our mind draws by way of reasoning from particular things; for particular things are relative and contingent, and cannot contain the universal and necessary. . . . Truth, beauty, and goodness are attributes and not entities. . . . It is by the participation of the divine reason that our reason possesses something absolute. Every judgment of reason envelops a necessary truth, and every necessary truth supposes necessary being. . . . These two principles — that every effect supposes a cause, and every quality a subject — are universal and necessary principles. . . . Moreover, to what are those necessary principles applied? To metaphysical and moral truths, which are also necessary. It was therefore necessary to conclude in the existence of a cause and a necessary being; or, indeed, it was necessary to deny either the necessity of the principle of cause and the principle of substance, or the necessity of the truths to which we applied them, that is to say, to renounce all notions of common sense: for these very principles and these truths, with their

character of universality and necessity, compose common sense."¹ On the nature of these internal and necessary truths, the doctrine of Leibnitz is scarcely less notable, that "whatever number of particular experiences you could have of a universal truth, you could not assure yourself of it forever by induction without knowing its necessity by reason."²

Cousin clearly exposed the errors of his predecessor, Maine de Biran, and of Hume, in supposing that our knowledge of the principles of causality, of substance, of sufficient reason, of contradiction, and of the limitations of time and space, were derived from our ideas of external things by induction merely, after the manner of the practical Understanding, — a process that, strictly, can never reach beyond the particular facts observed, or beyond some partial generalizations from particular instances by the aid of comparison and abstraction, but must still leave the gulf between Nature and the absolute Cause unbridged. He demonstrates

¹ *Lectures on the True, the Beautiful, and the Good*, by V. Cousin, trans. by O. W. Wight, New York, 1857, pp. 350-362.

See further on this topic M. Paul Janet's able exposition of Cousin's relation to Kant, Schelling, and Hegel (1817-1820), and of his doctrine of the absolute, of necessity, of universality or independence ("l'indépendance de la vérité en soi"), and of the pure apperception of truth ("l'apperception spontanée de vérité") in his *Victor Cousin et son Œuvre*, Paris, 1885, pp. 70-81.

"The reduction of all the absolute truths," continues M. Janet, "to the principle of substance and to the principle of causality, the reduction of the idea of substance to the idea of the absolute, and of the idea of cause to the idea of phenomenon and the relative, was marked with a Spinozistic and pantheistic character already pronounced; and this is why it disappeared later in the revision (*le remaniement*) of 1845. It ought to be restored historically; and whatever judgment may be formed of it, it informs us at once what a flight the thought of Cousin had taken at this epoch, how he had raised himself above the philosophy of the Scotch and of Lamoricière, of whom, one or two years before, he had declared himself the disciple." — *Ibid.* p. 81.

² *Critique of Locke*, trans. by Alfred J. Langley (*Jour. Spec. Phil.*, New York, vol. xix. p. 295).

that these universal principles and necessary truths are both internal and external to our minds; that they necessarily underlie all our ideas and all possible experience; and that we in fact gain our knowledge of them, not by induction and inference only, nor by any use of the practical reason, nor by any external argumentation whatever, but by immediate intellectual insight into their own inherent character of necessity, universality, and eternal truth. At first, our knowledge of them may indeed be said to be spontaneously intuitive only, but, by the help of a sound psychological analysis, mature reflection, and a universal science of logic, this vague intuition is raised into transparent clearness and logical certainty: "truth is in me and not by me."¹

It might be too much to say that the superstructure was completed by Cousin, or that he made the passage over this bridge entirely clear and safe; but his thorough discussion of principles and categories, together with his masterly elimination of the errors of Locke and Kant,² may certainly be said to have contributed much towards making the thing conceivable in a logical and intelligible manner. But the more searching dialectic of Hegel, his more thoroughly log-

¹ Cousin's *True, Beautiful, and Good*, trans. by O. W. Wight, New York, 1857, Lect. i., ii., and iii.

² Kant recognized the same truth in his own narrowly restricted way, as confined to what he called an "intuition" of sense or an "intuition" of pure reason of a certain mathematical character; or as when the mathematician distinctly defines his own synthetical proposition or "constructive conception" as an axiom, or an assumed major premiss, in such manner as necessarily to include all the minor premises which he proposes to bring under and within it, and so makes it a certain ground of his necessary conclusion. "In the judgments of pure reason," he says, "opinion has no place. For as they do not rest on empirical grounds, and as the sphere of pure reason is that of necessary truth and *à priori* cognition, the principle of connection in it requires universality and necessity, and consequently perfect certainty: otherwise we should have no guide to the truth at all. Hence it is absurd to have an opinion in pure mathematics; we must know, or abstain from forming a judgment altogether."—*Critique of Pure Reason*, by Meiklejohn, p. 498.

ical summation of these same categories into the synthetic Unity of Apperception and Judgment in the human mind, putting movement, essence, and life into the syllogism of the formal logic, may be said to have planted one abutment upon the hither shore of the Time-River as upon an impregnable and everlasting foundation. And his clear demonstration of both the necessity and the universality of these ground principles of thought in us, and the inexorable logic by which he carries them to the ontological height of the absolute, essential, and universal Notion of all Reality in a logical theory of the Universe, though not set forth by him under the figure of a Bridge or a Tale, may be said to have planted the other abutment upon an adamantine basis of necessity and eternity, to have thrown the superstructure over the apparent gulf, and to have established and illustrated the actuality of the Bridge, — not merely the conceivable possibility of it to the poetical imagination, but the necessary truth of it to the knowing intellect.

The sensational and positive philosophies begin and end in ignoring or denying the reality of any such bridge. For them, no *à priori* passage over from the human mind, as ground and basis, to a knowledge of the existence of universal mind, is possible. They refuse to look inward upon the internal Reason, and insist upon looking outward, exclusively, upon external Nature. They go upon the assumed theory that all our knowledge is derived from the senses and experience, or that it has no other ground. Locke did not attempt to proceed further. Kant laboriously endeavored to penetrate to the foundations of our internal knowledge, and made some progress in constructing a science of pure Reason in us. He expounded the categories of the finite mind in a profound and admirable manner, though but partially only, and he missed the key-stone of the arch which should bridge for him the gulf between the Natural and the Supernatural. He could find no *à priori* road to a knowledge of the existence of God, or to an ontological

science of the universe. Under the categories of Reason, our minds gave forms to the material presented in sensation in the process of forming our own images or representations of external objects; but these same categories could furnish us no means of arriving at a knowledge that objects in Nature must necessarily have in themselves some like forms in reality, which proceeded from an ontological source and a universal cause in the creation or evolution of them into existence as they are in themselves. The first proposition was doubtless true enough: the latter was not so clear. Kant certainly failed to discover the logical method by which the affirmative truth of the proposition could be demonstrated.¹ Consequently there was no way left for him but to turn to the sensational side, and invoke the methods of experience and scientific research for a knowledge of Nature, and, by an external use of the practical Reason, to natural theology and the received biblical revelations for a knowledge of the existence of God, or of a supernatural side of Nature: wherefore all possible knowledge of the existence of God, or of a theory of the universe, must necessarily be mere matter of inference from evidence externally presented to our reasoning faculties, or to our unreasoning faith. Thus he stood, at last, exactly where Locke and the Scotch philosophers had stood before him. The result was, that a philosophical theory of the universe, grounded upon the logic of Reason, or upon the eternal necessities, was an impossibility for the human mind. And, of course, all the materialistic, sensational, and positive philosophies readily accepted a conclusion (as the orthodox theologies for the

*Kant's
failure.*

¹ "Objectivity of thought, in Kant's sense" (says Hegel), "is again to a certain extent subjective. Thoughts, according to Kant, although universal and necessary categories, are only *our* thoughts, separated by an impassable gulf from the thing as it exists apart from our knowledge. But a truly objective thought, far from being merely ours, must at the same time be what we have to discover in things, and in every object of perception." — *The Logic of Hegel*, by Wm. Wallace, M. A., Oxford, 1874, p. 72.

* An "objective thought" must be an eternal
necessity relational conclusion in a system of
relations created by infinite process.

most part likewise did) which they had themselves always assumed from the outset to be the real truth. Henceforth all metaphysics that attempted to go further were to be regarded by the one as speculative dreaming or emotional moonshine, and by the other as impious infidelity, or as atheistic Pantheism. It is hardly necessary to say, that the German successors of Kant made a valiant (if not a victorious) struggle against this summary destruction of philosophy itself. Most powerful of all, notwithstanding all defects, Hegel produced his Science of Logic in refutation of this latent fallacy of an Excluded Middle, and in solemn protest that philosophy still lived, even if its circuit were not completed in himself.

Schopenhauer fell back upon the scientific and positive grounds, and betook himself to the external methods. Through them we might learn that there was in Nature a universal force which he was pleased to call unconscious Will (*Wille*), or otherwise blind force (*blinder Drang*), operating mechanically in the production of us and the world in which we live and suffer. Our knowledge could not go beyond the representations of sense-perception and imagination (*Vorstellungen*).¹ This knowledge, formed in our own minds on the uncertain impressions of sense, was for the most part illusory and vexatious. The actual universe was a perpetual-motion machine, the best, and also the worst, that possibly could be. There was no providential order, direction, or government in it. Biblical Christianity was about the worst part of it. The philosophy of Spinoza was not much better, and that of Hegel was still worse, — not alone on account of his own failure to appreciate the depth and strength of the Science of Logic, or to discover any bridge, or better way, into the sphere of ontology, but more especially (as it would seem) because he conceived

¹ *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*, von Arthur Schopenhauer, 2 vols., Leipzig, 1859; *Atheism in Philosophy, and other Essays*, by Frederic Henry Hedge, Boston, 1884, pp. 70-81.

that the Hegelian system came in aid of Church and State and the biblical theologies. It being thus settled for him that the human mind could never, by any logic of Reason, or by any *à priori* method, attain to an ontological science or theory of the universe, all endeavor to reach an inside view of Nature necessarily became for him a futile undertaking. Having also determined (perhaps rightly enough) that any notion of an immaterial Spirit, wholly apart and distinct from the material world, was an illusory vision of the emotional fancy, nothing remained, that could be the subject of philosophical inquiry, but an external science of Nature, some practical wisdom in the conduct of life and affairs, and some patient resignation under afflictions in an incomprehensible theatre of blind force, whereof men and animals, in common with inanimate things, were but a product of necessity and chance, a part of the general mechanism, a sport of Nature, at once and alike the accidents of fortune and the victims of fatality. For him, too, philosophy had become impossible.

The philosophy of Schopenhauer seems to have been a revolt from Fichte and Hegel and a return to Kant, bearing some analogy to that of Hume from Berkeley to Locke. He endeavored to carry out the Kantian philosophy to its legitimate result in a mechanical theory of the world of Nature, altogether rejecting its theology, which grounded a belief in the existence of God on mere inferences of the practical reason in support of Revelation; and he ended in the opposite extreme of sheer atheism. Fichte's Science of Knowing was scarcely more than a psychology of the human mind: it did not purport to be a science of universal Being and Knowing. He starts from the fact of Consciousness in us. This was nearly the same thing as Descartes' *Cogito ergo sum*; and that was essentially the doctrine of Parmenides, that Being and Knowing are one and the same; but Fichte confined it to our limited human being and knowing only. With him, the I in us was an activity that found

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(posited) within itself the distinction of the self or *me* and the *not-me* as its own object: it was at once and in one subject-object. As subject, it also came in collision with an external Nature through sensation, feeling, and perception: this outer opposition the I recognized as also a *not-me*, and in like manner objectified it to itself in the form of ideal images or representations (*Vorstellungen*), formed by the conscious I itself as its ideas thereof. The knowledge thus gained of the external world of things was only just what the image-forming imagination of the I itself made of them. Of the external things (or of the whole external somewhat) as they really were in themselves, the I neither thus gained, nor could in any manner acquire, a true knowledge. This faculty of perception was supposed by its own operation to sever and break up the whole given presentation into objects or things for itself, which, however, had no reality as such, but were only these same ideal representations thereof. Such ideas were merely illusory: they gave us no certain knowledge of any external reality, or of nothing more than the mere being of something external. The true vocation of man was to free himself, as far as possible, from this illusory world of sense-perception, and to rise into the higher sphere of reflection and intelligence, and above this to a full recognition of the absolute character of its own conscious knowing activity as Will, which could thus become capable of the *should* (*sollen*) or duty, and learn to live a blessed life after the image of God. This conscious Will, the I, was the image of God, or should strive to become such. Its life was to continue indefinitely, or even to immortality. God was defined as "pure Being," "pure Activity," and perhaps also in some vague way as pure Spirit; but as to the actual or logical constitution and nature of it, or as to the manner, necessity, law, or fact of the proceeding of such Being, Activity, or Spirit, into an actual world of Nature, or in what manner the I as a finite soul was created or constituted by it to be such a special activity, there was no definite

statement, or none that is intelligible, or only in a general and vague way. "Being" was to be taken as the ground of the activity of the I. His philosophy ended in theological speculation and ideal dreaming. In somewhat like manner as with Schopenhauer, but with just the contrary result, all possible knowledge for us was to be made up of our own ideal representations and a blind faith in some vague notion of pure Being, pure Activity, or pure Spirit, external to ourselves indeed, but knowable to us through sense-perception only as some unconscious force or *blinder Drang* in the outer world of things, whereof we could have only some illusory images or dreams of our own fancy; and at the same time, internally knowable by us, not in any scientific method or manner, nor in any metaphysical theory of the universe, but only as a pious dream of our own exalted imagination, with the help of some sort of supernatural revelation, whereof no philosophy was possible.

§ 2. FIRST ABUTMENT — THE FACT OF BEING AND
KNOWING.

Such contradictions and failures result in great part from taking things too absolutely, and but superficially, not critically distinguishing the true from the false. The truth is, that our representations on sense-perception are neither wholly true nor wholly false. If we had no other ground of judgment, our world would indeed be illusory enough. Our imaginary conceptions of external things in Nature are usually both partly true and partly false in an external reference, while, internally and considered in themselves only, they are necessarily true by the very laws of thought, as Spinoza said. Philosophical systems, biblical Christianity, the ordinary conceptions of God, great poems, and many other things, may be neither wholly true nor wholly false as representations of things and realities external to ourselves. The business of philosophy is, to distinguish the truth from the falsehood, and to accept the one and reject

the other; and the end of its critical search is not yet. It needs but a glance over the field of human progress to make manifest the vast amount of illusions of the senses which scientific research has already dispelled, while bringing forth the real truth that was involved therein. Indeed, it seems to be the special work of science to correct the illusions of sense as well as the visions of the imagination. In the field of physical Nature, Science is every day correcting its own mistakes and misconceptions. It is approaching ever nearer to an exact knowledge of the real forms and pressures which natural objects, from æther or atoms to molecules, and from molecules to solar systems, possess from the original source of their existence as such. On the other hand, the progress of metaphysical study, in dispelling the illusions of both sense and imagination in the advance of the higher Reason towards a knowledge of the universal and the natural, is not less notable in our time. If the Metaphysical Bridge should fail to lead to such knowledge thereof as many devotees of Supernaturalism might desire, or expect, the fault may lie, not so much in the metaphysics as in the Supernaturalism; and if Science (as seems probable) should fail to reach such a knowledge of matter and force, mechanism and perpetual motion, as many theistic and atheistic theories of the universe would think desirable, that may be the fault, not of Science, but of the theories, or indeed the fault of both.

There is no question here of the wisdom of this external investigation of nature, nor of the practical use of all our human faculties for the amelioration of human life and affairs in this actual world; nor of the sciences and arts and their practical methods and provisional hypotheses, or their fruitful achievements; nor of historical and critical research, utilitarian moralities, sociologies, political economics, educational or religious institutions, or civil politics; nor of the knowledge to be derived through the senses, or instruments in aid of the senses; nor of the various cultures

of mankind; but the question still is, and will be, of a true theory of the universe and all it contains, and of the right method of proceeding in our efforts to attain to a knowledge of it. // 4/1

In keeping with the Kantian philosophy, the later tendencies of the biological and physiological sciences have been to place mind itself upon a purely material and physical basis. Soul itself is to be reduced from a *noumenon* to a *phenomenon*. Metaphysical conceptions and supernatural sources are by them, for the most part, systematically ignored or summarily rejected. In treating of the subject, their physical conceptions and terms are soon exhausted; and in order to express themselves at all, they are driven to the use of metaphysical language, which they must necessarily employ in a vague and obscure manner, superficially, and sometimes with an extraordinary confusion of ideas and words, in the vain effort to express metaphysical truths in terms of natural physics. In such feeble endeavor to grasp and handle a subject which can neither be comprehended nor expressed in that manner, the interior source and nature of life and thought inevitably escape their search, and are ever flying before them, unattained and unattainable. At the end of a laborious survey of the results of science in this direction, not only Auguste Comte, but also Spencer, is obliged at last to confess as much. The elaborate efforts of George Henry Lewes to explain mind by brain are for himself at last a manifest failure: he is driven to "a change of front," and finally recognizes the fact that there is a realm of true metaphysics which physical science cannot evade. The psychology of Maudsley is scarcely less stupid than the logic of Mill. With strongly positive tendencies, Dr. Bastian nevertheless treats of the Brain as the organ of the mind rather than as the mind itself, and he approaches nearer to the real questions than some others do.¹ Dr. J.

¹ *The Brain as the Organ of Mind*, by H. Charlton Bastian, M. A., M. D., F. R. S., N. York, 1880. E.g. 1/1-16. S p. ...

Luy¹ surpasses all the rest, perhaps, in tracing the nerve-cell tissues and fibres of the brain, but when he comes to discourse of the physiological psychology of this wonderful structure, and attempts to expound a brain-theory of "intellectualizing" ganglions, an "organic personality," and a "phosphorescent" consciousness, an "automatic *in concreto* moral sense," a "residual" memory, and a "macerating judgment," the only rational notion to be gained from the whole exposition is, that his own brain has become terribly muddled. However instructive or useful these sciences, or these summaries of scientific results, may be in other respects, it is evident that, as bearing upon the main question of a philosophical theory of either mind or matter, they must be set down as quite inadequate and inconclusive; and in so far as attempting to reduce the mind or soul to purely physical categories of brain-structure, they may be said to be utterly futile.

In truth, there is much ambiguity in these words *matter*, *mind*, *physical*, and *metaphysical*. Different persons use them in different senses; or rather, there is ambiguity, vagueness, and want of critical precision in the thought of the persons who employ them. *Matter*, in common acceptation, is taken to mean something solid, or liquid, or gaseous, or at least something perceptible to sense, though invisible to the eye. It is vaguely assumed to be something material, substantial, or real and indestructible, a persistent substrate of bodies and forms, the stuff whereof the material world is made, or (as Kant expressed it) *the thing in itself*; but exactly what it is, or what it is conceived to be, or how it can be such, there is no precise thought at all, or it is evaded as something unknowable. Yet everybody supposes he knows well enough what it is, and assumes that everybody else knows as well as he does himself that matter is matter. And so of mind, the common acceptation is equally vague, uncritical, and ambiguous. It is surprising how many philo-

¹ *The Brain and its Functions*, by J. Luy, N. York, 1882.

sophical writers treat of Mind or Soul without so much as distinguishing whether they speak of the human or the divine mind, even when not intending to ignore the existence of a universal Soul altogether. Some treat of Human Understanding, some of Mental Powers or Faculties, some of Sensation, Perception, Imagination, Reflection, Reasoning, Association of Ideas, Fancy, Memory, and Judgment; and some of Ideation, Unconscious Cerebration, Residual Impressions, Relational Perceptions, Brain-states, and other like phrases of the Physiological Psychology. There is seldom any particular consideration of what Mind is, universal or finite; and *Soul* is ignored, derided, or confounded with animal life, or is treated as a spiritual phantasm having no real existence out of the land of dreams. It is generally assumed that only human beings have mind or soul at all; though Naturalists will sometimes invent curious experiments to determine whether ants, beavers, or perhaps rotifers, do not possess some means of communicating knowledge to one another. In general, every one supposes that everybody else knows perfectly well what mind is: there has been no critical thought about it. Each one understands the word according to his own notions of its meaning, and, in most instances, it would probably be difficult for himself to tell what those notions are. The case is just as bad with the terms *physical* and *metaphysical*. Usually *physical* is supposed to mean something relating to matter, or to the laws and properties of matter; but the sense of the word is as vague as the conception of the thing. But physical facts, forces, laws, necessities, or properties are tacitly assumed to be real truths and the only certain truths. There is some vague notion that they are material realities, or substantial actualities. Laws, necessities, and forces are often confounded as if they were alike active, or were indeed the same. There has really been no thought, no critical discrimination, of the differences and the identities. Matter, laws, necessities, forces, conditions, facts, truths, actualities,

contingencies, accidents, quantities, qualities, degrees, properties, affinities, atomicities, combinations, dissolutions, attractions, repulsions, adhesions, revolutions, vibrations, oscillations, evolutions, potentials, kinetic energies, inertia, statics, equilibrium, and indeed the whole sensible phenomena of Nature, are assumed and supposed to be acting, operating, and suffering in a blind mechanical, that is, physical way, as in a perpetual-motion treadmill. Whatever is perceptible to sense is *physical*; whatever is not physical has no reality, no truth, and all consideration of such subjects is speculation, is mere guessing, is ideal dreaming, — is *metaphysical*. In this crude and superficial manner of thinking and using words, it is no wonder that metaphysics should be deemed synonymous with a science of nonentities, or nonsense.

But the truly scientific thinker knows that, even in the Sciences, the real meanings of mind and matter, of physical and metaphysical, are, as knowledge advances, and in a truer conception of either, constantly approaching nearer and nearer to identity with each other. In its search into matter, physical science has already got quite beyond the reach of the senses, and is penetrating into the *beyond-physics*, into metaphysics; and in its search into mind, it has exhausted its physical vocabulary, its physiological psychologies, its nervous structures, its convolutions and interconnected brain-tissues, and begins to discover that mind, soul, life, thought, lies deeper, is something beyond all that, — is in fact *metaphysical*.¹ In reality, matter may be said to

¹ According to Zeller, the title of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* (Τὰ Μετὰ τὰ Φυσικά) is due merely to the position that was given to this topic, in the Collection of Andronicus, as coming after the "Physics" (Τὰ Φυσικά); but whether or not Aristotle himself gave it this title, Andronicus (or whatever other disciple) had much reason for placing it there, as being a subject that in its own nature necessarily comes *after*, as it actually lies *beyond*, and really contains, all physics whatever. *Outlines of the Hist. of Greek Phil.*, by Dr. Edward Zeller, trans. by Sarah F. Alleyne and Evelyn Abbott, New York, 1886, p. 174.

be both physical and metaphysical; and so is mind also. At bottom they are one. Mind is no more material or immaterial than is matter. Both are substantial realities and actual truths. But as distinction must be made of Essence or universal Substance and the essences or particular substances of bodies, so must distinction be made of universal mind and finite and particular minds.

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cf. 498

The finite soul has been conceived to be a distinct entity, severable as such from the body. It has been said that Descartes imagined it had its seat in the pineal gland. The anatomists, of course, have never found it there. The widely extended notion of the popular theologies has been that the soul was a spiritual entity, distinct from the body, and separable from it, at death, so as to float away in some spiritual form, or as newly clothed with a spiritual body, into some purely spiritual world beyond the really existent universe; and that while it dwelt in the body it was connected with the organization, but was in no causal continuity with it, nor so dependent upon it as to perish with it. Materialistic science, ever rushing to the opposite extreme, has denied the existence of any such separable entity, and has sought to identify mind and soul with the organization itself, or with its physiological action, in some such way as light is a consequence of a current of electricity passing between two carbon-points, and setting the æther and then the retinal rods of the eye and then the nerve-cells of the brain in vibration or tremor; and so tremor, or seeing, is conceived to be in causal continuity with the bodily organization as its immediate effect, and as having its entire source and origin in the body itself: consequently there is no need of any soul at all other than that. This theory goes upon that same fallacy of the Excluded Middle which underlies the method of the whole materialistic philosophy: it propounds the false issue, *Either soul is material* (and in this way a product of matter), *or it is immaterial* (i. e. a sheer nonentity and a spiritual dream). This method takes a

* This is a destruction of the dualism
and the materialism. It is the only
way to the truth. It is the only
way to the truth. It is the only
way to the truth.

very superficial view of both body and soul, assuming (unconsciously perhaps) that the body (as well as the soul) has an existence by itself, wholly severed from the rest of Nature: whereas by its own science, the whole organization of the body, even to its innermost molecules and the most inward stream of living essence that is continually flowing into and through both body and molecules, stands in direct causal continuity with one and the same primal source and cause whence the stream of essence and life flows into both body and soul as alike effects and products of it, as also into the whole organization and life of Nature; for all Nature has to be regarded as an effect, an external manifestation of an internal essence and power which lies deeper within it, comes before it, and presides over it. The stream of causal essence into both body and soul may be considered as evolving the molecules whereof the organization is composed, and as at the same time dwelling within the organization when once built up, and in that free state in which it may receive a specialized form, and become a living soul within the body. Such stream of essence and life into a temporarily fixed or determined organization, whether of body on the one hand, or of soul on the other, or of both body and soul compounded in one, or in whatever manner constituted, must necessarily take place under those same metaphysical categories of necessity, necessary relation, and causal activity which are constitutive of universal intelligence, and are the fundamental principles and grounds or laws of all bodies and souls alike; and it is at least conceivably possible that a certain speciality of the causal essence may be so constituted therein as to become (by itself considered) a special knowing, conscious, and intelligent soul. Such soul must be in causal continuity, not with the body as such or as flowing from its organic action, or as an effect and mere result of the organic action, but with the primal source and cause whence both flow.

Organs, brain-convolutions, nerves, tissues, are no doubt

important parts of the creature, and are necessary instruments of the soul within; and the life of these parts, like that of the inward soul itself, must consist in a certain continuous flow of action and determination in their inner and essential constitution. The intelligence as such must consist in that certain limited and special participation which the finite soul has in the universal intelligence in common with the organization of the body, and in so far as that does also necessarily participate in the same. Its knowing must partly depend on the fact that its own continuing essence and life is an essential activity in and under the Reason; and its consciousness can be nothing other than the mere fact of its knowing. If the stream of essence and life were to cease flowing and being determined into the bodily organization, the body would vanish altogether as such: if it ceased to continue in the special determination and logical constitution of the soul, that must also vanish as such into utter oblivion. But there is, perhaps, no absolute necessity that this metaphysical stream should ever cease to flow for either; but, as to the body, the observed fact is, that the flow of organization does so far cease in it at death that it loses its organic life as a living whole, and its parts are resolved into their original elements. These parts merely change their forms and combinations, falling to a lower stage of organic and physical constitution: they are dissolved into carbon, oxygen, hydrogen, etc., into molecules, or (as it may be) into atoms. What should hinder them from falling back into æther, or even into the one whole ocean of essence and life whence they came? And what should hinder the soul itself also from falling back into that same eternal fountain of all essences, bodies, and souls? Or, again, what should hinder either from taking another direction of flow and determination into some other finite form and mode of existence at the will of the Creator?

But the point to be emphasized here is, that finite mind, or the special soul, is by no means, either physically or

physiologically, a result or effect of the organization, any more than is essence or life itself; though the bodily organization may be a necessary condition and instrument for the manifestation of soul in this finite form. And it is for this reason that both physiological and metaphysical science must go beyond the material organization, and penetrate deeper into the internal source and cause as well as into the external manner of constitution of both body and soul.

At this stage of the investigation, strictly physical science comes to an end, and metaphysical psychology properly begins. It must start with the fundamental fact and first certainty, *I think and I am*. This is the real meaning and true purport of the Cartesian *Cogito ergo sum*. It is simply the indubitable fact and absolute certitude of Being and Knowing. It is what Parmenides meant when he said that *to know and to be is one and the same thing*.¹ Lord Verulam, no less than Aristotle, recognized the truth of it. Hegel and Cousin merely repeat it as a settled axiom of thought. It is, and always was, the first fact, the first truth, that the philosopher immediately, directly, and intellectually sees that he certainly knows, if he knows anything. To deny that, is to put an end to all possible philosophy. This is the first abutment of our Metaphysical Bridge.

In any treatment of soul and body, ambiguity of thought and of words is sure to come in to embarrass the undertaking; for we have to settle and define the meaning of the terms *mind, soul, reason, intelligence, perception, conception, memory, consciousness, self*. This, again, involves the whole Science of Logic and a true metaphysic of the universe. *Soul* has generally been employed in philosophy, as in common parlance, to express more especially that phase of the concrete whole which regards the living activity or life of the thinking subject. *Mind, Reason, and Intelligence* are commonly employed, in like manner, to

¹ Τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ νοεῖν ἐστίν τε καὶ εἶναι. — Parmenides.

express that aspect of the concrete whole which more especially regards the necessary principles or laws of thought. *Spirit* (in our language, at least) has been more generally used to signify that mystically spiritual conception of soul which contemplates it as something immaterial, wholly above Nature, and in no directly causal continuity with material things, though capable of exercising a controlling power over them ; but in philosophy the terms *Mind*, *Soul*, *Spirit*, *Self*, have been most usually employed, either tacitly or expressly, in the sense of the concrete whole of the thinking subject ; and in this sense they are nearly synonymous in our language. "The Thinking Power," says Bacon, "holds the first place." *Mind and Soul*, perhaps, more irresistibly enforce upon the thought the concrete conception of the one thinking Subject or Self, as when the poet said : —

"For Nature, crescent, does not grow alone
In thews and bulk ; but, as this temple waxes,
The inward service of the mind and soul
Grows wide withal."

Here, it is the finite mind or soul that is the subject of treatment. But the inward service of soul may grow so wide in thought as to become expanded or enlarged into identity with the universal Soul itself, without entirely losing its own inner and essential nature. It is for this reason that many statements may be made with entire truth as stated, and as equally applicable to finite as to universal Soul ; but wherever statements are to be made which are not thus universally applicable, but concern those limitations and differences whereby the finite is distinguishable from the universal, then it becomes important that the distinction should be clearly made and observed. The proper distinctions will be noticed in another place.

§ 3. THE SECOND ABUTMENT — ADAMANTINE NECESSITY.

Having thus placed the first ABUTMENT, the next question is, Where and how the other is to be planted ? On the

Y.B.
 other side of the imaginary gulf, of course ; not exactly upon any opposite shore, however, but in reality at the very head of the Time-River itself. Any literal bridge from shore to shore must needs be illusory, however it may do for poetical metaphor. Really, it is better to go around by land : it is in truth not an opposite shore at all that we are in search of, but the fountain-head from which the stream flows. If Natural Science were to undertake the search, its method might be to send an exploring expedition up the River to its source ; and it is probable that report would come back that it issued from a Lake. It is plain that our metaphysical method (and metaphysics is said to have dominion of the air) must take an ethereal, supernatural flight, "cutting the liquid air of Philosophy and Sciences," or almost like Venus's

"Deity

Cutting the clouds towards Paphos,"

A.B.
 if we would arrive at the same goal in advance of such scientific expedition, or indeed ever at all. In a sense, the stream of the Time-River is shoreless : shoreless also is the Lake whence it flows, both alike being bounded and measured out of Eternity and Immensity, however variable may be the limits of the flow in Time and Space. The Eternity and Immensity are sure to remain in themselves the same unalterable, eternal Necessities. However these necessities may be regarded as two, one in respect of Time and the other in respect of Space, they nevertheless constitute but one absolute Necessity. Whether we call it Necessity or Freedom, sheer blank Possibility (with the metaphysician), or "the Empty" (with Epicurus), or the Void (with the atomists), or Infinity (with the mathematician), it will make no difference but in name ; for it is an absolute necessity of Thought, of Reason, and of Nature alike : I will even call it Oblivion. In either case, it is just what it is, and nothing else or other, namely, the sheer blank Possibility of the actual existence of the One and All of real Being or Essence,

such as it is. On this primal Necessity our other Abutment shall be planted : there it will certainly stand immovable to all eternity as upon a basis of adamant. The One and All of Real Essence shall itself be the abutment. How should it possibly fall ? or what difference could it make with it if it did fall, eternally and immensely ? In a boundless abyss of Nothingness, one place would be all the same as another to it : movement of the Whole as a Whole would be all the same to it as standing still. In truth, any such movement would be an utter impossibility. In the Oriental fable, the World stood upon the back of a Tortoise. " But what did the Tortoise stand on ? " said an astute inquirer. " On Nothing, sir, " was the reply ; and the questioner grinned, perhaps, as if he were exceedingly wise and knew better. On Nothing, truly enough : why not ? Most certainly, here is an actual universe of Something, with movement enough in it, but standing — on what conceivable else or other than absolute Nothingness, or the sheer Necessity of standing ? But what kind of an All, or whole Something, can that be which eternally stands still, and at the same time has eternal movement within it while standing ? The Standing, being universal and necessary, is an absolute truth ; the Movement, being universal and necessary, is an absolute truth ; the Freedom or Possibility, being universal and necessary, is an absolute truth ; and the Whole as such is an universal, necessary, and absolute truth : it is the Absolute, for this is the meaning of the Absolute, and it is nothing else but that. If there is to be movement in a standing All, the Freedom, the blank Possibility, is as absolutely necessary as the All itself. The Nothingness is as necessary and absolute as the real Something : Oblivion is as necessary as Thought. The two are indeed but one Whole. Universality is the Allness of the One Whole. The Movement is an active distinction of the Whole into aspects, parts, relations, and particulars in the Whole. This Unity or Wholeness of the Something and the Nothing, this abso-

N.B.
~~See~~
 Abutment

cf. 186.

N.B. | lute Universality, is the adamantine basis whereon the world is built. The movement of distinction of particulars and relativities into the limitations of Time and Space is the eternal activity or life of the Whole; it is the active dialectic of the logical Syllogism of the absolute Intelligence, and proceeds in an eternal cycle of distinction and differentiation, of unfolding, infolding, involution, and convolution of its own Essence into a world of infinite variety in the unity of the one Whole, in a continuous process of the arising and departing, the institution and cancellation (or destruction), of the relations and particulars: but this dialectic movement, being ever and always a movement of and in the Whole, never departs from the Whole, remains ever the same in itself, and is eternal and continuous in a perpetual cycle, while the relations and particulars as such are eternally arising and vanishing. This is what is meant by saying that they have no real being, no truth, in themselves: they have no independent or absolute reality as such, but only a temporary and evanescent existence. The particulars are appearances, manifestations, phenomena, but not illusions, except in so far as taken to be absolute and eternal realities which they are not. This makes out the one universal category of Universality, Speciality, Particularity, and Wholeness or Totality, or the logical Concept of the All, which Hegel defined as "the Notion," or "Absolute Idea." Here is not the place for undertaking to describe this "Notion" in all its logical aspects, or to pursue the logical dialectic through the entire evolution of the One and All into the creation of the World of Nature. Something has already been said concerning that; but here we are dealing with the matter of our Metaphysical Bridge, and endeavoring at least to sketch an outline of its method, plan, and scope.

* | Now, to come back to our first ABUTMENT, the *I think* and *I am*. There is necessity, movement in freedom under necessity, and life in reason in us. They are in us par-

How exactly the "I" steps into the "us"! Notionally, I never pondered, though he pondered the Sociology of the Consistent "I" in the "us" in mind.

tially only, not wholly: we are in them, not wholly, but partially only. We share or participate in them, but do not exhaust them: they participate in us, but are not exhausted in us. The finite soul is specialized in them into a kind of one Whole by itself considered, not as wholly severed into an absolute and independent One, but as dependent, partial, and temporary only. But the Notion, Idea, or Thought, as specialized in us, has also a certain oneness, or wholeness, by itself as such, while it continues. There is in us a certain unity of reason, life, consciousness, knowing and thinking. The categories of Reason are summed up in us into a certain synthetic unity of Apperception, Judgment, and Consciousness in the activity of that living Essence which we call the Self, the I, or the Will; for otherwise no sensation, no perception, no consciousness, no knowing, no thinking, were at all possible or conceivable for us.

The body, too, is a certain living whole with its parts, a dependent not an independent Whole; and so the brain also. The nerves of sense and motion are all centred in the brain as a whole organ, with whatever distribution into ganglions, convolutions, layers, cell-tissues, connecting fibres, interlacings, and ramifications. All begins and ends in the one Whole; when the whole dies, all perishes. Sensation, sense-perception, knowing, consciousness, thought, reside in the brain as a one whole organ. Volition, Will, proceeds from it as such whole. There are, indeed, distinct impressions, movements, actions, processes, sensations, feelings, passions, in the several parts of the structure and in the whole, which do not rise to the height of conscious knowing, reason, thought, or intelligent Will; but when they do rise to that height, it is in the one whole mind or soul only. Biological science sometimes endeavors to find the life of the animal in the disintegrate protoplasmic cells whereof the body is made up, but that does not get rid of the organic life of the body as a whole. Neither does protoplasm get back to that essential life which is the source alike of protoplasm, body, and soul.

Essential activity in Reason becomes conscious feeling, perceiving, knowing, thinking soul; for such is the very essence and nature of soul. When this rational activity rises to the height of conscious light in the human soul, and intelligence becomes clear insight in us, then we become capable of intellectually seeing and knowing that these necessities, necessary relations, and principles, which are the ground of reason and knowledge in us, are in themselves both universal and necessary, and are absolute truths; that universal activity in universal Reason must necessarily also be universal knowing and absolute Intelligence; and finally, that universal Soul is as logically certain, as absolutely true and necessary, and as much a fact, as the finite soul itself is, and so as certain as is that first certainty, the *I think and I am*, with which we started; and our knowledge is immediate and direct, if any knowledge be possible at all. There is the same necessity, in either case, both that these categories should be absolutely true and real and that they should be logically subsumed into the unity of one living whole. This unity is no mathematical point, nor mere zero, but is the Oneness of the Whole as a Whole. It is the universality of the one Whole as such, and is its Life; and this Life as universal is the Ideality of the universal Soul, and as finite it is the Ideality of the finite soul. The Ideal and the Real are one and inseparable.

§ 4. PHYSIOLOGY — THE SCIENCE OF LOGIC AND EXPERIENCE.

We learn from physiological science that the convolutions of the brain, in which it seeks to localize certain definite centres of sensation and faculty, corresponding to certain organs of sense, are intimately interconnected by fine nervous threads into one whole organ, and in such manner that an impression upon one centre or convolution is immediately felt throughout the associated tracts, but with different degrees of force in the several parts, so that there is sup-

posed to arise a certain coördination, or equilibrium of action, and a balancing or overweighing of one impression by another, followed by the consequent reflex actions and transmissions through the motory centres and nerves to the organs of motion. Dr. J. Luys traces the nerves of the special senses through as many distinct ganglions situated in the *thalami optici*, and thence to the layers of cell-tissue in the gray matter of the cortex, and thence backward through corresponding motor ganglions in the *corpus striatum* at the base of the brain, and thence to the organs of motion, establishing a continuous circuit. He imagines vaguely some "intellectualizing" function of these sensory ganglions; an "organic phosphorescence" in the nerve-cell layers serves as consciousness; a delicate protoplasmic sensibility answers for an "*in concreto* moral sense;" a sensitive "automatism" is sufficient for "Volition," and "the sensitive plexuses of the *sensorium*" are the "conceptive regions;" deliberation is a "cold maceration" of judgment; and a "synthetic" aggregation of all the parts and functions constitutes the "human personality." A considerate view of this complex, ingeniously contrived, and quite wonderful structure may very well impress a rational mind with the idea of its remarkable fitness and adaptation for the uses of a human person, if so be only that there was one seated somewhere within it, like a telegraphic operator, to work the wires and direct the operations, and he were a conscious, knowing, perceiving, imagining, remembering, judging, and reasonably intelligent person. Nor does Dr. Luys entirely dispense with such person; but his endeavor to construct him as a sheer organization of nerves, ganglions, cell-tissues, automatism, and phosphorescent gleams, seems to have a very lame conclusion, and may remind a thinking man of the celebrated feats of the Strasbourg clock, or of the famous automaton chess-player.

Dr. Bastian found that when he destroyed the convolution of Sight in the brain of a dog, the poor blind creature,

after some patient trial and training, learned how to employ his convolution of Hearing as a means of communicating with the outer world, and at length made it do tolerably well the same service as his former convolution of Sight. This would seem to show that the mind or soul of the animal was a whole something quite different from the sense-organ, or its convolution. The experiments of Professor Ferricr, however curious or confounding, tend, on the whole, to a like conclusion. While they demonstrate the extreme complexity of the instrumentation, they fail to destroy the logically synthetic unity of the soul of the operator, while he remains alive.

The brain-theory presumes to explain the phenomena of mind by the physiological action of the organs and tissues. General conceptions are supposed to be simply the more extended impressions on the organization, giving by their extent merely a definite outline of form. Particular ideas are the less extensive impressions on distinct parts, which are coördinated by connective fibres into what are called "relational perceptions." Memory is a "residuum" of impressions upon the affected tissue, stamped there as it were upon wax, or impressed on the cell-tissue as a definite habit of action after much repetition. Recollection is a subsequent shaking up of the *residua*. These residual impressions are considered as stamped upon as many distinct convolutions, or parts of convolutions, as there are sense-organs. It is not distinctly specified where or what the "Sensorium" is: sometimes a ganglion, sometimes a convolution, and sometimes, perhaps, the whole cortical layer of cell-tissues as a connected aggregation of distinct convolutions into an organic whole, seems to be spoken of as *the Sensorium*. Volition appears to be located in this cortical layer of gray matter; and its function seems to be, not that of will or choice, but that of a pair of scales, in which the various conflicting impressions, or sensations, are weighed or balanced against each other, letting the overplus of force in any

particular direction go over into the motory nerves and strands and set the proper organs in motion. Manifestly, the theory itself requires a one whole *Sensorium* upon which the several distinct senses shall deliver their impressions to be weighed, measured, and balanced against each other, so that the outward motory or reflex actions may duly follow, in obedience to the motive forces, in the chain of cause and effect, or regular sequence: otherwise utter confusion and disorder must be the result. But the whole machine is conceived to be so accurately adjusted as never to go wrong, except in case of insanity. Now, admitting such whole *sensorium*, still, how should there be any consciousness there? or, indeed, what need of any at all, if the mere instrumentation of the structure were alone sufficient to bring about all the results? And in short, how could a brain-theory of this sort explain the intellectual faculties of comparison, judgment, memory, will, or indeed explain mind or soul at all? In fact, it gives no account whatever of the mental powers, capacities, and processes, and it is utterly impossible in the nature of things that it should. Mr. Lewes's "lake" might as well be knowing and conscious of the waves and tremors on its surface. The soul that created the lake and the waves might possibly be conscious of them; but the lake itself has certainly not yet risen to that height of special knowing where the light of consciousness can be supposed to have appeared in a special form.

At the same time, this physical theory is an implied admission of the necessity of a centre of unity in a one conscious whole, if not the synthetic unity of Apperception and Judgment in the active logical Syllogism; and it furnishes some affirmatory proof of the necessary wholeness of the thinking Subject or Soul, however it may be constituted. In truth, it is a matter of direct and immediate knowledge in the finite mind, that all the mental actions, operations, and processes do proceed from the one conscious

knowing personality ; and it is a matter of logical necessity that they should.

No more does the Time-River flow out of Nothing, nor out of a mathematical point, but of a necessity out of the One and All of Essence. Truly enough, it may be said to have its head and source in a Lake, not in any little spring or single rain-drop. Springs, rain drops, vapors, and the molecules whereof they are composed, do all alike flow from one and the same fountain-head in the one Whole and All of Essence and Power. It is conceivable, indeed, that an eternal movement in the standing All may be a simple Reciprocity of Action and Reaction, a kind of perpetual oscillation that rises into local states of "stress," and again sinks into a state of rest in some temporary equilibrium of stationary balance for the time being ; or again, that the wave-motion may roll continuously and eternally on some great circle of infinite causality. Particular things may be conceived as thus rising into existence where no such things existed before, as wave follows wave on the bosom of the ocean ; but they proceed, not out of Nothing, but out of the whole Something, and they vanish, not into Nothing, but into the Something whence they came. It may be said that where the thing was before there is now, indeed, nothing other than that same Void, or the empty possibility that the thing may again be where and what it was before, or that quite another and different thing may appear and exist in its place. One may imagine himself to see in the heavenly Void two moons, each one foot in diameter and one foot apart, and he might say there is a distance of one foot between them ; but what is distance, then, but the mere blank possibility that another moon, one foot in diameter, might be put in between the two, without displacing either of them, if only there were a power capable of creating another moon and placing it there. It is perhaps conceivable that if there were a one whole ocean of simple and same substance, with an actual *Vis Viva* movement in it, a

wave might roll eternally and mechanically on some great circle of the All. But it would seem to require a great stretch of imagination to conceive how any finite thing, be it a moon or a soul, an atom or a wave, should be kept rolling, whirling, living, and being as they are, by a blind mechanical force, or a mathematical *Vis Viva* only, and without any artistically creative power.

An eternal movement in a one whole Essence, at once in freedom and on the basis of the universal and necessary, that can give limitation, determination, or law unto its own action to a definite end and purpose, is artistic, is intelligence, is life and also knowing, in the power that does it: it can be nothing else but that. All knowing is conscious: consciousness is nothing else but the fact of knowing. Conscious, intelligent activity is Will: Will is nothing else but that. And such Will must be capable *ex vi termini* of prevision, plan, art, end and aim, and election or choice. Such a power must necessarily be real and true. It must be presumed to seek the greatest good, the highest beauty, the most perfect art, that is possibly realizable. What else should it seek? To seek the contrary of these, says Proclus, "would be the characteristic of an evil demon." But of a fundamental necessity, that same adamant chain of Necessity and Fate must run through the entire order and evolution into a created world of things. Necessity is the ground and the first of all. Everything has its opposite or contrary, its positive and its negative, its good and evil, its bright and dark side. The All exists only in the relations of its parts or aspects to the Whole, and of the parts to one another. The relations are as necessary and eternal as itself. There is both Providence and Fatality in the All and in us. In short, the finite Notion leads directly and necessarily to the universal Notion, whereof it is but a reflex and partial exemplification. To demonstrate these truths is to throw the span over from one abutment to the other of our Metaphysical Bridge: this work is the proper business of the

Necessity

My
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Science of Logic. For the finite mind is capable of turning its thought inward upon the logical pathways of a searching metaphysic, and of pursuing the lines of the invisible dialectic of pure Reason, until the analytic ascent is seen to be the simple reverse of the synthetic descent, and of compassing at length a comprehensive conception of universal Mind, "the Thought which thinks itself," as Aristotle called it. And the human mind can do this, being (as Bacon said) "as a mirror or glass capable of the image of the universal World." A one and whole real Essence, in a state of eternal movement within itself, or (what is the same thing) self-moving, other than which is only the boundless nothingness of Oblivion, having in itself the internal and external constitution of the absolute logical Notion, and being an eternal and living Syllogism of synthetic Apperception and Judgment, is a necessary truth and a fact, and it is to be accepted as a first and last fact. And being active under necessities, necessary relations and laws which are in themselves constitutive of universal Intelligence, it is thereby knowing, thinking soul, and creates Nature as its thought, eternally wielding the movable on the ground of the immovable into a process of creation in a certain free, artistic manner as a "proceeding intellect" or Providence, but also absolutely under a certain Adrastic law of Necessity and Freedom, eternally creating and cancelling particular things as such, or perpetually creating the new in the destruction of the old; itself ever dwelling in eternity and immensity, without beginning, middle or end, and so infinite and absolute. Yet the whole given creation from top to bottom, from beginning to end, from the highest stage of freedom to the last degree of fixity and permanence, even to the final termination of the process, is and must be, in like manner as itself, necessarily bound in the links and degrees of that adamant chain of necessity and law by means whereof only either itself or the order of created Nature is constituted or established, and the work of crea-

tion carried on. Thus is there, of an absolute necessity, both Providence and Fate in All and Singular, in Creator and Creation. It is a knowing process, for knowing is nothing else but that, human or divine. It is a conscious process, for consciousness is nothing else but the fact of knowing, divine or human. It is a process of Will, for Will is nothing else but that in God or in us; but with the distinction that we only share and partake of the essential life and intelligence partially, being bounded off into the particular souls and bodies that we are. As when a net is let down into the sea, the water is in the net and the net is in the water, partially only, not wholly: the whole net, indeed, may be in the sea, but not in all the sea. So man is in the creation, and the creation is in man, not wholly, but partially only. We are still capable of passing over by the Bridge of that very intelligence (which, though in us but partially, is nevertheless in itself universal, and eternally one and the same) to a knowledge of the universality and reality of essential life and intelligence. And by means of a thorough scientific experience of all Nature (if science should ever get so far), we may have the evidence of all external phenomena in confirmation of our internal knowledge, and thus, in thought at least, transcend the Natural and rise to a knowledge of the height and breadth of the Supernatural.

These necessary truths (whether we call them necessities, necessary relations, principles, laws, or facts) seem to underlie all our sciences, mathematics, and theories of mind and matter. There would seem to be no other possible ground of knowledge, science, philosophy, religion, or experience either. To deny them is to abnegate all rationality, all possibility of knowledge or wisdom, and to reduce ourselves to the level of soulless material things. Even these are thoroughly bound up in those same general necessities, necessary relations, laws, or principles, and so, in some due measure and degree, participate likewise in the universal

Reason. It is only on the higher planes of organization that Nature rises again to the height of self-moving Soul in animals or men, who share the essential life and intelligence in a larger measure and a higher degree, in nearly all degrees from instinct to the largest capacities, but still partially only, not wholly.

Aristotle may be translated substantially thus: "The action of intelligence is life. God is this action; and this action hinges on itself, and his life is perfect and eternal. So that we say, God is living Being (ζῶον), perfect and eternal. Life and duration, eternal and continuous, belong to God; for this is God."¹

This of Aristotle is brief and of course vague. Nevertheless it may be said to contain the quintessence of his philosophy, which was born of Platonism. It is the germinal seed of Neoplatonism, which degenerated into Christianity. One emphatic point in it is, that activity in Reason is Life and Intelligence, and that such action or life is eternal, and is a Fact. Another emphasis is, that this action hinges on the Intelligence itself, proceeds on the basis of Intelligence as its ground (ποῦ στῶ), and reacts on that, or turns upon it as upon a hinge. It was clear to Aristotle that reaction against absolute Nothingness, or a proceeding of activity out of Nothing, was an impossibility and an utter absurdity. It was equally clear to him (as it must be to all logical thought), that the One and All of real Being must have an absolute subsistence as such, without beginning, middle, or end; that is, it subsists as such infinitely, eternally, absolutely: and that the internal and essential nature of it, the necessity, law, manner, and fact of it, must necessarily be that of living Intelligence or universal Soul, and this was God. The Hegelian philosophy is an endeavor, more perfect than that of Aristotle, Kant, Fichte, Schelling, or Cousin, however imperfect still, to give a more

¹ *Works of Aristotle*, trans. by Thomas Taylor, ii. p. 353; *Arist. Met. A. 7*, redarg. W. Christ, p. 258.

complete and exact logical statement of this same doctrine. Hegel did not claim that the doctrine was new with him: he simply professed to give a more logical, exact, and better statement of it than his predecessors had done before him. Realistic Idealism can have no other purpose or end. No philosophy which stops short of this aim can be entitled to the name of philosophy, for such is the end and aim of Philosophy itself.

§ 5. THE NOTION SOUND — FREEDOM ALSO A NECESSITY.

In respect of Necessity, Law, the active Power, Will, Self-movement, the Hegelian exposition of the Notion is somewhat vague, indistinct, and in some respects unsatisfactory, or it is at least difficult to grasp and comprehend his statement of it in a satisfactory manner; and yet his Logic would seem to involve implicitly, if not expressly, an intelligible and substantially true philosophy of the whole subject. At any rate, it has seemed to me to approach nearer to a sound and acceptable theory of the universe than any other statement hitherto known to me; and if this theory, or something like it, be not the sound and true philosophy in its main substance, then I know of none that is rationally conceivable. Sometimes his statement, on the face of it and upon a first impression, appears to be visionary, if not quite absurd; but upon a more thorough insight into his real meaning, and in view of the whole of his scheme, it comes to be intelligible, consistent, and at bottom unanswerable. His absolute Spirit seems to hover between materiality and immateriality; from some parts of his writings the reader might too hastily conclude that it was no more or other than the empty spiritual dream of the mystical Idealists: but Hegel himself will be found elsewhere strenuously and in terms denying that his Spirit is immaterial, unessential, or unreal, and insisting that it is a substantial reality, an actuality, and a necessary Truth. His "Becoming (*Werden*)" certainly has the appearance, on the face of his

statement, of a proceeding of Something out of Nothing; but that, again, he positively denies, and insists that the Something subsists in relation with the Nothing coeternally, and as the absolute unity of positive and negative: the real Essence or Something has an absolute and eternal reality of subsistence, but exists so, and not otherwise. The Nothingness may be regarded as merely the empty Possibility of the actual Something, such as it really is. As such, it may be said to be bounded out of the Nothingness, or rather bounded in the Nothingness, and so out of it, and is absolutely limited in it and distinguished from it, though standing in an absolute and inseparable relation with it. It is a standing All of real Essence, eternal and immovable as such; but at the same time an eternal movement of Becoming something other than it was before, in some part or in some respect, resides within it, and this movement is an absolute fact, and as necessary as the truth of the standing All itself as such. This movement would seem to have been conceived as a kind of reciprocal Action and Reaction in an absolute and eternal relation of Reciprocity, taking place within the whole, whereby particular states, aspects, or things (ideas), are perpetually arising out of it and returning into it (becoming and departing) in a dialectic cycle of reflection; and it is therefore and in that way an infinite Ideality on the ground of necessity and Reality, and, as such, an infinite Causality; somewhat as (if the ocean were conceived as covering the whole globe) the rolling of a wave on some great circle might be conceived as a continuous and successive positing and cancelling of the definite form of a wave in and out of the more indefinite and stationary whole ocean, and as rolling eternally. This movement as perpetual is intelligibly infinite, endless: the necessity of it is not so intelligible, nor so clear. The one whole Ocean of real Being or Essence cannot rationally be conceived as *infinite* in a spacial sense, though it can be intelligibly comprehended as the absolute Whole in a state of eternal movement or

life: the movement may be considered, not as a necessary consequence, but as a part of the absolute Fact, of such whole Reality, and as a necessity in the same sense as the All itself is a logical Necessity.

Now what is the true nature and meaning of Necessity and of Law? The terms are often confounded: in a true and proper sense they are quite different. Of Necessity, in a proper sense, it may be said that in its own nature it is unalterable, eternal, absolute: it is never anything else but Necessity. But Necessity is not all that is; it is not the only truth. Strictly as such, it can neither be made nor unmade; but it can be recognized by conscious knowing Intelligence, and can be wielded into employment and use, or not wielded, when its use or service can be dispensed with; but it can never be wholly ignored, abolished, or annihilated. The limitation of boundary which an atom or an orange has in order to be such as it is, and must necessarily have while it is such, is in itself an ultimate and absolute necessity; but there is no necessity at all that any particular atom or orange should exist, or that, once existing, it should continue to exist, with that specific boundary which it may have, or with any other, however large or small. The use that is made of the unalterable necessities in the creation of atoms or oranges may be much or little, or none at all: there is no absolute necessity that they should exist, or be created. The atom, or other thing, is indeed bound up in the necessities and necessary relations of its actual existence, in its real substance and form as such, if it is to be at all, and while it is such. That is an absolute, unalterable, indispensable necessity. No power of soul, no God, could make it otherwise. But it is quite conceivable that the essential power of absolute Soul can make atoms, or not make them, at will, wielding or not wielding the necessities into action and operation for that purpose. Atoms (if there are any), while they are such, are and must be just what they are, and can by no possibility be anything else or other than that.

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Again, if atoms or molecules are to be at all, however they may be interiorly constituted, or if other bodies are to be compounded of them, then all the consequences, external or internal, all the properties, qualities, capabilities, effects, and uses, which they in fact have by reason of the necessities of substance, form, and nature in which their actual existence as such is thus necessarily bound up, must necessarily and inevitably follow as if by a blind fatality. No conceivable power of soul, no God, could make it otherwise. An absolute will, independent of all necessity, or of all the laws and relations of reason, is an impossibility. But the power that can, in this manner, bind up things in the chains of necessity and law must also be capable of loosing them again. It is further conceivable that this same power and cause, consistently with the essence, form, relations, and necessities of the things as such, may, through instrumentalities both internal and external to such things, be capable of wielding and employing them, such as they are or may become, in the work of building up a molecule, an æther, a sun, and an infinite variety of interrelated and connected bodies or a world of identity and difference. What should hinder the construction thus of a whole starry heavens, piling atom upon atom, molecule upon molecule, or body upon body, and setting them all to whirling, oscillating, and revolving within the interstellar æther, or within the absolute All of Essence and Power, within, behind, above, and beyond the æther? But plainly, in any case, the same unalterable necessities and conditions must attend each and every form of body or combination of bodies, throughout the process, if they are to be what they are, and while they are such, and all effects and consequences that necessarily belong to their actual constitution as such must follow. No power of thought, no God, could make it otherwise. So much is certainly blind necessity and absolute fatality. Such is Necessity in its own nature and truth. The power of thinking soul may cancel its own thoughts, but not the necessities, the necessary rela-

tions, laws, and conditions, under which alone thoughts, ideas, are possible, or can exist as such. In this sense, necessity is absolutely imposed (as it were *ab exteriori*) on all possible or conceivable thinking power; or rather it must underlie it as its necessary ground, and as an essential part and presupposition of itself.

What, then, is Law? It has been well said that Law implies a lawgiver. This is the proper sense of the word. It has relation to mind, soul, person, as a power capable of prescribing a rule of action for itself or for other persons, who are capable of knowing and obeying law. It implies authority and obedience. Nothing but mind or soul is capable of either. Laws which are laws, and while they are such, and in reference to both maker and subject, authority and obedience, may be regarded as a kind of necessity. To him who must obey, they are, for the time being, a practical if not an absolute necessity; and for him, violation or disobedience must, in the nature of things (and strictly should), carry with it the necessarily resulting consequences as certainly and inevitably as the necessary consequences follow upon any contradiction to the necessities or laws of Nature. Neither laws nor necessities are, in a proper sense, active: they are operative only. They are not active powers, but are, in their own nature, obstructions, hindrances, limitations, restraints. They limit or restrain, control and guide, the action of an active power. They may become, or may be made, instrumentalities to be wielded and employed for definite uses, ends, and purposes. As thinking power and choosing cause, soul can impose law upon itself, upon its own action or conduct: it can restrain itself to a determined scope. It can establish law, and make it a necessity for the time being. Soul can be moral; nothing else can be, for the essential meaning of morality consists in obedience to self-imposed law. Laws, while they remain such, become and are a temporary necessity, and so far as they are operative as such the consequences must follow. Laws may

be changed or repealed, or they may continue at the will of the law-maker; and so also the temporary necessity that is involved in them as such. But the essential nature and truth of law, while it is law, is that of an absolute necessity; and just so of the temporary necessity itself while it lasts. In this they are not different. The real difference is, that, properly speaking, all laws and temporary necessities are made, but not all necessities; for there are necessities which are not made by any power whatever, but exist absolutely, unalterably, and eternally. This kind of necessity is truly that adamantine basis whereon the universe itself is built. It lies at the foundation of all logic, reason, intelligence, knowledge, wisdom, goodness, beauty, and truth, of mind and matter, of Science and Nature, and of all possible thought, divine or human. But Freedom is as necessary as necessity itself: without freedom, law is impossible. The Metaphysical Bridge must stand on these necessities, and throw its eternal arch over the bottomless abyss of Nothingness; and thereupon only can the finite soul travel and pass over into a knowledge of the necessary existence and reality of the universal Soul. There it will stand forever, a safe and sure pathway from mortal to immortal, as from immortal to mortal, however it may have been twisted and colored hitherto by the poetical fancy into some visionary Chinvat, Rainbow, Shadow, Snake, or Ferry, feigned as stretching between the illusory shores of a fabulous Time-River.

The belief in Necessity was strong among Oriental peoples. The ground tone of the Greek Tragedy was an inexorable Fate. The Mahometan sees in Providence itself an unalterable Destiny. Calvinistic Predestination or Foreordination was not much different. Says Euripides:—

“Wise men have said (it is no speech of mine),
There's nothing stronger, or more terrible,
Than dire Necessity.”¹

So says King Richard in the play:—

¹ Helene, 512-514.

"I am sworn brother, sweet,
To grim Necessity; and he and I
Will keep league till death."¹

But besides that Necessity which is eternal and unalterable, and to which Providence itself must be subject, there is a Necessity which may be also Providence as well as Fate for us; and there is Freedom also as well as Necessity for both the Greater and the Lesser Providence.

§ 6. AN ABSOLUTE COSMOLOGY — VERIFICATION BY EXPERIENCE.

As bearing upon the method of Philosophy itself, and at this stage of the inquiry, it must be borne in mind that the point gained so far is, that such an ontological theory makes it proper, and indeed necessary, in any outward investigation of Nature, to consider the external world of things from the standpoint of an absolute Cosmology of the whole universe, existing in fact (whatever may be its internal nature) independently of us, of our thinking about it, and of any external observation we can make of it. By the metaphysical and *à priori* mode of proceeding, we have obtained a sufficiently certain knowledge that the whole Cosmological universe must be, and is, grounded on the eternal necessities, the essential and necessary relations and categories of universal intelligence, and the eternal movement therein of the logical syllogism of the one whole standing All, and that such absolute Whole must be a real Essence and Power in the form of the Notion, moving in Freedom, and also under all those necessities, relations, and mediations which necessarily constitute it to be what may properly be called Mind or Soul, knowing and creating in an immediate and absolute manner. But this conclusion rests upon a metaphysical science of Logic, which involves an assumed validity and right use of human reason; and our whole method requires that this one-sided proceeding,

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¹ K. Richard II., v. 1.

this provisional assumption (as it might be called), should be verified by the other and external mode of proceeding, that is, by observation and experience, pursuing the methods of natural science. Not that in a true science of Logic there can be any reasonable doubt of the fundamental validity of human reason, but that the right use of it in these abstruse investigations is exceedingly difficult; and the misuse of it leads to all manner of error and misconception, ending often in a substitution of mere ideal visions of the imagination for reason itself, or for a theory of the universe.

In the methods of external science, we turn about and confront Nature itself as actually presented to the senses and the knowing intellect in ourselves. Fichte seems to have assumed that our only means of knowing anything about what the Cosmological universe is, in itself, was to be found in the purely metaphysical method of our own subjective thinking, and this seems to have led him to the doctrine of some kind of pure Being, pure Activity, or immaterial Spirit, subsisting in some mystical and wholly unintelligible manner apart from Nature, or at least as having no conceivable continuity of essence or connection with it; and so he fell off into that same gulf of spiritual Nothingness, in which nearly all supernatural orthodoxies are swallowed up and lost. As to Nature itself, seen externally, he seems to have concluded that all our minds (with whatever aid of the sciences) could do was, simply to frame in our imaginations some more or less illusory images, representations, or visionary dreams concerning it, but which could have no certainty of truth or reality beyond a certain limited amount of sensational experience and practical utility. Schopenhauer ended in the conclusion that the universe was not of the nature of Thought at all, and that the world of Nature was not a creation of any God or Intelligence whatever, but of some blind, unconscious Motion, or Force, called Will, — a kind of perpetual motion in a World-Machine, of the origin or inner nature whereof no account was or could be given;

since we could never know anything more about it than what our own subjective representations (*Vorstellungen*) could tell us, or what little our external experience might teach us, in that illusory and for the most part utterly futile manner. This Will-Motion, or Force, indeed, lay at the foundation of all Nature as also of our minds, or rather brains (for nothing like a soul other than the organic movement therein seems to have been admitted), which thereby somehow received a certain fixed "intelligible character;" but there was nothing like intelligence, consciousness, knowing, or purpose, in universal Nature, as a comprehending and governing Whole, or otherwise; though this unconscious motion (this "*blinder Drang*") embodied itself in natural things in such manner as to give to them also a certain fixed character, or thing-in-itself (*Ding an sich*), and make them what they are. And so there came to be in us, as also in them, a certain determinative *Will to live* in a world of illusions, a limited faculty of ideal representations concerning it all, and a certain witty acuteness of fallacious argumentation about a philosophy of it. But all we could ever know about Nature or the universe was only what was so given, or what we could thus learn. This would seem to be the upshot of his philosophy of universal motion, or "Will" (as he prefers to call it) "and Representation."¹ In Fichte and Schopenhauer, we have, again, the polar extremes of a spiritualistic Optimism and an atheistic Pessimism. Schopenhauer seems to have borrowed his phrase *Will to Live* (*Wille zum Leben*) from Fichte: but Fichte's will was a *will to live a holy life eternally*; Schopenhauer's (in so far as it could be called will at all) was a will not to live long, but rather to end as soon as practicable. Schopenhauer's Will, says Trendelenburg, "is a metaphor."

In Trendelenburg² we have an elaborate and able criticism

¹ *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*, von Arthur Schopenhauer, Leipzig, 1859.

² *Logische Untersuchungen*, von Adolph Trendelenburg, Leipzig, 1870, ii. 120-141.

of Schopenhauer's system, and his blind Motion or Will is shown to be, not only before any kind of Knowing, but without ground, essence, intelligence, or purpose. Trendelenburg lays the stress on the End (*Zweck*). Schopenhauer is learned and brilliant as a writer: as a logician, Trendelenburg is more exact and profound, but his logic is still, in the main, an external argumentation, rather than the internal logic of metaphysical science. Both seem to proceed from the philosophy of Kant as basis. Both alike miss the true import and real meaning of Hegel's philosophy; but Trendelenburg comes much nearer to Hegel than Schopenhauer does, and, while equally decisive against his system, is far less abusive of it. In respect of some parts of it, and especially in what relates to a science of Nature as now understood, he justly criticises and exposes some of Hegel's deficiencies. But fundamentally it is still the method of Kant. There is an external world of things; there is intelligence, conscious thought, and purpose, in us, and these are discoverable by us as actually existing in Nature also; but when it comes to the question, how they got there, then, since Kant is supposed to have demonstrated once for all that there is no inner road into an ontological science or theory of the universe (God, Nature, and Man inclusive), nothing remains for us (the poor subjective, and merely practical intelligences that we are) but to consider the external evidences, the "proofs (*Beweise*)," exhibited in Nature to our apprehension, of the existence in fact of a supreme power of thought, will, and purpose in the universe, argumentatively, or inferentially only, proceeding on the ground of an external logic of ratiocination, and with such a metaphysic as we can find in our own minds, on the foregone presupposition of the inexpugnable validity of the Kantian philosophy thereof. Trendelenburg reaches the conclusion, accordingly, that there must be, above Nature, a sovereign spiritual Omnipotence and source of motion (*Bewegung*) of some mystical and incomprehensible nature

which no logic nor metaphysic of ours can reach; and so, when the "Logical Researches" come to that subject, they simply decline (as, of course, they must) to enter upon any further investigation of it. "According to this," says Trendelenburg, "it is not given to us to unfold, with this logical necessity, that essence of God by which the Spirit (*der Geist*) may pervade finite things. All construction is only an image, a vision (*Bild*) of God out of the World [very much as Fichte got an image (*Bild*) of God out of his "Ego"]. How can it be asked, What is the nature of that unconditioned essence which reveals itself in the world so and not otherwise? All grounding of it is thereby indirect."¹ That is, it must rest on the proofs, viz., the ontological, the cosmological, the teleological, and the moral; and so these proofs receive an extended consideration. It becomes wholly an affair of the "Great Spirit (*des grossen Geistes*)," which is prefigured to the imagination as "above Time and Space," and is an "Unconditioned Unity in the process of Knowing," and "the restless motion of the Spirit reposes in the Concept (*Begriff*) of the Whole," as the "silent presupposition." "In the Absolute alone, the Relative fastens itself; in the Unconditioned, the conditioned wins firmness and signification; in God, the creation gains Unity and End." The "Unconditioned, which carries the Unity of the Whole, is what philosophical Abstraction [*i. e.* Hegel's, we may suppose] calls *the Absolute*, but the living Faith calls it God."² Here we are brought back to a "Religion-Philosophy;" and the inference is to be (it would seem) that no other is possible.

In the extreme antagonism and fierceness of this contention over the gulf of that excluded middle ground of a sound metaphysic and an absolute ontology of the universe, which Plato dimly marked out, and Aristotle imperfectly reasoned, and the Neoplatonists obscurely conceived, but which Bacon, Berkeley, and Schelling more profoundly

¹ *Log. Untersuchungen*, ii. 493.

² *Ibid.* ii. p. 461.

grasped, and Hegel and Cousin more completely expounded (however imperfectly or inadequately still), as at bottom a Realistic Idealism, but not an Idealism laid on top of a Realism, like two books on a shelf, the true science of Logic has been much neglected of late, and well-nigh ignored, in both the science and the philosophy of these later days. So powerful always is that mother of faction and contention, the fallacy of the Excluded Middle, — which of these two is it, Something or Nothing, Matter or Spirit, Optimism or Pessimism, Heaven or Hell, Abolition or Secession, God or Devil? — and you must even take your choice, for there is no other way.

In this external investigation of Nature, it is important to distinguish clearly between universal Mind and our finite minds, between that Soul where no sense-perception is at all possible, but where is only the immediate knowing of the absolute Thought itself, and those finite specialities of thinking essence and power which appear in Nature as a part of it, in whatever degree from the lowest physical endowment of sensation and perception in the lower animals up to the highest power and faculty of sense-perception, conception, imagination, memory, and rational intelligence in Man. For here the differences are no more to be lost sight of, in so far as they are different, than are the identities, in so far as identical. In this scheme of ours, the Matter of popular science is raised to the height of rational essence and power in one; the blind force of Schopenhauer to the height of intelligent cause, will, and purpose; and the "pure activity" of Fichte's "pure Being" is reduced to the solid ground and comprehensible level of such a real essence and power as can be in itself at once and in one a conscious knowing Will, carrying in itself a certain possible prevision to an end and aim, and conceivably capable of being such a universal Personality as can have a direct and immediate causal continuity with Nature itself in its inmost essence, and actually "pervade finite things," but yet as a power

above material things as such; for it is neither wholly in material Nature merely as such, nor wholly above and apart from it. Neither is it to be conceived as a blind unconscious motion, nor as an unconditioned essence, nor as a "restless motion" of "unconditioned spirit," but rather as the firm and steady power of universal intelligence as it really is and must be in its own nature and being in order to be such at all. In this theory, while the absolutely creative power is eternal and essential movement in the standing All, in both freedom and necessity, that is, in reason, and so both real and ideal in one, and is infinite in the proper sense of being without beginning, middle, or end, as such, yet all special or particular things which are evolved and created by it, or come into actual existence as such things through its action, agency, and operation, may, or indeed must and do, have a beginning, middle, and end, and are finite and temporary, according to the necessities, necessary relations, mediations, laws, plans, and purposes of the creative intelligence therein; but the eternally standing Whole must necessarily include and contain, or comprehend, both creator and creation, not as two distinct entities, but only as opposite aspects of one and the same indivisible Essentia.



